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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the position of women in Algeria and Tanzania, and 
their marginalisation and domestication. through illiteracy. 
The choice of Algeria and Tanzania was made in order to highlight the 
rationale of 'specific socialism', upheld as the official ideology in 
both countries. The rejection of Marxian 'scientific socialism', and 
the projection of an endogenous ideology are distinct features of 
'specific socialism' in these two countries. 
The thesis argues that the discourse of 'specific socialism' is 
ambiguous and has allowed for the resurgence of conservative trends 
which threaten to affect women's status as equal citizens. This is 
manifested in the adoption of regressive family laws in Algeria and 
Tanzania which endorse women's inferiority. 
The thesis demonstrates that, while high illiteracy rates among adult 
women in Algeria have maintained their marginalisation and domesticity, 
higher rates of literacy in Tanzania have not necessarily improved 
their participation record in the country's public processes. It is 
subsequently suggested that educational solutions to women's 
marginalisation should be studied in connection with the pertaining 
specific social conditions, and not taken as panaceas. 
In conclusion, it is pointed out that the position of women in society 
is a cogent catalyst in emphasizing the contingency of social change 
and the unpredictability of social behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Preliminary Questions 
When initially embarking on this comparative study of illiteracy 
amongst women in Algeria and Tanzania, the present author was often 
told that the comparison would be untenable, owing to the historical 
and socio-economic differences between the two countries. It was more 
often than not pointed out that the two nations belonged to different 
cultural entities (Arab World and Africa) and that their contemporary 
historical developments differed considerably from one another. 
Algeria's violent war of liberation (1954-1962) and Tanzania's 
piecemeal transition to Independence (1954-1961) were considered 
sufficient to question the comparison. Finally, Algeria' s relative 
wealth as an oil-producing country, and Tanzania's lack of mineral 
resources undermined any comparison. 
However, the initial interest in such a comparison was influenced by 
criteria which differ vastly from the above 'technical' objections. 
First and foremost, the present author was intrigued by the political 
and ideological discourse conveyed by the official rhetoric in both 
contexts. Indeed, there was a repeated emphasis upon a 'specific' 
brand of socialism in the Algerian and Tanzanian official formulations 
based on a leitmotive of 'authenticity' rather than contemporary 
international socialism, and a staunch rejection of Marxian 'scientific 
socialism'. 
1 Hence 'specific socialism'. This formulation is the 
present author's and not the official appellation. 
.. 1 
1 
Secondly, considering the position of women within such a discourse 
promised an interesting reappraisal of the ubiquitous debate on theory 
and practice in social research. Was the continued marginalisation and 
alienation of the majority of adult women from processes of the 
'public realm' in favour of the 'domestic realm', a result of 
contradiction between the theory and practice of the discourse, or was 
it embedded in its initial ambiguities? Posing such a question 
necessarily begs a theoretical reappraisal of the hitherto 
evolutionist and positivist tradition in social science, (at least in 
its present predominant Western form). This latter rests on a unilineal 
approach to social change, regarded as being intrinsically 
'progressive'. This entails that there is a contradiction between 
'infrastructural' and 'superstructural' change, the latter 'lagging' 
behind the former. 2 But, more importantly, it also means that there is 
no recognition of the myriad of societies and cultures and their own 
inner logics and representations of the world. Indeed, we often 
overlook the fact that the notion of 'progress' has been linked to 
specific social and historical contexts, namely those of Europe and its 
evolution through its mercantile, capitalist and imperialist periods. 
The notion of 'development' today, and its decried 'failures' in a 
variety of so-called Third World countries (ie. non-Western societies) 
is testimony to the ethnocentrism of 'progress', and its implicit 
corollaries; rationalism and secularism. 
Thirdly, the provision made for pre-colonial 'authentic' systems of 
values in the discourse of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania 
promises to draw attention to the often overlooked vitality of local 
societies and cultures, and their internal dynamics. The caution with 
2 
which women's equality has been addressed by Algeria's and Tanzania's 
'socialisms' cannot be dismissed at first hand as a 'betrayal of true 
socialist principles'. 
3 
It should instead emphasize the mechanisms of 
local responses to the dominant and sweeping process of 'modernisation' 
of institutions and norms. 
4 
Above all, the most compelling question which initiated the theme of 
the present thesis, was that of the notion of 'development' and 
'education for development' which has grown into an international 
discourse for the last thirty years. Since its inception in the late 
1950s, endless revisions of the 'philosophy of development' have had to 
be made: this has led to the 'economistic' 1960s; then the less 
ambitious and 'qualitative' oriented 1970s; and finally, the 
'monetarist' 1980s. Beyond the economic vested interests it served at a 
global level, the whole rationale of 'development' appeared dubious in 
view of the wide range of societies it purported to affect. The 
uniformity of the operation thus created a most convenient wholistic 
ensemble, that of the 'Third World', or the 'South', and addressed it 
as a mammoth deformity whereby, a myriad of societies and cultures are 
treated as social 'malformations'. 
Consequently, this work identifies a specific problem, in two 
distintive national contexts of the 'Third World', namely Algeria and 
Tanzania, in order to draw attention to the improbability of social 
evolution. 
3 
The Object of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the continuing marginalisation 
of Algerian women from major public processes, in view of the high 
rates of illiteracy among adult women (aged 10+) in Algeria ,5 
(notwithstanding a formidable expansion of the educational system, and 
an egalitarian societal programme). The investigation begged the 
following query: could illiteracy be accountable for the derisory 
participation of women in the political and social processes, and could 
literacy be solution to such a marginalisation? It would have been 
feasible to limit the study to Algeria, but Tanzania has been taken as 
a comparator in order to widen the significance of the research. 
Indeed, Tanzania springs to mind as another 'socialist' experience in 
Africa for the last twenty years, with a renowned record in the domain 
of adult literacy, especially among women, 
6 
and this despite the 
country's lack of resources. Another question was worth posing at this 
point in the preliminary comparison. Did the expansion of adult 
literacy bring about a greater economic and social participation of 
women in Tanzania? A priori the comparison of these two cases looked 
promising in breaking away from the conventional wisdom of two 
important themes: women under socialism, and the 'sanctity' of literacy 
as a social and economic promoting device, whatever the circumstances. 
However, this author would stress that primary research has been 
undertaken only in Algeria, while for Tanzania, the researches were 
limited to secondary sources. 
The position of women in Algeria's and Tanzania's societal 
programmes promises to be a useful catalyst of the ambiguities inbuilt 
in the discourse of 'specific socialism'. Rhetorically, this latter 
4 
attempts to reconcile two different patterns of normative and 
institutional egalitarianism: that of local pre-capitalist, 
pre-colonial social organisation, and the more universal ideal of 
modern socialistic organisation. Where women are addressed primarily as 
reproducers in the first, the second considers them as producers; and 
where the first holds them as 'inferior' members of the community, the 
second regards them as citizens enjoying direct allegiance to the 
state, as individuals. The individualism of modern citizenry, in 
general and its more egalitarian form in socialism is perhaps the most 
devastating antithesis of the traditional position of women as the 
invisible reproducers. 
Accordingly, the present thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the 
very discourse of 'specific socialism' has permitted the 
marginalisation of women, despite its overall positive philosophy of 
progress and egalitarianism. For the very notion of 'specificity' and 
its emphasis on 'authenticity' has provided ample grounds for the 
legitimation of conservative claims against prospects of sex equality 
contained in socialism. Thus, in analysing the condition of women's 
marginalisation, and in examining existing and tentative solutions, 
particular attention will be paid to actual social dynamics in their 
relation to the official discourse of 'specific socialism'. 
The Thesis: Structure and Content 
The thesis is divided into two parts and comprises five Chapters. The 
first part is mainly devoted to questions of a theoretical nature and 
includes a discussion of social theory in Chapter 1, and the rationale 
of 'specific socialism' in Chapter 2. The purpose is to highlight the 
5 
issue of ethnocentrism in social investigation, through a discussion of 
Marx and Weber and their respective approaches to non-European 
societies, with a special emphasis on 'Oriental's societies. The 
question is asked as to what extent they differ or converge in their 
representation of non-European social formations. A further question 
ensues as to whether dependency theory, a 'Third World' theory 
can claim to be Marxist, especially in the light of Marx's positive 
attitude to colonialism, which can be said to have a more direct 
bearing on functionalist theory and its thesis of diffusion of 
modernity. A less inductivist and positivist approach to problems 
arising from social change has been proposed by Holmes (1965,1981), 
especially in the educational field. 
8 Accordingly, a statement of the 
problem under investigation in the present thesis will be made in the 
light of the Holmesian 'problem(-solving) approach'. 
Chapter 2 examines the rhetoric of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and 
Tanzania. The claims that respectively Islam and Africaness represent 
the sources of an endogenous brand of socialism is extensively 
illustrated by official political documents, namely Algeria's societal 
blueprint, the 1976 Charte Nationale, and Nyerere's writings of the 
last twenty years. 
9 Particular attention will be given to the speeches 
of late President Boumediene of Algeria, and the recently retired 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in view of their charismatic role in the 
societal programmes of their countries. 
The second part of the thesis concentrates on the adoption and 
implementation of the societal project, with a view to demonstrating 
the contingency of social change, and consequently illustrates 
the 
6 
argument on women's continued marginalisation. It comprises the 
remaining three Chapters. 
Chapter 3 attempts to delineate the various social actors and 
political protagonists at play in the societal programme formulated and 
adopted by the dominant polity. It gives mainly a comprehensive idea of 
the process of state and nation building in Algeria and Tanzania over 
the last 25 years. In this, it puts emphasis on the social interaction 
between the official agents of change and the wider spectrum of 
recipients in civil society at large. There will be a particular 
concern for the dynamism of those on the receiving end of change, 
whereby an explanation for problematic policy implementation might be 
found. 
The two last Chapters examine the position of women per se. Chapter 4 
attempts to throw some light on the legal status of women through a 
discussion of the family laws of the two countries. However, while it 
was possible for the present author to consult the National Assembly 
debates which had led to the enactment of the Algerian Family Code in 
1984, no such arrangement could be made for Tanzania. Consequently, the 
Tanzanian data had to be taken from secondary sources. Such 
consultation promised to be useful in illuminating the prevailing. 
attitudes of the main social protagonists towards women's status and 
role in society. It will also help to illustrate the inconsistencies of 
the official discourse of equality contained in 'specific socialism', 
and the pugnacious role of traditional social actors in retaining 
tradition in the private realm of the family. Models of traditional 
kinship structures will be drawn for Algeria and Tanzania, and used as 
7 
parameters for the residual valuations of conservative social 
protagonists who oppose a change in women's domestic status. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, a comparative examination of Algeria's and 
Tanzania's educational strategies is carried out so as to assess 
women's integration through education in the modernising societal 
project. Special attention is given to the 1967 Experimental World 
Literacy Programme10 in which Algeria and Tanzania have participated. 
The different results yielded by the programme draw attention to the 
importance of local social conditions in determining policy 
formulation. On the other hand, the question of whether a Freirian11 
'education for liberation' can free women from their alienating 
domesticity is also posed, through a discussion of Freire's method of 
'conscientization' in adult literacy. Local conditions of women's 
'oppression' in Algeria and Tanzania might point in the direction of 
less millenial panacea, be they technocratic or revolutionary, 
towards more pertinent solutions, albeit imperfect. 
8 
NOTES: INTRODUCTION 
1. Friedrich Engels distinguished between the Fabian and Owenian 
versions of socialism as 'utopian', and Marx's appeal for a communistic 
millenium as 'scientific socialism'. Cf. Engels F., Socialisme 
Scientifique et Socialisme Utopique, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1971. 
See Chapter 1 for further details. 
2. Objections may be raised to the simultaneous use of Ogburn's notion 
of 'lag', and Marx's 'infrastructure' (material basis) and 
'superstructure' (ideological and legal values), but European social 
theory has by and large advanced the idea of a gap between theory and 
practice in social change. As Holmes (1981) put it, "these theorists 
assumed that change takes place first in one aspect of society and that 
problems are created because individuals or other aspects of society 
fail to respond immediately to such change". Cf. Holmes B., Comparative 
Education: Some Considerations of Method, George Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1981, p. 10. For a comprehensive discussion of European social 
theory, see, Etzioni, A. & E., Social Change, Basic Books, New York, 
1964. 
3. The thesis of betrayal of 'the true socialist ideal' (of scientific 
socialism) has been entertained by radical scholars of socialist 
experiences such as Algeria and Tanzania. See Chapter 2 for a more 
detailed discussion. 
4. 'Modernisation' is increasingly denounced as a euphemism for 
'Westernisation' by intellectuals in a number of countries. For 
9 
instance, the recent 'fundamentalist' claims which emerged from Islamic 
movements worldwide, are the expression of a world-view which takes 
pride in the comprehensiveness of a distinctive societal programme. 
Contemporary Muslim scholars have been increasingly critical of the 
Western world-view in general, and of Western epistemology in 
particular. Their main target seems to be the methods of conjecture, 
doubt, relativity and objectivity, which they argue, go counter to the 
notion of revealed knowledge in Islam. Cf. in particular "Conceptual 
Crisis in Social and Natural Sciences", in S. S. Husain, & S. A. Ashraf, 
Crisis in Muslim Education, Hodder & Stoughton, Jeddah, 1979; S. M. 
al-Naquib al-Attas, "Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge, 
and the Definition and Aims of Education", in S. M. A. al-Attas, (ed. ), 
Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, Hodder and Stoughton, 
Jeddah, 1979; I. R. al-Faruqi, "Islamizing the Social Sciences", in 
Social and Natural Sciences, edited by I. R. al-Faruqi, & A. O. Naseef, 
Hodder and Stoughton, Jeddah, 1981. Above all educational, and 
pedagogical issues seem to have been the centre of interest of Muslim 
scholars anxious to counteract Western approaches. Cf. The Islamic 
Education Series volumes edited by Syed Ali Ashraf, for King Abdulaziz 
University, Jeddah, published by Hodder and Stoughton. In addition to 
the above, titles include: Philosophy, Literature and Fine Arts; 
Curriculum and Teacher Education; Education and Society in the Muslim 
World; Muslim Education in the Modern World. 
5. Latest national estimates (1982) counted 60.8 per cent of adult 
illiterate women. See Chapter 5. 
10 
6. In ten years (1971-1981) of adult literacy campaigning, Tanzania 
reduced national illiteracy rates among women from 80 to 26 per cent. 
See Chapter 5. 
7. The term 'Oriental' has been retained in its nineteenth century use 
designating Middle Eastern (including Muslim North Africa) as well as 
Asian societies. Marx had studied the repercussions of colonialism on 
India and Algeria. While Weber concentrated on the Chinese and Islamic 
intellectual legacies, as well as India's social structure. Both were 
informed by a comparison of these with European capitalism. See 
Chapter 1. 
8. Professor Brian Holmes is a specialist in the field of Comparative 
Education at the University of London. His contribution in this 
discipline is based on the elaboration of an a-historicist method, 
aimed at stressing the contingency of social change, and the 
hypothetical nature of solutions to problems arising from change. In 
this approach, he was inspired by the American philosopher Dewey and 
his notion of 'reflective thinking' and Popper's hypothetico-deductive 
method in science, which he brought together in his ensuing 
'problem(-solving approach'. See Holmes B., Problems in Education: A 
Comparative Approach, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965. And for 
further references on the evolution of Holmes' methodology, consult his 
Comparative Education (1981). 
9. The 1976 Charte Nationale has been reviewed and extended in 1986, 
but the 1976 version is used herein. Only where alterations have been 
dramatic, has the 1986 version been mentioned. As for Tanzania, 
11 
Nyerere's main writings will be mentioned since they represent the 
country's societal blueprints. 
10. Cf. Unesco, EWLP: A Critical Assessment, The Unesco/UNDP Press, 
1976. 
11. The adjective is taken after Paulo Freire, the Brazilian adult 
education specialist, who adopted an original approach in the field of 
adult literacy, based on militant critical thinking, rather than the 
conventional 3Rs. See Chapter 5 for further details. 
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PART ONE 
THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIALIST RHETORIC 
CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.1. A First Identification of the Problem 
Formulating the problem is seemingly simple. Since Independence, the 
political regimes in Algeria and Tanzania have pledged to construct 
socialist societies, whereby, inter alia equality of the sexes is 
guaranteed as a constitutional right. 
1 However, more than a generation 
later, not only is sex equality far from being achieved, but the 
majority of adult women are relegated to the realm of domesticity by 
high rates of illiteracy. On the other hand, rather than a linear and 
progressive emancipation of women, growing resistance to this prospect 
can be detected (Chapter 3). Indeed, most striking of all is the 
de jure consecration of the inferiority of women in the family laws 
of each country, not immediately after Independence, but in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Chapter 4). How can one explicate the departure from the 
political recognition of full citizenry for women in both countries? 
The following sections of this Chapter will illustrate the dilemma 
through a discussion of conventional theories of social change, in 
relation to the problem under investigation. The theories discussed are 
those of the modernisation and dependency schools. A brief historical 
e igression into the paradigmatic precedents of each school, Weber and 
Marx respectively, will help in so far as it will illustrate the issue 
of ethnocentrism. Marx's and Weber's insight into societies other than 
Europe were not only ethnocentric but surprisingly condescending, as 
each belittled other social formations for not producing capitalism, 
and for being intrinsically incapable of doing so. Accordingly, the 
conventional 'parental' connections between dependency theory and 
13 
Marxism or at least Marx on colonialism, is questioned. In fact, the 
present author argues that dependency theory has implicitly, (and most 
probably inadvertently) broken away from classical Marxism on the role 
of colonialism, and that liberal modernisation theory has a lot more 
to share with Marx on the positivity of Westernisation than 
conventionally admitted. 
In view of the aforementioned epistemological traditions, the problem 
under investigation would be simply interpreted in one of two ways. 
Either, not enough Westernisation as assumed by modernisation theory, 
with the corollary that a subsequent formulation of the problem would 
be that women continue to be marginalised in Algeria and Tanzania 
since the pre-requisites of a developed Western society have not been 
met. These should be enforced regardless of local conditions, which are 
anyway pre-judged to be 'traditional', in the sense that they are 
static and amenable to change only under the impulse of Western 
dynamism. Or, too much Westernisation, in the sense of capitalist 
penetration, which dependency theory has denounced as a generator of 
underdevelopment rather than development. Accordingly women's 
marginalisation would be a result of the overall underdevelopment 
caused by the position of Algeria and Tanzania on the periphery of the 
world capitalist system. 
However, these formulations present the disadvantage of the inductive 
method in social investigation in that they seek to prove their 
theoretical model correct, and consequently ignore the subtleties of 
local responses to extraneous influences. By the same token, they 
bestow an aura of passivity onto the local social formations; 
14 
modernisation by considering them inherently static; dependency by 
locking them in the perpetual position of 'the oppressed'. On the 
other hand, their inherent propensity to represent social reality in 
dichotomous terms allows little room for the examination of social 
interaction, except in the sense of bestower and recipient. Last but 
not least, the obsession with the West or international capitalism as a 
central criterion for measuring social change, denies all other 
historical epochs and types of social organisation any part in the 
attainment of present social processes. 
As 'development' theories, modernisation and dependency have compressed 
the history of societies into that of capitalist expansion, thus 
pushing into oblivion all previous 'civilisational' experiences. The 
capitalist 'moment' in global history is made supreme either to 
regenerate or destroy. Hence the dubiousness of both theories of 
'development'. 
1.2. Marx and Weber Revisited Through the 'Orient': Ethnocentrism and 
Epistemological Convergence. 
The 'Oriental' analyses of Marx and Weber are important to recall 
because they constitute the substratum for present-day theories of 
social change in the 'Third World', namely modernisation and dependency 
theories. It might be objected that there can hardly be a direct 
correspondence between the 'Third World' and the 'Orient'. 
Nevertheless, a rapprochement is possible through the medium of their 
'observer', and that is by and large the European and Western 
traditions of social investigation. Given the universalistic fever 
which had inevitably marked European perception of the rest of the 
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world in the midst of a triumphant industrial imperialism, it seemed 
hard for most social observers to admit a different 'otherness' to the 
newly-conquered. Consequently, this 'otherness' had to be grasped 
within stereotyped cliches as if to help legitimise the observer's 
interference. For instance, it is quite significant that scholars as 
disparate as Marx and Weber in their respective appraisal of 
capitalism, agreed so much on its 'superiority' over other modes of 
social organisation and cultures, at the risk of taking ideological 
stances rather than scientific ones. 
Marx was particularly eager to see colonialism destroy the 
pre-capitalist social organisation of India and Algeria2 in the hope of 
regenerating them within a higher stage of historical development. Of 
the British colonisation of India, he had this to say: 
... Indian society has no history at all at 
least no 
known history. What we call its history is but the 
history of the successive intruders who founded their 
empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and 
unchanging society. The question, therefore, is not 
whether the Eng is had a right to conquer India, but 
whether we are to prefer India conquered by the Turk, by 
the Persian, the Russian, to India conquered by the 
Briton. 
England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one 
destructive, the other re-generating ---the annihilation 
of old Asiatic society, and the laying 3of the 
material foundations of Western society in Asia. 
(in McLellan, 1978: 332) 
Along the same line of argument, Friedrich Engels welcomed the French 
conquest of Algeria: 
... the conquest of 
Algeria is an important and fortunate 
fact for the progress of civilisation... if we may regret 
that the liberty of the Bedouins of the desert has been 
destroyed, we must not forget that these same Bedouins 
were a nation of robbers... the modem bourgeois, with 
civilisation, industry, order, and enlightenment 
following him, is preferable to the feudal lord or to 
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the marauding robber, with4 the barbarian state of 
society to which they belong. 
(in Gallissot & Badia, 1976: 25-26) 
Thus, non-European social formations are denied history which they 
can, nevertheless, join through the self-evident dynamism of 
colonisation. The argument of Marx and Engels on the 'civilising 
mission' of colonisation betrays an evolutionary and positivist 
approach, given that they consider capitalism as a necessary higher 
stage. 
On the other hand, Weber was particularly keen on demonstrating the 
so-called intrinsic incapacity of 'Oriental' civilisation at inducing 
capitalism in view of the rigidity of its socio-political structure: 
In the patrimonial state, the typical ramifications of 
administration and judiciary created a realm of 
unshakable sacred tradition alongside a realm of 
prerogative and favoritism. Especially sensitive to 
these political factors, industrial capitalism was 
impeded by them in its development. 
(in Tumer, 1978: 79) 
Weber's analysis of the political and economic structures of Oriental 
formations (China, India, ) as being typically patrimonial complements 
the argument of Marx and Engels as to the absence of feudalism as a 
necessary pre-requisite for a subsequent industrial capitalist 
revolution. What seems to have struck Marx and Weber was the excessive 
centralisation of administrative structures which they found to be 
totally at odds with the decentralised and autonomous fiefs of European 
feudalism. Indeed the large water works developed in India and China 
were at the root of a strong centralised political and military power, 
as well as a very large bureaucracy, which caused Marx to talk of 
'Oriental Despotism' and Weber of 'Patrimonialism'. 
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In their discovery that Oriental societies had not developed in the 
'evolutionary' fashion that Europe had done, Marx and Weber shared 
"the view that Oriental societies were socially reactionary and 
regressive" (Turner, 1978: 77). Although both had operated a sort 
of 'epistemological rupture' with positivism, Marx with his 
dialectical development, and Weber with his interpretative sociology, 
both remained overwhelmingly conditioned by the idea of the 
inevitability of progress, and the implacable rise of rational, secular 
industrial capitalism. Indeed, a unilinear construction (of society) is 
clearly implied in Marx's sequence of class struggles, as well as 
Weber's idea of rational bureaucracy5. 
Viewing the capitalistic revolution as peculiar to Europe, and as a 
higher form of social organisation, presents a curious reminiscence of 
the Comtean stages of the religious, the metaphysical and the 
scientific. Whilst the Comtean stages purport to be universal, and are 
to a certain extent oblivious of other cultures, the Marxian and 
Weberian theoretical positions seem to acknowledge the individual 
specificities of other formations, but nevertheless to lock them up in 
a perpetual irrational religious stage, from which they could be 
salvaged by European intervention. 
Marx legitimised the expansion of bourgeois capitalism as a necessary 
civilising mission: 
The bourgeoisie by the rapid improvement of all 
instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated 
means of communication, draws all, even the most 
barbarian nations into civilisation. ... It compels 
all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the 
bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to 
introduce what calls civilisation into their midst., i. e. 
to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates 
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a world after its own image. 
... Just as it (the bourgeoisie) has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and 
semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized 
ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the 
East on the West. 
(in McLellan, 1978: 225)6 
On the other hand, Weber argued that neither the ethical nor the 
social economic prerequisites of capitalism could be found in the 
'Orient' in view of the contemplative nature of its religious sects, 
and their lack of asceticism: 
The Occidental sects of the religious virtuosos have 
fermented the methodical rationalization of conduct, 
including economic conduct. These sects have not 
constituted valves for the longing to escape from the 
senselessness of work in this world, as did the Asiatic 
communities of the ecstatics: contemplative, orgiastic 
or apathetic. 
(in Gerth & Wright Mills, 1977: 291) 
The purpose of evoking Marx's and Weber's views of non-European social 
formations is to draw attention to the astonishing convergence of 
hitherto fundamentally different theories of social change. How is it 
that Marx's 'historical materialism' and Weber's 'interpretative' 
method could agree so much on the verdict of stagnation and rigidity 
ascribed to other social formations worldwide? The answer lies in what 
Igor Kopytoff has called the "social mythology of the observer's 
culture", which: 
consist(s) of the assumptions and myths about his own 
society and, by projection, about society in general. 
(in Friedland & Rosberg, 1964: 54) 
Accordingly, Marx and Weber lived a 'social mythology' heavily 
permeated by the triumph of capitalism and a sprawling 
imperialism 
which shaped their view of the superiority of 
industrial capitalist 
organisation, whose rationalism becomes a matter of ethnic and cultural 
peculiarity. 
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In his eagerness to see the world hasten its pace towards the 
communistic millenium, Marx attributed to the 'bourgeois epoch' a 
unique revolutionizing effect whose expansion was not only desirable 
but perfectly legitimate: 
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most 
revolutionary part. 
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has 
put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic 
relations. ... It has drowned the most heavenly ecstacies 
of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of 
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of 
egotistical calculation. 
(in McLellan, 1978: 223) 
Marx's admiration for the revolutionary task of the bourgeoisie, which 
he evidently saw as an objective historical process, had led him to 
welcome with enthusiasm the colonial and imperialist stages of 
capitalism. This position ironically brings him closer to structural 
-functionalist and modernisation theories than to dependency theory, 
as we shall see below. 
Marx's experience of capitalism in Europe led him to project an 
equivalent process for all societies at large, and thence consider that 
capitalistic expansion was desirable and necessary for future 
advancement in all social formations. His description of the role of 
the bourgeoisie worldwide was clearly positivist: 
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the 
world-market given a cosmopolitan character to 
production and consumption in every country. To the 
great chagrin of Reactionists it has drawn from under 
the feet of industry the national ground on which it 
stood. All old-established national industries have been 
destroyed or are daily being destroyed. ... In place of the old local and national seclusion and 
self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as 
in material, so also in intellectual production. The 
intellectual creations of individual nations become 
common property. National one-sidedness and 
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narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there 
arises a world literature. 
(ibid : 224-5) 
Marx's description of a potential world culture is almost idyllic. This 
champion of 'dialectical' change seemed to have exchanged the very 
principle of exploitation upon which his whole theoretical edifice 
stands, for a conciliatory vision, whereby uniformity is attained, and 
the contradictions of domination forsaken. 
Indeed, it would seem that Marx's sweeping inductions on the 
uniformisation of capitalism worldwide had cast aside all reference to 
local and national contexts as living entities with their own social 
dynamic. Notwithstanding the elaboration of the concept of the Asiatic 
Mode of Production which helped establish that feudalism was not a 
universal pre-capitalist feature of all societies, Marx somewhat 
ignored his own findings and those of Engels and pressed on with the 
idea of a necessary colonialist intervention as a higher stage for the 
"barbarian and semi-barbarian" societies. In fact, Marx was true to the 
nineteenth century European social thought and its predominantly 
inductivist approach. With regard to the approach of other societies 
and cultures, no better than the notion of 'Orient' illustrates the 
stereotypical entities created by this thought, which Marx enjoined: 
We are immediately brought back to the realization that 
Orientalists, like many other early nineteenth-century 
thinkers, conceive of humanity either in large 
collective terms or in abstract generalities. 
Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of 
discussing individuals. ... Similarly, the age-old 
distinction between "Europe" and "Asia" or "Occident" 
and "Orient" herds beneath very wide labels every 
possible variety of human plurality, reducing it in the 
process to one or two terminal collective abstractions. 
Marx is no exception. The collective Orient was easier 
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for him to use in illustration of a theory than 
existential human identities. 
(Said, 1978: 154-155) 
It seems that the same tradition of broad categorisation is being 
perpetuated in the twentieth century, despite the 'relativist 
revolution'. It could be found in the huge ensemble of the 'Third 
World', which is to modernisation and dependency theorists what the 
'Orient' was to Orientalists. 
1.3. Modernisation and Dependency Theories Reappraised: the False Heirs 
of Weber and Marx 
In their treatment of capitalism and Asiatic societies, Marx and Weber 
may be considered as the respective pioneers of contemporary theories 
of dependency and modernisation. Indeed, at first sight Weber's 
interpretative sociology and his emphasis on meaning rather than 
causality as well as his insistence on the contingent character of 
major processes of changed directly places him in line with the 
principles of adaptability and structural autonomy of social systems as 
claimed by Parsons8. On the other hand, Marx's historical materialism 
based on the dialectical evolution of society (with class struggle as 
the propellor of change), has admittedly influenced dependency 
theorists in their endeavour to analyse the causes of 
'underdevelopment'. Hence the heavy emphasis on causality and 
domination within an international, rather than an autonomous national 
context. 
However, there is reason to believe that such unilineal correlations 
are ill-founded. Indeed, the developments of dependency and 
modernisation theories will help gauge the extent to which Marxian and 
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Weberian methodologies have been used in the most ad hoc manner. On the 
other hand, it will be shown that the 'epistemological convergence' 
between Marx and Weber is again to be found between Marx and 
modernisation theorists, namely in their advocating 'Westernisation' in 
lieu of modernisation. 
1.3.1. The Two Wings of Dependency: The Search for Independence 
The development theory of dependency was first launched by the 
economists of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the 
mid-sixties. In their endeavour to explicate the persistence of 
economic underdevelopment in Latin America following World War II, the 
ECLA group sought it in the international position of Latin America 
vis ä vis North American and European capital, rather than in a class 
struggle either intra-nationally or internationally. Their overall 
argument is that the expansion of capitalism created a structure of 
dependence and not of integration of the Latin American economies. Dos 
Santos summarizes it as follows: 
Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the 
economies of one group of countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others. A relationship 
of interdependence between two or more economies or 
between such economies and the world trading system 
becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can 
expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a 
dependent position, can only expand as a reflection 
of the expansion of the dominant countries... . (in Oxaal et al., 1975: 12) 
The position of dependence is understood to be that of an export 
economy which tends to preclude autonomous industrialisation and 
manufacturisation. Structures are put at fault rather than the 
bourgeoisie. The structural nature of dependence and underdevelopment 
is described explicitely by Sunkel: 
23 
An analytical scheme appropriate for the study of 
underdevelopment and for the formulation of strategies 
of development should be based on the concepts of 
process, structure, and system. It is illegitimate to 
argue that underdevelopment is a stage in the evolution 
of a society both autonomous and economically, 
culturally and politically isolated. On the contrary we 
postulate that development and underdevelopment are the 
two faces of the same universal process. . . and that its geographic expression is translated into two great 
polarizations: on the one hand the polarization of the 
world between industrial, advanced, developed, and 
metropolitan countries and underdeveloped, backward, 
poor, peripheral and dependent countries; and on the 
other hand, a polarization within countries in terms of 
space, backward, primitive, marginal, and dependent 
groups. 
(Ibid: 14) 
There are no traces of Marxian analysis in Sunkel's view of 
underdevelopment and dependence. However, whilst this reformist trend 
of dependency theory is clearly non-Marxian in its methodology and 
outwardly non-Marxist in its political stance, the same could not be 
said, at least immediately, of the more radical outspoken trend of the 
'delinkers'. 9 The delinkers amongst dependency theorists sought to 
enlarge the findings of the early school to other parts of the Third 
World by demonstrating that underdelopment was actively provoked by 
capitalist expansion. In this, they not only broke away with the 
founders of dependencia, but also with orthodox Marxism. 
Underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic 
institutions and the existence of capital shortage in 
regions that have remained isolated from the stream of 
world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and 
is still generated by the very same historical process 
which also generated economic development: the 
development of capitalism itself. 
(Frank, 1969: 9) 
The process of underdevelopment is alleged to have started in the 
early days of European mercantilism, especially in Latin-America, and 
then developed and was further reinforced under colonialism and 
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imperialism up to the present era which is seen as neo-colonial and 
imperialist. The plunder of the conquered societies, which Marx 
welcomed as the 'seed' of bourgeois capitalist revolution in the world, 
has been denounced by radical dependency theorists as provoking and 
maintaining an archaic and feudal social economic organisation in the 
conquered areas. Thus, backwardness, archaism and feudalism were not 
characteristics which caused underdevelopment, but were themselves 
caused by capitalism in its colonial and imperialist phase. To put it 
in the imagery of A. G. Frank, the leading theoretician of radical 
dependency, underdeveloped areas are "capitalist castles with a feudal 
facade", where capitalism did not bring about the expected bourgeois 
revolution in view of the "satellite" position of the dependent society 
vis A vis the long-established capitalist "metropole". Hence, the 
following hypotheses: 
1. in contrast to the development of the world 
metropolis, the development of the national and other 
subordinate metropoles is limited by their satellite 
status; 
2. the satellites experience their greatest economic 
development and their most classically capitalist 
development if and when their ties to their metropolis 
are weakest; 
3. the regions which are the most underdeveloped and 
feudal-seeming today are those which had the closest 
ties to the metropolis in the past. 
(Frank, 1969: 9-14) 
In view of these hypotheses, radical dependency theorists have 
prescribed 'delinking' between the metropolis and the satellite as the 
only way for the latter to develop. They have clearly rejected the 
positivism of Marx with regard to the 'colonial question' by 
establishing a new dialectic between exploiter and exploited. One notes 
for instance the absence of a class analysis in favour of an 
international market analysis. Instead of the Marxian positive 
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consequence of the dialectical relation ultimately in favour of the 
exploited, they put forward a 'negative' dialectic. Accordingly, the 
exploited can only be freed by the voluntarist action of 'delinking' 
(rather than through the objective development of the forces of 
production and the presumed withering of capitalism, as in Marx). Most 
important of all to the present study is that Marx never sought the 
independence of the colonised and would not today advise that of the 
satellite. Instead, we should remember his euphoric pleas for colonial 
penetration onto formations whom he considered out of the stream of 
history. Marx's position is in fact astonishingly close to that of 
modernisation theory usually ascribed to the structural-functionalist 
school. This is often ignored by radical dependency theorists. For 
instance, in his scathing criticism of Rostow's 'historical stage 
approach'10, Frank said: 
It is explicit in Rostow that underdevelopment is the 
original stage of what are supposedly traditional 
societies -that there are no stages prior to the present 
stage of underdevelopment. ... But all this is quite 
contrary to fact. This entire approach to economic 
development and cultural change attributes history to 
the developed countries but denies all history to the 
underdeveloped ones. 
(Frank, 1969: 18) 
Ironically, in using 'historical materialism', Marx had explicitly 
denied history to the colonies of Britain and France, and 
enthusiastically called for their Westernisation so that they 'enter 
history' as it were. 
On the other hand, despite its valuable contribution in depicting the 
dynamics of underdevelopment, radical dependency theory, especially 
Frank's analysis, fails to "recognise and deal appropriately with the 
role played by internal factors in the process of underdevelopment, 
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[making] it very difficult, if not impossible, to devise and formulate 
more appropriate and effective policy measures for the eradication of 
the problems with which the underdeveloped countries are beset" 
(Manghezi, 1976: 30). 
In other words, dependency analysts can also be blamed for placing 
underdeveloped societies on the margin of history by ignoring the 
dynamics of their internal social structure and the weight of their 
cultural heritage. Notwithstanding their condemnation of capitalism as 
a destructive agent, dependency scholars have by the same token 
elevated it as the principle landmark in the history of pre-capitalist 
societies worldwide. 
1.3.2. Modernisation Theory: Unsuspected Heir of Marx's Ethnocentrism 
Establishing a linkage between modernisation theory and Marx could be a 
farfetched endeavour should one venture to suggest that their approach 
to social investigation presents similarities. Indeed, the historical 
premises of the Marxian method, and the avowedly a-historical approach 
of modernisation and its underlying structural functionalism are a 
sufficient and potent difference. Suffice it to compare Marx's outlook 
of social evolution with that of the American tenor of structural 
functionalsim Talcott Parsons. For Marx: 
The history of all hitherto society is the history of 
class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and 
plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in 
a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant 
opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, 
now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended 
either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at 
large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. 
(in McLellan, 1978: 222) 
A continuum of social change is embedded in this passage, and an 
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historical unfolding of successive epochs seems to constitute a central 
feature of social evolution, thus denoting Marx's holism. This holism 
is exactly what Parsons rejects. For him: 
Structural analysis must take some priority over the 
analysis of process and change. '... One need not develop 
a truly advanced analysis of the main processes of 
social change in order to make general claims about the 
structural patterning of evolutionary theory. 
(in Hoogvelt, 1981: 50) 
The declared a-historicity of Parsons' approach led him to consider 
society as a system of structures functionally linked to each other in 
a 'compatible' rather than 'causative' manner. Hence a harmonious 
evolution of society, which is presumably endowed with a "general 
adaptive capacity"11, whereby "social differenciation" is complemented 
by "integration" rather than settled through conflict. In view of the 
precedence given to the parts rather than the whole(as in Marx), social 
evolution occurs by "diffusion" rather than domination or exploitation. 
The principle of "diffusion" as the process of transmission of social 
and cultural patterns is important to retain as it becomes the focal 
point of modernisation theory whereby the attributes of modern society 
are "diffused" from societies at a higher evolutionary level to 
societies at a lower one. 
Notwithstanding the huge divide between Marxian social theory and that 
of structural-functionalism, the principle of "diffusion' remains a 
significant reminder of Marx's view of the missionary role of the 
bourgeoisie as a 'di ffuser' of a world civilisation, that is of a 
Western one. This is precisely what the proponents of modernisation 
theory have strived to enforce in the wake of the decolonisation 
process in the late 1950s and early 1960s, albeit without mention of 
the role of capitalist expansion. Instead, a dual view of the world was 
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created; modern and traditional societies; with only the second 
needing to change by acquiring the attributes of the first. Parsons 
provided the methodology to distinguish between the two by establishing 
indices of "modernity" and "tradition". He called his indices "Pattern 
Variables". The pairing structure of these patterns is supposed to 
inform us on how a multitude of individuals are supposed to think and 
behave. C. S. Whitaker interpreted Parsons' dichotomies in the following 
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way: 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Context of Action Tendency of Tendency of 
Traditional Society Modem Society 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Orientation toward Prescription Irrovation 
established socio- 
political institutions, 
rules, arrangements 
Criteria of role 
recruitment and 
allocation 
Ascription Achievement 
Criteria of distrib- 
ution and rewards 
Quality of official 
relationships 
Sanction of authority 
Privilege and Performance, skill, 
status contribution to 
objective goals 
Diffuse functions, Specific functions, 
personal loyalty impersonal loyalty 
Divine, sacred Secular 
Criteria of membership Particularistic Univeralistic 
and participation 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Modernisation theory has adopted this dichotomous vision as the basis 
of development programmes worldwide whereby all non-industrialised, 
non-Western societies are 'invited' to become 'modern'. 
Enthusiasts 
have suggested that to be modernised is in effect to 
be Westernised: 13 
Development will come about only when traditional 
societies are acculturated by the West - through 
diffusion of knowledge, skills, values, organisation, 
technology and capital - until over time its society, 
culture, and personnel become variants of that which 
has 
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made the North Atlantic Community economically 
successful. 
(in Manghezi, 1976: 20) 
We should remember that acculturation by the West had been advocated 
nearly a century ago by none other than Marx when he referred to the 
"laying of the material foundations of Western Society in Asia". 
Modernisation theory has been criticised for using the Weberian 
'idealtype' or logical construct by radical dependency theorists 
(Frank, 1969) as well as liberal thinkers such as Whitaker who was led 
to the conclusion that: 
... The notion of modernisation has involved the 
conceptualisation of mutually exclusive classes of 
societies in terms of certain analytical categories, 
logical constructs, or what Weber called 'ideal-types' - 
all these being terms for logically alternative 
principles which the behaviour of people in modern and 
traditional societies respectively suggests to the mind 
of an observer. Thus Weber and others all 
characteristically insist that 'ideal-types' or 
principles of action they formulated, like all 
analytical categories or heuristic devices or logical 
constructs, are not the same thing as reality itself 
-ie. the actual behaviour of the people concerned. These 
principles of action supposedly do not, in other words, 
predict what, in fact, a given people do or will do. 
Rather, they constitute observations which the mind 
derives from observing behaviour in an effort to 
understand its implications. Rather, they constitute 
observations which the mind derives from observing 
behaviour in an effort to understand its implications. 
(Whitaker, 1970: 8-9) 
However, it is argued in the present thesis that modernisation theory 
has resorted to the device of the 'ideal-type', at least in its 
Weberian conception, in a travestied manner. As we shall see in the 
following pages, Weber did not use or intend to use 'logical 
constructs' in finite dichotomous terms such as modernity versus 
traditionality. Neither in his constructs of 'traditional and rational 
authority', did he imply any value-judgement by erecting the 
latter as 
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a better state. Each construct is established in its own right and not 
to exclude the other. Whereas modernisation theory uses modernity and 
tradition as a finite set of ideal-types, which are not only exclusive 
of one another, but imply that the traditional is to be superseded by 
the modern. Hence the birth of the whole conceptualisation of 
'development' as the process by virtue of which traditional societies 
will acquire attributes of modern societies. Since the 'inception' of 
the concept in the 'Third-World' thirty years ago, the evolution of 
social processes has been as manifold as the societies and cultures 
which constitute the 'Third-World', thus refuting the uniformity of 
'development' theorising, be it of the left or the right. Hoogvelt made 
a pertinent remark about modernisation theory, which could be extended 
to dependency theory. He concluded that: 
... the formal subject of modernisation theories 
has 
never been social change in general, but rather the 
processes of social change whereby less developed 
societies become more developed. In other words, 
modernisation theories have always had a teleological 
concern with social change. 
(Hoogvelt, 1981: 53) 
Hence the misuse of 'ideal typical constructs' into value-ridden 
stereotypes. 
In the light of modernisation and dependency theories, the problem 
under investigation in the present thesis would be construed in a 
somewhat tautological manner as suggested earlier in this Chapter. 
Whilst the 'modernists' would blame traditional social organisation 
alone for the continued marginalisation of women, the champions of 
'dependency' would incriminate the satellite position of Algeria and 
Tanzania in the world economy. Accordingly, solutions to the problem 
are thus predictable: establish close links with the West so as to 
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emulate it as in modernisation; or cut ties with 
metropoles by 'delinking' as in dependency. 
Western capitalist 
Parsons has for instance advocated a Westernisation of the elites of 
'underdeveloped areas' 
14 
through: 
... The building up, under the 'umbrella' of government, 
of a strong highly educated and ... technically trained class of people whose primary social status is bound up 
with occupational careers of the modern type and who thus come to be dissociated from any traditional elite 
ýgrowus 
in their society. It must in some sense be a functional equivalent of the Western 'middle class'. 
(Parsons, 1960: 127) 
The 'dissociation from traditional elite groups' is precisely what has 
not happened after thirty years or so of such remedy in most 
'underdeveloped areas'. On the contrary, 'traditional' elites in 
Algeria and Tanzania have a significant influence on the new 'modern 
Western elite' as will be shown through the position of women. On the 
other hand, to suggest that members of the Westernised elite themselves 
will be automatically and mechanically alienated from the traditional 
one is a completely unfounded assumption. If anything it betrays a 
mechanistic determinist approach which has greatly underestimated the 
dynamics of local social forces in each particular national context of 
the 'Third World'. And this is what has been omitted from both 
modernisation and dependency theories: 
Indeed, the fever of historical developments seems to 
have gripped so many minds that decades have been spent 
in articulating trans-historical laws and documenting 
evolutionary universals, stages, and trends, instead of 
focusing on a discrete range of phenomena to discover 
the scope, the tempo and the rate of change of specific 
societies. (Hermassi, 1975: 3) 
The continued marginalisation of women in Algeria and Tanzania, despite 
the promise of egalitarianism of the official socialist discourse, 
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therefore calls for a less inductivist and positivist analysis than 
that provided by modernisation and dependency theories. 
1.4. A Second Identification of the Problem 
1.4.1. Holmes' 'Problem(solving) Approach'15 
The appeal of Holmes' approach lies in the rigorous grasp of the 
'social problem', when he suggests that the latter arises as a 
consequence of 'asynchronous change': 
... for the purpose of analysis it may be assumed that a 
change (or innovation) can occur in any societal aspect 
and the task of intellectualisation involves identifying 
both the change and relevant (and perhaps relative) 
no-change. 
(Holmes, 1975: 89) 
The 'change/no-change' notion helps single out the 'asynchrony' and 
thus formulate what was a broad social issue into a 'problem'. The 
advantage of such 'intellectualisation' lies precisely in the 'focusing 
on discreet phenomena' of social change, and consequently promises to 
break away from 'historicist' interpretations such as those of 
dependency or modernisation. Social change is not necessarily seen as 
inevitable or occurring in a given direction, but rather may be 
contingent. On the other hand, the outcome of change is not 'determined 
by universal laws of social development' but by specific social 
conditions. Ample room is thus given to the dynamics of local social 
forces in contexts involving extraneous agents of change such as 
colonialism, imperialism or neo-colonial development (such as 
post-independence nation-building). However, the changes examined in 
Algeria and Tanzania in the present study present an interesting 
combination of contemporary as well as historical exogenous factors of 
social change, overlooked by dependency and modernisation theories in 
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view of their obsession with the capitalist Western 'moment' in global 
history. 
It is important to point out that the Holmesian methodology is not a 
theory of social change, as it is primarily concerned with educational 
issues. However, Holmes is careful to distinguish between issues 
related to education, and problem-identification in terms of a problem 
approach analysis of change/no-change in the political, economic, 
social and cultural sectors. 
Holmes suggests that change may occur in any part of the 
'institutional, normative or environmental' patterns of society and 
that several changes are likely to happen. He also points out that 
"problem-analysis demands that no-change be identified in relation to 
change" and adds that "for this purpose, it is useful to assume that a 
particular innovation has been introduced into a static social context" 
(Holmes, 1975: 89). At this point, it is important to draw a 
distinction between the instrumentality of the notion of the 'static 
social context' and the inductivism of the notion of the 'static 
traditional society' imprinted upon all non-industrial social 
formations by modernisation theory. It seems that the Holmesian 'static 
social context' is methodologically expedient, and once the 
asynchronous change is identified, one has to take into account the 
dynamics of the 'innovated recipient'. Whereas modernisation 
methodology takes 'statism' as an intrinsic feature of the object of 
innovation, (ie. traditional society). 
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The distinction is of some significance for the present investigation 
as the processes of nation-building undertaken in Algeria and Tanzania 
suggest the introduction of a comprehensive innovation; that of 
national re-construction following decolonisation, and socialist 
construction as a societal programme; by national political elites. 
The 'static social context' is roughly that of a neo-colonial 
socio-economic structure; ie. a poor industrial and manufacturing 
infrastructure, widespread illiteracy, and a scant written and literary 
culture. 
Following the Holmesian analysis, the innovations which have been 
taking place since the early 1960s in Algeria and Tanzania have 
involved a whole process of policy 'formulation, adoption and 
implementation' which is far from uniform. Normative changes, which 
obviously inform policy formulation and adoption, do not necessarily 
"imply that new... values have been successfully allocated or adopted 
widely" (Holmes, 1975: 91). On the other hand, institutional change 
"may necessitate behavioural change" so that institutions are run 
efficiently. However, behavioural change remains controversial as it 
"does not necessarily follow normative or institutional innovation". 
Its difficulty lies in its delineation, given that behaviour implies 
residual beliefs, or what Mallinson (1957) has called "deeply held 
sentiments", and Myrdal "lower valuations" (Holmes, 1975: 91). The 
notions of 'residues', 'deeply held sentiments', or 'lower valuations', 
can be a valuable asset since they promise to help apprehend the 
so-called 'resisting, traditonal'social actors. Holmes suggests that 
"some understanding of the success (or failure) of the political 
process of allocating new or modified values may be gained by comparing 
35 
normative, institutional and behavioural changes" (Holmes, ibid : 91). 
In Algeria and Tanzania, the innovations have mainly concerned the 
normative pattern with the formulation of 'specific socialism' as the 
official ideology, and the institutional one with the creation of a 
variety of economic, social and cultural structures. Education in both 
cases has attracted particular attention as a socialisation process in 
the allocation of new values. These have by and large been informed by 
the models of 'individual, society and knowledge' broadly designed in 
the official ideological rhetoric of Algeria and Tanzania. The models 
roughly provide for a centralised socialist organisation of society 
(predominance of state-run economic, social and cultural institutions); 
a socialistic and community-minded individual (as opposed to 
capitalistic individualism); and modern technologically oriented 
knowledge. The underlying assumption of the innovations contained in 
these models is that both male and female individuals are considered 
equal as they are granted the same constitutional rights as citizens of 
the state to which they owe allegiance. For the bulk of the population 
in Algeria and Tanzania, this was probably one of the most 
revolutionary innovations of all, as a great majority of people are 
still informed by models of individual, society and knowledge which, by 
an large, consecrate two different social statuses to men and women. 
More detailed accounts of these will be given later. Suffice it to note 
at the moment that women's status is still largely determined 
by their 
predominant domestic role of procreators, rather than 
by their 
productive role emphasized by the new values. 
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1.4.2. Weber's 'Ideal-type' versus Modernisation's 'Ideal-reality'. 
In proposing to draw models of 'individual, society and knowledge', 
Holmes relied on Weber's 'ideal-type' or 'logical construct'. Given the 
controversial use of the device by modernisation theory in the dual 
patterns of the 'traditional' and 'modern' society, it is worth trying 
to distance the Weberian conception of the ideal-type from that of 
modernisation. Indeed, the latter postulates characteristics of 
traditionality and modernity, and proceeds to capture an awesome 
variety of societies in them. Weber's construct on the other hand seems 
more flexible and even more ad hoc: 
The theoretically constructed types of conflicting 'life 
orders' are merely intended to show that at certain 
points, such and such internal conflicts are possible 
and 'adequate'. ... Such constructions make it possible' 
to determine the typological locus of a historical 
phenomenon. They enable us to see if, in particular 
traits or in their total character, the phenomena 
approximate one of our constructions: to determine the 
degree of approximation of the historical phenomenon to 
the theoretically constructed type. To this extent, the 
construction is merely a technical aid which facilitates 
a more lucid arrangement and terminology. 
(in Gerth & Wright Mills, 1977: 323-4) 
Thus Weber's 'ideal-type' was meant to refer to a rational and logical 
construction, which does not render reality, but instead helps to 
simplify and classify it. Gerth and Wright Mills adequately pointed out 
that Weber: 
... felt that social scientists 
had the choice of using 
logically controlled and unambiguous conceptions, which 
are thus more removed from historical reality, or of 
using less precise concepts, which are more closely 
geared to the empirical world. Weber's interest in 
worlwide comparisons led him to consider extreme and 
pure cases. These cases became 'crucial instances' and 
controlled the level of abstraction that he used in 
connection with any particular problem. (ibid: 59) 
The degree of abstraction recommended by Weber does not seem to have 
been attained in modernisation theory which takes 'modernity' and 
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'traditionality' to be 'realities' of two kinds of societies. 
Furthermore, modernity is so heavily permeated with the attributes of 
Western society that it becomes the 'ideal reality' envisaged by 
'traditional societies'. 
Another major drawback of ideal-types is the tendency to misuse them as 
cliches: 
There is a danger that they may be used to stereotype 
individuals and ascribe to all of them the same 
personality traits and behavioural characteristics. 
(Holmes, 1981: 112) 
Holmes also points out the danger that 'ideal-types' will be taken to 
correspond to reality, when they clearly do not, and should not, given 
the complexity of reality. Nevertheless, they remain: 
necessary if we are to compare extremely complex 
situations, analyse certain problems and in particular 
if we are to compare the aims, hopes, expectations and 
attitudes of individuals and organised groups in 
different societies. It may be assumed that they 
simplify some constituents of national character but 
they should not be used to stereotype the behaviour of 
citizens of a nation-state. 
(ibid.: 112) 
The Parsonian dual 'pattern variables' of 'tradition' and 'modernity' 
seem to stereotype behaviour through the dichotomous pairs of 
'prescription vs. innovation; ascription vs. achievement; diffuseness 
vs. specificity; particularism vs. universalism'. Consequently they 
imply stereotypical psychological dispositions and traits of all 
individuals of the 'modem' or 'traditional' society'. 
In this thesis, the ready-made set of 'tradition vs. modernity' is 
rejected. Instead 'ideal-types' are made 
'context-specific' and are 
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largely related to the problem under investigation as advised by 
Holmes (ibid: 121-122). 16 Indeed, in order to comprehend the continued 
marginalisation of women in Algeria and Tanzania (partly in relation 
to illiteracy given that in both countries social mobility is more and 
more determined by educational attainment), an ideal typical normative 
model of the discourse of 'specific socialism' should be drawn. The 
purpose of the exercise is to work out likely inconsistencies inbuilt 
in the discourse, as well as "examine national policies to see how far 
they are consistent with the most general normative statements and 
normative laws" (ibid: 118). 
However, the discourse of 'specific socialism' rests on more general 
normative statements. The documents reviewed in this thesis disclose an 
eclectic discourse based on universal tenants of Fabian socialism; or 
what Engels called 'utopian socialism'; and more local philosophical 
and religious traditions (Islam in Algeria and tribal communitarianism 
in Tanzania). Thus, from the 'actual pattern' of specific socialism as 
contained in official contemporary rhetoric, we should delve into the 
more 'pure types' of socialist philosophy on the one hand, and local 
traditional philosophies on the other hand. 
17 Their respective views of 
'individual, society and knowledge' might help us analyse points of 
incongruity which have given rise to the problem of women's 
marginalisation, and anticipate future outcomes of policy solutions. On 
the other hand, in the instances of Algeria and Tanzania the 
constitutional and legislative translations of the societal programme 
of 'specific socialism' constitute important elements of change. They 
have however, unleashed the response of a variety of social actors in 
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the process of formulation, adoption and implementation. As Holmes 
stated: 
Agreement on aims and policies established in 
legislation and an overt willingness of individuals to 
work towards their achievement do not guarantee that 
appropriate institutions are established or that the 
psychological traits of individuals will ensure that 
whatever institution is set up will be run in a way that 
will ensure that the aims of policy are achieved. 
(ibid : 129) 
However, in Algeria and Tanzania, to the difficulty of the gaps between 
policy adoption and policy implementation, is added the fluctuating 
legitimacy of policy formulation, masked by an aura of political 
unanimity. Indeed, behind the facade of the one-party state and the 
decision-making process, lie unsuspected and thriving conflicts between 
different social protagonists of change and no-change. In order to 
identify them, logical constructs have been resorted to for two main 
reasons: firstly, in order to avoid entering into the endless debate on 
whether there are social classes in the Marxian sense in non-capitalist 
social formations such as Algeria and Tanzania, 
and, 
secondly, so as to 
elaborate 'context-specific' social categorisations more likely to 
correspond to the local social dynamics. Such constructs will be 
largely inspired from Germaine Tillion's study of women's social 
position in the societies of the Mediterranean basin. 
19 A more detailed 
account of Tillion's analysis and the constructs will 
be given in 
Chapter 3. But it is important to mention here that the models of the 
main social protagonists in the change/no-change process were 
specifically devised for the present research and are therefore 
completely instrumental. At the risk of 
being maverick, they 
nevertheless present the advantage of 
helping circumscribe the 
Holmesian 'asynchrony' between stated aims of egalitarianism 
for women 
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(new norms), and opposition to them in the form of residual behaviour 
informed by older norms. Above all, the Tillion models will act as 
useful catalysts for the unsuspected inconsistencies of the agents of 
change, and the significant role of the agents of no-change, especially 
in relation to women's social position. 
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Preamble to Tanzania's Interim Constitution, (1965) amended in 1972. 
See the bibliography for the full references. 
2. Marx/Engels, Textes sur le colonialism, Moscou, edition en langues 
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British colonisation of India, and Algeria's occupation by France. 
3. Marx K., The Future Results of British Rule in India, excerpts of 
the 1850's journalism period, in D. McLellan, Karl Marx: Selected 
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et Algerie: Textes de Marx et Engels, 10/18, Paris, 1976, pp. 25-6. 
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Weber, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1977, Gerth and Wright Mills suggested 
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in 
European history, he nevertheless noted the implacable rise of 
rationalism and secularism, op. cit., p. 51. 
6. Marx K., "The Communist Manifesto", in McLellan D., Karl Marx: 
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9. The 'delinkers' in dependency theory have been particularly prolific 
in demonstrating that 'underdevelopment' was caused by capitalist 
penetration, in Latin America and Africa. The most renowned spokesmen 
of the delinking formula are Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, 
Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin. See in particular Wallerstein's The 
Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979; 
Arrighi's The Geometry of Imperialism, Schocken, London, 1978; Amin's 
Le Developpement Inegal: essai sur les formes sociales du Capitalisme 
Peripherique, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1973. Frank will be quoted at 
length below in this chapter. Consult the bibliography for his 
references. 
10. Rostow had devised a five-stage process of modernisation to be 
followed by all 'traditional' societies. His motivations were primarily 
ideological and political, his concern being to counteract the 
communist influence in 'developing' areas. See his Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
11. Parsons quoted in Hoogvelt A. M. M., The Sociology of Developing 
Societies, The MacMillan Press, London 1981, p. 12. 
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13. See for example Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: 
Modernizing the Middle East, New York, 1958. 
14. See Parsons T., Structure and Process in Modem Societies, Glencoe, 
Ill., 1960, in which he devoted a section to the analysis of "The 
Problems of Underdeveloped Areas", pp. 116-131. 
15. Brian Holmes' approach constituted an interesting rupture in the 
methodological tradition of Comparative Education in the West (Europe 
and North America). Since its early days (19th century) as a systematic 
study of educational issues, Comparative Education concentrated on 
'Cultural Borrowing' between different national educational systems. It 
was marked by a strong 'emulative' tradition (see Holmes, 1981: 19-35). 
By opposition, Holmes drew attention to the importance of "initial 
conditions" in situations of cultural borrowing, and thus devised his 
'problem-approach'. Inspired from Dewey's philosophy of 'reflective 
thinking' and Popper's 'hypothetico-deductive' method, Holmes' method 
is par excellence a pragmatic, one. A complete account of 
it can be 
found in his Problems in Education: A Comparative Approach, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1965; and highlights of it in 
his Comparative 
Education: Some Considerations of Method, George Allen and Unwin, 
London 1981, as well as Some Considerations of Method in Comparative 
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Education, a series of student seminar papers prepared under a SSRC 
Personal Research Grant in 1974-1975, University of London Institute of 
Education. 
16. In order to draw an 'ideal-typical normative model', Holmes 
stresses that "In selecting from a wealth of sources the research 
worker should have in mind concepts of reliability and validity, his 
particular 'problem' and the context (or contexts) in which he intends 
to analyse it and the policy solutions offered to the 
'problems "'(Holmes, 1981: 122). This is vastly different from the 
ready-tailored models of traditonal and modern societies. Holmes adds 
that the researcher should take into account the : "1. spatial context, 
2. historical dimension, 3. contemporary scene, 4. social change, 
5. policy aims, 6. implementing policy, 7. economic/political 
considerations. " ibid. 
17. Holmes distinguishes between 'pure' and 'actual' types that is 
between general philosophical sources and their modification 
(as in 
constitutions and legislation). See his Problems in Education, op. cit., 
pp. 57-58. 
18. The controversy of the 
Chapter 3. 
class analysis will be examined in 
19. Tillion, G., Le Harem et les Cousins, Le Seuil, Paris, 
1966. 
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CHAPTER 'NO: THE RATIONALE OF 'SPECIFIC SOCIALISM' 
The notion of 'specific socialism' adopted in the present study to 
describe Algeria's and Tanzania's official political ideology has not 
been encountered in the literature on either country. Many a study on 
Algeria and Tanzania has been concerned with the 'construction of 
socialism' in each context, 
1 but not with the nature of the official 
discourse. As a result, subsequent contradictions of socialist policies 
in Algeria and Tanzania have been interpreted as a 'betrayal of the 
socialist cause', especially by radical scholars. 
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In this Chapter, the 'betrayal thesis' will be examined and rejected, 
in favour of an internal reading of the official rhetoric of socialism 
in Algeria and Tanzania. This latter will help disclose a clear 
rejection of 'scientific socialism', and an emphasis on a specific 
brand of socialism, mostly inspired from local socio-cultural 
traditions. Hence the notion of 'specific socialism'. Extracts from 
Algeria's Charte Nationale (1976), and Nyerere's Ujamaa: Essays on 
Socialism (1968,1978) will be used as illustrations for the argument. 
2.1. Socialism: National, Islamic, African, Universal but not Marxian 
A careful reading of the discourse of 'specific socialism', as 
illustrated by official rhetoric in Algeria and Tanzania, shows above 
all a persistent emphasis on the 'authenticity' and endogeneity of 
socialist practices. Nyerere affirmed in Ujamaa, (the first blueprint 
he produced for independent Tanganyika in 1962), that: 
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We, in Africa, have no more need of being converted to 
socialism than we have of being taught democracy. Both 
are rooted in our own past - in the traditional society 
which produced us. Modem African socialism can draw 
from its traditional heritage the recognition of society 
as an extension of the basic family unit. 
(Nyerere, 1968: 6) 
The ideologists of the Algerian Charte Nationale, for their part point 
out that: 
Socialism in Algeria does not proceed from any 
materialist metaphysique, neither is it attached to any 
dogmatic conception alien to our national genius. Its 
engineering is identified with the emancipation of 
Islamic values which constitute a fundamental element of 
the personality of the Algerian people. 
(Charte Nationale, 1976: 23)3 
and: 
Socialism in Algeria is neither an arbitrary option nor 
an imported system thrown onto the inert body of the 
Nation; it is rather a dynamic process whose roots go 
back to the struggle of national liberation, a process 
intimately linked with the renascent nation and its 
future. 
(ibid: 24) 
One cannot fail to note that the socialist options of Algeria and 
Tanzania are clearly a national endeavour which purports to legitimise 
socialism by virtue of local norms and values. Socialism is intimately 
intertwined with national and cultural identity. For the Algerians, it 
even becomes a necessary corollary of national liberation and national 
reconstruction in the 'Third World': 
Socialism appears to be a process adjacent to the 
process of national liberation. It is characterized 
by a 
feature of internal necessity which, favours its 
development in the minds and confers upon it an 
authentic mark. It is from this adherence to 
the 
national ego that socialism has extracted the secret of 
its vitality in the Third World. (ibid: 25) 
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Thus, there seems to be an organic link between the choice of socialism 
as a societal programme and the struggle for national liberation: 
In the conditions of newly-independent countries, 
socialism is not external to the nation; it is 
identified with its organic development. The future of 
the socialist revolution in the Third World, will be 
increasingly tributary of a creative national thought 
which will be transformed, in a dialectical manner, into 
a socialist thought. Thus, for any Revolution to be 
socialist, it should primarily be national, and for any 
national Revolution to be consequent, it should 
necessarily lead up to socialism. 
(ibid: 27) 
The corollary of the 'organic' national component of socialism in 
Algeria and Tanzania interestingly implies the rejection of any attempt 
at establishing an orthodox socialistic message such as that of 
'scientific socialism' as embodied in Marxism-Leninism for instance. 
This is how Nyerere put it: 
We are groping our way forward toward socialism and we 
are in danger of being bemused by this new theology, and 
therefore trying to solve our problems according to what 
the priests of Marxism say is what Marx said or meant. 
If we do this we shall fail. Africa's conditions are 
very different from those of the Europe in which Marx 
and Lenin worked. To talk as if these thinkers provided 
all the answers to our problems, or as if Marx invented 
socialism, is to reject both the humanity of Africa and 
the universality of socialism. 
(in Mazrui, 1978: 178) 
Less polemically, the Charte Nationale deems it necessary to hint to 
orthodox 'scientific socialists' that: 
Socialism is not a religion, it is a theoretical and 
strategic weapon which takes into account the reality of 
each people and therefore implies the rejection of all 
dogmatism. 
(ibid: 23) 
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However, belying the demarcation from a 'dogmatic' socialism is the 
rejection of the class conflict analysis inbuilt in 'scientific 
socialism', according to which socialism is to be considered as: 
... the necessary product of the struggle between two 
classes produced by history, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Its task did not consist in building a 
social system as perfect as possible but rather to study 
the historical development of the economy which 
engendered these classes and their antagonism; as well 
as find in the economic situation thus created the means 
to resolve the conflict. 4 (Engels, 1971: 88) 
At this point it is pertinent to contrast Engels' view of socialism as 
the 'objective' result of the exacerbation of class conflict (in 
conditions of capitalist exploitation), with that of the Charte 
Nationale and Nyerere. 
In his usual polemical mood, Nyerere explains that it is precisely the 
conflictual nature of what he calls 'European socialism' which he 
rejects: 
... As prayer is to Christianity or to Islam, so civil 
war (which they call 'class war') is to the European 
version of socialism -a means inseparable from the end. 
Each becomes the basis of a whole way of life. The 
European socialist cannot think of his socialism without 
its father - capitalism! 
Brought up in tribal socialism, I must say I find this 
contradiction quite intolerable. It gives capitalism a 
philosophical status which capitalism neither claims 
nor deserves. For it virtually says, 'Without 
capitalism, and the conflict which capitalism creates 
within society, there can be no socialism'! This 
glorification of capitalism by the doctrinaire European 
socialists, I repeat, I find intolerable. 
(Ujamaa, 1968: 11) 
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In a less polemical tone, the Charte Nationale explains that: 
socialism in the newly-independent countries could 
not abide by the same conditions prevalent in industrialized countries where, a sizeable working-class faces no oppression other than that of its own capitalist class. 
(ibid: 26) 
It continues to argue that 'capitalist exploitation' in the 'Third 
World' has been mediated by colonialism and consequently: 
has not brought about the formation of a working class, but rather produced the accelerated pauperisation of the 
peasant masses, the ruining of their traditional 
economy, without providing the alternative lay-out of industrialisation. 
(ibid) 
Consequently, the Charte Nationale suggests that the class conflict 
analysis is not tenable in 'Third World' countries. Neither is the 
proletariat to be reckoned with as the guarantor of the advent of 
socialism. But instead, one should count on social forces such as "the 
mass of poor peasants, workers of the cities and national revolutionary 
cadres" (ibid: 27), to bring about socialism. This denial of the 
existence of a proletariat is by the same token a subtle rejection of 
the Marxian conflict analysis. In this, the Algerian official 
ideologues betray the predominance of the unitarian nationalist norms 
which inform them, and which they have inherited from a long tradition 
of anti-colonial struggle. 
5 In conditions of national struggle, as 
indeed in conditions of national reconstruction and state 
structuration, national elites strive to be seen as a natural alliance 
of 'progressive' social forces. 
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For his part, Nyerere rejects the term 'class' altogether as alien to 
African etymology, so strong is his aversion to the conflictual 
underpinnings of the concept: 
African socialism, on the other hand, did not have the 'benefit'of the Agrarian Revolution or the Industrial 
Revolution. It did not start from the existence of 
conflicting 'classes'in society. Indeed I doubt if the 
equivalent for the word 'class'exists in any indigenous 
African language;... and the idea of 'class'or 'caste' 
was non-existent in African society. 
(Ujamaa, 1968: 11) 
Instead: 
... Both the 'rich' and the 'poor' individual were 
completely secure in African society. ... Nobody starved 
either of food or human dignity, because he lacked 
personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed 
by the community of which he was a member. That was 
socialism. That is socialism. 
(ibid: 3-4) 
And as if to exorcise the body of 'African' socialism from any alien 
import, the Mwalimu 6 created a special term for the designation of 
socialism in Tanzania: 
Ujamaa then or 'Familyhood' describes our socialism. 
It is opposed to capitalism which seeks to build a happy 
society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; 
and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which 
seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of 
inevitable conflict between man and man. 
(Ibid: 12) 
As for the Charte Nationale, the natural cradle of 'the socialist 
revolution' in Algeria is to be found in Islam. For: 
Islam,... entertains no links with any particular vested 
interest, or specific clergy, or any temporal power. 
Neither feudalism nor capitalism can claim to proceed 
from it. Islam has presented the world with a superior 
conception of human dignity... Its intrinsic 
egalitarianism can find expression in any era. (Charte Nationale: 21) 
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Thus, a careful reading of either the Tanzanian, or Algerian official 
rhetoric on the formulation of socialism, suggests that there is a 
forceful claim for a 'specific socialism' characterized by: 
1. its organic link with the anti-colonial nationalist struggle; 
2. its unitarian injunctions and the denial of class divisions; 
3. its 'authentification' with a pre-colonial social order (presumably egalitarian) which requires a simple revival of its intrinsic values and attitudes. 
This maverick mixture of revolutionism and reformism is indeed rather 
bewildering, as it confers an aura of transcendence to the pre-colonial 
social order, and by the same token renders it a-historical. The 
staunch rejection of scientific socialism on the one hand, and the 
appeal for the reform of an allegedly pre-colonial socialistic 
organisation of society, on the other, does not only betray an 
emotional assertion of a recovered identity. It is also the expression 
of world views different from the evolutionary positivist conception of 
absolute progress which came in the footsteps of Western domination. 
Instead of advocating an unconditional triumph of progress, due to an 
accumulative pattern of social organisation, these world views render 
progress tributary of a transcendent past. What the Algerian and 
Tanzanian rhetorics seem to advocate is the retention of a unitary 
cosmos, found in Islam in the case of the Algerian formula, and in 
communitarian familyhood in the case of Tanzania. Both share a 
non-materialist view of the universe, and insist that it should inform 
the models of individual, society and knowledge of their proposed 
societal programmes. Essentially, both view the individual as tributary 
of the community, with specific roles for men and women; society as 
based on social solidarity; and knowledge as pragmatic, progressive but 
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not infinite. 
In effect, they reject European socialism as part of the Western legacy 
which had generated capitalism. Indeed, Weber had shrewdly observed 
that both capitalism and socialism alienated the individual: 
... Weber rejected what he regarded as the utopian belief 
of certain socialist philosophies that public ownership 
of the means of production would eliminate alienation 
and exploitation. The scale of economic operations under 
socialist conditions would intensify the process of bureaucratization which had been set in operation by 
capitalist economies. 
(Turner, 1974: 152) 
One recalls at this point Nyerere's condemnation of what he called 
'European socialism' as being the heir of capitalism, and his rejection 
of it. In fact, at the core of the discourse of 'specific socialism', 
is an implicit refusal to abandon community allegiances for impersonal 
ones. For, in that case: 
... there are boundaries fo 
means that an 
wisdom of his 
individual has 
of knowledge. 
no longer any natural or inevitable 
r an individual's life. Maturity no longer 
individual has mastered the lore and 
tribe or society; it means rather that an 
been overtaken by the ever growing stock 
(ibid: 153) 7 
This is precisely the kind of 'individualism' which seems to be 
rejected by Algeria's and Tanzania's 'specific socialism'. For this 
would entail disharmony in what is seen as the 'congenial brotherly' 
body of social solidarity. But most significant of all, it would break 
'familial harmony', by conceding to women absolute freedom to act as 
individuals, and not merely as agents of reproduction. 
8 
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Finally, the notion of specificity in Algeria's and Tanzania's formulae 
of socialism is a convenient reminder of the monolithism of their 
political and cultural opinion, a powerful deterrent to political 
dissent or cultural schism. This contrasts with the tendency in 'modern 
society' towards pluralism, the underlying reason being that: 
The progressive development of science and the 
increasing specialization of all fields of knowledge 
give rise to countless world-views and interpretations 
of reality, but precisely because these interpretations 
are infinite, they cannot lay claim to any absolute 
value. 
(ibid) 
It is precisely this 'need' for absolute value that the Algerian and 
Tanzanian discourses hint at when they express recognition of the 
pre-colonial norms. The aura of transcendence given to the pre-colonial 
cultural values as valid for all periods, represents in a way the 
'absolute value' Turner refers to. Indeed, one may argue that the 
emphasis on local values, as parameters of cultural identity, has been 
put forward as a shield against the multiplication of 'world-views and 
interpretations of reality'. For the national-unitarian political 
regimes of Algeria and Tanzania, this would mean the acceptance of 
political and cultural plurality. 
Thus, the reading of Algeria's and Tanzania's rhetoric of 'specific 
socialism' discloses a clear demarcation from orthodox 'scientific 
socialism'. But it has been seriously misread by radical critics of 
both countries. 
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2.2. Radical Disenchantment: a Misreading of 'Specific Socialism' 
The processes of post-colonial nation-building in Algeria and Tanzania 
have, more often than not, caused some consternation amongst students 
of both countries. This has been, translated into a confusing 
delineation of the nature of the decision-makers in each context. 
The bewilderment has indeed been fed by the normative statements of 
wholistic societal programmes aiming at the construction of socialism 
in Algeria and Tanzania. The eclectism of these statements has often 
been overlooked, especially by left-wing scholars who hastened at first 
to give support to the experiments, but then soon denounced them as 
revisionist, when they did not respond to the canons of 'scientific 
socialism' (Chaliand, 1964; Humbaraci, 1966; Clegg, 1971; Raffinot and 
Jaquemot, 1977 for Algeria; Shivji, 1978; von Freyhold, 1977 for 
Tanzania). 
In endeavouring to understand why 'genuine' socialist transformation 
(ie. scientific socialism) was not favoured by decision-makers in 
Algeria and. Tanzania, such students resorted to a class analysis as 
most were interested in the political economy of each country. 
Interestingly enough the similarity of the verdict is rather striking. 
The core of the argument can be summarised as follows: Algeria and 
Tanzania are not practising socialist policies, but capitalistic ones 
in view of their connivance with international capital and the 
exclusion of workers and peasants from the decision-making processes. 
The two regimes are at best populist and demagogical, and are led by a 
bureaucratic class, which is more of a 'bourgeoisie' rather than a 
'revolutionary avantguard'. The "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" of Tanzania 
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(Shivji) and the "state bourgeoisie" of Algeria (Raffinot & Jacquemot) 
have allegedly been practising state capitalism rather than socialist 
construction. Each is considered as a class which has formed in the 
shadow of state structuration, as an heir of a dispersed and weak petty 
bourgeoisie on the morrow of independence (Shivji, 1978: 63; Raffinot 
&Jacquemot, 1977: 121). Each typically includes political officials 
from the state, party and army as well as the state-run economic 
structures such as national companies or parastatals, and the higher 
echelons of the civil service (ie. ministries). Each is supposedly an 
'exploitative' class as it seeks to extract the surplus product of 
workers and peasants for its own reproduction. Its use of the state as 
the sole proprietor of economic and public institutions is considered 
but a legal and formal device 
to occult the real nature of the system of appropriation 
and affectation of the means of production and social 
surplus product, that is a capitalist system. 
(Raffinot & Jacquemot, 1977: 120) 
Such class analysis presents a number of pitfalls. The most outstanding 
of which is the confusion it has thrown on the very Marxian concept of 
'bourgeoisie' which does not incorporate the state, except in the sense 
of its use by the bourgeoisie as a superstructure and not as an 
infrastructure. On the other hand, it is important to remember that the 
bourgeoisie in the Marxian sense, was born of the antagonism with a 
feudal class which presumably preceded it, and was based in its 
formation on the privatisation of the means of production. In fact no 
better than Marx himself explained the process of this formation. Thus: 
56 
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class 
antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more 
splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two 
great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie 
and Proletariat. From the serfs of the Middle Ages 
sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. 
From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed. 
(in McLellan, 1978: 222) 
Not only has no such process been taking place in Algeria and 
Tanzania, but neither 'proletariat' nor 'feudalism' as landmarks in the 
history of the bourgeoisie, appeared in the history and social 
structure of these two societies. No trace of a dialectical 
relationship is to be found there between either feudal nobility and 
bourgeoisie or between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Indeed, in each 
context, pre-capitalist structures were 'tribal' and not feudal, and 
the state of manufacture has hardly brought about the formation of a 
proletariat as described by Marx. 
Significantly enough neither proletariat nor feudality are mentioned by 
the advocates of the 'state' or 'bureaucratic' bourgeoisie, but rather, 
they refer to 'workers' and 'peasants' which depict social categories 
rather than theoretical concepts. Indeed, they cannot render the social 
dynamics embedded in the Marxian concepts of 'proletariat' and 
'feudalism'. On the other hand, Marx makes it clear that the state is 
indeed used by the bourgeoisie as "a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Ibid: 223), but it is 
far from 
ruling it, as is the case of the so-called state or 
bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie. Last but not least, what is described as bourgeoisie in 
Algeria and Tanzania does not own the means of production (a sine qua 
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non condition in Marxian theory) but 
, 
disposes ' of them (Coulson, 
1982: 322). But above all, what casts doubt on the theory of the state 
and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, is the disregard for the origin of its 
members: 
The mode of access to this class is a secondary 
question; what is decisive is the existence of a frame 
of bourgeois practices and vested interests which are 
organised around the consolidation of capitalist social 
relations. 
(Raffinot & Jacquemot, ibid: 121) 
Such disregard for the process of elite recruitment is precisely what 
is lacking in this particular class analysis, which has distorted both 
Marx's careful historical analysis, and the specific conditions of 
local social formations. The expedient urge to squeeze these latter 
into existing paradigms seems to have taken over the theses of 'state' 
and 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. 
The processes of nation and state building in Algeria and Tanzania have 
been taking place in the specific conditions of post-colonial 
socio-economic contexts. These have been inherited from disintegrating 
pre-capitalist structures and embryonic modem structures of a colonial 
kind. This has meant by and large that neither 'traditional' society 
was dead and buried, nor 'modern' society was established. The 
transitional nature of the above processes is important to retain in 
order to avoid the inductivism and positivism witnessed in the 'state' 
and 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' type of analysis. 
On the other hand, the normative statements of socialist construction 
in Algeria and Tanzania have obviously eluded critics of both 
experiences. As seen earlier, these statements unmistakably reject 
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socialism as understood by their radical critics. Furthermore, the 
discourse of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania has never 
been a strict and rigorous blue-print; rather it has followed a 
pragmatic itinerary. 
2.3. 'Specific Socialism': An Expandable Discourse 
As seen above, the notion of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and 
Tanzania has not only appeared as a natural corollary of nationalism 
(ie. of the anti-colonial struggle); but also, and maybe more 
significantly, as a rejection of 'scientific socialism', and the 
assertion of pre-colonial values. In both cases, the insistence upon an 
authentic origin of socialism is almost an obsessive preoccupation. It 
is interesting to follow the evolution of the socialist discourse in 
Algeria and Tanzania both prior and after independence. In both cases, 
the socialist option has been swinging between radical and 
reformist-liberal moods, instead of following a consistent linear 
development. 
2.3.1. Algeria's Socialist Triangle: Nation, State, Islam 
The contemporary history of political ideology in Algeria discloses 
that there was hardly mention of socialism in the early texts which 
accompanied the national uprising since 1954.9 There was, however, a 
repeated stress on the social and democratic nature of the 
anti-colonial struggle. Reference to revolution could be found in all 
documents and declarations, but this was portrayed as 'popular 
revolution'. One of the earliest references to socialism was made, 
rather significantly, in one of the most comprehensive and critical 
documents on the national struggle and the role of the FLN (Front de 
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Liberation Nationale): Le Programme de Tripoli adopted in June 1962.10 
The document was indeed uncompromising in its denunciation of the 
"feudalistic, paternalist, and petit-bourgeois"" attitude of the FLN 
which it accused of not making provisions for a projet de socihte (or 
societal programme) for Algeria beyond the nationalist period. The 
severe criticism of the lack of a clear ideological choice by the FLN 
leadership reflected the internecine power struggle between the old 
nationalists to whom national independence was paramount, and who were 
attracted to an undefined liberal reconstruction of the country, and a 
younger generation of radical members of the party who had in fact 
been summoned to write the programme (Harbi, 1964; Quandt, 1969). 
Following independence in 1962, references to socialism became more 
frequent, and a radicalisation of official rhetoric emerged in favour 
of a discourse of 'socialist reconstruction'. The explicit reference to 
socialism was laid out in the two most important documents of the early 
independent Republic: the 1963 Constitution, and the 1964 Charte 
d'Alger. Although the two documents did not fail to mention Islam as 
the state religion, the sharp analysis of Algerian society contained in 
the Charter and the provisions of the Constitution, betrayed strong 
left-wing Marxian inclinations. Indeed, it was the period when the 
internecine struggle was raging between radical left-wing elements of 
the political elite who were not all necessarily Marxists, but 
advocated radical reforms of the political and socio-economic 
structures, and more conservative elements who were in favour of a more 
liberal line (Lacheraf, 1976: 291-304). The aggravation of the 
conflict between the two civilian groups, scattered between party and 
government, hastened the intervention of the army in the 1965 coup led 
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by Col. Boumediene, who became subsequently Algeria's President until 
his death in December 1978. The intervention was not in order to 
promote a particular group, but it proved to be harsher on the 
left-wingers whose nationalism was doubted. The move was partly the 
result of a mounting technocracy anxious to enforce state and economic 
efficiency. 
On the other hand, the emphasis on the specificity of Algerian 
socialism, especially under Boumediene's administration, was also a 
genuine expression of the still overwhelming hold of nationalism on the 
polity as well as civil society at large. The legitimation of the 
unifying character of the national struggle, so closely linked with 
the spirit of resistance of the Islamic faith, was certainly not to be 
forsaken in favour of a socialism based on class struggle and secular 
values. Concrete experience with the French communist movement during 
the war of liberation12 had been sufficient proof that 'scientific 
socialism' was not prepared to support national struggles. Rather it 
gave priority to the metropolitan class struggle, the outcome of which 
would presumably bring about the communistic millenium. 
Following the death of Boumediene, and the discreet dismantling of his 
all powerful technocratic team who masterminded Algeria's 
industrialisation (to the detriment of agricultural development), the 
new team in power was not so keen on continuing on the path of a 
centralising socialism. Its almost immediate task was to 
discredit the 
inefficiency of heavy industry projects and encourage intermediate and 
smaller industries (Benissad, 1982). However most significant of all, 
there was a new emphasis on the encouragement and contribution of the 
61 
private sector, especially in the economic sphere. The legitimation of 
these shifts can be found in the amended Charte Nationale of 1986.13 
One cannot fail to detect the lower key position given to socialism in 
this new blueprint. Instead, there is a clear emphasis on the 
'necessity' to promote the private sector of the economy on the one 
hand, and a stronger reassertion of Islam on the other. 
With regard to the new emphasis on the private sector in the economy, 
one can sense the pressures of entrepreneurial groups, who ironically 
started burgeoning under the Boumediene administration, and who were 
now powerful enough to lobby the central administration. However, the 
most striking amendments of the Charter, are its ideological 
priorities. Indeed, a sharp emphasis on the paramount position of Islam 
is now patently made. It is understood that Islam is part of the wider 
developmental process, and should inspire the 'socialist construction' 
of society. This is a significant difference from the 1976 Charter, 
which refered to Islam in relation to the "socialist revolution". 
14 
whilst the revised document links it to the "exigencies of the 
century", 
15 
and requires that "Islamic thought should be directed 
towards the solution of problems of the present epoch". 
16 This sharper 
emphasis on Islam as an active component in the development process, is 
the deed of the advocates of more 'authentic' policies which would 
take into account the Arab-Islamic heritage of Algerian society. Yet, 
fundamentalism is certainly not their motto, but rather the 
establishment of Islamic values as the regulators of modernity. 
Thus, the discourse of specific socialism in Algeria seems to have 
followed a rather irregular development, from the early vague populist 
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and social declarations of the national struggle in the mid-fifties, 
to the radical analyses of independence in the early sixties which 
presented socialism as paramount. A mixture of radicalism and populism 
appeared under the technocratic era of Boumediene, and seemed to have 
struck a balance between nationalism and authenticity, from the 
mid-sixties to the late seventies, only to be followed by a 
liberalising tone which tried to moderate a rising puritanism of a 
cultural and religious nature. 
At no point in time has socialism been questioned as a fundamental 
societal programme, but the emphasis on its national specificity has 
legitimised progressive and conservative claims alike, as will be seen 
in Chapters 3 and 4. However, the only steady development has been that 
of the Islamic component which became more and more articulate over 
the years, to the point of representing the main trait of specificity. 
Indeed, it seems at present to be the most cogent and coherent argument 
in defining specificity, which for a long time contained nationalist 
and populist undertones of a more secular nature. The margin of 
interpretation allowed specificity in the dominant discourse has, 
interestingly enough, represented a forum for the expression of a wide 
spectrum of opinions at odds with the official rhetoric, especially 
those emanating from more conservative quarters. 
2.3.2. Tanzania: The Uncertainties of Ujamaa . 
As in Algeria, the development of the discourse of 'specific socialism' 
in Tanzania followed an irregular path, switching from vague 
nationalist populist declarations, to more radical wording, and finally 
to more liberalising tendencies. 
63 
When first created in 1954 to lead the process for independence, TANU 
(Tanganyika African National Union) relied mainly on a programme of 
social reforms in its provisions for political independence, achieved 
in 1961. The Constitution of TANU was mainly concerned with 
redistributive policies of the national product (Bienen: 1967) as well 
as with the 'Africanisation' of the political sector. The wording of 
socialism in Tanganyika at this time was not very different from that 
of 'African Socialism', based on African pre-colonial values, as 
formulated elsewhere by Senghor in Senegal. This brand of socialism was 
'excommunicated' by Khrushev who threatened that "if they [Senghor and 
Nyerere] fail to understand that there is only one form of socialism, 
17 
we will reject them". 
However, even within the realm of African Socialism, no clear 
formulation of Tanzanian socialism was made before 1967, when Nyerere 
issued the Arusha Declaration. 
18 The declaration seemed to come as a 
response to previous failures in Tanzania's social and economic 
policies. These policies were made in an ad hoc manner and were based 
mainly on the incentive of economic growth which allowed for different 
tendencies to appear. Strings were being pulled between advocates of 
re-distributive ideas and state control of the economy, and those of 
economic growth based on private enterprise. The two economic plans19 
which preceded the Arusha Declaration remained ambiguous as to what 
economic vocation Tanzania should be given, industrial or agricultural. 
On the political front, the 1964 mutiny20 and the 1966 student 
demonstrations21 represented significant protests which precipitated 
Nyerere's opting for a clear formulation of Tanzanian socialism. Thence 
the Arusha Declaration and the developmental formula of 
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Ujamaa Vijijini rural socialism), which provided for a more 
systematic societal programme as envisaged by Nyerere. 
The Declaration was to represent a watershed in Tanzania's 
post-independence history, since it expressed for the first time a 
clear definition of the Tanzanian brand of African Socialism. This was 
to be based exclusively on rural development, within a modernised 
framework of traditional African communalism with the creation of 
cooperatives and villages. In the long term it aimed to achieve 
economic 'self-reliance' and put an end to Tanzania's dependence on 
foreign aid and foreign imports. The Arusha Declaration, and 
Ujamaa Vijijini were nevertheless belied by an intense power struggle 
between ideologists and bureaucrats of the party, and the technocrats 
of the government who had to implement the new societal programme. 
22 As 
will be seen in the following Chapter, the actual implementation became 
a matter of bureaucratic zeal versus the latent resistance of the 
would-be beneficiaries of Ujamaa (ie. the peasants). The latter 
refused to become totally dependent on the new bureaucratised process 
by retreating into subsistence production. As a response to this kind 
of resistance, the authorities expedited the 'villagisation' of the 
peasants and had to have recourse to more coercive means such as the 
displacement of families. Accordingly, millions of people were 
displaced between 1973 and. 1977.23 The move marked also a new era in 
Tanzanian socialism, which had to be revised so as to pave the way to 
more liberal economic policies, as drought and lack of capital 
stretched the country's resources to their limit. 
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The seventies and early eighties were to prove very trying for the 
specificity of Tanzanian socialism, especially for its utopian reliance 
on pre-colonial values of egalitarianism, and communitarianism. As in 
Algeria, the margin of specificity was either directly opposed by 
radicals as revisionism, or discreetly used by more conservative trends 
to legitimise their resistance to the sprawling effects of modem state 
control which could only deprive them of their autonomy and 
encapsulate them within its mechanisms of surplus extraction. Yet 
again, specificity was seized upon by the more liberal trends so as to 
reinforce the private enterprise sector, both national and foreign. 
24 
As in Algeria then, the discourse of Ujamaa found itself at odds with 
its specificity as this latter was used by those very tendencies which 
the dominant elite tried to whittle down in order to establish the new 
order and discipline of modernity. However, the development of the 
official socialist discourse did not follow a gradual linear 
development, but rather oscillated between an early independence 
national-populism, between 1961-1967, to more radical social-populism 
and elements of socialism in the period 1967-1977. With Nyerere's 
assessment of the Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After (1977) came the 
first hints at economic liberalisation. But, as in Algeria, there was 
no denigration of specific socialism, only an appeal for its reform in 
order to meet the demands of incessant world crises. 
It is interesting to note the similarities in the line of development 
of Algeria's and Tanzania's rhetorics of 'specific socialism', marked 
by their unpredictability, and mixture of ad hoc and wholistic 
measures. The above brief expose of the 
development of Algeria's and 
Tanzania's official rhetorics of specific socialism is meant to shed 
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some light on the social forces, which by their interaction have marked 
the adjustments of the ideological discourse. 
The emphasis on specifity can be seen as a legitimation device used by 
the political elites so as to avoid alienating a variety of groups, and 
provoking their outright opposition. Hence Nyerere's view of Ujamaa as 
consensus, and consultation. The 'talk until you agree' formula is 
certainly meant to eschew opposition outside the existing structures, 
and frameworks of expression. In Algeria, on the other hand, the aura 
of sacrality still surrounding the 'revolutionary legitimacy' of the 
nationalist struggle makes it difficult to stray away from the 
unitarianism of the official discourse. Hence, the stability of both 
political regimes for the last twenty years, and the persistence of 
their unifying, albeit eclectic ideological discourses. Or should one 
say because of their eclectic discourses? Indeed, the contention herein 
is that this relative stability is belied by internecine tensions and 
conflicts which the margin of specificity allows for. Given that 
discontent cannot be channelled outside the official structures in view 
of the one-party system, it has, more often than not, been voiced and 
legitimised in the name of specificity, which, by and large, has been 
brandished by conservative tendencies in view of its easy 
identification with authenticity. In examining the evolution of the 
official rhetoric of specific socialism in Algeria and Tanzania for 
the last twenty years, one is tempted to probe further the interplay 
between the various social forces involved in the societal project of 
modernity to which the elites of both countries are committed. 
A review of these interactions will be made in the following 
Chapter. 
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NOTES : CHAPTER 2 
1. We can distinguish two main types of academic interpretations of the 
Algerian and Tanzanian socialist experiences. The first focuses on 
political institutions and is dominated by 'liberal' political 
scientists such as Quandt, W. B., Revolution and Political Leadership: 
Algeria 1954-1968, the M. I. T Press, 1969; Bienen, H., Tanzania: Party 
Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton University Press, 
1967. The second are those of radical scholars such as Cliffe, L. and 
Saul, J. (eds. ), Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader, 
Politics, Vol. 1, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1972, and 
Vol. 2, Nairobi, 1973; Shivji, I. J., Class Struggles in Tanzania, 
Heinemann, London 1978; von Freyhold, M. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: 
Analysis of an Experiment, Heinemann Educational Books, 1979; Chaliand, 
G., 1'Alg6rie est-t-elle socialiste?, Paris, Maspero, 1964; Humbaraci, 
A., Algeria: A Revolution that Failed, London, Pall Mall, 1966; Clegg, 
I., Workers Self-management in Algeria, Allen Lane, London, 1971; 
Raffinot, M. & Jaquemot, P. Le capitalisme d'etat algerien, Francois 
Maspero, Paris, 1977. 
2. The 'plurality' of socialist formulae has been strongly condemned by 
dependency theorists. Cf. Amin S., Arrighi G., Frank A. G., Wallerstein 
I., Dynamics of Global Crisis, The Macmillan Press Ltd., UK, 1982. 
Frank sees that: 
Independent national development in the Third World has 
proved to be a snare and a delusion; and self-reliance 
... is a myth. ... 
These political compromises of the 
avowedly revolutionary socialist ... are another measure 
of the ideological crisis of the left in the face of the 
present world crisis. Therefore, as the world crisis 
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generates further political stress in the Third World, 
new populist movements, increasingly based on 
nationalism and religion are likely to emerge. 
See his article "Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis" in op. 
cit., p. 143. As for Amin, he blames in the same venue "socialist and 
national liberation movements" for being: 
incapable of criticising the petty-bourgeois state mode 
of production, of understanding the implications of de-linking and of the worker-peasant alliance in the 
transition... . As we can see, the peoples of the 
periphery are responding in their own way to this impasse: by popular uprisings and the renewal of traditional ideologies. 
See his article "Crisis, Nationalism, and Socialism" in op. cit., p. 
228. In pointing out the re-emergence of 'traditional ideologies', 
these conclusions do not however admit that they have their own 
autonomous dynamics, as it is suggested in the present research. 
3. This extract and subsequent quotes from the Charte Nationale are 
this author's translations. 
4. See note 1 in the Introduction. 
5. The anti-colonial struggle, in its political form, started in the 
1930s. It was marked by a passionate debate on the nature of the 
Algerian nation, between the national secularist trend led by Messali 
Hadj who identified the Algerian nation with modern colonial times, and 
Sheikh Ibn Badis, leader of the reformist religious movement, who 
identified it with the wider Arab-Islamic sphere, be it historically or 
politically. At stake was the rejection of France's assimilationist 
policies by virtue of which Algeria was to become part and parcel of 
France as a 'departement'. For a poignant account of the nationalist 
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struggle, consult Mostefa Lacheraf, Algerie: nation et Societe, 
Maspero, Paris, 1965. 
6. Mwalimu is a term of endearment used to designate Nyerere. It also 
means teacher in Kiswahili and refers to Nyerere's early career as a 
teacher in the early 1940s. 
7. The notion that knowledge is infinite has been strongly criticised 
by Muslim scholars. The broad characteristics of Western epistemology 
as described by Turner, have been rejected as 'insane' by al-Attas: 
Can one be judged sane and coherent who contemplates 
some matter, and at the same time recognises something 
else entirely different from what is being contemplated 
and who says something again quite different altogether, 
who hears different sounds and sees yet again different 
things? ... such a condition is maintained by the 
encouragement and elevation and legitimization of doubt 
and conjecture as epistemological tools of scientific 
enquiry. The Holy Qur'an repeatedly repudiates such 
methods, branding them contraries of knowledge. 
See his article "Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and 
the Definition and Aims of Education", in al-Attas (ed. ), Aims and 
Objectives of Islamic Education, Hodder and Stoughton, Jeddah, 1979, 
p. 21. His fears as a scholar usefully rationalise for us those held by 
politicians with regard to the multiplicity of opinion, at least in the 
Muslim world. 
8. See the discussion of Algeria's and Tanzania's family laws in 
Chapter 4. 
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9. Textes Fondamentaux du Front de Liberation Nationale (1954-1962), 
Ministere de l'Information et de la Culture, Dossiers Documentaires, 
no. 24, Janvier 1976. 
10. The programme was adopted in Tripoli (Libya) by the 
Conseil Nationale de la Revolution Algerienne June 1962, and contained 
guidelines for the "construction of the popular and democratic 
revolution". Independence was declared a month later on 5 July. 
11. Textes Fondamentaux, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
12. The French Communist movement hesitated to support the liberation 
struggle in the colony, and was condemned in a renowned document 
entitled Le CommunismeAbsent The criticism appeared- in the 
Plate-Forme de la Soummam, the second most important document after the 
Proclamation du 1er Novembre 1954, the call for the war of 
liberation. The Soummam Platform was issued on 20 August 1956, to put 
forward the position of the FLN in the struggle for national 
liberation, op. cit., p. 15. 
13. The National Charter of 1976 has been replaced by a so-called 
"enriched" version ( enrichissement de la Charte Nationale) in January 
1986, following a national debate and referendum. Cf., La Charte 
Nationale, Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne Democratique et 
Populaire, Annee 25, no. 7,16 Fevrier 1986. 
14. Front de Liberation Nationale, Charte Nationale 1976, Editions 
Populaires de 1'Armee, 1976, p. 21. 
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15. Charte Nationale, op. cit. p. 109. 
16. Ibid, p. 111. 
17. The declaration was made at Bucharest in May 1963, cited in Rene 
Dumont & Marcel Mazoyer, Socialisms and Development, Andre Deutsch, 
1973, p. 143. 
18. The Arusha Declaration, in Uhuru Na Ujamaa, Freedom and Socialism, 
by Julius K. Nyerere, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 231-251. 
19. The Tanzanian authorities had launched a 3-year plan for 1961-1964, 
and a 5-year plan for the period 1964-1969. 
20. In January 1964, Nyerere called in British troops to crush a 
military coup attempt. 
21. In October 1966, students demonstrated in Dar es Salaam against the 
introduction of the National Labour Service destined to enroll them in 
developmental 'manual' programmes. It could be argued that the attitude 
of students was one of the apparent reasons which triggered off the 
radicalism of Ujamaa which was to appear a year later in the Arusha 
Declaration. 
22. See J. Hartmann's unpublished Ph. d thesis "Development 
Policy-making in Tanzania 1962-1982: a Critique of Sociological 
Interpretations", University of Hull, April 1983. Hartmann argues that 
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three political organs are involved in policy making, the Party, the 
Government and the Presidency (with special reference to Nyerere's 
charismatic role). More often than not deep rifts have marked the 
process as the militantism of Party members clashes with the liberalism 
of Government technocrats, with the President playing the 'referee'. 
23. See Chapter 3. 
24. Hartmann, op. cit. chapters 2 to 8. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SPECIFIC SOCIALISM AT ODDS WITH SPECIFICITY 
As seen in the previous Chapter, the rationale of 'specific socialism' 
was above all characterised by the identification of socialistic ideals 
with indigenous values of egalitarianism. These, according to official 
rhetoric, were embodied in Islam in Algeria, and 'tribal 
communitarianism' in Tanzania. However, the discourse of 'specific 
socialism' is also a societal programme of 'nation building' and 
'modernisation' of both state and civil society in Algeria and 
Tanzania. It marks the entry of these two countries in the world 
economic, political and cultural arena as decolonized nation-states: 
hence, its eclectism or 'synthesism' of pre-colonial values and 
post-colonial 'universal' ideals of modernism and progressivism as 
embodied in 'science and technology'. 
However the wide ranging spectrum of values covered by 'specific 
socialism' may present some difficulty at the level of policy 
implementation, as it is expected to legitimise two world-views, be it 
in Algeria or Tanzania. It will be argued in the present Chapter that 
the rationale of 'specific socialism' constitutes not only a 
'normative inconsistency' in attempting to reconcile values of 
different if not opposite time scales, but it is also a recipe for the 
enforcement of conservative and traditionalist claims (in matters of 
social control for instance). The normative ambiguity of 
'specific 
socialism' will be best rendered by the process of institutional change 
whereby the efficiency of the latter is 
dependent on corresponding 
attitudes and mental states. How can 
'specific socialism' secure them 
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when it legitimizes at the same time the attitudes and mental states of 
other epochs? 
In order to facilitate the answer, models of the social protagonists at 
play in Algeria and Tanzania are drawn. These are by and large meant to 
represent the two main conceptualisations contained in 'specific 
socialism': the local and the universal. 
3.1. Citizens versus Cousins and Brothers-in-Law: the perennial saga 
of change/no-change. 
The societal programmes of Algeria and Tanzania based on a specific 
brand of socialism have been the product of a nationalist elite laying 
down a normative conception of the good society, man and knowledge. A 
shared basic normative statement has been the emphasis on the 
engineering of a 'modern, progressive society, man, and knowledge' with 
the retention of elements of the 'traditional good society'. That is 
one embodied in the pre-capitalist and pre-colonial social organisation 
and cultural values. 
A process of 'modernisation'1 has thus been formulated, adopted and 
implemented, with the condition that it should not operate a rupture 
with 'tradition' but rather 'revive' it. The idyllic 
image given the 
latter in the official rhetoric can be very misleading, as it is not 
corroborated by sociological findings. Instead, it 
is the result of 
emotional apologia for a mythical order, albeit a natural post-colonial 
response to the colonial experience. It 
is also misleading on another 
account. The celebration of a 
'mythical' traditional order conceals 
the survival of 'real' traditional norms which continue to 
inform the 
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world-view of ordinary people as well as members of the political 
elite. And these norms do not always answer the idyllic canons of the 
mythical traditional society of the official rhetoric. This is what the 
'modernising' polities of Algeria and Tanzania have seriously 
disregarded. It will be argued that they have unwittingly paved the way 
to the reinforcement of conservative social trends, thus putting 
socialism at odds with 'specificity'. Indeed, the apparent acquiescence 
of civil society faced with a forceful polity (determined to win the 
battle of 'development'), is largely due to the monolithism of the 
Algerian and Tanzanian political systems. But 'people' have many a way 
to express discontent or opposition as will be shown in this Chapter. 
An orthodox pattern of analysis of 'modernity versus tradition' would 
have disclosed a modernising trend at the one end of the line of change 
undergone by Algerian and Tanzanian societies, and a resisting, 
conservative, traditional one at the other end. However, in view of the 
ambiguities of the official normative discourse of 'specific 
socialism', one is tempted to consider normative inconsistencies within 
the rhetoric, and not only a 'lag' between theory and practice. With 
regard to the position of women in the rhetoric of specific socialism, 
it is pertinent to use ideal typical models of 'tradition' and. 
'modernity' which would not present them as totally dichotomous (as in 
modernisation theory). This would help establish an interaction between 
the two. 
The pattern is drawn from the study of Germaine Tillion2 on the 
persistence of women's marginalisation and domestication in 
Mediterranean society despite the dominant rule of: 
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modern governments which have not hesitated to issue 
legislation in order to try and associate the female half of the population. In vain. Resistance of the 
milieu has constantly been stronger than the law. 
(Tillion, 1966: 21-22) 
Tillion's study is an anthropological investigation into the 
correspondence between a certain type of society based on "tribal 
endogamy" and the "lowliness of the feminine condition" (ibid: 13). She 
argues that women have been debased throughout human history, but their 
subjection has been most consistent in the historical societies whose 
survival was tributary of the retention of the familial and tribal 
patrimony, be it agricultural or pastoral. These societies happen to 
have e en along the stretches of the Mediterranean, and 
throughout the pastoral areas of Asia Minor, reaching as far as Japan 
in the Far East. According to Tillion, such a society, which she calls 
the "Republic of Cousins", has mainly survived through the retention of 
its women thanks to the institution of the "endogamous marriage" within 
the patrilineal line, so as to prevent women from inheriting, and thus 
avoid the atomisation of the tribal patrimony. This society, she claims 
is in sharp contrast with the so-called "savage society" so often 
described by anthropologists as based on the 'exchange of women', ie. 
exogamy'. The practice of the exchange of women has made the on '3 
'savage' society a "Republic of Brothers-in-law" (ibid: 8-10), whereby 
familial and tribal intra-marriage is strictly forbidden. However, as 
in the endogamous 'Republic of Cousins', women had no better or higher 
status in the exogamous 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law' , be it 
patrilineal or matrilineal40 
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The 'Republic of Cousins' is also in opposition with a third republic 
of immediate interest to the present enquiry. That is the "Republic of 
Citizens", namely the modem and modernising republic, which nowadays 
"extends from Peking to New York" (ibid; 8). The 'Republic of Citizens' 
has flourished with the establishment of "structured states" (ibid) 
and: 
... if we consider that the whole world is divided into States, and that big cities have proliferated and 
extended, we may admit that the "republic of citizens" is probably an unavoidable step in human evolution. 
(Tillion, 1966: 23) 
The model of the ' structured state' is what has characterised the 
socio-economic and political developments of Algeria and Tanzania as 
'new nations-states' since Independence in the sixties. The societal 
programme put forward by their respective elites is that of a universal 
'Republic of Citizens'5 whereby: 
men and women are free individuals, equal to their fellow men 
and women, reasonable and only accountable to the state as sole 
regulator of social life; 
society is based on exchange and mobility of its members, who 
are treated equally regardless of sex, since the market economy 
'frees' individuals as labour force; 
knowledge should be scientific and progressive and open to all, 
it should encourage technological subjects so as to help 
society develop, and man be rational. 
Needless to say that in the Algerian and Tanzanian 'Republics of 
Citizens', one is bound to find a mixture of the good man, society and 
knowledge ranging from the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, 
to the Marxist-Leninist model. All these basically represent 
derivations of the 'Universal Modem Model', whereby individuality, 
secularity, and rationality are paramount features. However, members of 
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the 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania have shown 
hesitation in as far as a total adherence to the 'episteme' of the 
West was concerned. The discourse of 'specific socialism' showed that 
they prefered to recourse to their own traditional episteme. This 
hesitation has been dictated somehow by the 'Republic of Cousins' 
(Algeria) and the 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law" (Tanzania) whose 
conceptions of man, society and knowledge may be summarized as follows: 
men and women are subordinated to a corporate community, with 
clear cut distinctions of sex roles; status of individuals is 
based on sex, age and experience rather than talent and 
expertise; 
society is egalitarian in the sense of its members sharing the 
total labour product. It is not equal in the sense that there 
is a strict hierarchy between the sexes and ages. Society is 
reproductive more than it is productive in the sense that it is 
based on subsistence economy, and does not produce a surplus; 
knowledge is the reproduction of past experience, and the 
result of a particular, pragmatic approach and not of systematic 
scientific investigation. It is6not rational but spiritual, is 
magically or religiously induced. 
The above synopsis of the conceptions of 'man(woman), society and 
knowledge' in the three 'Republics' are certainly informed by different 
sources, but they are presented here in a general form so as to grasp 
their rationales. They will be further illustrated in the more detailed 
analysis of social interaction in Algeria and Tanzania, later in this 
Chapter. Suffice it now to present them as alternative paradigms of 
'modernity' and 'tradition'. They interest the present enquiry because 
they suggest a historical development of different agents of social 
change. The purpose behind their adoption is to highlight significant 
and relevant imports other than those of the colonial and post-colonial 
era, and not to give a chronological account of the various 
historical 
experiences in Algeria or Tanzania. Above all, they suggest 
that 
79 
'modernity' and 'tradition' are part of an incessant process of 
change/no-change. 
3.2. Algeria's 'Re public of Cousins' 
The 'traditional' society of Algeria can be easily assimilated to 
Tillion's 'Republic of Cousins' since Algeria belongs to the 
historical-geographical area covered by Tillion's investigation. The 
latter focused on the Mediterranean basin, with a special emphasis on 
societies of North Africa and the Middle East. The practicality of the 
model lies in its reference to the position of women. Thus, instead of 
drawing an extensive descriptive picture of the area's social structure 
and 'superstructure', one is informed about them through one particular 
aspect (ie. women's position). 
The crux of Tillion's model deals with the marginalisation of women 
within a cause and effect paradigm between "tribal endogamy and the 
subjection of women". It is not concerned only with structural 
features, but with the evolution of structures as well: 
Indeed, it is not in the institutions but in the manner 
in which they evolve that I have perceived a 
contradiction or, ... a conflict. And the 
'hiding' of 
women seems to me to result directly from this conflict. 
... The "conflict" 
in question seems to be the product of 
a chronic 'frustration', of a habitual 'aggression' to 
which the organism, - herein: society - responds by a 
'defense posture'. 
(Tillion, 1966: 23) 
Tillion refers for instance to the multifarious and repeated 
aggressions that Mediterranean society has been subject to 
from time 
immemorial. Hence the development of a conservative defence mechanism 
which, "sucks back these societies into a 
dead past, instead of 
thrusting them into the future and the unknown " 
(Tillion: 24). It was 
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for fear of losing its autonomy and its reproduction that the 'Republic 
of Cousins' had developed structural mechanisms which would protect it 
from more universally-oriented types of social organisation. And it is 
in this sense, that the 'Republic of Cousins' had been tightening its 
grip on women's mobility. For instance, Tillion argues that the 
features of the domestication of women in Muslim North Africa have 
been simplistically attributed to the Islamic doctrine. If anything, it 
was in the process of resisting the 'universalistic' claims of the 
Islamic religion that the customs of the North African 'Republic of 
Cousins' became more rigid, especially in the treatment of women. 
7 
Hence the veiling of women, their disinheritance, and imposed 
marriages. However these should be seen instead as customary practices 
of the 'Republic of Cousins" which we can still witness today. Rather 
than stemming from Islamic dictates, they coincide with a number of 
structural developments, which Tillion classifies as follows: 
1. The veil coincides with the city: "Muslim women wear the veil 
only when they dwell in the cities; rural women go round 
unveiled" and "the veil regresses in the cities but progresses 
in villages" (ibid: 25). 
2. Endogamy means nobility: "Nobility, for the Maghrebians, is 
in relation with marriage between cousins of the paternal line; 
... one is nobler when 
descending from a pure endogamous family" 
(ibid: 25). This explains the practice of forced marriage 
which affects mainly young women, while again, Islam insists 
on the8 explicit agreement of the woman or the rejection of the 
offer. 
3. Women inherit where tribes have been destroyed: "... women's 
inheritance destroys the tribe. The whole tribal structure 
relies on the impossibility, for an outsider to claim lineage of 
the ancestor, and to acquire a part in the familial patrimony" 
(ibid: 26-27). Indeed, if women were to inherit or be married to 
outsiders, their part in either case would go to the husband's 
side. In this case, Tillion explains that "To avert the danger, 
the Maghrebians have combined two systems of protection: 
disinherit all the girls (that is violate the Koranic law) and 
marry them systematically to kin members of the paternal line" 
(ibid: 27). 
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4. The destruction of tribes coincides with devotion: as seen 
above, following the Islamic prescription of women's inheritance 
would mean devotion, but also the end of the tribe. The 
'Republic of Cousins' faced the following dilemma: either save 
the tribe by violating devotion to Islam, or abide by the 
Qura'nic law and consequently cause the distintegration of the 
tribe. However, the first alternative was chosen as testified 
by the survival of tribal organisation throughout the medieval 
and Ottoman periods. Even European colonial aggressiveness 
failed to undermine9 customary practices but rather had 
to accommodate them. 
5. Girls are veiled only where they inherit: "it is as if women, 
by acquiring inheritance rights, - that is by acquiring economic 
power - lose disposition over their own person" (ibid: 28). A 
paradoxical result indeed, when it is commonly thought that 
economic autonomy entails power, or at least self-determination. 
But not so in the North African 'Republic of Cousins', which 
creates the veil when conceding inheritance to women. 
Tillion sees a common thread to these five 'coincidgnces' in the 
following manner: 
a. Religious fervour imposes female inheritance; 
b. Female inheritance destroys the tribe; 
c. The destroyed tribe admits strangers; 
d. The fathers then veil their daughters, so as to keep them 
for the family's sons... . (Tillion, 1966: 29) 
Thus Tillion's demonstration implies that Islamic teachings in North 
Africa are by and large principles conducive to a 
'Republic of 
Citizens', and not as generally thought to a 'Republic of 
Cousins', 
which incidentally has circumvented Islamic precepts on women's 
treatment for fourteen centuries. In fact, the 
implementation of 
Islamic injunctions was bound to break apart the tribal system while 
it 
erected cities and dynasties, and created new allegiances 
to a central 
government headed by a Khalifah , 
10 
a temporal ruler more than a 
spiritual one. It also 
broke through the reproductive subsistence 
barriers of the tribal system by establishing 
trade routes, and an 
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extensive tax system. For this it needed a layer of middlemen and 
government officials to carry out the task of tax collection, and thus 
established a hierarchical order. This new political, social and 
economic organisation of an expanding empire threatened the closed 
world of the endogamous, self-sufficient, egalitarian tribal system of 
North Africa. The seventh century Arab conquerors were bringing no 
other than a typical 'Republic of Citizens' to impose onto the 
'Republic of Cousins' of North Africa. Subsequently, the ideal 
normative and institutional patterns of the 'Universal Islamic 
Republic' were likely to clash with the actual normative and 
institutional patterns of the North African 'Republic of Cousins'. More 
interestingly, they were to develop into travestied expressions of the 
ideal patterns following interaction with local customs, so much so 
that today most students of Islam talk about 'orthodox' and 'popular' 
Islam. 11 The first is considered a higher form, whilst the second 
accommodates a variety of customs and beliefs legitimised in the name 
of Islam, but remain alien to the body of its teachings and scholarly 
traditions. In Algeria, this is well illustrated by the 1930s 
'religious' reformist movement of the Ulamaa of which more later. 
3.2.1. Ibn Khaldun on the Maghrebian 'Republic of Cousins' 
The best testimony on the meagre structural changes brought in by the 
Islamic expansion is to be found in the writings of the fourteenth 
century Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun, renowned for his systematic study 
of 'Maghiebian' medieval society. 
12 Ibn Khaldun was concerned with the 
repetitive pattern of rising and falling dynasties of medieval 
Islam, 
and particularly of North Africa, which, 
in the making seemed to evolve 
according to a cyclical process. 
Lack of space in the present research 
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prevents us from expanding on Ibn Khaldun's theory of society. Suffice 
it to note those of his observations which help corroborate Tillion's 
hypothesis on the survival of the 'Republic of Cousins' in the very 
midst of the Muslim empire. 
First of all, Ibn Khaldun draws attention to the dominance of the 
tribal structure, and the role of tribes in the seizure of political 
power. According to his pattern, it was the rural tribe, badw which 
invaded the city, hadhar (a term which can be translated into 
'civilisation'). The complex structure of the hadhar is alleged by Ibn 
Khaldun to lead to the weakening of blood ties and the esprit de 
corps or assabiyya needed for the retention of power. On the 
contrary the austere, and puritan way of life of the rural tribes 
enhances their assabiyya thus helps them covet and seize political 
power. However, the new triumphant tribe, which was most of the time a 
federation of tribes, established in the city and became 'civilised' in 
its turn, in the sense that it espoused an urban way of life whose 
refinement, Ibn Khaldun argued, was bound to undermine its esprit de 
corps . After "three generations and 
five phases" (Ibn Khaldun, 1965: 
112-115) of urbanite prosperity, the now loosened dynasty established 
in the city was in its turn overthrown by a new warrior-tribe, and the 
cycle went on. 
It is essential to understand that the concept of assabiyya evolves 
around kin and lineage, (ie. around a biological conception of cohesion 
guaranteed by close blood ties). Hence the preference for the 
endogamous marriage, and the conception of "honour and nobility 
[as 
resulting] only in the absence of mingling" (Ibn Khaldün, ibid: 
71). 
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Ibn Khaldun's description of political change in fourteenth century 
Maghrib goes beyond the descriptive stage to propose a theory of social 
change. His cyclical model of rotative rather than cumulative change 
helps shed some light on the resisting mechanisms of the 'Republic of 
Cousins' in North Africa, and the inability of the Islamic empire to 
undermine such mechanisms. If anything, the empire's 'universalistic' 
claims seemed to have been absorbed by the North African 'Republic of 
Cousins' and transformed into 'particularistic' ones. Suffice it to 
remember that for the lay observer, women's subjection in the Islamic 
areas is automatically attributed to the very philosophy of Islam and 
its cosmogony. Whereas Tillion's research very helpfully unveiled the 
structural reasons for such a subjection (ie. the pastoral-nomadic and 
segmentary nature of social organisation in the Mediteranean basin, the 
Middle-East and Asia-minor, and the ensuing practice of endogamy as 
detrimental to women). The Islamic empire could expand the faith, but 
could never tame the tribes. For Islam itself emanated from one of the 
centres of the segmentary, pastoral-nomadic society prevalent in the 
Arabian peninsula. Whilst the Islamic doctrine provided a 
'universalistic' and 'individualistic' rhetoric, it did not upset the 
autonomy of the tribal order which is at the core of pastoral-nomadic 
and segmentary society (ie. the 'Republic of Cousins'). 
As Gellner put it, Ibn Khaldun's major contribution was to teach us 
(in the case of medieval Maghrebian society) that "the preconditions of 
civilisation and of cohesion are mutually antithetical" (Gellner, 
1981: 88). Accordingly, in order to remain cohesive, the North African 
'Republic of Cousins', which was by and large a segmentary, 
pastoral-nomadic society, rejected all that was susceptible to 
incur 
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'civilisation' in the Khaldunian sense. In fact, it strove to retain 
its autonomy vis 6 vis the city and the state. It never allowed the 
city to extort from it a surplus, but rather acted as a consumer of 
artisan goods which it could not produce. It is yet again Ibn Khaldun 
who informs us about the unorthodoxy of the pastoral segmentary 
society: 
Note that they [the Bedouin] need the townsmen for the 
necessities of life, while the townsmen need the Bedouin 
only for conveniences and luxuries. The Bedouin thus 
need the cities... . As long as they remain in the ba diya [the countryside] and do not found a monarchy, 
they will need the townsmen. 
(Ibn Khaldun, 1965: 100) 
As Gellner said, "this is an astonishing statement to European ears , 
13 
and indeed to all ears used to the widespread pattern of the cities' 
dependence on rural surplus. Another paradox is that in view of this 
exclusively consumer position, Bedouin society did not have to modify 
profoundly its social organisation, despite its dependency. This is 
mainly due to its political rebelliousness to any central authority, 
such as a state or a city-state, which would encapsulate it into a 
system of taxation, and political hierarchy. Two fundamental antitheses 
of its deeply ingrained egalitarianism. 
This was the 'Republic' which defied the Roman one, outdared Islam by 
turning a deaf ear to its 'feminist' claims on women's right to 
inherit, took refuge in the solidarity provided by its customary and 
religious practices in the struggle against colonial rule, and is 
today trying to resist the edicts of a 'democratic and popular 
republic', 
14 
especially where women's rights and family regulation are 
at stake. Can one conclude therefore that it is a conservative republic 
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par excellence ? Or has its conservatism been developed in the wake of 
its struggle (defence mechanisms) for its autonomous existence as 
Tillion tried to suggest? 
So far, the model of the 'Republic of Cousins' has been built largely 
on the characteristics of pre-capitalist North African society, as 
part of a socio-cultural and geographical whole where endogamy was a 
dominant practice. Contrast has been drawn between this model as 
typifying the 'traditional' pastoral-nomadic and segmentary society of 
North Africa, 15 and the model of the Islamic 'Republic of Citizens' 
established as a conquering power and later developing into the 
dominant pattern of North Africa, which it metamorphosed into the 
'Maghreb'. 16 Emphasizing the Islamic import as 'universalistic' and 
'individualistic' should not be interpreted as an apology of Islam. 
Rather, it is to help comprehend the accumulation of the 
change/no-change processes which have led to the present 
marginalisation of women in Algerian society, as part of the Islamic 
social and cultural ensemble. In its own way, Islam was a 'modernizing' 
agent in Berber North Africa in the sense of opening a 'larger world' 
to its scattered ethnies. Yet, the Islamic empire was not entirely 
successful in undermining the autonomy of the Berber communities which 
continued to disinherit their women, and keep them in their midst 
through endogamous marriages. This did not only mean a considerable 
lack of movement for women, but a continuation of the closed social 
scale of the 'Cousin' type. Acceptance of Islam as a religious creed 
prevented clashes with its ideal 'Republic of Citizens'. 
Instead, it 
helped develop confusing situations whereby Cousin-type customs are 
legitimised in the name of Islam, as will be shown in Chapter 4. 
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3.3. Tanzania's 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law' 
The model of the 'Republic of Cousins' developed for Algeria could not 
be extended to Tanzania because of its close identification with 
endogamy. Instead, the model of what Tillion termed the 'Republic of 
Brothers-in-law' will be applied to encompass the 'resisting' social 
actors in contemporary Tanzanian society (ie. the elements of 
no-change). Earlier we have seen that Tillion coined the term to 
designate the so-called 'savage' societies in the human kaleidoscope. 
Her reproduction of the colonial expression 'savage' was made with a 
tinge of irony in it, as it drew attention to the violent European 
onslaught on such societies as exemplified by the North American 
tribes, the Australian aborigines and the numerous hunter-gatherer 
populations of Africa; all perceived as 'savage' by colonial 
anthropology. This so-called 'savage' society was characterized, 
inter alia , by its strict practice of exogamy. This was the general 
social pattern which prevailed in 'native' Tanzanian societies till 
their interaction with what Iliffe called the 'larger world'17 of 
medieval Islamic mercantilism and nineteenth century European 
colonisation, two forms of the 'Republic of Citizens'. 
However, the pattern has survived as Tanzania's 'peasant' society. It 
is characterised mainly by small-scale subsistence agricultural 
production, within the family or the tribe. 
18 The ensuing social 
structure is egalitarian in the sense that the produce is by and large 
equally shared between the members of the family and the tribe. 
19 This 
subsistence economy not only means that there is no production of 
surplus but also that the family and the tribe are relatively 
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autonomous. This is the type of society which practices what Goran 
Hyden has called " the economy of affection". He explains that: 
In the economy of affection, economic action is not 
motivated by individual profit alone, but is embedded in 
a range of social considerations that allow for 
redistribution of opportunities and benefits in a manner 
which is impossible where modem capitalism or socialism 
prevails and formalized state action dominates the 
process of distribution. 
(Hyden, 1980: 19) 
The notion of the 'economy of affection' is very useful in that it is 
contrasted with the type of impersonal production relations of the 
'Republic of Citizens'(be it capitalist or socialist). In the case of 
Tanzania , the capitalist form was embodied in the German and British 
colonial administrations, which succeeded each other in the first half 
of this century; and the socialist form in the post-independence 
societal programme of modernisation. 
The 'economy of affection' based on household production is 
characterised by: 
-a rudimentary division of labour; 
- little exchange between small units of production; 
- the provision for domestic needs alone; 
- cooperation manifested at time of emergency; 
- planning related to socially reproductive needs. 
This type of socio-economic organisation informs a specific social 
logic and world-view whereby the conceptions of man, society and 
knowledge are antithetical to those of the 'Republic of Citizens' seen 
above. In the Tanzanian peasant 'Republic of Brothers-in-law': 
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Man is not an individual distinct from the group, but is 
subordinate to the corporate household. His status is not 
commensurate to his possessions, but to his age. Men and women 
are not equal and perform well defined chores. Although women 
are essential in production, 20 they are mainly perceived as reproducers, hence inferior. 
Society is egalitarian in the -sense that the total labour 
product is shared between the members of the community. But it 
is not equal or democratic as there is no scope for individual 
action or opinion. It presents very little21 hierarchy outside 
that defined by gender and generation. Reproduction of the same organisational pattern prevails, as well as kinship and 
communal ties rather than impersonal ones. 
Knowledge is based on past experience; it is immediate and not 
universal; it is practical and pragmatic but within a 
reproductory process and not a systematic scientific one. It 
is also22 magical and mythical pertaining to extra-human 
'forces'. 
These conceptions of man (woman), society and knowledge of the peasant 
'Republic of Brothers-in-law' were likely to clash with those of the 
modernising 'Republic of Citizens'. Their interaction has been well 
depicted by Hyden in his study of the implementation of the 
societal programme in Tanzania. He rightly points out that the 
programme proceeds from the attempt at subordinating small peasants 
to the State and the new social 'classes' which emerged in the wake of 
nation-building. In this process, the previous colonial administrations 
had paved the way in trying to extort a surplus out of the 
small-holding peasants, and had perturbed the local pre-capitalist 
socio-economic organisation by creating export-oriented cash-crop 
agriculture. However, the colonial and formal nature of this kind of 
capitalist exploitation prevented the total disruption of the 
pre-capitalist social organisation of the prevailing 'Republic of 
Brothers-in-law'. This latter could still maintain a fair margin of 
autonomy thanks to the continuing practice of subsistence agriculture. 
Hyden argues that the same pattern of resistance and protection 
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provided under colonialism, is used by the peasant household in times 
of national independence and 'socialist construction', mainly as 
embodied in Ujamaa : 
The real problem of Ujamaa is that the material base of 
the peasant mode was far too narrow for a rapid 
socialist transformation. In addition, the structural 
constraint of the peasant mode, encountered efforts to 
bring the peasants to meet the demands of capitalism, 
operated also against a socialist transformation. The 
above account does not imply that the peasants in 
Tanzania are uninterested or incapable of change. The 
problem is that they are unwilling, and usually unable, 
to achieve it at a pace, and to an extent that other 
social classes demand of them. Socialist transformation 
is as taxing on the peasants as capitalist development. 
(Hyden, 1980: 124-125) 
Thus Hyden draws our attention to the point of 'resistance to change' 
by the Tanzanian 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law' not as an intrinsic 
feature, but as a defence mechanism. The Ujamaa societal programme in 
Tanzania proceeds after all from the logic typical of a 'Republic of 
Citizens' in that it threatens to subordinate the peasant communities, 
by 'liberating' their individual members as citizens of the State, free 
to sell their labour, and by invalidating peasant knowledge by making 
it dependent on modern expertise and know-how. 
In constructing ideal typical models for the 'traditional' societies 
prevalent in Algeria and Tanzania, and by contrasting them with a model 
of the 'modem' 'Republic of Citizens', the aim was less to emphasize 
'intrinsic' features than to draw attention to the dynamics behind 'the 
resistance to change' of so-called 'traditional' societies. The 
pertinent findings of Tillion on the mechanisms of the 'Republic of 
Cousins' in the Mediterranean basin does not only bear directly on the 
question of the subjection of women, but 
breaks away from the 
simplistic assumption which assimilates traditionalism with 
Islam. That 
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this latter is seen by Tillion as a form of 'modernising' 'Republic of 
Citizens' is quite novel. On the other hand, the tenacious survival of 
the 'Republic of Cousins' in the Maghrib, due to its 'absence of 
mingling', is further supported by the Khaldunian theory of social 
change in agro-pastoral and nomadic societies. In contemporary 
terminology, he informs us that they are 'cohesive' when and because 
they are neither state-prone nor city-prone. 
They are so organised that they can resist the state 
without, at the same time, crystallising a state in 
their own midst. This is the central feature of their 
social organisation. It is egalitarian. 
(Gellner, 1979: 189) 
It is significant that the same 'feature' has been pointed out by Hyden 
as the source for the stateophobia of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' 
in Tanzania. His metaphor of the 'uncaptured peasantry' and their 
'being powerful because they are small' (and we should add scattered), 
is very much reminiscent of the Khaldunian austere, cohesive and 
autonomous badw . Another significant similarity 
between the North 
African badawi and the East-African peasant is that they approach the 
city-state and the city-market as consumers and not as producers. 
Accordingly, they evade 'capture' by the dominant classes in the 
city-state by not producing the surplus so badly needed by these in 
order to construct their 'Republic of Citizens'. 
Our two 'traditional' republics, that of the 'Cousins' in Algeria, and 
the 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania prove still that the history of the 
peasantry is far from being a 'closed chapter'23 in Africa. 
Ironically, 
the independent socialist states of Algeria and Tanzania are confronted 
with the task of capturing these 
'resisting' Republics economically and 
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socially, while creating new legitimations based on science, progress 
and the work-ethic. Just how successful they have been in this process 
for the last two decades, can be depicted in the implementation of 
societal programmes aimed at 'modernising' the two countries. 
Accordingly, the next section will examine some selected policies of 
'development' in Algeria and Tanzania and their reception by the 
'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law'. 
3.4. The National 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania: 
Three Decades of Nation-building. 
Following Independence in the early 1960s, the nationalist elites of 
Algeria and Tanzania embarked on formidable societal programmes, along 
the framework of 'nation-building', (the international catchword which 
followed in the footsteps of decolonisation). Although a great deal 
may differ between the two contexts; notably the nature of the colonial 
occupation and the process of national liberation; 
24 the post-colonial 
political elites shared similarities in the voluntarist and populist 
nature of their 'nation-building'. Both political regimes boasted an 
ideological rhetoric which purported to be both anti-capitalist and 
anti-Marxist. The ensuing ideology was to be a special 
brand of 
socialism, owing more to an alleged pre-colonial egalitarianism, than 
to the Western ideal of socialism. 
Accordingly, an eclectic, pragmatic, and modernist conception of 
individual, society, and knowledge has marked both societal programmes. 
Although the blueprints containing these have shifted since 
Independence, as national and international conjunctures changed, the 
mainstream argument 
has remained a nationalist one. Thus, although 
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there has been a steady tendency towards 'economic liberalisation' 
since the late seventies and early eighties in both countries, the 
legitimation of such a move from earlier radicalism, remains national 
unity. In actual policy formulation and implementation this continues 
to mean a paramount concern for the reinforcement of the state 
apparatus, and a desperate search for ways and means to reinforce 
economic efficiency. 
What is interesting to note about the Algerian and Tanzanian political 
regimes is their continuity and stability since the mid-sixties. 
25 This 
should not mean that their elites have shown a high degree of 
cohesiveness. If anything, the frequent changes in the political 
'teams' and the discreet discarding of officials, reflect an 
undercurrent of internecine struggles. However, both governments have 
consistently posed as anti-imperialist and non-aligned regimes in the 
international scene, and as serious and reliable forces of social and 
economic 'development'. 
Typical modernist 'Republics of Citizens' have steadily been 
established in Algeria and Tanzania, led by 'elites' which proved 
skilful in striking a balance between the pressures of international 
capital, and the 'resistance' mechanisms of the internal 'traditional 
social formations' of the Algerian 'Cousins' and the Tanzanian 
'Brothers-in-Law'. This has been achieved through the 
"nationalitarian process" (Abdel-Malek, 1965: 16-17) which followed in 
the wake of national independence. The term 'nationalitarian' proves to 
be more accurate than nationalist in that it 
depicts external as well 
as internal action. Externally, this 
has been mainly translated in 
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terms of economic and diplomatic policies, such as the nationalisation 
of foreign holdings and adherence to the non-aligned movement in an 
attempt to counter imperialist hegemony of either West or East. 
Internally, the supremacy of national unity has led to the growth of 
the public sector, and the consolidation of the State vis a vis civil 
society. In this process it is worth noting the relative weakness of 
political coercion exercised by the modernising 'Republic of Citizens' 
in Algeria and Tanzania. This is largely due to their populist 
celebration of the 'masses' and the formidable investments in social 
and welfare institutions which have brought about an appreciable 
improvement in the standards of living at a national level. Hence the 
aura of 'national consensus' obtained in both cases by the lack of 
support of any one group or any one social class, exclusive of the 
others. In each context, due to the opaque social structure whereby 
social classes have not crystallised and elite recruitment has 
remained relatively open, political and social dissent has been 
minimised. It is remarkable that in the last twenty years, the history 
of the Algerian and Tanzanian regimes has not been marred by major 
antagonisms, but rather presented an appearance of unity and continuity 
rarely matched in other parts of the African continent. 
However, it is time to consider more closely some of the modernising 
policies brought about by the 'Republic of Citizens' in each country. 
This should clarify the nature and composition of such a Republic, and 
highlight policies which have caused it to interact with the 
traditional formations of the Algerian 'Cousins' and the Tanzanian 
'Brothers-in-law'. It will be interesting to find out whether we are 
in the presence of discrete models, or whether they are likely to 
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overlap. Accordingly, it is worth asking if the 'Citizens' have been 
systematically modernists, or whether they are not sometimes caught in 
the web of their eclectic and inconsistent normative statements which 
favour the retention of certain features of the very society they are 
out to modernise? 
In order to examine the impact of the modernising process in Algeria 
and Tanzania throughout the sixties, seventies and early eighties, 
Holmes's notion of 'change/no-change' will be used to depict the 
normative, institutional and environmental background of the adopted 
policies. Particular attention will be given to their reception by the 
residual 'Republics of Citizens and Brothers-in-Law'. Given the 
wholistic dimension of the Algerian and Tanzanian societal programmes 
since the emergence of each independent republic, it would be beyond 
the scope of the present investigation to provide a comprehensive 
treatment of all policies involved. However, a selection of major 
policies can be conveniently adopted. 
The Algerian and Tanzanian ruling elites seem to have shared similar 
preoccupations as to the priorities of their respective 
'nation-building'. Their position vis ä vis international capital as 
former colonies, and as recipients of technology transfer and 
'cultural borrowing', has influenced internal developments. However 
categorising them as mere extensions of developments on the world 
scene would not do justice to some independent and single-minded 
decisions which have affected policy formulation and implementation in 
these two countries. The evolution of political and ideological 
adjustments since independence, and the ensuing policies, will 
help 
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disclose the mechanisms of leadership recruitment through the inter- 
vention of various social contenders. 
On the whole, internal political and socio-economic developments in 
Algeria and Tanzania have been characterised by: 
1. a preoccupation for institutional building with a strong 
emphasis on state and administration (Algeria) and party (Tanzania), as well as the recovery of economic sovereignty 
through the nationalisation of foreign assets, banks and 
insurance companies, in the mid and late sixties. 
2. launching of formidable economic programmes such as 
industrialisation, and agrarian reforms (this took place in 
the early and mid seventies, and constituted a radicalisation 
in policy-making compared to the piecemeal process of the 
sixties) and at the same time, the accompanying political 
jargon articulated more radical conceptualisations of 
socialism, and the slogan of 'participation' predominated. 
3. a sudden shift in 
'liberalised' formula 
private sector, 
economic (Algeria) 
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capital (Tanzania) 
marked the late 
policy formulation from radical to more 
ae involving a new appraisal of the 
emphasis on the social rather than the 
and 'surrender' to international 
hitherto so staunchly resisted have 
seventies and early and mid-eighties. 
Objections might be raised against the claim herewith, that there 
have been similarities in the decision-making process of Tanzania and 
Algeria, given the different nature of their national liberation 
processes. Indeed, Algeria fought a long and bitter war against French 
colonialism (1954-1962), 
28 
while Tanzania achieved independence almost 
'hand-in-hand' with the British colonial administration. 
29 It has been 
argued for instance, that wars of liberation have brought about 
radical political parties as supreme organisms of direction and 
control, while piecemeal decolonisation has induced stronger legis- 
lative instances: 
only in countries that have gained their independence 
through armed struggle, as in the territories of 
Portuguese-speaking Africa, have political parties 
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developed a capacity for decision making equal to 
TANU's. TANU is thus the exception rather than the rule. 
(Okumu, 1979: 61-62) 
However, as will be seen below, this does not apply to the Algerian 
FLN party (Front de Liberation Nationale), the initiator of the war of 
liberation which raged between 1954 and 1962. The weak post- 
independence role of the FLN remains to this day a maverick develop- 
ment of the revolutionary part it played as a rallying force in 
the war of national liberation. 
30 In contrast, TALAU (Tanganyika African 
National Union), later to become Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary 
Party) of Tanzania, evolved into a relatively strong political 
instance, where radical militants predominated. 
31 Whereas, Algeria's 
FLN was deserted by its radical elements as early as 1963-64, and was 
later to become the shadowy figure of Algerian politics. 
3.5. The Euphoric Sixties 
It is important to observe that colonies were managed in 
a manner similar to that of an administrative state in 
which decision-making powers are centralised in the 
state bureaucracy while organised politics, if allowed 
to exist, is kept to the barest minimum. 
(Okumu, 1979: 43) 
Although it was precisely this state of affairs that African national 
movements fought against, most independent African countries 
have been 
ruled by administrative state bureaucracies, rather than representative 
governments. This has usually been ascribed to an alleged 
'political 
immaturity' of African regimes, thus overlooking the inception and 
institutionalisation of such process under colonial conditions. On the 
whole, the colonisers' consent to enfranchise the colonised came most 
of the time as a last resort to retain the colony, or secure 
its 
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'dependence' after decolonisation. 
32 Hence the formalism of political 
participation. 
At Independence, Algeria and Tanzania inherited precisely such 
conditions of political decision-making. Apart from a brief spell of 
parliamentary rule in the early sixties, the enforcement of the state 
(Algeria) and party (Tanzania) took over from the mid-sixties. 
3.5.1. Algeria 
In Algeria, a military coup on 19 June 1965 overthrew the civilian 
government and dissolved the National Assembly following heated 
internecine power struggles, which involved advocates of legislative 
power against those who favored the predominance of the executive 
apparatus. The period 1962-1965 was marked by attempts of democratic 
management of the economy with the burgeoning of 1'autogestion 
agricole (agricultural self-management), whereby farmers took over 
vast colonial properties to run them as co-operatives. It was also a 
period of active radical and militant thinking which produced the most 
progressive documents of Algeria's recent history. The 1963 
Constitution and the 1964 Charte d'Alger (Algiers Charter) are 
testimonies of this radical era. Above all it was a period of heated 
debates at the National Assembly where various opinions were 
represented, notwithstanding the unitarianism of national reconst- 
ruction (Quandt, 1969). It was to prove fatal for the civilian 
political institutions. The 1965 military coup led by Colonel 
Boumediene put an end to what was seen as 'formal democratism' and 
political confusion, as well as a threat for the unity of the nation. 
No better than Boumediene himself, (later to become President until 
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his death in December 1978), has expressed the motivations behind what 
he called "the revolutionary adjustment" of 19 June. A content analysis 
of his speeches on the event disclose three main obsessions: 
1. revolt against individual leadership as a reaction to the 
cult of personality style of the demised President Ben Bella; 
2. the engineering of the state as the best guarantor of national unity; 
3. organisation of the economy in a disciplinary and efficient 
manner. 
The following passage33 refers to these aspects, which countless 
declarations by Boumediene repeatedly emphasized over the years. On the 
first anniversary of the coup, Boumediene declared: 
The 19th of June is a return to the sources, to the past 
of the Revolution, to collective leadership, to the 
distribution of responsibilities at all levels of the 
Party and the State. The 19th of June means also the 
construction of the Algerian State, the reinforcement of 
the FLN. ... Finally, it entails the reorganisation of the national economy, ... the achievement of 
revolutionary unity on the basis of the FLN principles 
and not on imported ideas... . 
(in Mameri, 1975: 35) 
Later, when commemorating the coup in 1973, he reiterated most of these 
points: 
On 19 June 1965 we promised to provide the country with 
stability and calm, while organising the economy which 
is of capital importance. ... We promised to create institutions capable of outliving both men and events. 
... We had proclaimed our will to construct a State 
worthy of respect both inside and outside. We had 
pledged to liberate the country's economy. 
(in Mameri, 1975: 38-39) 
Boumediene's declarations and speeches abounded in the direction of the 
strengthening of the state seen as "an indispensible and vital 
question" (ibid: 121-2), and indeed a series of measures were taken to 
extend state control over the whole country. A new territorial, 
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administrative and political organisation was launched with the 1967 
Communal Reform and the 1969 Departmental Reform whereby administration 
became a tool for 'participation'. It has been argued that such 
reliance on the strengthening of local and national administration is a 
'pragmatic' device, which bears an astonishing resemblance to old 
colonial practices (Aboutaki, 1974: 324). Although the authorities had 
proclaimed that they envisaged decentralisation, it was never made 
clear whether this meant administrative or political decentralisation. 
What was made clear was that 'delegation' of central power and not 
'devolution' or 'derogation' was the aim (Riggs, 1964: 344); especially 
at the level of the wilaya (district) where the wali (or prefect) 
is appointed as a state representative and not elected. Whereas the 
head of the daira (commune), the lower echelon in the administrative 
hierarcy, is proposed by the FLN party, and elected in national local 
elections. The charter of the Wilaya makes it clear that: 
This decentralisation is not meant to give any autonomy 
for the wilaya, because our State is a unitarian State. 
It is only a technique towards a greater active 
participation of the wilaya and the popular masses to 
revolutionary power. 
(in Leca, 1973: 225) 
One cannot fail to note the recurrence of 'technique' as a key symbol 
in Algerian politics in which political integration is more a matter of 
administrative and technical efficiency. The 'technicalisation' of 
politics, and the politicisation of technique are not alternatives in 
the Algerian case. They go hand in hand in the realm of administrative 
and political control. In other words, the state in Algeria has 
decentralised in order to permit greater political integration 
(political control); but has retained tight control over local 
institutions which play the role of representatives of the central 
authorities rather than locally elected bodies. 
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The consolidation of the state apparatuses between 1965 and the early 
seventies, did not involve local administrative reforms alone. 
However, they remain the most telling example of the technocratic 
conception of decentralisation and participation which characterised 
Algerian politics in the sixties. The pre-eminence of the state over 
the party was quite clear in view of the formulation of economic 
programmes which needed swift adoption and implementation. 
Thus, hand in hand with state consolidation came economic 
structuration. The recovery of national resources was a priority 
together with the creation of state companies. The state proceeded to 
nationalise totally the banking sector as early as 1966-67, and created 
its own banks. A rigorous control of the banking system helped reach a 
necessary financial balance for the launching of socio-economic 
programmes. The most conspicuous economic policy of the period was the 
launching of heavy industries, with the adoption of the policy of 
'industrialising industries'. The chief objective was to provide 
Algeria with a basic heavy industry which would provoke a chain of 
reaction in light industry generation and job creation. The idea was to 
create conditions for import-substitution with the help of industries 
of equipment; seen as the only way towards the "fulfillment of economic 
autonomy, the attainment of growth and the necessarily ensuing social 
transformation" (Benissad, 1982: 142). The industrial effort was 
impressive, absorbing 51.6% of the total investments of the first Three 
Year-Plan (1967-69) (Benissad, 1982: 46-47). 
Going hand in hand with the strengthening of the state and the 
expansion of industrialisation, there was heavy investment in formal 
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education as part of the overall technocratic package for the creation 
of a 'modern' citizen, society and knowledge in Algeria. Emphasis was 
put on all cycles of the formal educational system, but hardly at all 
on the informal sector of adult education and adult literacy, as will 
be examined in Chapter 5. 
In summary, the sixties in Algeria were marked by the consolidation of 
executive power over the legislative and the ideological, with a 
significant absence of party action. There was a formidable expansion 
of all state apparatuses, but mainly of the administrative functions, 
for a tighter control (integration) of the national territory, as well 
as an expansion of economic planning and the launching of ambitious 
import-substitution industries. Strong organisational and economic 
bases were launched by a leadership which had shown a fervent 
commitment to state power, and economic competence and performance. 
Although revolutionary legitimacy was not questioned, a new ideological 
and political discourse based on an economistic and developmentalist 
philosophy became paramount. Save for the former political groups and 
some regional military personalities, the new political team met very 
little opposition. It was by and large accepted that the army should 
reinforce a threatened national unity, and launch the bases for 
national development. 
The new military team was very quick in co-opting all strata of the 
civil service, a pragmatic move which was to prove extremely efficient 
in securing the new economistic and developmentalist choices: 
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Along with the elimination of the past political elite 
and the establishment of an internal cohesion within the 
army's structure of authority, the new Algerian regime 
strengthened its hold on the economy and the 
administration by recruiting civil servants and technicians in such a way that the congruence between 
military and managerial elites was maximised. 
(Hermassi, 1975: 167) 
In conclusion, social change in Algeria in the sixties was charac- 
terised by: 
normative change noted for its eclectism linking revolutionary 
rhetoric with a developmentalist and modernist one; 
institutional change translated into formidable economic and 
social infrastructural projects with a special emphasis on 
administrative and economic efficiency; 
environmental change with the systematic exploitation of the 
national resources, especially mining and oil. 
Behind these changes there was a reasonably cohesive political elite, 
"contending only with weak vested interests, ... and pursuing a policy 
independent of various social classes" (Hermassi, 1975: 155). However, 
in as far as this political elite gave prominence to the executive in 
its outlook and policies, it was supported by a "variety of petit 
bourgeois clienteles" (Raffinot & Jacquemot, 1977: 77) who aspired to 
extend and preserve privileges and interests built up in the course of 
the policy choices mentioned above. However, the comprehensiveness of 
the societal package earned it an unequivocal support from all quarters 
of the population, as social mobility increased, and no clear cut class 
divisions riddled Algerian society as yet. The regime could then be 
said to have achieved a fair amount of success in securing its 
philosophy of unitarianism and economic efficacy. 
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3.5.2. Tanzania 
The sixties in Tanzania were also characterised by the introduction of 
significant institutional changes, albeit under the aegis of one single 
outstanding personality, that of Julius K. Nyerere, rather than a 
'collective' leadership. Indeed, the personality of Nyerere started to 
mark Tanzania's life as early as 1954 when TANU was created to take 
over political power in 1961. The charisma of Nyerere could be said to 
have determined most of Tanzania's development strategy for two decades 
and a half until he retired in 1985. 
Again as in the case of Algeria, the sixties, and especially the mid 
and late sixties were marked by institution-building. However unlike 
the Algerian leadership, the Tanzanian elite, under the instigation of 
Nyerere, sought to strengthen the role of the party. Consequently 
ideological matters were at the forefront in the process of 
nation-building. Nyerere for instance, resigned as prime minister in 
January 1962 to write and think about a societal programme for Tanzania 
(Coulson, 1982: 136). He came out from his retirement to propose a 
presidential regime and a one party system for Tanzania. But 
he was 
also armed with one of the most original reflections on African 
socialism, thus strengthening his reputation as the enlightened 
leader 
and moral teacher: the Mwalimu. The document was called 
Ujamaa: The 
Basis of African Socialism (1962). In it Nyerere advocated a socialism 
based on the pre-colonial and pre-capitalist social organisation 
to 
which he ascribed a natural egalitarianism 
due to the self-reliance of 
the households as units of production. He translated Ujamaa as 
'familyhood' and exorted his compatriots to revive it as "a mentality, 
a state of mind" (Nyerere, 1962). 
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Although a period of confusion followed Independence in the early 
years: a coup attempt, and an army mutiny in 1964, (which both failed), 
Nyerere was back in control. He successfully managed to divert 
national opinion towards institutional and economic building. In 1965 
(also a watershed in Tanzania's recent history) a new constitution was 
adopted consecrating TANU as the only legitimate party, thus giving it 
a constitutional status allowing it "to function in governmental 
capacities" (Bienen, 1967: 198). At the same time, the former in- 
dependence Parliament was transformed into a National Assembly in 
October 1965 (Nyerere, 1970: 86). 
As in Algeria, the Tanzanian leadership proceeded to expand the economy 
once administrative reorganisation had taken place. Planning was chosen 
as the most rational device for a comprehensive economic strategy. The 
1961-64 Three Year-Plan and the 1965-69 Five Year-Plan launched the 
bases of infrastructural facilities, with a heavy emphasis on 
agriculture and education. Although, unlike Algeria, Tanzania could not 
afford launching programmes of heavy industries in view of the limited 
mineral resources. However, the same nationalist spirit was animating 
the Tanzanian leadership. In 1967 a comprehensive wave of 
nationalisations took over foreign banks, insurance companies, food 
industries and export-import bodies thus securing state control but 
also expanding the 'Africanisation' of the civil service so badly 
needed for the credibility of the party in power. Indeed TANU had 
always advocated the Africanisation of the civil service, in all 
sectors as a priority. However, the greatest emphasis rested with 
agriculture as the sector occupied 90 per cent of Tanzania's 
population. 
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So great was the country's dependence on agriculture, especially on the 
cash crop sector, that Nyerere issued yet again another revolutionary 
blue-print in 1967 unequivocally binding Tanzania's fate to its 
agricultural policy: The Arusha Declaration. 
Initially, this meant nationalizing the commanding heights of the economy, promoting communal production in 
rural "Ujamaa" villages, and adopting a policy of "education for self-reliance" which integrated 
agricultural work into the primary school curriculum. It 
also included a "leadership code" which prohibited 
senior state officials from holding more than one job, from having shares in or directing private companies, 
from owning rental property and from employing wage 
labour. 
(Mueller, 1980: 13) 
However, the Declaration became renowned for the Mwalimu's vision of 
a uniform agrarian society in Tanzania, orderly gathered in villages 
and performing communal work, which was to directly benefit the 
villagers. Thus he advocated the 'villagisation' of Tanzania, insisting 
that this should be achieved through "persuasion" and "participation" 
of those concerned, ie. the peasant masses. However these latter were 
to be at the receiving end of the policy, and consequently were not the 
only ones 'to change'. Indeed, as a visionary and as a modernist 
Nyerere tended to overlook the dramatic changes which were likely to 
take place among the 'implementors' of the vision, ie. the countless 
administrators and bureaucrats, either of the party or state apparatus, 
who were all too eager to carry out the operation in view of the gains 
they were likely to extract from it in their capacity of 'power 
intermediaries'. In advocating free will in the creation of communal 
Ujamaa villages, Nyerere remained rather ambiguous, trying to 
accomodate the peasants as recipients, and party and government 
officials as bestowers. Indeed, Nyerere was extremely misleading in 
107 
delineating the peasants' free will and the officials' intervention. 
First he declared: 
Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist 
organisations created by the people, and governed by 
those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from outside, nor governed from outside. No one can be forced into an ujamaä village, and no official - at any level - can go and tell the members of an ujamaa village 
what they should do together, and what they should 
continue to do as individual farmers. No official of the 
Government or the Party can go to an ujamaa village and 
tell the members what they must grow. ... An ujamaa 
village is a voluntary association of people who decide 
of their own free will to live together and work 
together for their common good. 
(Nyerere, 1973: 67) 
However, Nyerere seemed to go back on the emphasis on 'free will' 
claiming that it needs 'leadership': 
The fact that people cannot be forced into ujamaa 
villages, nor told how to run them, does not mean that 
Government and TAND have just to sit back and hope that 
people will be inspired to create them on their own. To 
get ujamaa villages established, and to help them to 
succeed, education and leadership are required. 
(ibid: 68) 
The role of this leadership was later to prove extremely problematic in 
the implementation of ujamaa villages as the operation of villagisation 
was increasingly bureaucratized (Von Freyhold, 1979; Hyden, 1980). 
Indeed, a whole host of administrative posts were created in order to 
introduce the idea and the practice of Nyerere's vision. The village 
had to have a chairman, a vice-chairman and a secretary as well as 
different committees. Mechanisms of coordination were introduced such 
as monthly meetings in order to discuss eventual problems, as well as 
training for local party officials so that they explain the policy to 
the villagers. In the course of implementation the socialist component 
of the programme, initially Ujamaa Vijijini 
(socialism in the 
villages) was transformed into Vijiji vya Ujamaa 
(ujamaa villages) 
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which emphasized the actual operation of the resettlement of the 
peasant population, hence the bureaucratisation. 
If Nyerere wanted ujamaa villages the bureaucracy would 
produce them. It is less clear whether administrators 
were as committed to socialism as they seemed to be to 
resettlement. 
(Hill, in Coulson, 1982: 107) 
Following Hill's point, it is pertinent to suggest that the operation 
was in the end more effective in establishing a national administ- 
ration and bureaucracy, rather than in 'modernising the traditional 
peasants'. This pattern occured both in Algeria and Tanzania in the 
sixties whereby the sheer breadth of nation-building in its early years 
confused participation with bureaucratisation. Where the Algerians 
directly used the bureaucracy to expand participation which finally 
took the shape of state expansion, the Tanzanians used participation 
but expanded bureaucracy. It is thus that towards the end of the 
sixties the state and party machineries were strengthened in Algeria 
and Tanzania, while people's participation was altogether absorbed into 
the process of institutional change. So much so that the vertical 
proceedings of bureaucratisation and the horizontal ones of 
participation became one. 
3.6. The Aggressive Seventies 
Following the initial structuration processes of the sixties, the 
Algerian and Tanzanian political elites were to be in greater offensive 
mood in the seventies. Interestingly enough, both leaderships continued 
their show of strength towards international capital in a bid to end 
their dependence on it. However while the same intention and motivation 
animated the new policies, the difference remained that Algeria's oil 
wealth permitted such offensive, 
but Tanzania's poverty led it to clamp 
down on its own peasants for surplus extraction. 
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3.6.1 Tanzania 
In Tanzania, the early seventies were marked by a slow down in 
'voluntary' villagisation as both peasant resistance and bureaucratic 
mismanagement contributed to bring the process to a stalemate. Communal 
production of the existing villages did not contribute more than 1 or 2 
per cent of total national production by the end of 1970 (Coulson, 
1982: 246). At the same time, the operation proved costly to the 
authorities who had to bargain social services and facilities in 
exchange for peasant consent to move to villages and engage in 
communal work (ie. in cash crop production rather than subsistence 
production). Petty thefts by officials, and corruption made villagers 
wonder for whom they were working (Coulson, 1982: 245). 
All this was not to the liking of the Mwalimu who, losing patience, 
declared in 1973 that "to live in villages is an order". The same year, 
the TANU Biennal Conference resolved that by the end of 1976, the whole 
of Tanzania's population should live in villages. These declarations 
were to start the most dramatic upheaval in Tanzania's history, whereby 
no less than 13 million people were moved to villages in a period of 
three years; "a village being defined as a site acceptable to the party 
with adequate agricultural land and at least 250 families" 
(Coulson, 
1982: 249-250). 
It was the first time that the Tanzanian regime 
had to resort to 
massive coercion34 in a desperate move 'to discipline peasant society'. 
At this point, the Nyerere vision became a matter of 'class 
interests'. 
Many observers have been able to demonstrate through 
field work that 
compulsory villagisation was the 
last assault of the "bureaucratic 
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bourgeoisie" (Shiv3i, 1978) to capture the peasantry (Hyden, 1980) in 
order to secure its own reproduction. Coulson gives an idea of who 
constituted this 'class' whose unity and loyalty Nyerere wanted to 
maintain (Coulson, 1982: 255): 
... the idea of villagisation (without Ujamaa) was 
popular with most urban-based professional politicians 
and at least acceptable to the civil servants who had been 'decentralized' to the region: it gave them a defined job to do, a sense of their own importance, and 
a chance to exert their influence on the peasants... . (Coulson, 1982: 254) 
3.6.2 Algeria 
In Algeria, a similar analysis of class formation and class conscious- 
ness was made of the leadership which was seen to have crystallised 
also in the early seventies (Raffinot & Jaquemot, 1977). This time it 
was coined as a bourgeoisie d'Etat (state bourgeoisie), and 
interestingly enough, its crystallisation was also linked to an 
agrarian reform, La Revolution Agraire . The ordinance of the 
Agrarian Revolution was signed by Boumediene on 8 November 1971, and 
was thus legitimised: 
We are aware that the agrarian revolution has failed in 
many countries for different reasons. Some of them 
wanted to achieve an agrarian reform without fulfilling 
other reforms. Hence their failure. As for us, we may 
claim that the conditions of success have been gathered, 
and that there is no danger on the economic front. Our 
economy is developing well. All industries are now under 
state control; as well as banks, insurance companies, 
external trade and a major part of internal wholesale 
trade. These are the conditions which allow us to 
further the struggle for development in all serenity. 
(in Mameri, 1975: 302) 
The aim of the policy was institutional and structural. It involved 
the grouping of peasant families in villages designed by the 
authorities, in order to produce communally within a system of 
cooperatives. Essential facilities were to be provided such as 
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schools, dispensaries, electricity, running water and gas, which meant 
that the operation was heavily subsidized by the state. But whereas in 
Tanzania the problem was to encircle the peasantry and thus answer an 
economic exigency as well as a political one (ensure the reproduction 
of the ruling 'class'), in Algeria the motivation was more of a 
political order. Indeed an agrarian reform had long been promised, but 
never fulfilled. In a country which had suffered an acute problem of 
land confiscation under settlement colonialism, one might have expected 
an agrarian reform to be the top priority of a socialist regime. This 
was however postponed in favour of industrialisation, and the 
technocratic elite could well afford following such a course thanks to 
the important oil revenues, as implicitly admitted by Boumediene. 
The crux of the policy of the Agrarian Revolution was that the private 
sector, as opposed to the self-managed farms, was to be affected. This 
entailed land distribution to the small poor peasants, but also 
nationalisation of big landholdings. And this is where the operation 
seemed more political than economic and entailed a 'class' conflict. 
However, unlike Tanzania where villagisation opposed bureaucracy and 
peasantry, in Algeria the Agrarian Revolution was to involve the 'state 
bourgeoisie' against the large landowners and notables (Raffinot & 
Jaquemot, 1977: 357-374). The interesting detail to retain is that a 
number of these landowners were part of the government and party 
apparatuses, suggesting that an internecine power struggle had taken 
place; whereby the managerial and technocratic faction of the elite was 
strong enough to clamp down on a faction of politicians. The presence 
of the latter within the polity had been 
legitimised by their 
nationalist past, but could no more 
be tenable in face of a growing and 
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aggressive bureaucracy. Indeed this latter managed to establish the new 
legitimacy of efficient nation-building through redistributive 
policies, and could afford to antagonise the agrarian 'bourgeoisie' in 
favour of the landless peasantry. Together with the policy of Agrarian 
Revolution, came another major politico-economic decision which was to 
illustrate the strength of the ruling elite; the nationalisation of all 
oil industries. Begun in the late sixties, the process had affected 
only various European and American companies, but not French ones, with 
which there were special agreements. But this favouritism came to an 
end on 24 February 1971 when Boumediene declared "in the name of the 
Council of the Revolution and the Government" that the state would 
retain 51 per cent of the French shares, nationalise natural gas 
fields, and all gas and oil inland transport (in Mameri, 1975: 
257-258). 
In summary, it may be affirmed that the seventies witnessed in Algeria 
and Tanzania the delineation of clearer contours of the ruling elite. 
This was distinguished by more offensive policies both towards 
international capital as well as internal social groups. 
In terms of institutional change, this was translated in Tanzania 
through the dramatic operation of villagisation between 1973 and 1977 
whereby millions of peasant families were moved into villages 
'in order 
to partake the benefits of modern institutions' 
(schools, health 
facilities), as perceived by the formulators of the policy, including 
the then President Nyerere. In the course of the operation, 
it became 
more and more clear that the 
decision was dictated by political as 
well as economic exigencies. 
This involved an offensive by a now 
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established bureaucracy in an attempt to control Tanzania's vast and 
scattered peasantry which accounted for more than 85 per cent of the 
population. Having secured control of the state apparatus, the 
leadership was now out to control society at large. 
The same pattern took place in Algeria where the defiance of 
international capital was even bolder. "No foreign company was left to 
work for its own benefit by 1974, and Algeria was involved in the new 
international division of labour on its own terms" (Raffinot and 
Jacquemot, 1977: 101-106). However the agrarian reform was not an 
assault on the peasantry's autonomy or a search for surplus extraction, 
but rather a way for the managerial and technocratic faction of the 
ruling elite to eliminate the liberalising political elements. If 
anything the peasantry in Algeria was conspicuously dependent on the 
state, having been already heavily undermined by the colonial system. 
3.7. The Pragmatic Eighties. 
The early eighties came as a total contrast to the radicalism of the 
seventies, as both the Algerian and Tanzanian ruling elites seemed to 
have again shifted their priorities. Institutional change was brought 
to a relative standstill, following the turmoil of the sixties and 
seventies. It seemed that both leaderships had secured their 
institutional bases. State and party machineries had been erected. The 
Algerian technocrats and military were reconciled to the idea of a 
stronger party and a legislative representation. Indeed in 1976, a 
Constitution and a National Charter were adopted, and a year later, the 
National Assembly was reestablished. In Tanzania, villagisation was 
being achieved, and power seemed to be 'equally' shared between party, 
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government and presidency, brought together as 'modernisers' of a 
'resisting traditional' peasantry. 
Nevertheless, this security having been bought more often on the 
"political market place" rather than on the "economic market place" 
(Hyden, 1980: 30), proved rather fragile as economies became increas- 
ingly unyielding. Mismanagement of huge industrial plants in Algeria, 
and of parastatals in Tanzania; insufficient food production and 
increasing dependence on food imports; high birth rates (4.6 per cent 
in both cases) and growing underemployment and unemployment; all 
contributed to the failure to reach targets. Hence the recourse to more 
liberalising measures. 
3.7.1. Algeria 
In Algeria, the death of Boumediene in December 1978, had precipitated 
an internecine power struggle between the harder-line of the army and 
party, and the more right wing elements in the government and the 
bureaucracy. However a totally unexpected successor was proposed and 
eventually elected according to the provisions of the new Constitution. 
The choice of the new president (Chadli Bendjedid, a colonel in the 
army), reflected the political elite's ideological inclinations. 
Bendjedid was known for his liberal sympathies and following his 
election, most of the political and technocratic teams working under 
Boumediene were ousted; accused of having failed to design a 'sound' 
economic policy for the country, in favour of a 'prestigious' one. 
Although no outward coercion was carried out, the new 'teams' were 
anxious to establish a new legitimacy. This time it was 
based on a 
discourse of 'social' investments rather than 'economic' ones. At the 
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same time, new alliances were sought amongst the burgeoning private 
sector which was discreetly hailed as an alternative in small 
businesses. Heavy bureaucratisation was denounced and all declarations 
were made in favour of the 'citizen's well-being and comfort'. In short 
the discourse of the 'socialist individual, society and knowledge' was 
being replaced by the 'consuming individual, society and knowledge'. 
This was obviously in response to the consumer goods shortages which 
had become endemic under the previous administration. 
3.7.2. Tanzania. 
In Tanzania, an even more difficult economic situation led to a return 
to the cooperative system in agriculture instead of communal production 
in Ujamaa villages. The cooperative system had been extremely popular 
with rich farmers before the Arusha Declaration and villagisation, and 
was more integrated into the market economy; hence its success as a 
productive sector. Here again the social alliances of the leadership 
shifted back to rich farmers, traders, and a burgeoning bourgeoisie 
which had been frowned upon earlier in the seventies. Indeed, as no 
surplus could be extracted immediately from the newly 'captured' 
peasantry, and as famine on the one hand, and lack of capital 
accumulation on the other, threatened the foundations of the ruling 
group, this latter had to liberalise its radical political stances. 
Significantly, Nyerere declared to the National Conference of Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi in 1982 that they had no choice but to deal with the 
International Monatery Fund (Nyerere, 1982: 59). This was indeed a very 
hard and bitter decision and one which the Tanzanian leadership 
had to 
take very reluctantly. Indeed, the decision was but a surrender to 
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international capital on its terms and not any more those of Tanzania. 
Could it be that these circumstances precipitated Nyerere's decision to 
step down as president of the republic in 1985, thus clearing the way 
for a more 'liberalising' leadership, and new legitimations away from 
self-reliance and Ujamaa ? The answer is yet to emerge as Nyerere has 
not stepped down as chairman of Chama Cha Mapinduzi. 
The depiction of the institutional changes for which the Algerian and 
Tanzanian post-colonial leaderships have been most noted in the last 
twenty years, has shown two strong tendencies: 
to establish administrative competence as a priority; 
to adopt policies which address primarily the political market 
in order to secure different alliances, without favouring any 
one social group, (hence the propensity to expand social welfare 
programmes and nationalist economic projects). 
As Hermassi rightly pointed out: 
Socioeconomic reorganisation and sociopolitical reforms 
require primarily the concentration of power and the 
mobilization of resources for national goals, that is, 
the capacity to create new power. These processes 
usually run into opposition from the interests and 
ideologies that benefit from the existing distribution 
of power, status and rewards. Governmental effectiveness 
in this sense is the ability of the government to modify 
the privileges of vested interest groups in the light 
of public policy. 
(Hermassi, 1975: 159) 
However, as shown in the cases of Algeria and Tanzania this process is 
far from homogeneous, and categories such as 'government' and 
'national goals' are far from being transcendental, but rather entail 
incessant movements and shifts in the alliances of the modernising 
'Citizens' in power. Nevertheless, the administrative and bureaucratic 
nature of the dominant group is unmistakable as it is largely deter- 
mined by the relative weakness of the Algerian and Tanzanian private 
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bourgeoisies, and "the awsome political project of consciously and 
deliberately transforming the entire social structure" (Hermassi, 1975: 
158). 
The normative and institutional changes introduced by the Algerian and 
Tanzanian leaderships have been typical of those of modernising 
'Citizens'. As modernists their stated aims and societal projects 
sought to replace (in modernisation jargon) the 'particularistic, 
ascriptive, affective and diffuse' traditional society with a 
'universalistic, achievement-oriented, neutral and role-specific' 
modern society. However, by and large, they found themselves more 
concerned with the implementation of order and efficiency, be it 
through party consolidation as in Tanzania, or state enforcement as in 
Algeria. In Holmesian terms, the normative and institutional changes 
were not always a coherent and homogeneous package. In both cases, the 
'Citizens' in power sought to maintain order and national unity by 
formulating, and adopting politically motivated policies, whose 
economic viability was frequently doubtful. The changes they 
introduced were certainly revolutionary in terms of improving national 
standards of living. However, they have also been more concerned with 
containing and controlling the growing wave of 'political 
participation' on the part of various groups, than establishing a 
grass-roots democracy. The policy shifts analysed earlier provided a 
way of adjusting to external pressure. But at least as important was 
the range of internal responses of civil society at large to official 
policies. This will be dealt with in the next section of this 
Chapter. 
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3.8. No-change in the Form of 'Resistance'. 
In practice, the vision of specific socialism (Islamic in Algeria, 
African and Ujamaa in Tanzania) was to be at odds with the very values 
and practices it purported to revive. Indeed, the visionary nature of 
the discourse of specific socialism tended to dwell on mythical rather 
than real 'traditional' pre-colonial values. These were far from being 
idyllic as assumed by official rhetoric. 
The Algerian discourse elevated, and by the same token, reduced all 
traditional society to an egalitarian Islamic 'city'. The Tanzanian 
rhetoric embodied in Nyerere's Ujamaa philosophy, distilled the myriad 
of tribal entities and groups of Tanzania into one fraternal and 
egalitarian brotherhood, presumably determined by the subsistence 
economy. Imbued with such mythical images of the past, the modernising 
'Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania took very little account of what 
these images entailed in terms of resistance to their respective 
societal programmes on the part of the real actors of the idealised 
traditional society; the 'Cousins' in Algeria and the 'Brothers-in-law' 
in Tanzania. 
In fact, the policy shifts described earlier were partly determined by 
their reception among the 'Brothers-in-law' and the 'Cousins'. Indeed, 
the 'Citizens' found themselves in the difficult position of having to 
impose, and not only propose a socialist model of society, which 
ironically proceeds from the same rationale which has brought about 
capitalism. 
119 
The dilemma facing African socialists is that since 
capitalism failed to revolutionize the means of 
production, their transition to socialism is not 
supported by dynamic forces generated under capitalism, for example, an articulate class consciousness, 
adherence to the principles of modern organisation, 
technical know-how, and a general sense of control of 
the forces of nature. The bourgeöis mentality has simply failed to have an impact in most parts of Africa. This 
means that the principle function of socialism will be 
to achieve exactly those things that capitalism has failed to attain. The conditions under which socialism has to be built in Africa, therefore, are bound to be 
very different from what has been experienced elsewhere. 
(Hyden, 1980: 200) 
Goran Hyden wrote this as a concluding remark to his book Beyond Ujamaa 
in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry, (1980) in 
which he was led to consider the cultural factors behind the relative 
failure of Ujamaa . Although these specifically concern Tanzanian 
society, some elements of analysis could also be extended to Algerian 
society in explicating the difficulties encountered by 'modernisation' 
there. Basically, Hyden argued that the world view of peasant society 
was pre-scientific in the sense that it was religious and mythical. 
Above all, it did not conceive that individuals can affect a change in 
their environment towards a higher stage. Rather, their efforts are 
closely tied to the mechanical solidarity which links them to the rest 
of the community and should be aimed at preserving a balance with 
the environment, and not master it. 
In Holmes' terms, the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' does not suffer 
discrepancies between the normative, institutional and environmental 
realms, and thus is unlikely to suffer 'problems'. Accordingly, in the 
case of failing official policies, Hyden has rightly pointed that "in 
the eyes of the peasants the official is part of the problem" (ibid: 
216); since he is the one who has brought disruption to the balanced 
120 
world of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law'. As will be seen below, the 
pre-scientific world view of peasants in Tanzania is to account, 
partly, for their resistance to Ujamaa , which after all embodies 
values and practices of a scientific era. 
3.8.1. The Resilience of Tanzania's 'Brothers-in-law'. 
When Goran Hyden embarked on his field-work to try and unveil the 
difficulties of villagisation, he intended it to be a study in 
political economy. It turned out to become a study on 'cultural 
relativism'. Hyden was bewildered by the 'determinism' of cultural 
factors as it were, in the implementation of Ujamaa , He, in fact, 
discovered what has been termed herein the 'Republic of 
Brothers-in-law', and which he coined as "the economy of affection". 
Given that the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' was described earlier, it 
suffices now to draw attention to the aspect of cultural resistance 
displayed by the actors of this 'Republic' to the enforcement of 
modernisation through Ujamaa . It has already 
been noted that the 
operation of villagisation became coercive from 1973 to 1976, as the 
'Citizens' of the official organs of power grew exasperated by the 
reluctance of peasants to move into government-designed villages. 
The 
move was prompted in order to break the structural support of 
the 
'Republic of Brothers-in-law', embodied in peasant 
household 
production. As Hyden pointed out: "pre-capitalist 
(or pre-socialist) 
social formations survive because the economic structures 
that give 
them life are still at work" (ibid: 4). Hence the recourse to coercion 
by the 'Citizens'. 
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However, the use of force might have helped bring the peasants to the 
village sites, but ensuring their participation in production was 
another matter altogether: 
The villagers made token efforts, for a year or two, 
usually clearing less than 1 acre of communal land per 
adult member, and doing so in such a way as not to 
interfere with the agricultural activity on their 
private farms. 
(Coulson, 1982: 245) 
Ingle (1972) has pointed out also that as far as political 
participation was concerned, individual peasants reacted either through 
"accomodation, aquiescence or withdrawal" depending on circumstance: 
Most likely the peasant's first and minimal reaction to 
the intrusions of the external political system into his 
established patterns of life was accomodation [which] 
meant little more than appearing for political 
meetings... As the district political system became 
capable of securing greater compliance to policy goals 
due to increased coercion, a second possible reaction 
was acquiescence. For the peasant acquiescence was a 
temporary coping measure. ... If the external system were 
able to place unrelenting pressure on the localities to 
ensure compliance with their demand, a third reaction 
might occur. The individual peasants might merely 
withdraw physically from the penetration of the external 
polititcal systems into their immediate political 
system. 
(Ingle, 1972: 253-4) 
Thus, the normative system which still informed peasant society in 
Tanzania, and which was ironically praised as being the basis of 
Ujamaa by Nyerere, constituted the most important element of resis- 
tance. When Nyerere claimed the Africanness of Ujamaa, he referred to a 
totally idealised version of communitarian and egalitarian organisation 
of life based on brotherhood and self-help. True the peasant mode was a 
self-reliant type of social organistion, but it was also dependent on a 
host of cultural beliefs and customs. 
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For instance, it has been found that often, peasants refused to move 
from their initial homesteads because they did not want to leave the 
place where their ancestors had been buried (Westerlund, 1980: 144). By 
moving to new villages , the peasants were indirectly drawn to abandon 
the cult of the ancestors, in favour of the cult of the state. This 
they were not prepared to do unless forced to. On the other hand, the 
discourse of Nyerere itself was caught in a contradiction, since its 
version of traditional society did not account for the importance of 
the cult of ancestors in promoting and preserving affinity with the 
extended families, "the affinity that ujamaa was supposed to extend" 
(Westerlund, 1980: 144). 
Another important point of conflict between the 'Republic of Brothers- 
in-law' and the 'Republic of Citizens' and their Ujamaa programme, has 
been the belief in witchcraft. 
The problem was all the more serious because many people 
joined ujamaa villages very reluctantly or even refused 
to do so "for fear that if they came closer together a 
lot of bewitching would arise". 
(Westerlund, ibid: 155) 
Thus proximity of other people is seen as conducive to witchcraft, and 
permanent settlement would make it difficult for people "to follow 
their usual practice of simply moving their village to another area 
when withchcraft or any other calamity threatened" (Ingle, ibid: 88). 
Sometimes, local officials were thought to connive with 'witches' when 
they prevented and outlawed local witchhunts. The state was seen to 
establish an alliance with evil, and the credibility of ujamaa was 
partly jeopardised. It is interesting for instance that the rapid 
changes sought by ujamaa "created situations which were conducive to 
the practice of witchcraft" (Westerlund, ibid: 
156-7), as the tensions 
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of change grew, while the normative framework most likely to deal with 
them was not internalised yet. it is also significant that the 
Tanzanian national press was used to denounce the "widespread belief in 
superstition", which was detected even amongst "highly educated and 
responsible people indulging in using witchcraft to get promotions and 
to 'maintain' themselves in their jobs" (in Westerlund, ibid: 155). 
This indictment appeared in the Daily News, 7 May 1974. The paper went 
on: 
Let it be said openly that it will be a mockery of the 
whole virtuous ideas of education, enlightenment and 
civilisation if even after Tanzania will have achieved 
100 per cent literacy, such rotten superstitious ideas 
will still be prevailing. 
(in Westerlund, ibid: 155) 
Westerlund further reports another editorial of the Daily News dated 30 
March 1977, which found it "distressing" to see that some people still 
believed in "primitive and unscientific ways of dealing with their 
environment" (Westerlund, ibid: 159-160). 
In Holmes's terms, the comments of the Daily News editorials disclose a 
twofold problem : 
a normative clash between the norms of the 'Republic of 
Citizens' and the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'; 
a normative discrepancy among the 'Citizens' themselves as they 
still held to some norms of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'. 
In these circumstances, while the higher valuations held by each 
'Republic' clearly clashed with each other, some 'Citizens' still 
maintained valuations pertaining to the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law', 
as lower valuations, which in theory should have given way to the new 
higher valuations of the 'Republic of Citizens'. Accordingly, the 
Tanzanian dilemma in terms of failure of Ujamaa , (ie. the 
difficulties 
of nation-building and modernisation), 
is due not only to a clear-cut 
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clash between two fundamentally different normative and institutional 
patterns. Part of the problem is also contained in the relative 
normative no-change prevailing amongst some 'Citizens', although they 
have initiated institutional change of modernisation and integrated 
nation-building, with all the attached paraphernalia of modern 
apparatuses. 
Another difficulty emerged in the course of Ujamaa implementation, and 
that was the weak productivity of the modern economic sector. At the 
1982 National Conference of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Nyerere passionately 
pleaded that "everyone must work" (Nyerere, 1982: 64), thus attesting 
to the absence of the 'work ethic' of a modem 'Republic of Citizens'. 
Indeed, in Nyerere's own words, the ujamaa conception of work remains 
very ambiguous: 
When I say that in traditional African society everybody 
was a worker, I do not use the word 'worker' simply as 
opposed to 'employer' but also as opposed to 'loiterer' 
or 'idler'. One of the most socialistic achievements of 
our society was the sense of security it gave to its 
members,... But it is too often forgotten nowadays that 
the basis of this great socialistic achievement was 
this: that it was taken for granted that every member of 
society... contributed his fare share of effort towards 
the production of its wealth. The other use of the word 
'worker', in its specialized sense of 'employee' as 
opposed to employer reflects a capitalist attitude of 
mind ... which is totally 
foreign to our way of thinking. 
... and it is incompatible with the socialist society we 
want to build here. 
Our first step, therefore, must be to re-educate 
ourselves; to regain our former attitude of mind. 
(Nyerere, 1966: 165-166) 
By rejecting the capitalistic version of 'worker', Nyerere did not 
realize that he was bound to reject its closest corollary, the very 
'work ethic' which, according to Weber and Marx, had guaranteed the 
rise of capitalism, and was subsequently adopted in orthodox socialist 
countries. While Weber insisted that: 
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Labour must... be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling. But such an attitude is by no 
means a product of nature, ... but can only be the product of a long and arduous process of education. 
(Weber, 1958: 62) 
Marx explained that: 
The advance of capitalist production develops a working 
class, which by education, tradition, habit, looks upon 
the conditions of that mode of production as self 
evident laws of nature. 
(Marx, 1967: 737) 
Labour as a 'calling' and as a 'self evident law of nature' is far from 
being the case in Tanzanian society today, where the eclectism of 
Ujamaa , and the reproductory (rather than productory) habits of the 
'Republic of Brothers-in-law' have made it very difficult for a 
'Republic of Citizens' to establish solid foundations. The Tanzanian 
experience of socialist transformation for the last twenty years, 
casts doubt on Nyerere's vision of socialism based on the peasant 
mode of social organisation, given the resilience of valuations 
typical of a 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' ( which managed to survive 
even amongst 'official socialists'). 
3.8.2. Algeria's 'Cousins' Wave the Islamic Flag. 
As in Tanzania, the elements of no-change in Algeria, have by and large 
emanated from the persistence of the normative system of 'traditional' 
society embodied in the 'Republic of Cousins', as well as from the 
normative inconsistencies of the modernising 'Republic of Citizens'. 
However, the scene in Algeria is further complicated by the presence 
of Islam as normative legitimiser of the 'Republic of Citizens' as 
well as the 'Republic of Cousins'. 
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Whereas in Tanzania, the relative balance between Islam, Christianity 
and African religions has favoured the adoption of a secular state; in 
Algeria the predominance of Islam within civil society at large has led 
to the state being proclaimed Muslim. Indeed, the assertion of 'Islamic 
principles' has been appearing unmistakably in all official documents 
from the Proclamation du 1 Novembre 1954 to the 1986 revised Charte 
Nationale. However, long before the war of liberation, the cultural 
movement of the Ulamaa , which thrived in the 1930's, erected Islam as 
its paramount motto against the assimilationist policies of the 
colonial administration. The leader of the movement, Sheikh Abdelhamid 
Ibn Badis, successfully launched a rallying cry against French presence 
in Algeria. Its motto was: "The people of Algeria is Muslim, and to 
Arabity it belongs". It was destined never to desert all subsequent 
rhetoric, be it during the war of liberation, or independence. Since 
1962, the two Constitutions (1963 and 1976) of the country proclaimed 
Islam as the religion of state (respectively article 4, and article 2), 
and so did the three Charters (1964 Algiers Charter, 1976 and 1986 
National Charters). 
To many observers, the proclamation of Islam as religion of the state 
seemed paradoxical in view of the modernist economic strategy, which 
in institutional terms has revolutionised the social structure of 
Algerian society, almost beyond recognition. 
In this disconnected society, one is struck by the 
socialist rhetoric disseminated to the outside and 
by 
the Puritanism embraced at home. Even within the 
society, the combination of technical 
build-up and 
complete avoidance of secular practices seems 
paradoxical... . (Hermassi, 1975: 213) 
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Some have argued that the proclamation of Islam as the religion of the 
state, is but a process of "ideologisation of Islam" by the dominant 
political class to legitimise itself and its developmentalist ideology: 
Such references present, for the political class, the 
double advantage of carrying modern options "along the 
sense of History" whilst backing a search for 
authenticity, which official apologia will not fail to 
underline as the most cogent proof of its attachment to 
cultural models of Islamism. 
(Merad in Gellner & Vatin, 1979: 154) 
Although there is an element of truth in this argument, it cannot, 
nevertheless, claim to be systematic. Indeed, such statements all too 
often overlook the dynamic behind the adoption of specific ideological 
discourses. Rather, they seem to be content with tautological confir- 
mations such as: 'official ideology is dominant, and is professed by 
the ruling polity in order to secure their interests, and insure their 
reproduction'. Accordingly, an aura of homogeneity is cast upon the 
political leadership, thus disregarding its need for recruitment 
amongst a variety of groups, and the likely heterogeneity it might 
suffer on this account. Above all, the argument of the presumed 
instrumentality of ideology disregards the very important element of 
lower valuations held by members of the polity, despite their tran- 
formist or revolutionary aspirations. 
Indeed the profession of Islam is far from being an instrumental matter 
in Algerian politics. This has been shown in the consistency of the 
discourse on 'Islamic identity', since the 1930's. All political 
movements known to have marked the nation were 
led by people who 
emanated from petty-bourgeois scripturalist milieux, and could 
not be 
accused of having merely paid 
lip-service to Islam. It would be 
difficult to deny the impact of such a tradition on post-independence 
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leaderships. Despite the presence of an overwhelming modernist tech- 
nocratic trend amongst the polity, none of its members can be 
confirmed to hold non-Islamic views. The fact that they are hardly 
fervent practitioners of the rites, is not a sufficient indicator of 
their indifference to Islam. 
On the other hand, the official profession of Islam indeed indicates 
that the Algerian 'Republic of Citizens' is tributary of the influences 
of the 'Republic of Cousins'. Although triumphant in its 'development' 
strategy on the whole, it has been increasingly under the spell of the 
'Cousins' and their allies amongst the 'Citizens', especially with 
regard to the enforcement of the Islamic discourse in the early 1980's. 
One should only judge by the latest amendments brought to the 1976 
Charte Nationale; now replaced by the 1986 version which concentrates 
in particular on the role of Islam as the first ideological reference 
(JORADP, no. 7,1986: 109-111) compared to its subordination to the 
"socialist revolution" as in the 1976 version (Charte Nationale, 1976: 
21). 
If anything, the 1986 amendments have revealed an offensive 
by the 
'Republic of Cousins', or at least their representatives within the 
'Republic of Citizens'. Indeed, the team officially appointed to 
"enrich" the National Charter could be said to belong to the 
cousins-prone faction of the wider 'Republic of 
Citizens' in power. 
Significantly enough, most of them were the product of the Ulamaa 
school, and educated in the Arab-Islamic tradition of 
the Maghribi 
medressa, and the prestigious 
Islamic institutions of higher education 
(such as Zaitouna in Tunis and El Azhar 
in Cairo). All of them were 
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party or government members. But most striking of all, they all 
belonged to the arabophone intelligentsia, a significant contrast with 
the team who elaborated the 1976 Charter, who were mostly 
French-educated nationalists. Another detail of some importance was the 
vernacular used to write each version of the Charter. The 1976 version 
was written in French and translated into Arabic for official purposes, 
whilst the 1986 version was written directly in Arabic. This is of some 
importance because it is symptomatic of the composition of the 
'Republic of Citizens', of its political alliances and of the reactions 
of the 'Republic of Cousins' to it. 
In essence, the re-writing of the Charte Nationale not only adds to the 
normative inconsistencies of the 'Republic of Citizens' in power, but 
it is also symptomatic of the growing reaction of the 'Republic of 
Cousins' at large. This latter has been gradually using the 
institutional channels of the 'Republic of Citizens' to voice its 
disapproval of the increasing secularisation of social and cultural 
life. In 1984, for instance , the 
'Cousins' managed to institutionalise 
the Shari 'a as the sole regulator of matters of personal status and 
family life in Algeria, thus defying the Constitutional provisions on 
"Fundamental Liberties, and Human and Citizen Rights" (Constitution, 
1976: 24) and especially Articles 39,41 and 42. But more on the legal 
battle of the cousins in Chapter 4, when the debates on the 1984 Family 
Law in Algeria are examined. It suffices here to examine the 
motivations of the 'Cousins' and their growing resistance to an 
outright modernisation of Algerian society. In this, the additional 
chapter of the 1986 Charter entitled "Islam and the exigencies of 
the 
century" is very eloquent: 
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... for the Algerian Revolution, it is not enough to dispose of the beneficial effects of economic 
development, but rather and in particular, it should 
ensure that there is balance and harmony between 
material needs and the demands of the spirit and soul, 
in a perspective which permits the construction of a 
society aware of its personality, proud of its past and 
its patrimony. ... the process of development has 
engendered modes of behaviour influenced by an 
environment away from true religion, in opposition to 
sane traditions, and uses a deceitful language which 
pretends to express modernity... . (JORADP, ibid: 110) 
The explicit demand for spiritual considerations of a religious kind 
is quite new in the Algerian discourse of specific socialism. The 1976 
Charter indeed denied that socialism in Algeria "proceeded from any 
materialist metaphysics-(p. 23), but no moralistic considerations were 
bestowed on the declaration. In fact, a number of developments in the 
normative and institutional changes brought about by the 'Republic of 
Citizens' have precipitated the reaction of the 'Cousins' and their 
allies amongst the 'Citizens', epitomized today in the 1986 Charte 
Nationale. 
Since the death of Boumediene in 1978, a questioning of the underlining 
philosophy of economic development, almost exclusively based on indust- 
rialisation, has taken place. The new philosophy was to favour consumer 
interests rather than sheer productivity, and by the same token, 
encourage the proliferation of the small and intermediate private 
sector. Behind the change a new polity was manoeuvering; in contrast 
with the aggressiveness of the 'Republic of Citizens' under Boumediene, 
the new team of 'Citizens' was more sensitive to the reaction of the 
'Cousins'. 
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The omnipotence of the state apparatuses in all spheres of life has not 
always been welcomed. It was in fact impinging more and more on the 
'mechanical solidarity' of the 'Republic of Cousins'. Although this 
latter had been profoundly undermined by the previous colonial 
structures (Benhachenhou, 1978), it managed to salvage its normative 
references. Whereas it could legitimise its resistance to a destructive 
foreign power, it was less willing to reject the progressivist advances 
of the modernisers under Independence. Nevertheless, the malaise grew 
as loyalty to a central state increasingly replaced the more 
traditional loyalties to the local clan, tribe or ancestor. For the 
'Republic of Cousins', which had maintained cohesion without central 
power through ancestral loyalties, offering allegiance to an impersonal 
centre of power had its limits. Whilst regulation of its economic life 
was now unavoidable, it nevertheless made this conditional upon its 
political participation with the 'Citizens'. 
Indeed, the survival of some practices of the 'Republic of Cousins' in 
Algeria, can be witnessed in the political recruitment process. 
Patronage and kin relations are still a predominant criteria for 
political office and the problem of 'regionalism' has always weighed 
heavily on the leadership's composition. To maintain a certain aura of 
homogeneity, the Algerian 'Republic of Citizens' has had to yield to 
demands for equal representation of each region. The redistributive 
policy of 'regional equilibrium' is a testimony of kin-patronage 
practices. Although meant to be strictly economic (in terms of 
expanding development programmes to the whole national territory so as 
to ensure national integration), it turned out in practice to be 
transformed into 'tribal and clannish' representation. The policy of 
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'regional equilibrium' was mainly enforced under the Boumediene 
administration, and went hand in hand with the consolidation of the 
central executive apparatuses. But it still remains difficult to 
distinguish between ideological rifts and regional ones. Indeed 
political debates between left and right in Algeria have hardly been 
predominant given the unitarian legitimacy of nationalism. Instead, 
very early after Independence, they gave way to regional competition. 
That is where the 'Republic of Cousins' had managed to survive and 
eventually influence the 'Republic of Citizens', within a pattern 
astonishingly reminiscent of the Khaldunian type of political 
recruitment. 
When modern conditions lead to the fusion of modern 
jargon with the spirit of Ibn Khaldun, we get a 
distinctive species of "totalitarian democracy" in which 
populist verbiage covers kin-patronage politics. Under 
modern conditions, it is often noted that government is 
by patronage network... The links of patronage are not 
created arbitrarily and freely, in a so to speak, open 
market of corruption. Their formation is weighted in 
favour of pre-existing group links. Such systems which 
are now common, should perhaps be considered a mixed or 
intermediate political form, a neo-Ibn-Khaldunian type 
of government. (Gellner, 1981: 30) 
In other words, a residual 'Republic of Cousins' 
(ie. the Khaldunian 
badw ) has survived in the bosom of the 'Republic of Citizens' 
by 
forcing onto it patronage links, thus retarding Weberian type meritoc- 
ratic practices. 
Despite an aggressive modernisation policy, the Algerian 
'Republic of 
Cousins' proved hard to eradicate as it continued to 
be residually 
manifest within the 'Republic of 
Citizens' itself. Indeed, unlike the 
Tanzanian 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' which can still take refuge 
in 
its structural basis of the 
'economy of affection', the Algerian 
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'Republic of Cousins' has totally lost its economic structural basis. 35 
However it managed to recuperate political influence over the 
'Citizens', as national integration forced these latter to recourse to 
kin-patronage practices rather than meritocratic ones in political 
recruitment. But, the main shield of the 'Republic of Cousins' in 
Algeria remains the brandishing of Islam as a legitmiser for their 
demands, and practices. 
Although introduced as a 'Republic of Citizens' itself (as analysed 
earlier), Islam has long been adopted by the Algerian 'Republic of 
Cousins' as its principal higher valuation, albeit with a significant 
disregard for the more universalist and individualist injunctions of 
the Islamic doctrine as demonstrated by Tillion. If the 'Republic of 
Cousins' today appeals to Islam to back up its resistance to the 
modernising 'Republic of Citizens', it is mainly because it fears the 
materialism and individualism of a modern socialist republic. Indeed 
the growing number of youths taking part in the Friday prayers all over 
the country, is not entirely fortuitous. The industrialised economy of 
Algeria and its polytechnical educational system should have been 
conducive to creating a secular political culture as modernisation 
theory would put it. Instead, it should be emphasized that the growing 
spiritualist demands have been made to put a halt to any attempt at 
secularisation, as attested by the inclusion of a whole new chapter on 
Islam and spirituality in the 1986 Charte Nationale. However the most 
pugnacious response of the 'Republic of Cousins' in Algeria remains the 
legal battle over family law. This will be examined in the next 
Chapter. 
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NOTES: CHAPTER 3 
1. 'Modernisation' should not be read as 'modernisation theory' as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Here the use is deliberately non-rigorous, and 
can simply be read as 'development'. Subsequent uses such as 
'modernizing' (elites of Algeria and Tanzania) will be made along the 
same lines. The expression conveys non-critically the process of change 
as conceptualised by policy-makers in both countries. 
2. Cf. Tillion, G., op. cit. Although historical, her study of the 
subjection of women in Mediterranean societies, is a remarkable example 
of a problem-centered reading of historical facts. She particularly 
enlightens our approach to 'traditional' societies by suggesting that 
their presumed static nature is more of a 'defence mechanism' than an 
intrinsic feature. Her study also skilfully draws attention to the 
survival of 'residual' practices long after the weakening or even the 
destruction of their material culture. Subsequent quotes from Tillion's 
work are this author's translations. 
3. Cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, Les structures el4mentaires de la parente, 
Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1949. Tillion criticizes for instance 
Levi-Strauss' inductive conclusion on the practice of the exchange of 
women as essential for the survival of all subsistence economies. The 
practice of endogamy in most Mediterranean social formations, also 
based on subsistence economies, is a significant refutation. 
4. Cf. Lucy Mair, African Marriage and Social Change, Frank Cass & Co. 
Ltd., 1969; Radcliffe-Brown A. R. & Forde D. (eds. ) African Systems of 
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Kinship and Marriage, London, 1953. Both accounts are very careful not 
to equate matriliny with a superior status for women. If anything, 
matrilineal descent can be very binding for women since they are kept 
within their familial compound as an element of production and 
reproduction. 
5. A 'Universal Republic of Citizens' is in fact a euphemism for the 
ideals of individual, society, and knowledge embodied in Western 
philosophical and political traditions, especially since the 
enlightenment. The Marxist-Leninist tradition is generally considered 
as a rupture with the 'liberal' traditions of Descartes, Rousseau, 
Locke, J. S. Mill, Condorcet, Jefferson. However, the Judeo-Christian 
and Hellenic heritage (particularly Plato and Aristotle) may be taken 
as the core for both. Holmes, recommends for instance that the Bible as 
well as Plato and Aristotle are taken as philosophical references for 
the USSR (Holmes, 1981: 124) along with Marx and Lenin. It is 
interesting that the scientific contribution of the Arabs passes 
unnoticed. Perhaps it was also considered 'universal' by Renaissance 
Europeans and therefore unrecognised as Arab. It is ironic that today, 
the rhetorics of Algeria and Tanzania ignore the European component of 
their discourse because it was mediated by colonialism. Cf. Ali 
Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, Heinemann, 
1978, about the mixture of Islamic radicalism and Rousseaunian 
'idyllism' in the African socialist discourse. 
6. The conception of knowledge of the 'Republic of Cousins' has been 
kept very broad as it is not meant to encompass one particular 
historical period, but rather a 'social framework of knowledge'. Cf. G. 
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Gurvitch, The Social Frameworks of Knowledge, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1971. Following Gurvitch's typology of 'Global Societies and their 
Cognitive Systems' (Part Four: 117-220), our 'Republic of Cousins' 
largely corresponds to his 'Patriarchal Societies' in which: 
... the structure was based on the exclusive pre-eminence 
of the large-scale domestico-familial group based on 
consanguinous kinship, related usually through masculine 
descent, whether or not it was polygamous. This group 
incorporated all others,... it predominated over age and 
sex groups. 
All economic, political and religious activities were 
brought together in the home of the domestico-conjugal 
family... . (Gurvitch, ibid: 144) 
The predominance of the familial group is exactly what Tillion has 
brought up in relation to women's subjection in the Mediterranean 
'Republic of Cousins', especially in view of its cansanguinity. Gurvith 
also draws attention to the behavioural pattern pertaining to such a 
social structure. It is "preferably customary and traditional rather 
than procedural or ritualistic" (ibid: 145). This has some bearing on 
the state of knowledge. Gurvitch notes that 'common-sense' knowledge is 
prominant in this type of society and is "firmly attached to 
tradition"; whereas 'knowledge of the external world' is "placed in the 
time of slowed down, long duration as well as cyclical-seasonal time" 
(ibid: 146). 'Mythico-theological knowledge' is "weakly expressed" 
(ibid): 
The fact that the concern for perpetuating the 
mythico-theological tradition was left to the 'bards'; 
narrators and singers of epic tales, whose position and 
social role were the least respected ones, is 
sufficiently eloquent: it proves that the patriarchs and 
their followers had little time to be concerned with 
theological knowledge. 
(ibid: 147) 
The 'little concern for theological knowledge' was encountered by Islam 
when conquering the North African 
'Republic of Cousins' which continued 
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to practice its 'customs' as noted by Tillion and as analysed by 
Gurvitch. Finally, Gurvitch points out that scientific knowledge in the 
patriarchal society is 'non-existent', although it had rudimentary 
technical knowledge. 
7. Pierre Bourdieu in his Sociologie de l'Algerie, Presses Univer- 
sitaires de France, 1961, draws attention to the depth of intermingling 
between the local Berber customary element and the Islamic component of 
Algeria's culture: 
An example of this is Kabyle law, in which it is 
impossible to distinguish the borrowings that have been 
re-interpreted in terms of the receiving context from 
the vernacular institutions and from the dissimilating 
reconstructions protecting against invasion by Koranic 
law. Inversely, everywhere the Berber rock may be seen 
just beneath the surface of Moslem legislation. A mass 
of local institutions have been absorbed by Moslem law 
in the name of the principle of "necessity" and of 
"necessity making law". It has been noted by G. Marcy 
that the most typical Moslem institutions are marked by 
the spirit of Berber law, for example, the agricultural 
and stock-breeding associations, and the accessory 
stipulations of marriage contracts. 
This passage is quoted from The Algerians, a translation of Bourdieu's 
'Sociologie' by A. C. M. Ross, Beacon Press, Boston, 1962. The emphasis 
on the intermingling of local Berber and Eastern Islamic laws throws 
some light on the power of local customs to transform the Islamic ideal 
normative pattern into a local actual pattern. See Chapter 4 for a dis- 
cussion of family legislation, taken as an illustration of the present 
argument. 
8. The subject of 'marriage compulsion' is still today one of the most 
passionate debates in Sunni Islamic legislation, as there is no exp- 
licit treatment of it in the Qur'an However, the latter's injunctions 
on women's 'good treatment' in a variety of verses (30: 21; 2: 187; 4: 
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19; 2: 229; 2: 31) has led to a consensus among 
Islam that compulsion should not be tolerated, arx 
may appeal against the imposed marriage contract. 
'Ati, The Family Structure in Islam, American Trust 
pp. 78-84; Afzular Rahman, Role of Muslim Woman 
Foundation, London, 1986, pp. 311-312. 
9. See Chapter 4. 
leading jurists of 
I if exercised women 
Cf. Hammudah Abd al 
Publications, 1977, 
in Society, Seerah 
10. The term Khalifah was first used to designate the prophet 
Muhammad's companions who succeeded him to lead the nascent Muslim 
empire. Those were the four Khu1 a fa ' al -Bashi di n who led the empire 
from Medinah and Mecca. The word means a 'viceroy' entrusted with the 
mission of preserving God's earthly realm. Cf. Watt, W. M., Islamic 
Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1980; and al Attas, 
op. cit., pp. 24-5. 
11. Cf. Arkoun, M., "Le Concept de raison Islamique" in Annuaire de 
1'Afrique du Nord, CNRS, Paris, 1979; Gellner, E., & Vatin, J. C., 
(eds. ) Islam et Politique au Maghreb, Table Ronde du Centre de 
Recherches et d'Etudes sur les Societes Mediterraneennes, Aix en 
Provence, Juin 1979; and in particular Vatin's article "Puissance 
d'Etat et Resistances Islamiques en Algerie, XIX-XX siecles: Approche 
Mecanique"; as well as A. Merad, "l'Ideologisation de l'Islam 
Bans le 
Monde Musulman Contemporain"; both in Gellner & Vatin, op. cit. The 
underlining argument defended by these authors 
is the distinction they 
draw between the orthodox scripturalist tradition in Islam, as 
official and intellectual; and a more grassroot model 
of Islam 
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combining faith and local customs. The two are alleged to be more 
likely at odds with each other, rather than confirm the aura of 
uniformity ascribed to the so-called Muslim World. 
12. Abd al Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) was born in 
'Innis, but travelled extensively in the Muslim empire of the period. 
Holding political and legislative office from time to time in numerous 
central and regional courts of the empire, he developed a close 
understanding of political change in 'medieval Islam'. Hence his 
formidable work on the history and social and political mechanisms of 
both Western and Eastern parts of the empire: Kitab el 'Ibar, known in 
translation as the Mugaddimah, after its first volume where Ibn Khaldun 
laid down his theory of social change based on the concept of 
'Assabiyya. However, ibn Khaldun's work included seven volumes which he 
devised as a comprehensive Discours sur 1'Histoire Universelle 
(Monteil's translation for Unesco, 1967-68). Cf. A. Megherbi, La Pensee 
Sociologique d'Ibn Khaldun, SNED, Alger, 1971. Ibn Khaldun concentrated 
his study on the North African provinces of the Muslim empire, which 
was coined as Maghreb. See note 16 below. 
13. Cf. E. Geliner, 'State and Revolution in Islam' in Millenium, 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 8, no. 3, Winter 1979-1980, p. 
191. 
14. At independence (5 July 1962) Algeria became Republique Alge rienne 
Democratique et Populaire. Note that socialism does not appear in this 
official title. 
140 
15. In Algeria, the pastoral-nomadic and tribal elements were 
predominant, especially among the Arab-speaking groups. However, Berber 
populations were divided between the sedentary arboriculturalist 
Kabyles in the northern mountains, the transhuming Shawia of the 
eastern mountains, and the city-based merchants of the M'zab region in 
central Algeria (see Bourdieu, op. cit., chapters 1,2,3). The seclusion 
of women is stricter amongst the first and the last and seems to 
coincide with sedentarity. The pastoral-nomadic and tribal 
characteristic was retained as general for the 'Republic of Cousins' as 
it is taken for a type, which, by and large, renders the total 
structure of both Arab and Berber groups which intermingled to a very 
great extent. 
16. The term Maghreb was adopted 
Arab-Islamic conquest of the 7th 
sun-setting time, but also West, 
empire's map, with the Mashrek in 
Laroui, A., 1'histoire du maghreb, 
for North Africa following the 
century. It literally means the 
and Occident. It completed the 
the Middle- East and Far-East. Cf. 
Francois Maspero, Paris, 1970. 
17. John Iliffe, A Modem History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University 
Press, 1979, p. 35. The Islamic merchant influence goes back to the 
ninth century with Arabs and Shirazi Persians migrating to Zanzibar, 
as well as establishing settlements in the islands of Pemba and Kilwa 
Kisiwani off the mainland coast. Between the thirteenth and eighteenth 
centuries the Arabs and Afro-Shirazi controlled the gold, ivory and 
slave trades from the city states of Zanzibar and Kilwa Kisiwani. 
By 
1840, Zanzibar became the world leading producer of cloves(based on 
slave-dependent plantations), Cf. Rodger Yeager, Tanzania, 
An African 
141 
Experiment, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 7-8. The Muslim islanders did not 
venture mainland, which was left to the Germans and later the British 
to colonise. Germany occupied Tanganyika by virtue of the Anglo-German 
treaty of 1886. Following WW1, the country was handed over to the 
British as a 'mandate' of the League of Nations in 1919. The European 
legacy was later to establish share-crop agriculture, and extend 
proselytisation of local peoples through missionary work and education. 
Cf. I. N Kimambo and A. J. Temu (eds), A History of Tanzania, Heinemann 
Educational Books for the Historical Association of Tanzania, Nairobi, 
1969. 
18. Again this is a general characteristic of our model of the 
'Republic of Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania. We should be aware that it 
is in fact a melting pot comprising a great variety of populations. 
Indeed, Iliffe has argued that dividing Tanganyika into 'tribes' was a 
European administrative and political device in order to implement 
'indirect rule' (Iliffe, ibid: 318-41): 
The notion of tribe lay at the heart of indirect rule in 
Tanganyika. Refining the racial thinking common in 
German times, administrators believed that every African 
belonged to a tribe, just as evry European belonged to a 
nation. The idea doubtless owed much to the Old 
Testament, to Tacitus and Caesar, to academic 
distinctions between tribal societies based on status 
and modern societies based on contract, and to post-war 
anthropologists who prefered 'tribal' to the more 
pejorative word 'savage'. Tribes were seen as cultural 
units possessing a common language, a single social 
system, and an established customary law. Their 
political and social systems rested on kinship. Tribal 
membership was hereditary. Different tribes were related 
genealogically, so that Africa's history was a vast 
family tree of tribes. ... this stereotype 
bore little 
relation to Tanganyika's kaleidoscopic history,... . 
Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; Africans 
built tribes to belong to. 
(ibid: 323-4) 
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Iliffe is careful to explain that groups and identities were 
ecologically and geographically determined, and that the history of 
Tanganyika is that of a flow of colonists. Two main groups are 
immediately recognisable: the Bantu cultivators with small scale fluid 
social organisation; and the Nilotic pastoralists, less numerous and 
more mobile. However, "most of Tanganyika's peoples were patrilineal" 
(ibid: 16). See note 19 below for further details on Tanzania's 
'traditional' social patterns. 
19. The egalitarianism of Tanzania's traditional societies (so much 
boasted by Nyerere for instance) is a general feature. Today's national 
society is based on "an extreme ethnic diversity", which a century ago 
meant that "a large number of tribes and separate political units 
... 
[ranged from] complex democratic states, [to] small chiefdoms, or 
were organized into large centralized kingdoms". Cf. J. E. G. Sutton, 
"The Peopling of Tanzania", in Kimambo & Temu (eds. ) (ibid: 1-13). 
Four distinct regions in mainland Tanzania may constitute our 'Republic 
of Brothers-in-law': the West Lake region where the Kingdom of Kitara 
rigidly divided people into castes, and held a stratification and 
clientship system; Western and Central regions where agricultural 
communities practiced matrilineal succession to perpetuate the nobility 
of the ruling group; the North-Eastern region with its pastoral 
polulations of Pare, and Masai with warrior-like traditions; and 
finally the Southern region with its small chiefdoms. See, Isaria N. 
Kimambo, "The Interior Before 1800", in Kimambo and Temu, (ibid: 
14-33). However, most of these communities were by and large 
agricultural societies organised into small chiefdoms, with 
individual 
autonomous clans, which recognised chiefdom authority only 
in matters 
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of common interest, as its function was more ritualistic 
trative (Kimambo, ibid: 15). 
than adminis- 
20. Iliffe has summarized the division . of labour between the sexes and 
the ensuing status of women in a general pattern for 'traditional' 
Tanzania : 
The division of labour between the sexes varied. In human societies generally, hoe-agriculture has tended to 
coincide with low levels of economic differenciation, 
the extensive use of female labour in agriculture, 
polygyny, the payment of bridewealth as recompense to 
the family losing a woman's labour and fertility, and 
the importance of extended families where survival 
remained tenuous and men owned little property which 
they wished to keep within a nuclear family. This was broadly Tanganyika's social pattern. In most areas, 
women did much of the repetitive agricultural work, 
while men herded, hunted, cleared the forest, and 
managed the homestead... . Polygyny existed in most 
areas... . Bridewealth was also common but not 
universal. Where cattle existed, they were the normal 
gifts in bridewealth. ... Those who lacked cattle might 
obtain brides by labour. 
(ibid: 16-17) 
It is clear from the above that women were by and large an 'exchange 
commodity', and where they were kept in their families, this was 
through "marriage by service to the bride's parents, who then owned the 
children" (ibid: 17). Present- day family legislation had to take 
these non-individualist traditions into account (see Chapter 4). 
21. A number of subtle exploitative practices exist and can be cataly- 
sed through the position of women: 
Control of women enabled older men to control and 
exploit their juniors. Although exploitation was masked 
by every man's expectation of becoming and elder, 
generational tension may have been the most important 
form of social conflict in all but the politically most 
sophisticated of Tanganyikan societies. ... Exploitation 
of women and young men was the corollary of men's 
inability to exploit each other by economic means. ' 
(Iliffe, ibid: 16-17) 
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However, we should be careful to note that slavery was practised on the 
coast and in Zanzibar, thereby entailing the existence of a 
sophisticated social and political system. "Coastal towns had each its 
Sultan, diwani or jumbe often claiming Shirazi origin and advised by 
leading merchants" (ibid: 37). The predominant Muslim influence of 
coastal Swahili culture also meant the 'domestication' of women, who 
"Although regarded as inferior in status, intellect and moral strength, 
could wield considerable political influence, and were spared the 
agricultural drudgery which was their lot in most inland 
societies"(ibid: 38). Thus, no matter how simple or complex the system 
of exploitation, the position of women seems to be that of inferiors. 
22. By and large, the conception of knowledge of the Tanzanian 
'Republic of Brothers-in-law" corresponds to that of Gurvitch's 
'archaic societies'. According to him, "theogonic and cosmogonic 
mythology ... pervades all the types of knowledge that appear in these 
societies, especially as the types of knowledge are not clearly 
distinguished: indeed not only are scientific and philosophical 
knowledge missing, but common-sense knowledge, perceptual knowledge of 
the external world, knowledge of the Other and the We, and political 
knowledge, tend to fuse together" (Gurvitch, ibid: 123). On the absence 
of philosophical knowledge, and the danger of equating philosophical 
thinking with oral 'folk' traditions in Africa, see Kwasi Wiredu, 
Philosophy and an African Culture, Cambridge University Press, 1980, 
particularly the introduction and chapter three. 
23. Cf. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
Penguin Books, 1981, in which he reviews the transformation of rural 
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social organisation in England, France, the USA, China, Japan and 
India, and the processes which led this transformation to bring about 
the contemporary forms of 'dictatorial and democratic' political 
regimes. Moore's argument is mainly concerned with the transformation 
of the 'peasantry' as an exploited class, which in most cases was done 
away with, to pave the way to more urbanite and industrial formations. 
Hence his conclusion that the 'peasantry is a closed chapter in human 
history'. However, both Africa and Latin America are examples of 
struggling peasantries which are more likely to have evolved together 
with capitalist mechanisms, rather than belong to inherent social 
structures. For Africa, see Iliffe, op. cit., Chapter 9; and for Latin 
America, A. Gunder Frank, Latin America, Underdevelopment or 
Revolution, Monthly Review Press, 1969. 
24. Algeria became a colony of France following its invasion by French 
troops in 1830. The colonial policy rested mainly on European 
settlement (and lasted until 1962). Thence, the agressive policies of 
land confiscation, and cultural assimilation, so that Algeria was 
considered a departement of France. Tanzania, experienced two 
colonial administrations, the German from 1886 to 1919, when the 
British took over until Independence in 1961. The Germans were noted 
for their expansion of Swahili culture and language in view of their 
privileged relations with the Zanzibari sultans; the British for their 
'indirect rule' policy to further control of the scattered population 
of mainland. Tanganyika. In both cases, even the proselytising 
activities of the various missions were carried out in local 
vernaculars. As a result, the nationalist struggles of Algeria and 
Tanzania vastly differed. Algeria's had to be far more radical and was 
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epitomised in a bloody war of liberation, whereas Tanzania's was much 
more piecemeal. 
25. Indeed, the mid-sixties represent -a landmark in both countries. 
Boumediene led a bloodless coup in 1965 to establish a strong and 
stable regime. In 1964, Tanzania was created following the amalgamation 
of mainland Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar. 
26. This came in sharp contrast with the previous discourse of economic 
austerity of the Boumediene administration, and was largely echoed in 
the national press. It was also welcomed by city-dwellers who grew 
impatient with endemic shortages of agricultural goods, and the quasi 
absence of luxury goods. 
27. Following ten years of talks between International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) officials and the Tanzania government, the latter had to yield 
finally to the conditions of the Fund. These included currency 
devaluation and the withdrawal of subsidies on staple goods. Agreement 
was reached in 1986, shortly after an international conference on 
Tanzania, organised by the Centre for African Studies of the London 
School of Oriental and African Studies. The conference, interestingly 
entitled Tanzania After Nyerere, conveyed in fact a very tense 
atmosphere, significantly linked with the IMF talks. The panoply of 
interventions disclosed both bitterly disillusioned radical scholars, 
and euphoric supporters of the new 'liberal' economic policies. 
Although Nyerere's policies, and philosophy of self-reliance were 
attacked, the Mwalimu himself still drew a lot of respect, especially 
as he had stepped down from his presidential office 
in 1985. 
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28. See Alistair Horn's account of the war and the social and political 
forces involved in it, A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962, 
Penguin Books, 1977. French and Francophone literature on the subject 
abounds; the most poignant account remains that of the Algerian Mostefa 
Lacheraf (currently a diplomat), L'Algerie, nation et societe, Francois 
Maspero, Paris, 1976. 
29. Cf. Iliffe J., 1979; Bienen H., 1967; Coulson A., 1982. 
30. Cf. Bedjaoui M., 1961; Quandt W., 1969; Lazreg M., 1976. 
31. Cf. Bienen H., 1967. 
32. De Gaulle's visit to Algeria in 1958, when the war was raging, is 
an example of such moves. De Gaulle came with a package of social and 
economic reforms aimed at improving the standards of living of 
so-called 'Muslim Algerians'. However he met with the wrath of European 
settlers, and the rebuke of fighting Algerians, who now wanted no 
less 
than full independence. 
33. This came in a compilation of Boumediene's speeches 
by Khalf a 
Mameri, Citations du President Boumediene, SNED, Alger, 1975. This and 
other passages are this author's translations. 
34. Earlier, when formulating his visionary philosophy of Ujamaa and 
Self-reliance, Nyerere was adamantly against coercion: 
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By orders, or even by slavery, you can build pyramids 
and magnificent roads, you can achieve expanded acreages 
of cultivation, and increases in the quantity of goods 
produced in your factories. All these things... can be 
achieved through the use of force; but none of them 
result in the development of people. Force and deceitful 
promises can in fact achieve short term material goals. 
They canot bring strength to a'nation or a community, 
and they cannot provide a basis for the freedom of the 
people. 
This is from his paper Freedom and Development published on 16 October 
1968, and reproduced in his Freedom and Development, A Selection from 
Writings and Speeches, 1968-1973; Dar Es Salaam, Oxford University 
Press, 1973, p. 61. 
35. Cf. Benhachenhou A., Formation du sous-developpement en Algerie, 
essai sur les limites du developpement du capitalisme en Algerie 
1830-1962, Entreprise Nationale, Alger, 1978. 
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PART TWO 
THE FORTUITIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AS ILLUSTRATED BY 
TIE POSITION OF WOMEN IN ALGERIA AND TANZANIA 
CHAPTER FOUR : FAMILY LAWS IN ALGERIA AND TANZANIA, THE BA'T'TLE FOR A 
SEGREGATED CITY OF WOMEN 
In the previous Chapters, attention was focused on the establishment of 
a 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania. Both rhetoric and 
practice of the societal programmes put forward by the national 
leadership of each country were examined. By and large, each national 
leadership was presented as a typical example of the 'Republic of 
Citizens' in time of nation-building. In the cases of Algeria and 
Tanzania, legitimacy for this 'Republic' drew largely on a discourse of 
'specific socialism' whose roots were claimed to be established more on 
a pre-colonial egalitarian social order, rather than on European and 
Marxian brands of socialism. 
Nevertheless, both the Algerian and Tanzanian 'Citizens' in power had 
to account with a pre-existing socio-economic structure whose 
protagonists were mostly acting as clients to the new deal and its 
institutional and normative proposals. 
1 While in Algeria the 'Citizens' 
were to face a 'Republic of Cousins' and its spiritualist demands, in 
Tanzania a tribal and scattered 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' simply 
exasperated the impatient 'Citizens' by taking refuge in ancestral 
customs. As analysed in Holmesian terms, the change sought 
by the 
Citizens happened to come up against a variety of elements of 
no-change, mainly exemplified in the retention by the 
'Cousins' and the 
'Brothers-in-Law' of their own normative and institutional models. The 
latter were not necessarily de-legitimised by the imposition of 
the new 
social and economic order since they were indeed recognised as 
its 
authentic basis. On the whole, the 
'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law' did 
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not openly oppose institutional innovations in view of their 
legitimacy, which, by and large, dwelt on the 'universal' axioms of 
development, science and progress. 
2 But they approached them as 
consumers rather than producers. Hence the resistance to the new social 
rites of a 'Republic of Citizens' which were yet to be internalised 
(Bouguerra, 1979: 113). However where the resistance of the 'Cousins' 
and the 'Brothers-in-law' seemed to be residual in matters of 
institutional change, it turned into adamant and firm opposition to the 
aspirations of equality of the sexes put forward by the socialist 
'Republic of Citizens'. Above all, provisions for equal legal status 
for men and women in matters of family law and personal status, have 
been considered as anathema; even heresy. This Chapter willaccordingly 
examine the disputes over family laws in Algeria and Tanzania as 
parameters for the ambiguity of the 'Citizens' towards sex equality, 
and the deep-seated resentment of the 'Cousins" and 'Brothers-in-law' 
at the idea. 
4.1. Family Law: The Lower Valuations of Algeria's and Tanzania's 
'Republic of Citizens' 
Both in Algeria and Tanzania, the 'Citizens' have long hesitated before 
bringing into the open the issue of personal status and family law. 
Indeed, confronting the issue meant entering the private realm, not 
only of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law' at large, but also 
their own. In Myrdal's terms they would be disturbing dormant 'lower 
valuations'. 
3 Whereas the public realm policies did not constitute a 
menace for these valuations, the private realm of family life, and role 
and status of the sexes presented an intense controversy. 
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Where public policies addressed citizens at large, family law and 
personal status law addressed the 'individual male and female'. This 
meant that promises of equality of the official rhetoric of socialism 
could be made more palpable and more immediate: 
It is common that laws which are promulgated touching 
upon the private lives of individuals and largely dependent upon their willingness to act or refrain from 
acting in a certain way, depend entirely upon the extent to which other social forces in the community are 
generated and directed towards the observance of the new 
rules. In the absence of such socialization the 
community will continue to be governed by the rules 
existing prior to the institution of the new rules. 
(Rwezaura, 1976: 120) 
In the cases of Algeria and Tanzania, Rwezaura's remark would have us 
assume that the family laws proposed by the ruling 'Citizens' are 
revolutionary in the sense that they are counter to the higher 
valuations of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', as well as the 
lower valuations of the 'Citizens'. It is argued herein that the new 
family law in each context represents at its very inception a comp- 
romise by the 'Citizens' to the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', as 
well as an expression of the lower valuations of the 'Citizens'. It 
will be argued and demonstrated in the following, that the 'Cousins' in 
Algeria and the 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania triumphed in their 
opposition to the 'Citizens' attempts at enacting relatively progres- 
sive family laws. This opposition was not only a lack of socialisation 
of the "law-subjects" as suggested by Rwezaura (ibid: 101), but was 
openly voiced by the representatives of the 'Cousins' and the 
'Brothers-in-Law' in the very institutions set up by the 'Republic of 
Citizens' to introduce change. Indeed, in both countries, parliamentary 
procedure was followed so that the new provisions were debated. 
Ironically, the issue of family law and personal status brought about 
the most lively debates ever experienced in either country. 
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Paradoxically, the conservatism of the 'Cousins' and the 
'Brothers-in-law' brought about the most memorable experiences of 
'democratic' discussions. Not only did they provoke the legitimation of 
the developmentist discourse to be questioned for the first time ever, 
but they also unleashed the expression of more radical and progressive 
views on the part of the secularist 'Citizens'. For the first time 
since independence, a variety of social protagonists came to the 
forefront to voice their opinion about official policy. 
In the following, the triumph of the ' Cousins' and the 
'Brothers -in-law' over the 'Citizens' in power, and the latter's 
inconsistencies will be examined in the light of the 1984 Code de la 
famille in Algeria, and the 1971 Law of Marriage Act in Tanzania. While 
a close study of the parliamentary debates was possible in Algeria, 
secondary sources had to be used for Tanzania in order to illustrate 
the role and reaction of the 'Brothers-in-law', as well as those of the 
secular 'Citizens' who represent the more progressive quarters of 
public opinion. Finally, in order to illuminate the attitude of the 
'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', it will be relevant to examine the 
structure of the family in Africa (North and South of the Sahara), as 
well as the world view of the Shari 'a and customary laws on woman's 
status, as sources for the valuations of our main social protagonists. 
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4.2. Personal Status and Family Law in Algeria (1962-1981). 
Relatively recently, an Arab woman scholar, Fatima Memissi was 
speculating: 
Why is it that the eclectism that reigns in so many 
spheres of Arab daily life is absent when it comes to the shaping of sexual identity? 
(in Barakat, 1985: 224) 
Mernissi was attempting to comprehend the systematic adoption of 
Islamic law Shari 'a in the private realm of the family and personal 
status in all Arab countries. She argued pertinently that, despite 
making provision for all other spheres of social organisation, the 
Shari 'a had only been adopted in the area of family legislation. 
4 
Mernissi's question can easily be extended to Algeria, where the eclec- 
tism and the aggressiveness of the economic policies since Indepen- 
dence have been unique in the Arab world. Notwithstanding its 
political and ideological eclectism, the Algerian national elite 
finally adopted one of the most retrograde family laws with grave 
consequences for women's constitutional rights as equal citizens. 
5 As 
will be demonstrated, the contemporary history of family legislation in 
Algeria reflects the hesitations of the official 'Republic of Citizens' 
and its normative inconsistencies, as much as it reveals the unsus- 
pected strength of public conservative trends (represented by the 
'Cousins' of the National Assembly) in imposing their world view on the 
matter of sex equality. 
It would be interesting to note, en passant, the attitude of the 
colonial 'Republic of Citizens' vis ä vis matters of personal status 
and family legislation. Notwithstanding the colonial offensive on the 
local social order, the French assimilationist onslaught had to stop at 
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the doorstep of the Algerian family. In his extensive study on personal 
status and family legislations in the Maghrib, Borrmans (1971) 
explained that the colonial administration was caught between its 
dominant assimilationist creed and the caution with which it had to 
treat matters of personal status to minimize clashes with what was then 
an undisturbed 'Republic of Cousins'. In Algeria, there were gradual, 
but timid assaults on the indigenous legal apparatus. They were 
embodied, for instance, in the Senatus Consulte (14 July 1865) on the 
naturalisation of Algerians, and the poi Jonnart (4 February 1919) 
which furthered assimilation, and finally the poi du 18 Aodt 1929 
which extended the naturalisation process to women. 
6 It was not until 
1959, when the war was raging, that a civil law was promulgated to 
regulate questions of marriage and divorce registration, as well as 
questions of inheritance; probably as a last attempt by the colonial 
administration to control the Algerian family. 
The colonial authorities realized that the way to breaking this 'atom' 
asunder was through the 'release' of the women as it were. On 13 May 
1958, the colonial administration launched a campaign of intimidation, 
whereby a number of women were forced to take of f their veils in public 
squares. But this "battle of the veil was to provoke the native's 
bristling resistance" (Fanon, 1970: 32), and was indeed a desperate 
move by the colonial 'Republic of Citizens' to violate the order of the 
'Cousins'. Paradoxically, the latter were joined by women in 
brandishing the veil as a liberating device, and a mark of cultural 
distinction against the colonial order. 
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To the colonialist offensive against the veil, the 
colonised opposes the cult of the veil. What was an 
undifferentiated element in a homogeneous whole, 
acquires a taboo character, and the attitude of a given 
Algerian woman with respect to the veil will be 
constantly related to her overall attitude with respect 
to the foreign occupation. 
(Fanon, 1970: 33) 
Fanon reminds us at this point of Tillion's analysis of the defensive 
mechanisms of the 'Republic of Cousins'; and the heavy burden they 
assigned to women for the protection of their order against the assault 
of the 'Citizens'. For the defeat of the colonisers in family legis- 
lation was to be followed by that of the national leadership. 
In encouraging women to join the struggle for independence, national 
leaders of the war of liberation (1954) had to compromise with the 
'Republic of Cousins', and thus kept the participation of women to a 
minimum. Indeed, the closed and unyielding structure of the Algerian 
family with its well-defined sex roles could not easily accommodate a 
public role for women, albeit for the sake of the anti-colonial 
struggle. According to Fanon, 
This relatively cloistered life, 
categorised, regulated comings and 
immediate revolution seem a dubious 
not such a decision have catastroph 
the progress of the Revolution. 
with its known 
goings, made any 
proposition. Would 
is consequences for 
(ibid: 35) 
It is significant that a revolutionary such as Fanon expressed doubts 
as to the consequences of a rapid reform of sex roles in the Algerian 
family. Obviously, compliance with revolutionary norms of sex equality 
would have jeopardized the whole revolutionary programme itself. 
The same kind of argument was to be adopted by the modernising 
'Citizens' after Independence. One could argue that the pace of family 
law reform was to be informed by the status of the individual person in 
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Algeria, as embodied in article 34 of the Code de la Nationalite (AAN, 
1963: 806-814), which stressed the paramount position of Islam as 
the main normative model of the ideal typical citizen in independent 
Algeria. Article 34 stipulates the agnatic, patrilineal, and Islamic 
status of the Algerian individual by birth: 
Our reference to the Islamic status is something we insist upon because it absolutely conforms to our historical realities, both sociological and judicial. 
When in 1830 colonialism deprived us of of the 
attributes of our personality, we found shelter in the 
only refuge left: the Islamic status. This latter is a 
system of judicial regulations ruling the majority of 
the population of this country, in conditions similar to 
those before 1830. This is the reason why, in conforming 
to our theory of continuity of the Algerian nation, we 
have insisted that this system of rules should appear in 
this text. 
(in Borrmans, 1971: 504) 
This was part of a speech by the Justice minister to the Assemblee 
Populaire Nationale (APN) in its debate on the Code de la Nationalite 
in June 1963v. Borrmans referred in his study to the emphatic reference 
to Islam (as a shield against assimilation) by the Assembly delegates 
(ibid: 503-505). The ensuing process of family law reforms between 1963 
and 1981 was to reveal the same concern for the role of Islam as a 
bulwark against the secularisation of daily life. 
4.2.1 The 1963 Law On a Minimum Age for Marriage. 
The revolutionary euphoria of early Independence made it possible for 
the radical secularists of the polity to make a number of moves in 
favour of women's rights in matrimonial matters. For instance a law on 
a minimum age for marriage, Loi no. 63-224, was adopted by the National 
Assembly on 25 July 1963. This law was especially designed to protect 
young girls from early marriage (sometimes arranged when they were only 
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nine or ten years old). 
8 It fixed the minimum age to sixteen years, 
and made compulsory the registration of marriages with a local 
authority. By the same token, it rendered the simple oral pronouncement 
of the Fatiha (the Exordium in the Qur'an)9 in the validation of the 
marriage contract obsolete. Not that the Exordium was not retained, but 
written registration became the sole legal recognition of the marriage 
contract. Articles 4 and 5 of the law were particularly interesting in 
view of their radical wording. They consider the failure to comply with 
the law as amounting to rape and complicity of rape, and hence called 
for maximum sanctions. However subsequent amendments toned down the 
forms of punishments which were either brief imprisonment (one to three 
months) or payment of a fine. It remains doubtful whether the 
provisions of the law were applied at all, but the enactment of such a 
bill was significant in that it illustrates the manifestation of 
radical secular opinion in the early days of Independence. 
Nevertheless, it was not long before some moves by the 'Cousins' became 
manifest in a series of administrative directives, validating marriage 
by the Fatiha, and forbidding the union of "Muslim women to men of 
other creeds". 
10 Such measures appeared for instance in the Circulaire 
no. 31,23 Avril 1963 (Borrmans, ibid: 511). It seemed that the 
circular was paving the way for an offensive by the 'Cousins' on the 
family code which was at that time in preparation. 
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4.2.2. Abortive Family Codes 1963-1972. 
Between 1963 and 1964 commissions were set up by the Party and 
Government to elaborate a family code, amidst repeated recommendations 
that Islamic precepts should be the main guidance. The Justice Minister 
declared that "commissions studying the family code should bear in mind 
that Islam [was] the religion of state" (Rasjep, March 1964,2: 75-81). 
It remains difficult to find out what happened during the debates of 
commissions for the code was never to be issued and was given up in the 
course of 1964. 
Borrmans reported heated debates on the questions of marriage 
procedure and polygamy between three trends of opinion; the 
traditionalists, the modernists, and the revolutionaries (ibid: 
512-516). These correspond respectively to the present categories of 
'Cousins', moderate 'Citizens' in power, and radical secular 
'Citizens'. 11 The first were staunchly in favour of polygamy, the right 
of the husband to repudiate his wife, and the retention of the guardian 
as the legal representative of the bride in the marriage procedure. 
They were not even in favour of the registration of marriage, since, 
they argued, the presence of two male witnesses is a sufficient 
guarantee. 
12 Facing this kind of intransigence were the compromising 
'Citizens' who swayed between secularism and religion; and the radical 
secular 'Citizens' who opted for a total equality between men and women 
to appear in the code. However consensus proved difficult if not 
impossible to reach and the proposals were never presented to the 
National Assembly for adoption. 
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The same scenario of intransigence and failure to compromise was to 
repeat itself two years later (1966), and was also to lead to an 
abortive attempt at issuing a family code. This time, a first draft was 
prepared but was kept unpublicised although it managed somehow to be 
circulated (M'Rabet: 1967). Despite the fact that Boumediene mentioned 
it vaguely in a speech commemorating International Woman's Day, on 8 
March 1966, Justice Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui insisted that it was 
just a project. 
13 
The most controversial points remained those related to marriage, 
divorce and inheritance, where Islamic tradition is clearly in favour 
of the male prerogative and superiority. The contention was how to 
replace the divinely bestowed male superiority (Qur'an, 4: 34)14 by a 
humanly designed equality, which seeks to metamorphose the mere 
consultation of women into their direct participation. This time again, 
an unpublished draft of the family code was stifled at its conception, 
and was not to be debated in any case since the National Assembly had 
been dissolved by the new regime of 19 June 1965. This last event was 
in any case to discard both the conservative 'Cousins' and the radical 
secularist 'Citizens', to pave the way for the more pragmatic and 
technocratically minded 'Citizens' who were to dominate Algeria's 
decision-making process up to this day. From then onwards, ideological 
debates were considered divisive, and no opportunities were, provided 
for consideration of contentious matters, such as family legislation. 
All efforts had to be geared on infrastructural change, and 
developmental processes. 
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Following the experience of 1966, the family code 'saga' fell into 
oblivion as family regulation was not deemed a priority in nation- 
building by the new technocratic team in power. The silence on a 
specific family legislation was nevertheless replaced by more general 
guidelines on the role of women, and women's ideal typical behaviour in 
Algerian society. Again Boumediene took the lead in spelling out such 
guidelines in various speeches for about a decade, that is between 
1966 and 1976 when the Charte Nationale and the new Constitution were 
issued. 
Boumediene for instance never failed to remind Algerian women of a 
double role. While conceding that their role as producers was guaran- 
teed by the development strategy, he always insisted upon their 'moral 
responsibility' towards the preservation of an Islamic ideal behaviour: 
When we mention the rights of woman and the role she is 
to play in the political, economic and social fields, we 
should not forget the evolution of the Algerian woman. 
This evolution cannot in any case lead to the imitation 
of the Western woman. We say no to such evolution as our 
society is Islamic and socialist. Accordingly a problem 
arises, it is that of the respect of morality. We are 
all for evolution and progress so that woman plays a 
role in all domains... . But this evolution should not 
be the cause of the decay of our society. 15 
(ibid: 189-190) 
Boumediene was here addressing women at a rally commemorating Inter- 
national Women's Day on 8 March 1966. His guidelines were more of a 
moralistic warning, than political injunctions. 
In another speech, 8 March 1967, he remarked: 
All doors are open to her [woman], and no hindrance is 
to limit her evolution. However, she should endeavour to 
preserve her dignity and her personality, by trying not 
to succumb to the charms of certain Western traditions 
and certain new fashions. What could be considered as 
progress by some, is no other than regression, and a 
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form of degradation which the Algerian woman should not 
mistake for real evolution. 
(ibid: 191) 
To the third Congress of the party's women's organisation, the Union 
Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes (UNFA) in April 1974, he had this to 
say: 
However, liberty, progress and emancipation of the Arab, 
Muslim and Algerian woman in particular cannot be 
achieved to the detriment of social morality and 
traditions... . Our desire is to see the Algerian woman 
enjoying her freedom and her rights like her husband, 
brother, and son, whilst remaining the Arab and Muslim 
woman armed with a morality which would preserve 
Algerian society. 
(ibid: 144-195) 16 
This leitmotive of morality seemed to be Boumediene's favourite 
whenever the issue of women's role in the construction of the new 
'Republic of Citizens' sprang up. It was as if the new role of 
'Citizen' granted to women was not a right, but a favour; for which 
they had to pay in return by retaining their 'virtue'. Boumediene's 
language would be incomprehensible for an ear external to Islamic 
culture. Indeed the obsession with morality (as related to women) is no 
other than the traditional restriction on women's movement, and the 
free disposition of their body. In order to understand Boumediene's 
references, a look at the model of the ideal typical woman in Islam, 
and into the customs of the 'Republic of Cousins' will be necessary. 
It 
will be dealt with in this Chapter. 
17 
In the meantime, yet another abortive attempt at issuing a 
family code 
was experienced in the early 1970's. Indeed the aggressiveness of 
the 
development strategy was thought to have tamed the 'Cousins', and 
mellowed their intransigence as 
far as women's legal equality in family 
matters was concerned. But the 
1972 project of the Family Code was to 
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unleash yet more clashes between 'Cousins' and secularist 'Citizens', 
tempered by the tactic maneuvering of the technocratic 'Citizens'. 
The confidence gained during a decade of nation-building led 
Boumediene to announce the preparation of a family code in a speech on 
8 March 1973: 
Dear sisters, we are aware that there are certain 
problems to which definitive solutions have not been found, as our revolutionary march has been geared on 
urgent and vital projects. However, the Code of the 
Family which we hope to promulgate soon, once woman has 
voiced her opinion on the project, will certainly bring 
about solutions to the serious problems which deny the 
Algerian woman-citizen her right to take part 
effectively in the construction of our society. 
(ibid: 192) 
Boumediene was referring to the project prepared by a National Consul- 
tative Commission affiliated to the Ministry of Justice since 1971. The 
commission had to elaborate a code which was "to rid the structure of 
the family of everything non Islamic" as it was put by the Justice 
Minister. 18 This acerbic remark heralded a rather conservative code 
which was to provoke the wrath of the UNFA. Its Secretary General had 
this to say following the discussion of the project: 
We hope that the amendments and the reflexions which we 
have formulated will draw the attention of the 
legislator and higher officials who hold the power of 
decision. We have for instance expressed our staunch 
opposition to polygamy, and even to its intermediary 
formulation in the project. Our rejection of both as 
humiliating to woman, takes into account the present 
sociological, religious and economic conditions. 
... Indeed, it is unthinkable to tolerate 
in socialist 
society either polygamy or bigamy, it would be contrary 
to our basic principles. It is with hope that we wish to 
foresee the ultimate version of a code of the family 
which would give our society its due stability. 
(El-Djazairia, no. 19-20,1972) 
This bold denunciation of the project of the code, and the demand for 
an immediate implementation of a 'Republic of Citizens' as it ought to 
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be, (ie ensure sex equality), was to cost the secretariat of the UNFA a 
heavy price. Indeed , the team of secularist 'Citizens' at its head 
were quickly dismissed, and replaced by more moderate ones. 
19 In any 
case, the project of the code was yet again withdrawn by the moderate 
'Citizens' as they failed again to bring together the 'Cousins' and the 
radical 'Citizens'. In the words of Boumediene, this is what happened: 
Some have accused us of giving in too much to women, 
whilst for others the rights granted to them remain insufficient. It must be admitted then that the project 
of the new code has not resolved the family issue. We 
shall then leave the debate open until such time the 
will of the majority is met, and is in harmony with the 
political options of the country. 
(Mameri, ibid: 193) 
Leaving the debate open meant that in the meantime, family legislation 
in Algeria was slowly drifting towards the growing adoption of the 
Shari 'a precepts for the resolution of family matters. Two documents 
were to pave the way to the future code based entirely on the Shari 'a ; 
the 5 July 1973 Ordinance and the 26 September 1975 Ordinance. These 
stipulated that, in the absence of legal provisions in family matters, 
the judge should resort to the principles of Islamic Law or to custom. 
These measures betrayed the natural inclinations of the 'Citizens' in 
power towards an Islamic order of the family, as much as a tactical 
manoeuver to discard secularist 'Citizens". However, the growing pres- 
sures of the 'Cousins', who were outraged at the ambivalent attitude 
of the moderate 'Citizens' in what was after all an Islamic state 
according to the 1976 Constitution (Article 2), were to lead eventually 
in 1984 to the adoption of a Family Code. 
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4.3. The 1980s Saga of the Code de la Familie . 
While the saga of the previous codes was kept hidden from the lay eye 
at large, and debates restricted to the official circles of 'Cousins' 
and 'Citizens', the history of the 1984 code was riddled with 
sensational incidents. Indeed this time, the modernising 'Citizens' in 
power were determined to enact the code at all costs. However, it is 
contended herein, that the final adoption of the code was not so much 
due to their aggressiveness or boldness, as to the existence of a 
greater proportion of 'Cousins' or Cousin-sympathisers in their midst. 
Indeed, following the death of Boumediene and the political purge 
within the secularist 'Citizens', the new leadership was brought to 
yield more willingly to the pressures of the 'Cousins'. The latter were 
reinforced both by the Pan-Islamic fundamentalist movement epitomized 
in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as well as a growing internal demand 
for authenticity. 
20 
The process which led to the adoption of the law on the family code was 
to prove particularly arduous for the Algerian leadership, mostly 
constituted of moderate 'Citizens'. The process started in 1981 with 
the elaboration of a project on Personal Status, and was to end four 
years later with the adoption by the National Assembly of the Family 
Code (which is in operation today). As will be seen from the following 
discussion, the process unleashed passionate debates at the National 
Assembly during two legislatures in 1982 and 1984. The most remarkable 
contrast between the two parliamentary sessions was the dynamic 
presence of the secular 'Citizens' in the first, and their noticeable 
absence in the second; which was exclusively dominated 
by hard-line 
'Cousins'. A close study of the interventions by Assembly delegates of 
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both categories will help illuminate the subsequent development towards 
the triumph of the 'Cousins'. But more of this later in this Chapter. 
So far no description of the various aborted codes has been given. It 
should be pointed out that they were all versions of the 1984 code 
which will be provided in relation to the study of the 1984 debates. 
Suffice it to point out that the hesitations of the moderate 
'Citizens', and the pressures of the 'Cousins', have always led to the 
elaboration of codes based by and large on Islamic Law (albeit with 
minor alterations, especially with regard to polygamy), so as to curb 
the opposition of the more progressive secular 'Citizens'. The debates 
remain very significant in that they represent broadly the different 
trends of Algerian public opinion on the matters of family life and 
women's status. 
4.3.1. The 1982 Debates at the National Popular Assembly. 
Following the 1972-73 experience, only vague allusions were to be made 
about a family code. However, the difficulties arising from a plural 
legal system, and the growing social tensions affecting families in 
view of the important institutional changes, prompted the necessity to 
enact a family law. The impetus for change arose from the increase in 
divorce in the form of repudiation of the wife, and abandonment of 
wives and children. 
Although all trends of opinion converged towards the timeliness of a 
family regulation, the nature of it in terms of being either secular or 
religious brought about the most passionate disagreements. In January 
1982, the Justice Minister presented the National Assembly with a bill 
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on the Statut Personnel (Personal Status). The bill was submitted in 
an aura of tension provoked by the circulation of a petition presented 
to the chairman of the Assembly by a group of women protesting against 
the retrograde provisions of the bill. The latter included clauses such 
as a limitation on women's freedom to work and a wife had to have her 
husband's permission if she wished to work. Such provisions sparked 
off the first feminist manifestation ever witnessed in Algeria since 
Independence. 
The underground circulation of the bill in the winter of 1981, 
initiated a series of public protests by groups of women of different 
occupations (though mainly professionals and university students). On 
the 9 and 16 November 1981 respectively, groups of 100 women and 250 
women presented petitions with 10,000 signatures to the Assembly as a 
protest against the bill, which they denounced as being "contrary to 
the spirit of the National Charter" and as "unconstitutional". Heading 
the delegations were former women war veterans who gave an aura of 
nationalist legitimacy to the protest movement. 
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However, as the Government had no intention to withdraw the bill, 
protests gained momentum on 23 December 1981, when more than 100 women 
demonstrated this time in the busy centre of the capital Algiers. They 
carried banners which read: "No to Silence, Yes to Democracy" and "No 
to Socialism without Women's Participation". But the protests were not 
to deter the moderate Citizens of the Government from submitting the 
bill to the National Assembly. Indeed, the opposition of the secular 
'Citizens' did not weigh heavily in the balance of power compared to 
that of the 'Cousins', who were eager to pass the bill, and with it 
167 
their world-view. The Assembly debates in January 1982 were to be 
the last opportunity for the secular 'Citizens' to voice their contempt 
for the reinstitution of a 'Republic of Cousins' in the midst of the 
promised 'Republic of Citizens'. 
4.3.1.1. The Argument of the Secularists. 
In his introductory talk on the bill of Statut Personnel , the Justice 
Minister summarized its message as embodying: 
... the legislative reference within the framework of Islamic principles, which'guarantee to woman her rights, 
her position as partner of man, and as mother in 
society. 
(JOAPN, 1982, no. 126: 3) 
In presenting the bill to the plenary session, the chairman of the 
Assembly's Admministrative and Legislative Commission insisted on four 
points: marriage, polygamy, divorce and guardianship of women, all as 
understood by the Shari 'a: 
Marriage should occur early so that society is preserved 
from the depravation of young people; it is first and 
foremost geared on the procreation of a progeniture 
useful to society; it is based on equality between 
husband and wife, except in legal responsibility and 
familial authority, a natural prerogative of the 
husband. 
Polygamy remains the only valid solution to grave 
familial discord, and in any case even positive law 
admits de facto polygamy, whilst Islam gives it a 
de jure status. 
Divorce is the exclusive faculty of the husband, for he 
is the breadwinner; it would be inconceivable that the 
wife is also permitted the exercise of such a 
prerogative as she is unlikely to suffer from the same 
disadvantages. 
Guardianship reflects the concern of Islamic legislation 
for the protection of incapacitated people. There is a 
special provision with regard marriage as the Hadeeth 
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[literally the Prophet's speeches] stipulate that the 
presence of four people is required for the validation 
of the marriage contract: 
the matrimonial guardian on behalf of the bride; 
the bridegroom; 
two male witnesses. 
(JOAPN, 126: 5-6) 
The points mentioned were all reminders of a 'Cousin-like' world view. 
It remains surprising that they were presented by a moderate 'Citizen' 
on behalf of the Government. 
The response of the few secularists present in the Assembly came as a 
passionate reminder of the values typical of the 'Republic of Citizens' 
which was, as it were, under construction in Algeria. They mainly 
concentrated on the values of: "equal citizenry for men and women; the 
national revolution; and socialism as legitimised by the war of 
liberation, and the 1976 Constitution and National Charter" 
(ibid: 12-19). 
About ten secularist delegates intervened to reiterate Algeria's 
commitment to socialism and progress. Significantly, not all inter- 
ventions were reproduced in the Journal Officiel de l'Assemblee 
Populaire Nationale (JOAPN). 22 The secularist 'Citizens' emphasized in 
all their interventions the role of Islam as the religion of 'change, 
progress, emancipation, justice and tolerance'. Delegate Djeffal (a 
woman) pointed out in particular that: 
Islam encourages the effort of Ijtihad, and nothing 
should prevent the Algerian legislator from interpreting 
the Shari 'a in a manner different from that of the 
seventh or eighth century legislator, in view of 
constantly changing social conditions. ... The effort of 
Ijtihad is a must for the continuation of the 
Revolution. 
(ibid: 17) 
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By Ijtihad , delegate Djeffal was referring to the effort of 
interpretation of the sacred law provided for by the body of various 
schools which mushroomed between the eighth and twelfth centuries when 
the Muslim empire was expanding. The principle of Ijtihad was erected 
in order to help apply the sacred texts to new circumstances. 
The endorsement by the secularist 'Citizens' of Islamic precepts 
should not come as a surprise, but rather illuminate their need for 
legitimation; hence their 'progressive' interpretation of Islam. The 
secularists were particularly unhappy with the retention of polygamy in 
the bill on the Statut Personnel. Delegate Mesli (another woman) argued 
that polygamy threatened to be socially divisive as it encourages 
social stratification, given that only rich men can afford to entertain 
more than one wife. She warned that acceptance of polygamy meant the 
implicit recognition of a rich class in Algeria, and this was in 
contradiction with socialism (JOAPN, ibid: 18). 
Another significant secularist argument concerned the idea of 
guardianship over women. It was seen as unconstitutional, as it ran 
counter to the principle of political and legal majority of all 
citizens (Constitution, Article 58). Indeed, guardianship as explicitly 
expressed above, is meant to protect a special category, the 
'incapacitated', and thus addresses women as a 'handicapped sex'. 
23 By 
the same token, their legal and political majority as citizens becomes 
nul and void, even though it has been endorsed without hesitation by 
the moderate 'Citizens' in the Constitution. 
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For instance, Delegate Saadi pointed out that arguments such as 
"guardianship of women prevents them from commiting immoral deeds", and 
"polygamy preserves society from depravation", were rather the expres- 
sion of personal ethics, than objective legal provisions. He insisted 
that: 
... it is unfair to incriminate moral deviation on woman 
when man shares a bigger responsibility given his 
leading role in society. It is rather presumptuous to 
expect that the Statut Personnel is to straighten all 
deviations, when these are linked to aspects of 
economic, social and cultural nature. 
(JOAPN, ibid: 18-19) 
This attack on the bill of the moderate 'Citizens' was furthered by 
doubts raised as to the credibility of the idea of Personal Status 
itself. Delegate Djeffal remarked pertinently that the Statut Personnel 
became a body of rules on women's behaviour, rather than stood as the 
most urgently needed family regulation which Algerian society required 
(ibid: 17). 
4.3.1.2. The Argument of the 'Cousins'. 
To these attacks, the 'Cousins' were swift to reply vehemently as they 
heavily outnumbered the secular 'Citizens'. Delegate Redouani retorted 
simply that the bill in itself "was a riposte against those impregnated 
with secular views" and that "Algerians, as Muslims, should not be per- 
mitted to ignore the Qur'anic precepts and the teachings of the Ulamaa 
ibid: 22). Delegate Abada, for his part, demanded that: 
secularism should be rejected because it has made of 
woman a merchandise, prohibited polygamy and encouraged 
the separation of bodies as well as adultery. 
(ibid: 23) 
The reference to the 'separation of bodies' as leading to 'adultery' is 
very eloquent of the 'Cousins'' yearning for the practice of women's 
seclusion. The phrase "separation of bodies" is a clear reference to 
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the release of women from seclusion. This 
'bodies' in the streets considered by 
territory. Indeed the presence of women 
bolised by 'the street', can only be seen 
bodies by the 'Cousins'. Furthermore, 
interpreted as sexual provocation to mind; 
women other than their relatives; hence 
process makes them appear as 
the 'Cousins' to be men's 
in the public domain, sym- 
in its crudest appearance of 
this presence can only be 
5 used to the invisibility of 
the allusion to adultery. 
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However, polygamy remained the dominant preoccupation of the 'Cousins'. 
Delegate Redouani asked: 
why cast doubt on polygamy, when it provides 
marriage to women to safeguard them from immoral 
behaviour; it should in fact be imposed by the 
State, while celibacy should be discouraged. 
(ibid: 22) 
Delegate Mezoued saw in polygamy: 
... a humanitarian action, which helps reduce the rate 
of divorce, and has a raison d'etre in case the wife is 
sterile, or seriously ill or the husband fears marital 
discord. 
(ibid: 23) 
Delegate Belkhadem expressed a deep-seated anxiety at the prospect of 
proscribing polygamy. He argued that: 
the basic principle of marriage is polygamy; 
monogamy is only the exception to the rule and is 
practised by those who fear to be unfair to many wives. 
(ibid: 25) 
As a 'Cousin', this delegate was anxious to demonstrate his fear of a 
shrinking extended family and its replacement by the monogamous con- 
jugal family, gradually imposed by the specific conditions of the 
rising 'Republic of Citizens'. 
The heated debates which had marked this first legislature on the bill 
of Statut Personnel led to the withdrawal of the proposals by the 
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moderate 'Citizens' of the Government, who, through the intervention of 
the chairman of the Assembly reiterated their eclectic view. Chairman 
Bitat had this caveat to give to the 'Cousins' and the secularist 
'Citizens' alike: 
The Algerian Revolution is at the avant-gard of the 
Arab-Muslim nation. One of its most outstanding 
achievements is equality between man and woman in 
the acquisition of knowledge and access to 
work. '' ... but... Algeria firmI. y opposes secularism as 
well as all forms of extremism and colonial alienation. 
(ibid: 10-11) 
The references to "extremism" and "colonial alienation" are subtle 
allegations to the respective positions of the hard line 'Cousins' and 
the secularist 'Citizens' in the eyes of the moderate 'Citizens'. 
Assembly Chairman Bitat's rebuke of these positions was a clear 
reminder of the moderate 'Citizens' dislike for political discord, as 
well as a reassertion of their power. The debate was simply drawn to a 
close. 
4.3.2. Loi 84-11 on the Family Code and the 1984 Debates. 
It was another two years before the issue of family legislation was 
raised again. By withdrawing the previous bill of Statut Personnel, the 
moderate 'Citizens' in power sought to temper the passions of the 
secular 'Citizens' and the 'Cousins'. In fact, their tactics of 
attrition did wane the energies of the secular 'Citizens' who left 
the National Assembly en bloc. But it was not in any way to affect the 
resolve of the 'Cousins' who came back to the 1984 legislature 
determined to win. 
Since the events of 1982, a new Party and Government national com- 
mission was set up to elaborate a new draft of 
family legislation. Yet 
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again, no publicity was given to the process. However, the present 
author managed to obtain a few details on the composition of the 
commission in interviews with party and assembly members. By and large 
it included members of the moderate 'Citizens' who held strong 
'Cousin-prone' sympathies and views themselves. Few women took part in 
the process of elaboration, and were themselves part of the new team of 
female moderate 'Citizens' who had replaced the former militant secular 
'Citizens' at the head of the women's organisation UNFA. The result of 
their deliberations was yet another version of the preceding projects 
characterised basically by the adoption of the Shari'a , and a unique 
obsession with women's behaviour. 
The bill, entitled Code de la Familie , was discussed 
during the 
spring session of 1984 at the National Assembly. The plenary sessions 
devoted to the bill took place on April 15,16,21,22,23 and May 10, 
28,29 and were issued in the 'Journal Officiel de l'Assemblee 
Populaire Nationale' (JOAPN), nos. 46,47,48 and 52. The bill, which 
was later adopted as Loi no. 84-11 du 9 Juin 1984 portant Code de la 
Familie was issued in the 'Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne 
Democratique et Populaire' (DORA) no. 24,12 Juin 1984. 
It comprises 224 articles in three volumes: 
Volume 1: Of Marriage and its Dissolution; 
Volume 2: Of Legal Representation; 
Volume 3: Of Successions. 
In all three domains, supremacy of man over woman was quite clear, and 
stands in sharp contrast with the legal and constitutional rights of 
equality pledged in the public realm. In all its provisions 
the code 
treats women as minor subjects to whom it denies any attainment of 
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majority. Indeed women are to be 'chaperoned' in the marriage as well 
as the divorce procedures either by male kins or legal guardians. The 
main provisions of the code stipulated that: 
Although marriage is not any more, compulsory (djabr), the father 
may still oppose the wish of his daughter to get married if she is minor (less than 18 years old) (Article 12). No such 
provision is explicitly addressed to sons. 
While the bridegroom represents 
marriage, the bride, although p 
'matrimonial guardian' (Article 
marriage is incumbent upon the 
marriage is considered nul and 
(Article 33). 
himself in the contract of 
resent, must be accompanied by a 9). Not only the conclusion of 
guardian (Article 11), but the 
void if he is not present 
The same status of inferiority of women is to be found in the 
conditions they have to fulfill in order to obtain divorce. 
Article 48 stipulates that: 
... (divorce) takes place by the will of the husband, ... and at the request of the wife within the limits of the cases mentioned under Articles 53 
and 54 of the code. 
(JORA, 24: 614) 
Accordingly, the husband divorces his wife by virtue of the 
traditional procedure of unilateral repudiation. The latter is 
irrevocable according to the Shari'a in case the husband formulates 
three pronouncements of the Talaq (ie. repudiation). The judge may 
endorse the husband's decision if the three Talaqs have been pronoun- 
ced. The adoption of repudiation as a divorce formula remains one of 
the most striking measures in the official endorsement of a status of 
minority for women. 
Divorce is granted to women only under certain conditions related to 
the husband's 'misbehaviour' (violent temperament, imprisonment, unjus- 
tified absence for over a year, sudden incapacity, failure to fulfill 
his familial duties such as provide for material gain) (Article 53). 
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The Arabic version of the aforementioned article is unequivocal with 
regard to women's incapacity (to divorce). The word divorce ( Talaq ) 
becomes Tatleeq, and simply means that the woman cannot divorce, but 
requests to 'be made divorced' by her husband, through the judge. 
This is yet another example of the overwhelming male mediation. 
However, the most 'Cousin-like' Article remains that which erects into 
a legal duty a haunting sense of scrutiny over specifically female 
behaviour. Article 39 stipulates that a wife has to: 
obey her husband ... as head of the family, 
... breastfeed his progeniture, ... and respect his parents and kin. 
It is indeed most revealing that such aspects are deemed necessary to 
appear in a family code, and that yet again they should only concern 
women. Such rules of conduct could only be laid down in the 'purest' 
ideal typical model of a 'Republic of Cousins'. 
26 Article 39 is a 
unique reminder of the idiosyncrasies and fantasies of the 'Cousins'. 
On the other hand, it is pertinent to contemplate in such a provision 
the expression of the lower valuations of the moderate 'Citizens' who 
have, after all, elaborated the code. Indeed the same doubts should 
arise with regard to the whole societal programme of the 'Citizens' and 
its conception of women's place and role. 
27 
An examination of the debates which took place in the National Assembly 
will show that the moderate 'Citizens' are able to circumvent some of 
the extremist demands of the 'Cousins' without affecting their own 
legitimacy. The procedure followed in order to pass the Government's 
amendment of Article 8 on polygamy, 
28 
will illustrate the ability of 
the moderate 'Citizens' to ignore the 'Cousins' pressure when 
they wish 
176 
to. Accordingly, it is contended herein, that the adoption of the 
family code in its 'Cousin' form is not only an illustration of the 
triumph of the 'Cousins' on the matter, but an expression of the 
ambivalent attitude of the moderate 'Citizens' with regard to sexual 
identities and roles. 
29 The evocation of Islamic precepts by both, 
complicates the picture and will require an examination of the Islamic 
world-view with its peculiar mixture of universalism and particularism, 
later in this Chapter. 
4.3.3. Article 8 and the Conflict Between the 'Cousins' and the 
Moderate Citizens 
The 1984 Code de la Familie would have been a total triumph of 
the 'Cousins' over the moderate 'Citizens', were it not for Article 8 
on polygamy. Indeed in all its provisions, the code was but a reproduc- 
tion of the Shari 'a as it was elaborated between the eighth and twelfth 
centuries by Muslim legal scholars, from the injunctions of the Qur'an 
on the ideal conduct of Muslim men and women, speeches and behaviour of 
the prophet Muhammad, Sunna , and the interpretation of these two 
sources by authoritative 'doctors of law' who specialised in the 
science of Fiqh . 
30 While leaving most of the provisions of the 
Shari 'a intact, the Government bill made polygamy conditional upon 
the consent of the first and second wife, in Article 8: 
It is permitted to contract marriage with more than 
one wife within the limits of the Shari 'a, if the motive 
is justified, the conditions and intention of equity 
provided, and after consultation of the preceding and 
future wives. Either wife may intent a judicial 
action against the husband..., or request divorce should 
he ignore her refusal to consent. 
This article alone monopolised most debates on the code, to the extent 
of turning them virtually into a conference on polygamy. 
31 Indeed, no 
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other item of the code provoked so much controversy as Article 8. Hence 
its extensive treatment below. 
The conditions attached to the exercise of polygamy are a departure 
from the original Qura'nic verse, which stipulates in Chapter 4 
(Women), Verse 2: 32 
... If you fear that you cannot treat orphans with fairness, then you may marry other women who seem good 
to you: two, three, or four of them. But if you fear 
that you cannot maintain equality among them, marry one 
only or any slave-girl you may own. This will make it 
easier for you to avoid injustice. 
There is a clear difference between the lavish permissiveness of the 
Qur'anic verse, and the legal and above all, man-made conditional terms 
of Article 8. These were enough to provoke an uproar among the 
'Cousins' of the National Assembly. The ensuing debates on the code, 
which opposed them to the moderate 'Citizens' on the Government side, 
were concerned exclusively with the verse and not with the issue of 
polygamy. There was no trace of interventions by secularist 'Citizens'. 
Accordingly, out of sixty interventions reported in the minutes of the 
Journal Officiel of the Assembly mentioned supra , not a single 
secularist voice was raised, and only one woman delegate was heard. Far 
from condemning polygamy, she merely proposed that the number of wives 
should be legally defined (JOAPN, no. 47). 
The protests of the 'Cousins' were extreme, and their defence of 
polygamy was more a defence of the sacrality of the verse, rather than 
polygamy in itself as a practice. Out of the 60 interventions reported 
by the JOAPN from the plenary sessions of 23 and 24 April 1984,45 
stood against the conditional terms on polygamy. The arguments mainly 
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denounced the article for being no less than heretical. Some delegates 
thought it unrealistic to presume that a judge should decide upon 
conditions of equity, and that the matter should be left to the 
husband's conscience (JOAPN nos. 46,47). Others seemed to compromise 
with the idea of the judge' s interference, but protested that wives 
need not be informed, since the judge is after all empowered to permit 
a polygamous marriage (JOAPN no. 47: 5-6). Yet others were outraged at 
the liability of the husband to prosecution, and the granting of 
divorce to the wife or wives: 
... polygamy cannot possibly be invoked as a reason for Tatliq since it is legitimised by the Shari 'a" How 
can polygamy be considered as a prejudice to the first 
wife? 
(delegate Laouamri, ibid: 8) 
As for delegate Bouilfan, the granting of Tatliq was potentially 
dangerous as it would encourage women to get divorce more easily and 
this "should never be allowed to happen" (JOAPN, no. 48: 2). But most 
fascinating of all interventions was that of delegate Madhkour who did 
not seem to be the least affected by twentieth century institutional 
and social changes in the public realm. Unperturbed in his idiosyn- 
cracies, he simply pointed out that: 
Polygamy is not to be disputed whatever the case, for a 
Muslim state is one based on Jihad , and this calls for the involvement of men alone. To whom will the women be 
left in case of Jihad , and how to protect society from 
subsequent depravity if widows cannot find parties to 
marry. Polygamy is therefore a must. 
(JOAPN, no. 46: 19-21) 
Although delegate Madhkour's intervention sounds extreme, it remains 
very eloquent as it throws some light on the legitimation paradigm of 
the 'Cousins'. Indeed his legitimisation of polygamy is to be found in 
the early history of the Jihad of the Muslims of Medina against the 
'pagans' of Mecca (7th. century AD). Following the death of many 
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Muslims, in the battle of Uhud, there was concern for orphans and 
widows; hence the Chapter titled 'Women' and its injunctions on the 
protection of orphan girls, and the endorsement of polygamy with a 
limit of four wives at a time. However, in his reference to the Jihad 
as the basic duty of the Islamic state, delegate Madhkour is in tune 
with the higher valuations of the 'Islamic City', and ironically with 
those of the Algerian 'Republic of Citizens' (especially Article 2 of 
its Constitution which stipulates that Islam is the religion of state). 
The most unorthodox facet of the debate on polygamy was the procedure 
applied by the Justice Minister in his capacity of Government 
representative - in connivance with the Assembly's Legal and 
Administrative Commission - in order to outmanoeuvre an amendment 
introduced by a 'Cousin' delegate, proposing the unconditional 
institutionalisation of polygamy. The amendment was introduced by 
delegate Kaddesh, who had been particularly virulent in his attack on 
the government bill, and its backing by the chairman of the Legal 
Commission. He exclaimed: 
Has the Qur'anic verse submitted polygamy to a 
decision by a judge or to the provision of a legal 
motive I ask you? Has the Qur'an laid out any such 
conditions as illness or sterility of the first wife in 
order to allow polygamy? How is it possible to subject 
polygamy to the conditions of Article 8? Has the verse 
stipulated that a wife could prosecute her husband I ask 
again? The article as presented by the commission 
is in flagrant contradiction with the Shari 'a, and 
grossly violates the Qur'anic verse. The verse on 
e plight of orphan girls, polygamy was concerned with the- 
... therefore the concept of equity in this matter 
is of 
a moral nature. The matter concerns the husband and his 
conscience and only God is the almighty judge in such a 
situation. 
(JOAPN no. 52: 18) 
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Nevertheless, the moderate 'Citizens' insisted upon their version of 
the legalisation of polygamy and defended it as a 'modernised' inter- 
pretation of the Qur'anic verse. The chairman of the Legal Commission 
retorted that: 
the restrictions introduced by the new legislation are 
only a translation of those evoked in the Shari'a. 
(ibid: 19) 
As for the Justice Minister, he made it clear that: 
even though the Qur'anic verse is addressed to the 
individual, the legal system today addresses itself to 
society at large, and not to an individual who would 
proclaim himself the sole judge of his actions. 
(ibid) 
Following the above altercations, the delegates were asked to vote. 
Despite overwhelming support for delegate Kaddeshe's amendment on 
unconditional polygamy, the Government version was reissued. The 
minutes of the Assembly remain very obscure about the whole procedure 
of voting, but some delegates did complain about the unorthodoxy of the 
voting (JOAPN, no. 52: 19) and were surprised at the reintroduction of 
the original Article. 
Under Article 11 of the internal regulations of the Assembly, the vote 
is cast first on the Government proposal, then the Commission's amend- 
ments, then the delegates' amendments and back to the Commission's 
again. But according to a delegate, the procedure had not been 
respected as the vote was carried on three amendments simultaneously 
(delegate Bedaida, JOAPN, no. 52: 19). The moderate 'Citizens' hastened 
to recall at this point that rifts and protests were not 'proper' 
between delegates and Government representives since, "all [were] 
militants of the FLN party, the source of power, of which the National 
Assembly was an integral part" (delegate Melaika, ibid: 19). Delegate 
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Melaika thought it timely to remind members of the Assembly of the 
limited margin of freedom allowed the legislative in the one party 
system. He had only to stress the traditional interdependence of the 
legislative and the ideological under the guidance of the executive 
in the Algerian power structure. He deplored that Article 8 of the code 
had unleashed such deep divergences: 
as if Islam were a new religion to this country. 
Remember that the FLN and the Army of Liberation were 
led under the flag of Islam, let there be no doubt 
about this fact. 
(ibid: 20) 
The 'Cousin' delegates were however to be 
threats than those of being found guilty of 
The Justice Minister warned that votes should 
delegate should assume responsibility for 
difficult to speculate on the implications o: 
it proved effective as delegate Kaddeshe 
clearing the way for the Commission's to 
Government bill to be passed as Loi 84-11). 
deterred by more direct 
disloyalty to the party. 
be nominal and that "each 
his vote" (ibid). It is 
E such covert warning, but 
withdrew his amendment, 
be adopted, (ie. for the 
The developments which led to the adoption of a family code in Algeria 
illustrate the triumphant survival of the 'Republic of Cousins' in 
matters of personal status and family law. This appears as much in the 
1984 debates in the National Assembly, as in the provisions of the code 
itself. That the row over the issue of polygamy led to the defeat of 
the 'Cousins' on this particular item should not overshadow the fact 
that the code in itself is a flagrant departure from the promises of 
the 'Republic of Citizens' concerning sex equality. It should mainly be 
remembered that in the 1982 legislative debates, the moderate 
'Citizens' were more prepared to discard the secularism of the radical 
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'Citizens', than to admonish the extremism of the 'Cousins'. 
It is also pertinent to retain that the elaboration of the code was the 
work of the moderate 'Citizens', who hence legalised an inferior status 
for women, and through it expressed the dynamics of their lower 
valuations. In this case it is difficult to agree with the idea of 
progressivism of the legal process in new nations, whereby it is 
supposed: 
to be ahead of society and social customs, [in contrast 
with its] classical function of institutionalisation of 
rules determined by already existing social conditions. 
(Vandevelde-Dailliere: 1980: 391) 
In Algeria, the 'Cousins' and the moderate 'Citizens' of the political 
elite have demonstrated through the code de la Familie that such is 
not the case in the private realm of personal status and family law. 
The determinism of predictions such as Vandevelde-Dailliere's (1980), 
and before her of Borrmans' (1971), who also expected the elaboration 
of a secular family law in Algeria in view of the modernisation 
policies, can be misleading. If anything, the process described above 
confirms the contingency of social change. Here we faced a case of 
normative no-change in the particular realm of family legislation, 
complicated by the ambivalence of normative change in the wider 
proposal of a new societal programme. The Algerian Code de la Familie 
is proof that it is difficult to make tabula rasa of a 'Republic of 
Cousins', especially where its private realms are concerned, for they 
have their own dynamics. In Algeria, the most sensitive of all private 
realms is clearly that of sex and gender as related to the family. 
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4.4. The 1971 Marriage Law Act in Tanzania. 
The enactment of a national family law proved less difficult in 
Tanzania than in Algeria. This may seem paradoxical as the need for 
such provision was more an exercise of national integration in 
Tanzania than in Algeria, where the conditions of a more integrated 
national unity were gathered. Predominance of one religion, one 
language, and one racial group33 should have guaranteed a 'unanimity' 
of opinions on the matter. In contrast, Tanzania is a typical pluralist 
society, consisting of more than one hundred and twenty ethnic groups 
"all having different customs from each other" (Muro, 1978: 133). In 
religious terms, the majority of Tanzania's population (40 per cent) 
hold traditional religious beliefs, while the remaining 60 per cent is 
almost equally divided between Muslims and Christians. "The Muslims 
[are] mainly divided into Sunni and Shia groups. Almost two thirds of 
the Christians [are] Catholics" (Westerlund, 1980: 8). Faced with such 
diversity, it is significant that the authorities failed to provide 
statistics on religious denominations in the 1978 Population Census: 
The Census Administrator,... is reported to have said 
that Tanzania had developed to a stage where information 
about religious and ethnic affiliation was outdated. The 
country was a secular state, and religious bodies which 
wanted to know the number of their adherents had to make 
their own surveys. 
(Westerlund, ibid: 15) 
In matters of family legislation, it seems that the avowed secularism 
of the 'Republic of Citizens' in power helped to reduce tensions 
appreciably between the various groups and religious denominations. 
In 
the field of family law, the 'Citizens' managed to enact a regulation, 
which did not upset the religious pluralism of the country. 
Instead of 
ignoring the different affiliations, the law was a major tour de force 
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in acknowledging them all, yet abiding by none in particular. 
Prior to the 1971 Act, various legal regimes were at work as they were 
set up by the British colonial policy of "legal pluralism". Each 
religious or ethnic community had its own legal regime and the whole 
legal system comprised: 
numerous customary laws; 
Islamic forms which varied according to sects; 
the Hindu regime; 
the civil form of marriage contracted before a registrar, a 
state official or sealed by a Church ceremony. 
The inherited colonial system was seen as reinforcing social and ethnic 
divisions: 
The regimes varied widely in their ethical and 
sociological assumptions, so that the specific rules 
they produced were often in direct conflict. The 
recognition of different communal or religious regimes 
tended to reinforce the autonomy and exclusiveness of 
the various communities, and prevented or at least 
hindered the emergence and establishment of a national 
ethic and values in these matters. ... This also meant 
that no reform in this area was undertaken except at the 
request of the specific community, and so the more a 
community was backward and consequently more in need of 
reform, the less likely it was to be disturbed in its 
orthodox and rigid customs. 
(Ghai, 1971: 101) 
As a result of the colonial plural system, 
in-Law' in Tanzania was reinforced, 
the 'Republic of Brothers- 
even though the colonial 
authorities were heavily biased in favour of Western and Christian 
forms of marriage in order to introduce the monogamous conjugal family, 
considered as superior to the polygamous family (Ghai, ibid: 102). 
However, those who contracted marriage through the civil form did not 
always abide by the commitment to monogamy: 
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The breach of law was widespread however, because the 
law deviated from the actual social behaviour of the 
people. Men married under civil law often added a 
customary law wife or deserted the first wife without a 
formal divorce. Those who married in Church often paid 
bridewealth or dowry in the same way as those who had 
married under customary law. 
"(Westerlund, ibid: 161) 
The policy of legal pluralism continued in the early years of indepen- 
dence. Safe for the Government Notice 279 of 1963 on the Declaration of 
Local Customary Law 1963 and 1964 which enacted the different forms of 
customary legal requirements (Muro, 1978: 133), no national family law 
was issued. 
However, the pressures of the process of national integration launched 
by the newly independent 'Republic of Citizens' increasingly led to the 
need for reform, so that the autonomy and exclusiveness of the various 
communities be weakened in favour of national integration. The 
discourse on traditional values has found itself at odds with these 
very values when they are effectively at work within social behaviour. 
By 1969, two years after the Arusha Declaration, the 'Republic of 
Citizens' started a campaign to enforce the idea of uniformisation of 
family law. The decision was taken precisely in relation to the 
deficiencies of those very values praised in Ujamaa , which for all 
their egalitarianism, indisputably held women in an inferior position. 
4.4.1. The 1969 White Paper on a Uniform Law of Marriage - Leading to 
the 1971 Law of Marriage Act. 
The issue of a Uniform Law of Marriage in October 1969 by the Tanzanian 
government was hailed by most observers as a remarkable challenge 
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(Read, 1972: 19; Rwezaura, 1976: 101). Indeed, there was widespread 
speculation that in attempting to 'uniformise' personal law in a 
religiously and ethnically plural society, there was a danger that the 
Government would inevitably interfere with religion (Westerlund, 1980: 
162). Religious variety in Tanzania disguised a variety of 'Republics 
of Brothers-in-law' who were not prepared to compromise on personal and 
customary rules. Hence the special procedure adopted by the authorities 
in order to enact the uniform law. 
The procedure adopted was interesting and unique; 
as a normal rule, proposals for new laws, are 
presented directly to Parliament, which enacts them 
into law within a matter of hours, and there is 
little public discussion. In this instance however, 
the government was aware that the subject was close 
to the hearts of all, and as its proposals were 
reasonably radical, it had anticipated considerable 
opposition. ... Considerable public debate took place 
and the feelings which were aroused were even 
stronger than the Government had anticipated. 
(Ghai, 1971: 102-3)34 
As the 'Cousins' in Algeria, the various 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania 
have caused an effective exercise of 'democracy' when voicing their 
conservative and retrograde opinions on woman's status and role. In 
contrast to their discreet resistance to modernisation policies in the 
public realm, they did not hesitate to show explicit opposition to 
legislative provisions which were not congruent with their higher 
valuations in the private realm of family law. There, the equality of 
man and woman was explicitly rejected, while the proposals of the White 
Paper purported to enforce just that. Paragraph 5 of the White Paper 
stresses that: 
TANU believes that all human beings are equal and that 
every individual has a right to dignity and respect. The 
government is therefore anxious to enact legislation to 
provide for uniformity of law relating to marriages and 
divorce. 
(in Read, 1972: 20) 
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The emphasis on equality was specifically addressed to the inferior 
status of women perpetrated through the practices of: compulsory 
marriage, which was seen as a union between two families and not two 
individuals (Ghai, ibid: 103); polygamy; and dowry, (or bridewealth), 
by virtue of which 'a wife was bought' from her kin. 
The most controversial items of the White Paper were: the contracting 
of marriage as a free union of two individuals (para 6), thus 
discarding the monopoly of families in the matter; para 12 on the 
freedom of consent for first wives in polygamous marriages; para 14 on 
the abolition of dowry as a necessary validation of marriage; and above 
all, para 25 on the compulsory registration of divorce, and the 
creation of Marriage Conciliatory Boards. 
4.4.2. Tanzania's 'Brothers-in-law' Reject Legal Uniformity. 
According to some observers who tried to assess the opposition of the 
'Brothers-in-law', the strongest resistance came from Muslim quarters35 
(Westerlund, 1980: 66-7; Rwezaura, 1976: 101-125). For instance, 
Westerlund reported on the discussion of the Paper by Shia and Sunni 
Muslim groups who both questioned the necessity for a uniform law. For 
them, "family law is the very kernel of the Shari 'a and need not be 
incorporated in a national system. Both dismissed out of hand the issue 
of sex equality and in its Memorandum, the Shia Ithna-Asheri Council of 
Tanzania did not recognise "the elevation of the position of women [as] 
a problem" (Westerland, ibid: 166). Although the retention of polygamy 
was saluted, the conditional consultation of the first wife was 
rejected. 
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Rwezaura assessed the reluctance of Muslims to abide by the 1971 Act 
provisions, especially on divorce. It was often argued that Muslims 
found it difficult to bring to the 'public eye' (embodied by the 
courts), the dissolution of a marriage. People prefer to keep their 
private life out of court, and husbands are reluctant to obtain Talaq 
from the courts when they enjoy the power to pronounce it in the 
privacy of their homes, according to the Shari 'a practice of the three 
Talaq . Interestingly, Rwezaura has been gradually drawn into depicting 
resistance among court officials themselves. The Sheikhs, standing as 
chairmen of Community Boards which play the role of Conciliatory 
Boards, "do not tell people about the new law and continue to legislate 
according to Islamic provisions" (Rwezaura, ibid: 108). 
Reporting on the 1971 Parliamentary 'debates on the Government bill, 
Westerlund pointed out that most male Members of Parliament, both 
Muslim and Christian, referred to African traditions in order to 
support their claim of the superior position of men over women. This is 
a clear indication of the trap which the 'Republic of Citizens' fell 
into in its ambiguous apologia of these very African traditions which 
it hailed as examples of equality. Westerlund exclaimed that: 
It is remarkable that references to ujamaa and its ideal 
of equality were almost completely non-existent in the 
parliamentary debates. 
(Westerland, 1980: 171) 36 
As for Ghai, although welcoming the boldness of the new law, he never- 
theless pointed out that: 
... it would 
be idle to pretend that they [women] have 
been placed on an equal footing with men. The 
subordinate position of women is strikingly illustrated 
by the provision for polygamy and the express 
prohibition of comparable rights for women -polyandry. 
Similarly, in some communities a woman can be divorced 
at the whim and discretion of the husband, while the 
189 
woman has to pursue the more cumbersome, complex and 
uncertain procedure under the law. ... Indeed doubts 
about the capacity of the legal and administrative 
system to implement and apply the new laws may well be 
entertained. It would certainly not be a surprise if 
many of the provisions of the new law remain merely 
'paper provisions', unaffecting the lives, practices and 
mores of people in large sections of the country for 
some time to come. 
(ibid: 108-109) 
From the above, one could conclude that Tanzania's conservative 
'Brothers- in-law' have been as triumphant as the Algerian 'Cousins' in 
retaining their higher valuations more or less intact in matters of 
personal and family law. By the same token, they have been able to 
perpetuate the inferior position of women by barring to them the path 
to individuality. In both countries women will still have to act 
according to the different functions deemed 'respectable' by the 
'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law', with the complicity of the moderate, 
modernising 'Citizens' in power. 
The considerable opposition shown by Algeria's 'Cousins' and 
Tanzania's 'Brothers-in-law' to sex equality, especially in family 
legislation, can claim institutional and normative legitimations in 
both cases. In Holmesian terms, the change element (family law reform) 
suffered from a normative inconsistency, which made room for normative 
no-change to be manifested (customary and religious rules). The ensuing 
paradoxical result has been the institutionalisation of no-change, 
(ie. 
women's inferiority). Accordingly, it would be pertinent to establish 
tentatively the likely sources which have informed the various social 
protagonists in their resistance to women's 
full legal equality in 
Algeria and Tanzania. These can be found in the pure types of 
family 
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and kin relations which continue to inform the 'Cousins' and the 
'Brothers-in-law', as well as the moderate 'Citizens' in power. 
4.5. Institutional Models of the 'Traditional Family'; When Function 
defies History 
The expression 'traditional family' is meant to designate the familial 
system(s) which prevailed in Algeria and Tanzania before the major 
upheavals of colonisation and nation-building. Radcliffe-Brown's 
expression of "systems of kinship and marriage" (1950) will be 
appropriate in drawing ideal types of family relations in the cases of 
Algerian and Tanzanian social fabrics, as family and kin continue to 
influence social relations. Above all, they are an important 
identification for the 'individual' (man/woman), and supersede personal 
interests. The idea of 'system' is useful in that it refers to the 
breadth of social relations regulated by familial roles and functions: 
A system of kinship and marriage can be looked at as an 
arrangement which enables persons to live together and 
cooperate with one another in an orderly social life. 
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1950: 3) 
Radcliffe-Brown's definition appears to be primarily consensual, but 
it also allows for the study of conflict through the disruptions that 
are likely to beset the regulatory principle of the system. In fact, 
the vigorous opposition of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law' to 
progressive family laws was an opposition to disruptions of a legal 
nature. In their respective kin systems, allowing for sex equality 
would have meant the end of their order, and consequently 
in their 
eyes, of a whole 'orderly social life'. 
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Radcliffe-Brown's method of inquiry into kinship is deliberately 
functionalist and a-historical, so that comparison and analysis are 
made possible outside historical a prioris (ibid: 1-3). Indeed he warns 
against the pitfalls of historical and, pseudo-historical theories of 
kinship: 
There are many varieties of such theories, but they all 
have one thing in common. Starting from some known 
condition in the present or in the historically recorded 
past, an 'explanation' of it is invented by imagining 
some condition or event in the unrecorded past and 
arguing on a priori grounds that the known condition 
might or must have had its origin in this way. The 
devotion to pseudo-history has had unfortunate results. 
It has led to the adoption of false ideas about the 
facts as they are, and has often influenced or vitiated 
observation and description. This legacy of erroneous 
ideas is only gradually being got rid of by field 
studies aiming at the analysis of social systems as they 
are without reference to their origin, where that origin 
is not known from history and can only be conjectured by 
a priori reasoning. 
(ibid: 1) 37 
Among the distinguished proponents of such theories, we can cite Lewis 
Morgan and Emile Durkheim. Both proposed theories of the 'origin of the 
family', and a hypothetical social organisation of early human 
groupings. Not surprisingly, both followed a positivist and 
evolutionist approach, heavily permeated by a Europeocentric view of 
family organisation. Indeed, both took the European conjugal family as 
the ultimate stage of human kin organisation. For instance, Morgan 
linked the development of the family to stages of human material 
organisation: 'savagery, barbarism, civilisation' to which correspond 
'group marriage, the pairing family, and monogamy'. 
38 As for Durkheim, 
he traced back the origin of the family to a psychological factor: 
totemism. To this effect, he followed an evolutionary scheme (Figure 
4.1) leading up to the modern (European) conjugal family. 
39 Durkheim 
presumed that originally, the unifying factor of the primitive clan 
is 
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Figure 4.1 Scheme of the Durkheimian Theory of the Family 
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the totemic being, "that is the deified object which serves as a 
collective emblem for the group". Later, "the totem loses its primitive 
character, ... becoming no more than a collective emblem. The clan 
becomes a village" of extended consanguinous families based on the 
community of patrimony with agnatic or uterine descent and several 
collateral branches. From there develops a more contracted form of 
kinship, the patriarchal family based on paternal authority as the 
unifying bond. As for the contemporary conjugal family, Durkheim 
assumed it was a "separate process of development, which occurred 
within Germanic and Christian civilisations", and was the continuation 
of the patriarchal and paternal family. 
40 
The pseudo-historicism of such theories is in fact deeply influenced by 
nineteenth century evolutionism, as well as the development of the 
newly born bourgeois conjugal family of the industrial revolution. 
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Consequently, all other forms of kin organisation were automatically 
relegated to more primitive stages, when they in fact exist and 
function within social frameworks which are as contemporary as the 
conjugal family. 
4.5.1 The Maghrebian 'ayia. 
Bearing in mind the arguments and attitudes of the 'Cousins' during the 
National Assembly debates and their evocation of the Shari'a, one would 
think that they are clearly informed by an institutional and normative 
model of the Muslim family. However, it is argued herein that while 
there is an Islamic regulation of the Algerian family, this 
has been 
transposed onto its specifically 'Cousin' type structure. 
42 
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Accordingly, a depiction of the pure types of the indigenous 'Cousin' 
family and the Muslim family is necessary so as to comprehend the 
references of the 'Cousins' as well as the moderate 'Citizens'. 
Incidentally, these types are by no means specific to Algeria, but to 
the whole region of the Maghreb with its underlying Berber component, 
which in a way constitutes the native element of the 'Republic of 
Cousins'. 
4.5.1.1. The 'Cousin-type''ayla 
As already seen with Tillion, the main pillar of the 'Republic of 
Cousins' was the indivision of patrimony, attained through the 
retention of women and the practice of endogamy. The corresponding 
family structure was the extended family or 'aria 
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which included a 
number of nuclear families sharing the same premises 
44 (the average 
size being between 20 to 60 individuals). It is patriarchal and agnatic 
in as far as descendency is always male, genealogy paternal, and 
inheritance transmitted exclusively to sons. The patriarchal aspect 
lies in the reverence due to the father (or the common male ancestor), 
in his role of spiritual head, as well as manager of the common 
patrimony and guarantor of the social cohesion of the domestic group 
(Boutefnouchet, 1982: 38). 
The social cohesion of the domestic familial group comes within the 
wider dynamics of the Khaldunian 'assabiyya in its original meaning of 
kin esprit de corps . Let us remember that 
Ibn Khaldun posed blood ties 
as the focal point of social cohesion. These are provided for by the 
'agnatic-cognatic'45 Maghrebian 'ayla with its extended collateral 
branches. 
46 At this point, it is interesting to note that, the 
195 
Durkeimian model of family evolution develops from the 'totemic clan', 
contracts into an extended consanguinous family, and is finally 
metamorphosed into a patriarchal unit (the modern conjugal family). 
This is far from being the case of the Maghribian 'ayla . The pattern of 
this latter is closely connected with the 'circular' development of the 
Khaldunian 'assabiyya . Thence the concentric diagrams (circles or half 
circles) which a number of students have drawn for the Algerian 
'traditional' family. 47 The idea of clan is not alien to the 
Maghrebian social structure. It is the hayy , and it is of bilateral 
descent (an important distinction from the totemic unilateral descent). 
Indeed, the structure of the hayy type clan is literally a family, 
which does not disappear to make way for the emergence of smaller 
entities. Rather, it embraces a congregation of smaller families (of 
the conjugal type), 'aylat , through intermarriage. This is quite 
different from the mythical totem as the 'collective emblem' of the 
human group. But it is a striking reality whose disruption is at the 
root of the contemporary social malaise in Algeria. 
The concentric pattern of Algerian traditional society is more likely 
to suggest a bursting of the circles into semi-circles, or quarter 
circles, in the establishment of new ties. But not a rupture resulting 
in the emergence of a new superior form of the family as happens in 
Durkheim's model. The mechanism of indivision of patrimony has created 
a concentric social structure, with units of different sizes (Figure 
4.2); but all strongly linked by the 'assabiyya. 
48 The circles evolve 
from smaller to wider ones, and fulfill different functions ranging 
from domestic to social, political, and economic. The 'ayla (as an 
extended family) is at the heart of five other circles linked by kin 
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Figure 4.2 Traditional Social Structure 
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relations (consanguinous or by alliance) 
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and, most important of all, 
by different layers of solidarity all evolving around the focal concept 
of the 'assabiyya. Megherbi has argued that Ibn Khaldun has surrounded 
this latter with: 
a constellation of subsidiary concepts entertaining a direct relationship with the dynamics of sociability such 
as: nasab (ascendency, parentage, lineage); iltiham 
(cohesion); sharaf (nobility); hasab (prestige); hilf 
(alliance); wala (clientele); bast (gentiles); riassa (leadership), etc... 
(Megherbi, 1971: 160) 
This complex web of solidarities has nevertheless been seriously 
undermined by the establishment of a national society. And while 
national solidarity has been internalised in lieu of the tribal 
'assabiyya, those solidarities linked with the private realm of kin 
(ie. nasab, sharaf, and hasab) are still valued by Algerians at large. 
They are still regulating relationships between individuals. Most 
important of all, they dictate to a great extent the roles and 
behavioural attitudes of a multitude of Algerians in their daily 
family lives. Thus, conformism and banishment of a distinct 
individuality are appreciated: 
In the first place, fidelity to the ancestors' 
traditions dominates... almost entirely actions 
pertaining to family life. Reference to tradition 
permeates the life of the individual [dictating] 
specific behaviour [to display] at ceremonial and 
familial circumstances. L 'art de vivre of an 
individual... is not only based on respect for others, 
and in particular his own people, but on a sort of 
abolition of individuality itself in favour of the 
interest of the group; ... the individual 
[is expected] 
to be in second position, even in situations of direct 
interest to [him/her] and should mediate [his/her] 
behaviour through conventional and conform [practices]. 
... If the principles of conformity and convention of 
social life seem to stifle personal life, it is worth 
underlining that the individual does not perceive it as 
an oppressive constraint. For the maintenance of social 
solidarity is a principle more fundamentally grounded 
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and vital for the individual than the expression of individual originality. 
(Boutefnouchet, 1982: 52-53) 
The above enunciated principles of respect, conformity and effacement 
of individuality are nevertheless regulated by those of age and sex. on 
the whole, they follow a hierarchical order which gives precedence to 
male and elder individuals over young and female ones. But most marked 
of all practices is that of the separation of the sexes, determined 
both by physical space and educational socialisation. Accordingly, 
boys are allowed outside the domestic premises (usually to play), 
whereas girls are confined inside (usually to help with household 
chores). Furthermore, the preference for male children is openly 
expressed, whereas girls are literally cursed as potential sources of 
50 hechouma (shame) for the 'ayla. The notion of hechouma is very 
closely linked with the so-called physical and moral integrity of the 
virgin girl. The obsession with virginity is closely linked with the 
'nobility' of the endogamous clan whose perpetuation was to be insured 
by the 'absence of mingling' as Ibn Khaldun put it. However, the 
preservation of a girl's virginity is still a tangible and haunting 
reality today, and cannot be said to be residual. This is because it is 
officially legitimised by Islamic cosmogony, and constitutes one of the 
most fascinating meeting grounds between the closed 'Republic of 
Cousins' and the universal Islamic City. 
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So far, general characteristics of the typical 'Cousin-like' family 
have been drawn. It is predominantly a patriarchal, agnatic, extended 
family, with clear cut sexual and generational divisions. It seems to 
rest on strict conventional sets of behaviour assigned to its 
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individual members, and mainly based on a certain aloofness between the 
sexes, backed by their confinement to different physical spaces, namely 
public for men and domestic for women. Above all, it is an oppressive 
family in as far as its individuals have to efface their egos in order 
to preserve the collective facade of the 'ayia. On the other hand, this 
oppressiveness is more or less willingly accepted by the individual. It 
serves as a token of recognition, and provides a sense of belonging 
which no other solidarity can match. But most significant of all, it 
rests on a complex web of interrelationships between individual 
members, the chief characteristic of which is the separation of sexes, 
and the value-ridden status given to each; men being indisputably 
superior to women, and more apparent: 
Woman, in Algerian traditional society entails 
effacement, reserve, discretion, secrecy, compared 
to man who represents appearance, prestige, honour, 
pride. 
(Boutefnouchet, 1982: 70) 52 
The attributes of the 'ayla and their repercussions on the 
individual's role, status and behaviour as described above, leave no 
doubt as to the likely residues they might imprint on collective cons- 
ciousness. Thence their survival as a dominant set of norms despite 
the disintegration of the 'Republic of Cousins' in its broader 
solidarities and loyalties, (ie. those of the wider political 
'assabiyya). As Bourdieu put it, the 'Cousin-type' family is: 
the Alpha and Omega of the whole [social] system: 
structural primary grouping for all other groupings; 
unbreakable social atom which assigns its members 
[their] place, function, raison d'etre, and in a sense 
[their] very being. 
(Bourdieu, 1961: 86) 
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Is this to say that the 'ayla as an extended family has remained 
unchanged? Far from it; the combined effects of urbanisation, 
industrialisation and rural migration have brought about new con- 
figurations of the family structure in Algeria. 
53 For instance, 
there has been a marked tendency towards the establishment of the 
smaller conjugal family as the basis of new households. 
54 But despite 
the growing trend of this type of family, links between the different 
layers of parentage of the now physically separated 'ayla remain very 
strong, albeit formal. While economic atomisation has now become a 
predominant reality, occasions such as marriage or birth or circum- 
cision, are still discussed collectively. Marriage rarely involves the 
mere participation of the bride's and bridegroom's immediate families. 
Weddings are often reunions of the extended family, and beyond it of 
the beni 'amm (ie. paternal cousins) who symbolically represent 'the 
tribe' ( 'arch) or a fraction of it (ferga). This is where the 'Republic 
of Cousins' has cogently survived; in the regulation of the union 
between man and woman, the most intimate of all human groupings. But in 
this, it has been sustained by the 'Islamic City' where the "family 
structure is assumed to be unchangeable, for it is considered divine" 
(Memissi, 1985: 18). 
4.5.1.2. Islam and the 'ayla. 
There is a widespread belief amongst students of Islam that: 
the creation of the institutions of the Muslim family 
... was quite unlike any existing sexual unions. 
Its 
distinguishing feature was its strictly defined 
monolithic structure. 
(Mernissi, 1985: 18) 
55 
However, it is argued here that this might have been the case in Arabia 
where, for instance, a variety of forms of marriage prevailed 
before 
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the advent of Islam, 
56 but not in the already monolithic world of the 
Maghribian 'Republic of Cousins'. That the Islamic universalist message 
of the ummah (community of believers) stumbled against the parti- 
cularist clanic and tribal allegiances of the closed 'Republic of 
Cousins' is left in no doubt. 
57 
But, by and large, the body of Islamic 
regulations of family and sexuality found a favourable echo in the 
rigid customs of the 'Cousin' family. 58 First of all: 
... Islam recognizes only blood ties and/or marital bonds 
as the true foundations of the family. 
('Abd al'Ati, 1977: 38) 
For instance adoption is strictly forbidden, and this was divinely 
decreed in Surah 33, verse 1 to 5: 59 
Allah has never put two hearts within one man's body. He 
does not regard the wives whom you divorce as your 
mothers, nor your adopted sons as your own sons. These 
are mere words which you utter with your mouths: but 
Allah declares the truth and guides to the right path. 
Name your adopted sons after their fathers; that is more 
just in the sight of Allah. If you do not know their 
fathers, regard them as your brothers in the faith and 
as your wards. Your unintentional mistakes shall be 
forgiven, but not your deliberate errors. Allah is 
forgiving and merciful. 
The Qur'anic prohibition of adoption was in total agreement with the 
consanguinous 'assabiyya of the predominantly endogamous 'Republic of 
Cousins' in the Maghreb. On the other hand, the Qur'an entreated 
Muhammad to marry his cousins of the paternal and maternal line 
(Qur'an, 33: 50), thence reinforcing the practice of endogamy amongst 
the Maghrebian 'Cousins'. Although there is little evidence to 
establish a preference for endogamous marriage in Islam, 
60 
the fact 
that a Qur'anic verse enjoins the prophet himself to indulge in such 
unions, is enough to bestow an aura of preference if not sacrality upon 
the practice. 
61 This is not to say that the ideal Islamic family ought 
to be endogamous, or for that matter extended or nuclear, but: 
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Although Islam does not prescribe any specific 
organizational family type, there can be little doubt 
that traditional Muslim family structure has actually 
been closer to the extended than the nuclear type. This 
is probably the result of continuity, and not the 
outcome of innovation by the Muslims. ... But whether the 
extendedness of the Muslim family structure was a 
function of historical continuity or of other social 
conditions, Islam apparently accepted this form. 
('Abd al'Ati, 1977: 30-31) 
But it is argued here that Islam has not accepted this form (extended, 
patrilineal and patriarchal) all that fortuitously. The very Qur'anic 
injunctions on the relations between the sexes and kin are bound to 
reinforce the 'Cousin' type family, albeit not necessarily in its 
extended form, but almost inevitably in its patriarchal and patrilineal 
shape, and above all in its puritanical code of conduct. For instance, 
extra-marital relationships are not admitted and are liable to severe 
punishment. There is in the Qur'an an obsession for chastity to match 
that of the 'Cousins': "Let those who cannot afford to marry live in 
continence until Allah enriches them" (Qur'an, 24: 33); "The adulterer 
and the adulteress shall each be given a hundred lashes. Let no pity 
for them cause you to disobey Allah, if you truly believe in Allah and 
the Last Day; and let their punishment be witnessed by a number of 
believers" (ibid, 24: 1); "You shall not commit adultery, for it is foul 
and indecent" (ibid, 17: 32). But the most clear injunction against 
extra-marital relationships came in Surah 5 verse 4: 
... Lawful to you are the 
believing women and the free 
women from among those who were given the Scriptures 
before you, provided that you give them their dowries 
and live in honour with them, neither committing 
fornication nor taking them as mistresses. 
The punishment reserved for illicit lovers is in perfect agreement with 
the 'Cousins'' conceptions of 'honour' and 'prestige' of the 'ayla , 
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closely linked with the purity of the lineage, exclusively derived from 
legal unions. Indeed, in the 'Republic of Cousins' of the Mediterranean 
basin, women who indulged in extra-marital sexual intercourse 
(especially virgin women) were put to death, 
the family. 
62 Up to this day in Algeria, 
expected to be virgin on their wedding day. 
63 
'to wash the honour' of 
marriageable girls are 
In the Islamic cosmogony, good believers are promised eternally virgin 
wives, the houris , to attend upon them in Paradise: "And theirs shall 
be the dark-eyed houris, chaste as hidden pearls: a guerdon for their 
deeds (Qur'an, 56: 15); and "We created the houris and made them 
virgins, loving companions for those on the right hand... (ibid: 56: 36). 
The image of the houris is unmistakably that which haunts Algerian 
'Cousins' and moderate 'Citizens'. We have only to remember 
Boumediene's concern for the 'preservation of morality' by women. In 
Algeria, women are expected to remain unaffected by the upheavals of 
social change, and are enjoined to retain their so-called 'dignity', 
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exactly as the houris maintain their virginity despite repeated 
intercourse. Another example of what might be called the 'houri 
syndrome' has been a series of amendments added to Article 12 of the 
Family Code by the legislators (ie. moderate 'Citizens'). The Article 
allows the guardian (of the woman) to oppose her if she wishes to marry 
and she is minor (under 18 according to Article 7 of the Code). 
Disagreement arose as to whether the terms, 'minor' or 'virgin' or 
bikr (Arabic for virgin or pubert) should be used in the Article. 
65 
At this point, it would be pertinent to suggest that the argument on 
Islam's position towards family organisation, and more specifically the 
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Maghrebian 'ayla , amounts to an argument on Islamic injunctions on 
individual behaviour. Indeed, short of presenting an ideal familial 
type, the Islamic code of conduct for individual believers is in 
agreement with the rigidity of the Maghrebian 'ayla. In this context, 
Qur'anic injunctions will be taken as the main source of reference of 
the code of conduct of the 'good' Muslim. Very few human secular 
references will be mentioned since they all strived to be mere inter- 
pretations66 of the main source, that is the Qur'an as it was revealed 
to Muhammad in seventh century Arabia. 
As one reads the Qur'anic text, one cannot fail to notice the advent of 
an open world in the sense that the individual believer is freed from 
particularistic allegiances (Qur'an 49: 10,64: 13), particularly Surah 
9, verse 24: 
Those that have embraced the faith and fled their homes 
and fought for Allah's cause with their wealth and their 
persons are held in higher regard by Allah. It is they 
who shall triumph... Believers, do not befriend your 
fathers or your brothers if they choose unbelief in 
preference to faith. Wrongdoers are those that befriend 
them. Say: 'If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, 
your wives, your tribes, the property you have acquired, 
the merchandise your fear may not be sold, and the homes 
you love, are dearer to you than Allah, His apostle and 
His cause, then wait until Allah has fulfilled his 
decree. Allah does not guide the evildoers. 
However, the paradox of such a universalist allegiance is that it has 
replaced the closed world of the family, the clan and the tribe, with 
an equally binding and closed world; that of the exclusive relationship 
with the creator. Believers are often reminded of their creator's 
omnipotence and of their own powerlessness. 
67 They are reminded of this 
through the theme of creation as the exclusive capacity of Allah68 The 
overall message is that because they are [His] creation they owe 
[Him] 
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total submission and obedience, and exclusive worship, as in the 
following Chapters and Verses: 
Men, have fear of your Lord, who created you from a 
single soul. From that soul He created its mate, and 
through them He bestrewed the earth with countless men 
and women. 
(4: 1) 
To Allah alone is true worship due... . He created you from a single being, then from that being He created its 
mate. ... He moulds you in your mothers' wombs by stages in three-fold darkness. 
(39: 1) 
Such is Allah, your Lord. His is the Kingdom. There is 
no god but Him. How then can you turn away from Him? 
(39: 5) 
If you render him no thanks, know that Allah doesoyou. 
Yet the ingratitude of his servants does not please Him. 
If you are thankful, your thanks will please Him. 
(39: 7) 
It was He who created you from a single being. From that 
being he created his mate, so that he might find comfort 
in her. 
(7: 189) 
It might be objected that the theme of creation is neither exclusively 
Islamic, nor does it entertain a direct bearing on family organisation 
and the relationship between the sexes. But the Qur'an strongly 
suggests that they are basically entertwined. Indeed, not only [Allah] 
creates the universe and human beings in pairs (ie. male and female) 
(Qur'an, 36: 36; 51: 43; 30: 16; 49: 13; 16: 70), but he bestows fertility 
onto woman as he pleases: 
Allah created you from dust, then from a little germ. 
Into two sexes He divided you. No female conceives or is 
delivered without His knowledge. 
(35: 11) 
He alone has knowledge of the Hour of Doom. No fruit is 
borne, no female conceives or is delivered, but with his 
knowledge. 
(41: 47) 
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We cause to remain in the womb whatever We please for an 
appointed term, and then we bring you forth as infants, 
that you may grow up and reach your prime. 
(22: 5) 
This divine monopoly over both creation and procreation has far- 
reaching consequences on the status of individuality and interaction of 
the sexes. To make sure that this exclusiveness is not impinged upon, a 
whole array of regulations for individual conduct is displayed, 
strangely tantamount to the effacement of individuality and ego for 
which the 'ayla of the Maghrebian 'Republic of Cousins' was distin- 
guished. Not only man and woman are addressed as the servants of 
their creator, but they are left no privacy. Individuals of opposite 
sexes are strongly advised to avoid meeting each other if not related 
by kin. In order to obtain this separation the Qur'an addresses both 
men and women: 
Enjoin believing men to turn their eyes away from 
temptation and to restrain their carnal desires. This 
will make their lives purer. Allah has knowledge of all 
their actions. 
(24: 30) 
Enjoin believing women to turn their eyes away from 
temptation and to preserve their chastity; to cover 
their adornments (except such as are normally 
displayed); to draw their veils over their bosoms and 
not to reveal their finery except to their husbands, 
their fathers, their husbands' fathers, their sons, 
their step-sons, their brothers, their brothers' sons, 
their sisters' sons, their women-servants, and their 
slave-girls; male attendants lacking in natural vigour, 
and children who have no carnal knowledge of women. And 
let them not stamp their feet in walking so as to reveal 
their hidden trinkets. 
(24: 31) 
It seems that the rules of modesty are more explicit with regard to 
women's conduct. This is to be reiterated in other verses: 
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Prophet, enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the 
wives of true believers to draw their veils close round 
them. That is more proper, so that they may be 
recognised and not molested. Allah is forgiving and 
merciful. 
(33: 59) 
The minute regulation of men's and women's behaviour is in fact no 
other than the regulation of their sexuality. It has been argued that 
Allah could not tolerate the intimacy between man and woman, for it 
endangered the exclusive adoration he requires of Muslims (Sabbah, 
1984: 98- 108). Consequently, the pairing conjugal family is dis- 
couraged, for it is there that man and woman learn to be together, 
intimately: 
At stake in Muslim society is not the emancipation of 
women (if that means only equality with men), but the 
fate of the heterosexual unit. Men and women were and 
still are socialized to perceive each other as enemies. 
... Muslim ideology, which views men and women as 
enemies, tries to separate the two, and empowers men 
with institutionalized means to oppress women. 
(Mernissi, 1985: 20) 
Mernissi argues that this enmity between Muslim men and women finds its 
rationale in the Islamic perception of female sexuality. Accordingly 
women are perceived as sexually powerful beings, whose control is 
necessary. Hence the institutions of polygamy, repudiation, 
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and 
segregation of the sexes (Mernissi, ibid: 19,27-45). But most sig- 
nificant of all is the Qur'anic consecration of men's superiority 
over women: 
Women shall with justice have rights similar to those 
exercised against them, although men have a status above 
women. Allah is mighty and wise. 
(2: 228) 
and: 
Men have authority over women because Allah has made the 
one superior to the other, and because they spend their 
wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient. They 
guard their unseen parts because Allah has guarded them. 
As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish 
them and send them to beds apart and beat them. Then if 
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they obey you, take no further actions against them. 
Allah is high, supreme. 
(4: 34) 
Thus not only are men unequivocally superior to women by divine decree, 
but they are entitled to dispose of them as they wish, either to 
exercise authority as in the above, or as pleasure: 
Women are your fields: go then into your fields as you 
please. 
(2: 223) 
or as part of 'worldly things' which men enjoy: 
All good things have this day been made lawful to you. 
The food of those to whom the Book was given is lawful 
to you and yours to them. Lawful to you are the 
believing women and the free women, from among those who 
were given the Scriptures before you... 
(5: 5) 
Thus, suppression of the individual ego, segregation of the sexes and 
finally women's inferiority may be said to constitute the kernel of the 
Muslim sexual order. Effacement of the ego evolves into the debasement 
of women, who despite being granted 'rights' (inheritance) are never- 
theless treated as objects, either of scorn or pleasure. The Qur'anic 
vision of women is on the whole that of minor individuals in a 
predominantly male social structure. Women are rarely addressed 
directly by Allah, unlike male believers. 
70 Although the Qur'an is by 
and large 'compassionate' towards women, and has widely treated their 
case, they play the role of background figures on whom Allah's will is 
mediated through men. Hence the authority and predominance given to the 
latter in matters of divorce (Qur'an, 4: 20; 2: 227; 2: 236; 65: 1), and 
marriage. Indeed, the Qur'an is particularly generous in its provision 
on polygamy (4: 2) even though it warns against unfair treatment of 
co-spouses. Accordingly, men are only accountable to their own cons- 
cience and to a very mild divine rebuke: 
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Try as you may, you cannot treat all your wives 
impartially. Do not set yourself altogether against any 
of them... . If you do what is right and guard youselves 
against evil, you will find Allah forgiving and 
merciful. 
(4: 129) 
The Qur'anic principles of man's authority over woman and this latter's 
confinement to an eternal status of 'minor' do not fail to appear in 
71 the Algerian Code de la Famille. It is no wonder also, that armed 
with such divine commandments on the 'ideal Muslim female' as obedient 
and pleasurable, the 'Cousin-delegates' of the National Assembly 
staunchly opposed any attempt at giving women an active role in family 
matters. In their eyes, any reform in this sense would have entailed 
the violation of Allah's will. Indeed, if women were to rise as active 
agents in the family unit, the very divine order based on the 
effacement of the ego, and the separation of the sexes would be 
endangered. For women would then be free to exercise their potential 
sexual power, hitherto controlled by the rules of polygamy and 
repudiation. It is worth remembering that the 'Cousin-delegates' of the 
Algerian National Assembly were not anxious to discuss the status of 
women in the code. Rather, they concentrated their attention and wrath 
on the article providing for conditional polygamy. They were fearful of 
the possibility given to women to consent to or reject a polygamous 
union; for this was a move which harbingered women's attainment of 
an all round majority. It is important to stress that the opposition 
of the 'Cousins' to conditional polygamy is the more significant that 
it is purely formal, since polygamy is rarely practised. Indeed, they 
were more preoccupied with keeping the Qur'anic verse intact, 
rather than securing the practice of polygamy. They were even more 
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anxious to bar women from having a say in family matters altogether, 
since this would have undermined the divinely bestowed authority of men 
over women. But it has been argued that the ban on women's emergence as 
active social agents concerned mainly the public realm: 
The desegregation of the sexes violates Islam's ideology 
on women's position in the social order: that women 
should be under the authority of fathers, brothers, or 
husbands. Since women are considered by Allah to be a destructive element, they are to be spatially confined 
and excluded from matters other than those of the 
family. Female access to non-domestic space is put under 
the control of males. 
(Mernissi, 1985: 19) 
However, the history of family law reform in Algeria, and the 
passionate debates which preceded the enactment of the 1984 Code de la 
Familie , illustrate different social dynamics from Mernissi's. 
Instead, the present author argues that female access to non-domestic 
space in Muslim areas has been relatively tolerated, through schooling 
and access to the modern professions (women's production in the 
traditional sector is not taken into account by statisticians and 
planners). By contrast, women were never consulted about the 
reorganisation of the domestic space, the family per se , whenever the 
issue arose in Muslim countries. 
72 The paradox is astonishing; it is 
as if sex roles and statuses were taken for granted given their 
consecration by divine law. Thus, while there has been a de facto 
participation of women in public life, albeit alien to the Qur'anic 
order of the separation of the sexes, granting women a de jure personal 
status equal to men's was by and large seen as heresy. 
Despite its socialist principles, Algeria was no exception. If anything 
its rapid modernisation reached an anti-climax when the 1984 Code de la 
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Familie sealed up women in a perpetual position of minority and 
incompetence. The violation of constitutional and socialist principles 
of equality went virtually unnoticed by the vast majority of public 
opinion, immersed in the pervading routine of the 'Cousin-like' 'ayla, 
with its well defined gender roles, and the deeply-seated Islamic code 
of conduct whereby 'men have authority over women'. But is this vision 
of women unique to the Maghrebian 'Cousins' and Islamic cosmogony? 
4.5.2. Woman in the 'African Systems of Kinship'. 
The diversity of Tanzania's ethnic configuration and the plurality of 
its religious creeds make it difficult to draw a national ideal type of 
womanhood, as in Algeria. The 1971 Law of Marriage Act, discussed 
above, had to take into account traditional customary rules, as well as 
Christian, Hindu and Muslim laws on family and personal status. What 
transpired from the Act was an institutionalisation of women's 
minority, especially through the retention of polygamy (para. 12) and 
the difficult procedure in obtaining divorce (para. 25). Indeed women 
have to suffer ill-treatment of some sort or other before aspiring to 
divorce, whereas men have only to decide and register the divorce with 
a local authority. 
The status of minor, retained for women in the Law of Marriage Act, can 
however disclose a uniformity in the lower valuations which have 
informed the law-makers (ie. the moderate 'Citizens' in power). They 
are to be found in the organisation of kin relationships: 
212 
For the understanding of any aspect of the social life 
of an African people - economic, political, or religious 
- it is essential to have a thorough knowledge of their 
system of kinship and marriage. 
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1950: 1) 
In Tanzania, as: "In most African societies, kinship constitutes the 
primary basis for the individual's rights, duties, rules of residence, 
marriage, inheritance and succession" (Ayisi, 1980: 18). This entails 
the effacement of the individual. As in the Algerian 'ayla : 
The extended family has served to perpetuate the low 
status of women in certain ways. A wife is expected to 
be subservient to her husband, father-in-law, 
mother-in-law, older sisters-in-law, and all her 
brothers-in-law, as well as to relatives extending 
beyond the immediate family of the husband. She is 
expected to contribute to their material well-being, by 
giving them surplus crops, general care, and financial 
help. She is not expected to give such assistance to her 
own family. 
(Mbilinyi, 1972: 66) 
Furthermore, generation and sex determine the place of the individual 
in the kin hierarchy. In both Bantu and Nilotic systems, elders are 
more highly ranked than youngsters, and men more than women (Mair, 
1969: 46-7; Wilson, 1977: 85). By and large, the position of women in 
Tanzanian traditional customs was that of subservience and obedience. 
Among the Nyamwezi in northwestern Tanzania: 
... by definition women occupied a socially subordinate 
place; although a few upper-class women attained 
considerable wealth and authority, men possessed 
political power, judicial rights, the right to inherit 
cattle and land. ... The few women who were able to rise 
above their sexually assigned standing did so by gaining 
the favor of a male superior, often by such means as 
manipulation, lying or flattery. Women of all social 
levels were expected to be subservient and obedient. 
(Berger, 1981: 160) 
Wilson's study (1977) of the Nyakyusa people of Southern Tanzania 
disclosed for instance that: 
A wife's duties to her husband were carefully taught by 
her mothers at the conclusion of the puberty-marriage 
ritual. She must cook and brew beer, fetch water and 
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firewood, clean the house and byre, mud the walls and floor, work in the fields... . Cooking was the primary duty of a wife, closely identified with sexual intercourse, and the most conspicuous activity of the favourite [wife]. 
(Wilson, 1977: 129) 
Another feature of the 'best' wife is to be wedded preferably virgin. 
Although the rules of most of Tanzania's ethnic groups allow for a fair 
amount of sexual freedom (as initiation rites) (Mair, 1969: 49), 
virginity is particularly appreciated: 
... In some cases physical virginity formerly received 
public congratulation, as with the Ganda and some of the 
Luhya tribes, where a special present was sent to the 
mother of a girl who was found to be virgin at marriage, 
the Hehe, where this news was received with rejoicing, 
or the Kipsigis, where virgins had a place of honour at 
the initiation dances. The Vugusu attached sufficient 
importance to the point to require that a bridegroom 
should deflower his bride in public, as do the Luo of 
Central Nyanza. ... Of the Birwana and Sumbwa of Sukumaland, ... the girls who were married with full formalities were nearly always virgins. 
(hair, 1969: 50)73 
Among the Chaga of Mount Kilimanjaro "girls were harangued on the 
importance of virginity at marriage, [while] boys were reminded of the 
law imposing death penalty on a girl who became pregnant before 
initiation and on her lover" (Mair, ibid: 47). 
Although these educational rituals do not always hold sway as they are 
originally taught, they nevertheless constitute an important set of 
values for the majority of Tanzanians. This has appeared for instance 
in the cautionary manner with which the 1971 family reform was 
introduced (see supra). 
74 Even more revealing was the response of 
traditionalist Members of Parliament (ie. spokesmen for Tanzanian 
public opinion) to the timid reforms of the Act. Of conditional poly- 
gamy75, one M. P. had this to say: 
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If a man has to get his wife's consent to a second 
marriage, the African tradition where man has always been superior to a woman will be endangered. Un ess the Law o Marriage Bill intends to change men into women 
this clause should be removed. 76 (The Standard, 22 Jan. 1971) 
According to Mbilinyi, this M. P. was summing up the general feeling of 
his peers, whose deeply held sentiments of woman's inferiority were in 
fact admitted openly. 
Thus, in Tanzania, as in Algeria, family reform helped 'exorcise' a 
well-established conservatism with regard women's position in society. 
While normative equality was received with the least controversy in the 
public realm, it was bluntly rejected in the more private realm of the 
family. Indeed, bestowing an equal status to woman was more directly 
felt as a threat to the whole familial structure itself. This latter 
rested on the predominance of patrilineal and patriarchal structures. 
Consequently, a new code of conduct establishing women's majority in 
familial rights would entail upheavals in the privileged position of 
men. On the other hand, even though the familial structure itself was 
markedly affected by the wider political and economic changes (division 
of labour, migrations, national identity, individualism), the values 
which regimented the status, role and position of women proved 
tenacious. 
The institutionalisation of the traditional status of women's 
inferiority and minority in Algeria's and Tanzania's family legislation 
constitutes a serious discrepancy with their constitutional rights as 
citizens. The combination of higher and lower valuations in each 
legislation may prove to be detrimental to women's participation in the 
215 
public realm, although this latter is not closed to them in either 
country. By institutionalising a preference for women's domestic roles, 
the 'Citizens' in power in Algeria and Tanzania may encourage an 
already weak presence of women in the formal political, economic and 
social sectors. The common thread to 'these is that they are almost 
exclusively manned by educated people; and women's presence in them is 
highly determined by their educational attainment, as will be demon- 
strated in the following Chapter. 
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NOTES: CHAPTER 4 
1. This author refers to the models of the pre-colonial social 
formations in Algeria and Tanzania. However, it is important to retain 
the changes forced on these by colonial exploitation. As a 
consequence, their normative pattern was converted into a defence 
mechanism, which instead of developing, became fossilised into a 
transcendental system. As seen in the previous Chapter, this mechanism 
continued to operate in the post-colonial 'Republic of Citizens' in 
Algeria and Tanzania. 
2. Habermas (1977) has argued that the increasing rationalisation of 
human societies has created the conditions for expedient technocratic 
decision-making. This was permitted by the growing legitimation of 
political decisions through science and technology, and threatens to 
seriously undermine political democratic debate in advanced capitalist 
countries. See J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, Heinemann, 
London 1977, pp. 102-3. However, Habermas' argument can readily be 
extended to 'developing nations' where the discourse of 'development' 
and its underlying axioms of 'technological and scientific progress' 
have constituted a paramount legitimation in political decision-making. 
That traditions of 'democracy' are lacking there can also be explained 
in Habermas' terms of expedient technocratic decision-making; probably 
even more so than in advanced capitalism. 
3. The use of 'lower valuations' refers here to the actual 'mental 
states' and 'social actions' of the 'Citizens' as opposed to their 
'higher valuations' found in the official discourse of what 'ought to 
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be done' to create a progressive, 'Republic of Citizens' professing 
equality of the sexes. The terms 'lower and higher valuations' have 
been coined by Gunar Myrdal in his An American Dilemma, McGraw-Hill, 
New-York, 1964. Holmes interpreted the distinction between the two as 
"what individuals assert ought to be done, their mental states, and 
their social actions" (Holmes, 1981: 112). 
4. See Mernissi F., "Women's Work: Religious and Scientific Concepts as 
Political Manipulation in Dependent Islam" in Halim Barakat (ed. ) 
Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration, 
Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 214-228. 
5. Articles 39,41 and 42 of Algeria's Constitution are contained in 
the provisions on 'Fundamental Liberties, Human Rights and Rights of 
the Citizen' (ibid: 24-30). 
Article 39: Fundamental liberties, human rights and rights of the 
citizen are safeguarded. All citizens are equal in rights as well as in 
duties. Any discrimination based on sex or race or occupation is 
proscribed. 
Article 41: The State insures equality of all citizens by removing 
economic, social and cultural obstacles which limit [this] equality, 
hinder the development of the human person, and hamper the effective 
participation of all citizens to political, economic, social and 
cultural life. 
Article 42: All political, economic social and cultural rights of the 
Algerian woman are guaranteed by the Constitution. 
In view of the above mentioned constitutional provisions, family law in 
Algeria should be in breach of the Constitution, but Article 2, which 
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provides for Islam as the religion of state, legitimises it. The 
dilemma is formidable. 
6. Sheikh Abdel Hamid Ibn Badis was the instigator and leader of the 
Algerian Ulamaa movement in the late 1920s and early 1930s, who used 
cogently the message of scripturalist Islam to counter the assimil- 
ationist projects of the colonial administration. In his writings, 
talks and courses, Ibn Badis used mainly a spiritualist message as well 
as a historical one to confirm the profound Islamic identity of the 
Algerians. See Chapter 5 for further details on his work in the 
educational field. 
7. Cf. Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne (JORA), Debats 
Parlementaires, nos. 23-29, June 20,24,27,1963 and July 1,15,22, 
1963. The emotional content of the interventions is particularly 
compelling apropos religion and its 'organic' link with personal 
status. 
8. The marriage of minors is far from being considered an offence in 
Islam, and is best explained by Muslim scholars. In his The Family 
Structure in Islam, American Trust Publications, Indiana, 1977, 
Hammudah 'Abd al'Ati has argued for instance that: 
Marriage in minority would seem to imply a betrothal or 
some formal agreement, deferring final consumation to a 
later date. This type of Child "marriage" is probably 
best explained by the desire to draw families together 
and to facilitate social integration. 
Given the low sex ratio and racial plurality of Muslim 
society, the need for social integration and the high 
value of sexual purity and virginity, it may become 
understandable why Islam set no age limits on 
marriage. 
(ibid: 76)(emphasis added) 
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It should be added that the marriage of minors coincided also with the 
practice of arranged marriages betwen cousins in Algeria's 'Republic of 
Cousins'. Accordingly, Loi 63-224, was easily circumvented as people 
would not report on child betrothal within the same kin. 
9. Traditionally, the reading of the Exordium not only sealed the union 
of a man and a woman, but that of two families. The ceremony involved 
the strict presence of agnates of each family. No women attended, for 
this part of the ceremony amounted to a 'gentleman's agreement' which 
involved the 'word of honour' of each party. The bride was not present 
but was represented by a male guardian (father, brother, uncle). 
10. According to 'Abd al'Ati, the rationale behind forbiding a Muslim 
woman to marry a non-Muslim man is to provide for religious and 
spiritual equality between the two partners: 
In the new order [Islam], it became lawful in theory and 
accepted in practice for any free Muslim man to marry 
any Muslim woman so long as his religious integrity 
remained intact. What was required in marriage was the 
"religious" not the traditional "social", equality. 
Thus, a non-Muslim man is forbidden to marry a Muslim 
woman because he is not her equal in religion. Nor is it 
lawful for a debaucher to marry a continent, decent 
woman for the same reason. If religious compatibility 
obtains, any other consideration is of secondary 
importance. This is the logic of the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet particularly as interpreted by 
jurist critics. 
(ibid: 88) 
By logic of the Qur' an, one should understand the unequivocal 
superiority it bestowed on men over women in a number of verses. See 
later discussion. Suffice it to note here that 'Abd al'Ati's fear for 
woman's 'religious' equality is also the best obstacle to her acquiring 
'social equality'. 
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11. See Chapter 3 on the internecine power struggles which marked early 
Independence. 
12. All of these are provisions of the Shari 'a and the Qur'an, and will 
be examined later in this Chapter. 
13. M. Bedjaoui was one of the most eloquent spokesmen of the war of 
liberation in international venues. This particular comment was issued 
in Revolution et Travail, 3 March 1966, the organ of the UGTA (Union 
Nationale des Travailleurs Algeriens). 
14. See this Chapter, and in particular the detailed discussion of the 
Qur'an and Shari'a views on the relation between the sexes and the 
status of womanhood. 
15. The term 'decay' is underlined by the present author to mark the 
extreme reluctance expressed by Boumediene, (a 'Citizen') at seeing 
women entirely emancipated as free individuals. The obsession with 
morality is a fascinating corollary of women's access to the public 
domain. Boumediene's ambivalent appeal to socialism and Islam at the 
same time is typical of the lower valuations of the 'Citizens' in 
power. Their yearning for 'chaste' domestic women is all too apparent 
despite the socialist promise of universal equality. 
16. Underlining added to mark again the leitmotive of morality. Note 
that this latter is never explicitly described. Nevertheless it need 
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not be so. For the average Algerian, it is clearly attached to 
'chastity' as will be seen in the National Assembly's debate on the 
Family Code. 
17. See section 4.5.1. and related subheadings. 
18. The Justice Minister, Kacem Nait Belkacem, was a virulent advocate 
of the transcendence of Islamic values. He launched one of the most 
impressive Islamic cultural venues: Multaqa al Fikr al Islamit' (The 
Conference of Islamic Thought), which, every year, gathers thousands of 
participants from all over the world. He made this declaration to the 
Fifth Conference held in Oran (Western Algeria) in July 1971, and 
reported by the daily El Moudjahid, 27.7.1971. 
19. The dismissal of the secretariat of the UNFA expresses above all 
the mood of the 'Citizens' in power. It is significant that they are 
more prone to compromise with the excesses of the traditionalist 
'Cousins', than with the radicalism of secularist 'Citizens'. In fact, 
they were equally eager to dismiss them in the early years of the 
Boumediene regime, whilst even then showing tolerance towards the 
'Cousins'. 
20. Boumediene's death unleashed the long-repressed growth of 
proponents of economic 'liberalisation' in the polity and army, backed 
by a new body of entrepreneurs who thrived on small industries. Almost 
simultaneously, religious fundamentalists brought their claims into the 
open. Whether the two movements were associated is yet to be 
established. A most fascinating item of social research would be to 
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investigate the legitimation discourse of the advocates of 
'liberalisation'; whether it be Islam or westernisation. It is most 
likely to be Islam as the two are not necessarily antithetical. See 
Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Penguin Books, 1980. 
Accordingly, the joint rise of both tendencies would throw some light 
on the likely social conservatism of 'liberalisation'. However, it is 
still too early to establish any lasting connections. 
21. The participation of women war-veterans in the feminist protests 
was over-estimated by organisers. Although the legitimacy of 
nationalism is still paramount in Algeria, it does not seem to hold 
sway where family and women are concerned. The public realm of the 
nation is, in the eyes of the 'Cousins' and the moderate 'Citizens', 
best served by women holding on to their domestic status. Indeed, the 
weak participation of Algerian women in nation-building, following 
their active role in the anti-colonial war, has baffled many an 
observer, who had awaited a continuation of the radicalism of the war 
in future social relations in independent Algeria. The most virulent 
indictment of the 'betrayal of the woman's cause' can be found in the 
writings of Fadela M'rabet: La Femme Algerienne, Paris, Maspero, 1964; 
Les Algeriennes, Paris, Maspero, 1967. 
22. Reporting on the interventions of secularist delegates was very 
scanty in the consulted issues of the Journal Official de l'Assemblee 
Populaire Nationale, compared to the faithful reproduction of those of 
the 'Cousins'. 
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23. See further discussion in this Chapter on the principle of 
'guardianship' over women and their inclusion in the category of the 
'incapacitated' in Islamic law. 
24. Whenever the public sector, as opposed to the private domestic 
sector of the home, is made accessible to women, sexual morality seems 
to haunt the minds of Muslim men (as shown by Boumediene's speeches, 
and the interventions of delegates ). For instance, Mernissi has 
pointed out that: 
... the perception of the woman who works for a wage 
outside the domestic unit [is that of] someone who is 
taking up unmentionable activities that are seen as 
prostitution. As she violates the separation of the 
social fields and transgresses the sexual limits of the 
division of labor by moving into the economic, public 
space, she is seen as only able to sell that which she 
administers as a commodity in the domestic space, in 
private intimacy - sex. 
(in Barakat, 1985: 217) 
Mernissi rightly points out that this perception is somehow shared by 
"illiterate peasants" and "highly trained industrial managers and 
factory owners as well as technocrats and state planners" (ibid). In 
our models it is certainly shared by dominant 'Citizens' (Boumediene), 
and 'Cousin' delegates of the National Assembly. 
25. Emphasis added to mark the explicit limits set by the ruling 
'Citizens' on women's aspirations for equality: knowledge (ie. 
education) and work (wage labour). Chairman Bitat's message is that, 
any other equality is not and cannot be envisaged (ie. legal equality). 
26. Yet, they are a reproduction of the Shari'a provisions on the 
relations between the sexes. See 'Abd al'Ati, op. cit. pp. 146-182. The 
224 
husband's duty of 'maintenance' is handsomely made up for by the wife's 
duty of 'obedience'. A courteous master-slave relationship would be an 
accurate description of the Shari 'a model for marital relationships. 
See details later in this Chapter. 
27. Discussing Muslim men's aversion for women's work outside the home, 
Mernissi pointed out that: "These men are not to be condemned for 
thinking in this way. They are in total harmony with their own frame of 
reference, the Muslim concept and definitions of masculinity and 
feminity shaped by Shari 'a laws and values" (in Barakat, ibid: 216). 
However, when 'these men' also happen to profess progressive principles 
of socialist equality as in Algeria, the Islamic frame of reference 
becomes latent among the ruling elite. Hence the ambivalence of their 
stance and the 
(Socialism/Islam). 
apparent opportunism of their legitimations 
28. The term 'polygamy' in the sense of plurality of wives is not 
technically correct. 'Polygyny' is the anthropological term to 
designate such plurality, and polygamy applies to the practice by both 
sexes. 'Polyandry' is the plurality of husbands. However, 'polygamy' 
will be used here in its lay sense of 'more than one wife' as it is 
used thus in the debates on the Family Code in Algeria, and the 
Marriage Law of Tanzania. 
29. Cf. note 27 above. 
30. 'Abd al'Ati, op. cit., pp. 13-18. 
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31. Polygamy is far from being an extended practice in Algeria. On the 
contrary it has been on the decrease and superseded by monogamy. It 
emerged from the Assembly debates that 'only' 3% of men practice 
polygamy. But, the Qur'anic sacrality of the principle (Surah 4, verse 
2) prevented the hard line 'Cousins' from accepting any conditional 
wording of it, let alone its abrogation. In the meantime, it is left to 
intellectual moderate 'Citizens' of the legal profession to 
'scientifically' rationalise the retention of conditional polygamy. An 
example of such rationalisation is that of 'Abd al'Aziz Saa'd (chairman 
of Annaba's Legislative Committee): "given that Algeria's population is 
constituted of 48% males and 52`/o females, four girls out of 52 would 
remain unmarried and would fall prey to non-Muslim unions or even 
depravation; therefore polygamy is justified in a statistical sense". 
See his article Nidham Ta'adud Azaujat fi Qawa'id al Shari'a wal 
Qawanin al Wadh'iya, (The Principle of Polygamy in the Rules of the 
Shari'a and Positive Laws), in al Thagafa, no. 95, Sep. /Oct. 1986, pp. 
197-211. al Thaqafa is issued by the Ministry of Culture. However, 
Saa'd's figures say nothing about the ratios for different generations, 
(but relate only to the overall population ratio), and therefore 
marriageable groups. Such simplistic statistical conclusions are 
surprisingly convenient as a pseudo-scientific evidence for the 
retention of polygamy as a principle. 
32. This and the following verses are N. J. Dawood's translation, The 
Koran, Penguin Books, 1981. However, this author has adopted the 
transliteration Qur'an, as it is closer to Arabic. Subsequent references 
from the Qur'an will consist of the Chapter's number followed by the 
verse's, as in 4: 2. 
226 
33. Cf. Nicholas Hans, Comparative Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978. Hans "enumerated five factors which make an ideal nation: unity 
of race, unity of language, unity of religion, compact territory, and 
political sovereignty" (ibid: 9). However, he warns that "Neither 
character is potent enough if separated, only the combination of at 
least four of them can result in creating a social unit called "nation" 
clearly distinct from other "nations" (ibid: 10). The cases of Algeria 
and Tanzania suggest that such proposals are not universally valid. 
34. Emphasis added to stress the importance of the private realm which, 
as in Algeria, attracted public debate and controversy. 
35. It is significant that the strongest opposition to a progressive 
piece of legislation came from Tanzanian Muslims. This can be explained 
by the sacrality of Islamic cosmogony and the divinely regulated 
relations between the sexes (see infra, section 4.5.1.2, of this 
Chapter). 
36. The lack of reference to Ujamaa recalls the indifference in Algeria 
towards the egalitarian principles of the National Charter and the 
Constitution. 
37. Radcliffe-Brown makes a distinction between 'history' and 'pseudo 
history'. The latter tends to distort knowledge of non-literate 
societies, where written records are scanty if not totally absent. 
38. Cf. Lewis Morgan, cited by Engels in his Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1981. 
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Engels' interest for Morgan's theory of the early matriarchal gens is 
justified by its materialist outlook: 
This rediscovery of the primitive matriarchal gens as 
the earlier stage of the patriarchal gens of civilized 
peoples has the same importance for anthropology as 
Darwin's theory of evolution has for biology and Marx's 
theory of surplus value for political economy. 
(Engels, 1981: 83) 
Such argument illustrates the thin divide between materialism and 
evolutionism in Western epistemology. The idea of positive evolution 
did not fail to appear in the then new science of anthropology. A 
product of colonial times, anthropology inevitably looked at tribal 
societies as an illustration of early human groupings, and not as a 
variety of social organisation. 
39. Cf. Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim, Penguin Books, 1977, pp. 182-3. 
40. Ibid. Note that Durkheim is not concerned with 'how' evolution 
occurs, but describes it as a finite product, thus giving us pseudo- 
historical assumptions. Note also how Germanic and Christian forms are 
taken as superior. 
41. Cf. Engels, op. cit., especially his analysis of the evolution of 
the bourgeois conjugal family of the industrial revolution and the 
exploitation of women as its corrollary. 
42. See Chapter 3, note 7. 
43. 'ayla is the Arabic word for family. In this context it designates 
"the extended family, of a patriarchal type, of agnatic descent, and 
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indivisible". See Boutefnouchet M., La Familie Algerienre, SNED, Alger, 
1982, p. 38. 
44. Cf. R. Basagana & A. Sayad, Habitat Traditionnel et Structures 
Familiales en Kabylie, C. R. A. P. E. S, Alger, 1974. 
45. In the agnatic structure, descent is traced through the male line; 
in the cognatic structure descent is bilateral as both parents are 
equally important. The combination of the two is a characteristic trait 
of the endogamous form of kinship prevalent in the Maghreb. This 
particularity was noted by Ibn Khaldun, but went unnoticed by 
anthropologists imbued with the Durkeimian totemic clan as being 
exclusively agnatic. See A. Megherbi, La Pensee Sociologique dtIbn 
Khaldun, SNED, Alger, 1971, p. 161. 
46. Cf. Boutefnouchet, op. cit., pp. 41-2, and p. 56. 
47. Cf. Basagana & Sayad, op. cit, p. 51, as well as R. Descloitres & 
L. Debzi, Systeme de Parente et Structures Familiales en Algerie, Aix 
en Provence, Centre Africain des Sciences Humaines Appliquees, 1965; 
also reproduced in the Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Paris, 1963. 
48. Megherbi explains that the term 'assabiyya does not only render the 
political aspect of power and sociological change, but also carries a 
biological meaning, that of blood ties. See A. Megherbi, op. cit., pp. 
159-160. The fluidity of such concept reminds us of more recent 
anthropological findings in Africa on the close links between political 
relations and kinship relations. See M. Fortes & E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 
229 
African Political Systems, International African Institute, Oxford 
University Press, 1961. 
49. The circles represent the different levels of integration of the 
individual, who entertains primary social relations with the immediate 
kin within the 'assab , and secondary relations within el-kherrouba (the 
segment), el-deshra (the sub-Clan), el-ferga(the clan), e1 'arsh (the 
tribe), and finally el-bled (the confederation of tribes). See 
Boutefnouchet, op. cit., p. 55. 
50. Cf. Nefissa Zerdoumi, Enfants d'hier, 1'education de l'enfant en 
milieu traditionnel algerien, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1970, p. 79. 
51. The Algerian Code de la Familie is a good example of the 
intermingling of 'Cousin' type lower valuations and orthodox Islamic 
precepts on the issue of women's virginity and minority. In the 
11 original Code (JORADP, 23eme annee, no. 24,12 Juin 1984), the father 
as a guardian may oppose the marriage of his daughter if she is minor 
(Article 12,2nd. paragraph, p. 612). Two subsequent amendments were 
brought in to replace the word minor. In the JORADP, no. 31,31 Juillet 
1984, p. 801, the term 'minor' was replaced by 'virgin', thus 
emphasizing the physical status of virginity so jealously cherished by 
the 'Republic of Cousins' and the Islamic cosmogony alike. The other 
amendment appeared in the JORADP no. 41,19 Septembre 1984, 
transforming 'virgin' into its Arabic transcription bikr, thus 
epitomising the confusion and paranoia surrounding the control of 
female sexuality. 
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52. Only with old age do women gain respectability and trust. See 
Boutefnouchet, op. cit., p. 72. 
53. A reading of the 1966 and 1977 National Censuses discloses that 
respectively 65 per cent, and 63 per cent of Algerian families were of 
the conjugal type. The slight decrease in the 1977 figure was more an 
indication of the difficult housing conditions which caused families to 
assemble, than a wilful retention of the extended type. The analysis 
was made for the FLN preparatory commission on the Family Code prior to 
its issue in June 1984. Cf. Hizb Djabhat al-Tahrir al-Lajnah 
al-Wataniah li-Tahdhir Milaf Siassat Tandhim al-Usrah, al-Tatawar 
al-Tarikhi lil-Usrah al-Djazairia hata al-Marhala al-Rahinah, (The 
Historical Evolution of the Algerian Family), mimeo, n. d. 
54. There is a growing reluctance among young couples in maintaining 
the extended structure of the family. Boutefnouchet's study on the 
Algerian family (op. cit. ) disclosed that this latter is by and large 
evolving into a conjugal type family, but dominated however by the 
paternal component. His sample of 86 families nationwide demonstrated 
that they were developing from a 'traditional composed structure' into 
a 'modern simple structure' under the special circumstances of 
urbanisation and industrialisation, within a span of time of three 
generations (1885/1914; 1915/1945; 1946/1976). 
55. Cf. Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, Male-Female Dynamics in 
Muslim Society, Al Saqi Books, 1985. Mernissi is ironically in 
agreement with apologetic writers on Islam and the family structure, 
who equally thought that Islamic family reforms were unique. But they 
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saw in them a purification of decadent practices of the so-called dark 
ages (a1-Djahilia), in Arabia. Cf. Mustapha al-Saba'i, 
al-mar's baina al-figh wal-ganun (Woman between Theology and Law) 
al-maqtabah a l-'arabiyyah, Halab (Aleppo, Syria), 1966. In the case of 
North Africa the rupture with previous familial practices occured in 
relation to women's right to inherit in Islam, but not in the rigid 
control of sexual behaviour already insured through endogamy. 
56. See Hammudah 'Abd al'Ati, The Family Structure in Islam, American 
Trust Publications, 1977, pp. 98-102, on the variety of marriage forms 
in pre-Islamic Arabia. At least 10 out the 12 forms compiled by 'Abd 
al'Ati were free relations between men and women, a remarkable contrast 
with the strict Islamic form of licit nikah (declared marriage). 
57. Cf. Qur'an, 9: 24,49: 10,64: 15. All emphasize the primacy of 
religious brotherhood over all other ties including blood and marriage 
should they conflict with it. 
58. See footnote 51 above. 
59. The reference is to the unhappy marriage of Zeyd, the Prophet's 
adopted son, with Zaynab the Prophet's cousin. Following their divorce 
Muhammad married Zaynab, but to do so a verse was issued in order to 
prohibit adoption; as otherwise an adopted son was to be treated as a 
real son, and marrying his divorcee was one of the unlawful union in 
Islam (Qur'an, 4: 23). 
60. Pertaining to be a universal message, Islam encouraged exogamy. The 
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Prophet's nine marriages were mostly known for being politically 
motivated unions. See, Nabia Abbott, Aishah the Beloved of Mohammed, Al 
Saqi Books, London 1985, and Qur'an, 49: 13. 
61. Muslims hold Muhammad's conduct as exemplary, hence the elaboration 
of the Sunnah, a compilation of the Prophet's sayings (hadeeth), and 
behaviour. The active participation of Muhammad in his community (as a 
husband, father, religious and political leader) established a 
tenacious tradition among Muslims at "reinstating in their integrity a 
series of stereotypical conducts [laid down in the] universal logos of 
Allah, and the ideal behaviour of the Prophet". See Abdelwahab 
Bouhdiba, La Sexualite en Islam, PUF, Paris, 1975, pp. 11-12. Bouhdiba 
is of the opinion that "in its essence, Islam is orthodoxy, hence the 
continuous fundamentalist and regressive temptation" (ibid: 11) at best 
reviving the original ideal model. The 'Cousins' of the Algerian 
National Assembly behaved accordingly when insisting upon the adoption 
of the Shari 'a , so much so that reform of 
family law to them simply 
meant a return to the original model, and not its adaptation to present 
circumstances. The a-historicity of the divine word and the Prophet's 
conduct is to them matter of fact. 
62. Cf. Tillion, op. cit., pp. 113-119. She argues that the 
Mediterranean notion of 'honour' is intrinsically linked with female 
virginity. 
63. The wedding feast has to be made public, since "publicity 
is the 
element which distinguishes legitimate unions from illicit ones. 
This 
was probably the reason for the Prophet to recommend marriage 
feasts" 
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('Abd ad'Ati, ibid: 61). On the other hand custom has it in Algeria, 
that marriage be consummated on the wedding night, so that the bride's 
virginal blood (on her blouse) be shown in public. The absence of 
bleeding is sufficient proof that the bride is not virgin. 
64. See Boumediene's remarks, earlier in this Chapter. 
65. See note 51 above. 
66. Two kinds of interpretations of Qur'anic injunctions may be drawn. 
The theological schools of the Sunni tradition: hanafi , after Abu 
Hanifa (699-769) ; sha fi i, after Abu Abdullah Muhammad al-Shaf i' i 
(770-819); malekite, after Malek Ibn Anas (705-795); and finally 
hanbalite, after its founder Abu Hanbal(780-855). The malekite rite, the 
most puritanical of all is predominant in Algeria. The other type of 
interpretation has been proposed by Muslim philosophers, the most 
comprehensive of all being Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111). Ghazali is 
best known for his Ihya ' Ulum al-Din, (The Revivification of Religious 
Sciences), where he drew ideal models of the Muslim man, woman, 
society and knowledge. He gave particular attention to the ideal 
behaviour of the Muslim woman who "on the whole, ... must remain in 
her 
private quarters and never neglect her spindle. She must not make 
frequent trips to the balcony nor spend her time gazing down from 
there. Let her exchange but few words with her neighbours and refrain 
from visiting them. She should be satisfied with her husband's lot and 
give in her rights to preserve his" (Ghazali, 1980: 163-4). This 
passage was taken from Volume 2 of Ghazali's Ihya 'Ulum al-Din, Dar 
al-Fikr, 1980. In brief, effacement, obedience, discretion, seclusion 
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are recommended for the Muslim woman. All features are in agreement 
with the Qur'an, and their interpretation is but a variant of the 
divine word. 
67. The etymology of the term Islam in Arabic includes submission and 
obedience. 
68. The will of Allah is often invoked in popular beliefs such as 
mektoub(it was written, predestined) and qadar (fate, destiny), whereby 
Allah's designs are inevitable: "To Allah belongs the kingdom of the 
heavens and the earth. He creates what He will. He gives daughters to 
whom He will and sons to whom He pleases. To some he gives both sons 
and daughters, and to others He gives none at all. Mighty is Allah and 
all-knowing" (Qur'an, 42: 49). 
69. The verses on repudiation are a very interesting mixture of 
tolerance for men's excesses and arbitrariness, and compassion for 
women. These latter have, nevertheless, to follow strict rules of 
'waiting periods' following repudiation in case they are pregnant. See 
Qur'an 4: 20,2: 226-232, 65: 1,6. Women are generally treated as a 
comodity which men can 'put away' (65: 1) or 'exchange' (4: 20), albeit 
'kindly'. 
70. Women are hardly addressed by the Qur'an even though no less than 7 
Surahs (Chapters) were devoted to them (The Cow, Women, Divorce, Light, 
The Confederate Tribes, The Table, She Who Is Tested). Ibn Khaldun in 
his Mugaddimah noticed that "God ... only addresses 
his order to him who 
has the power to carry it out. ... The majority of religious 
laws are 
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are not addressed to women. Women are not mentioned in the discourse. 
Nevertheless, these laws apply to them as they apply to men. ... women 
are included by analogy (bit-giyas). Laws are not addressed to them 
because they are without power. It is men who control their acts, save 
in regard with the acts of worship properly speaking (al-'. ibada). For 
these acts, women are directly mentioned in the discourse; they are not 
included by analogy". Cited in Fatna A. Sabbah, Woman in the Muslim 
Unconscious, The Athene Series, Pergamon Press, New York, 1984, p. 70. 
Also Cf. Qur'an, 33: 35, a rare occasion whereby women are addressed 
directly as believers. 
71. See earlier discussion of the code in this Chapter. 
72. Cf. White, E. H., "Legal Reform as an Indicator of Women's Status in 
Muslim Nations", in Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie, (eds. ), Women in the 
Muslim World, Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 52-68. 
73. Mair had covered the ethnic groups of Eastern Africa. Most of these 
are to be found in Tanzania. 
74. See this Chapter. 
75. As in Algeria, polygamy was made dependent on 
first wife. 
the consent of the 
76. In Marjorie Mbilinyi, "The 'New Woman' and Traditional Norms in 
Tanzania", in The Journal of Modem African Studies, 10,1,1972, pp. 
57-72, Cambridge University Press, p. 67. Emphasis added. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CAN LITERACY DESEGREGATE THE 'CITY OF WOMEN'? 
In the previous Chapter, we have seen how the ambiguities of the 
discourse of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania inadvertently 
made room for the expression of traditionalist and conservative trends 
vis ä vis women's emancipation into equal 'Citizens'. 
' This was 
mainly expressed in the rejection of legal equality for women in the 
private realm of the family. 
It is still early to assess the implications of the 
institutionalisation of women's status of minority on their economic 
and social participation. Now that, by virtue of family legislation, a 
segregated 'City of Women' has been erected in the midst of a 
modernising 'Republic of Citizens', it is important to consider whether 
other social processes could help alleviate the segregation. In 
particular, the role of education will be evaluated. in this Chapter in 
the light of the universal beliefs that education and literacy lead 
either to economic integration, or liberate from political and 
cultural alienation. 
5.1. Education and Literacy: the Rise of a World 'Republic of Citizens' 
Education has been greatly expanded by Algeria's and Tanzania's 
modernising 'Citizens' as a 'fundamental human right', following the 
recommendations of the United Nations (Article 26 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights), and a strong political will to make up 
for a segregated colonial policy in educational provision. 
2 As a basic 
principle, both educational rhetorics have included equal educational 
provision for both males and females, since Independence in the early 
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1960s. 3 Furthermore, education has been used deliberately in the 
systematic inculcation of new values pertaining to the principle of 
social and sex equality. 
The Algerian Charte Nationale stipulates for instance that: 
part of the Cultural Revolution in creating a new man in 
a new society... will be the educational effort based on fighting all prejudices of race, class, sex and manual 
work... 
(Charte Nationale, 1976: 64) 
In Education for Self-Reliance, Nyerere links educational function with 
the whole societal programme: 
Only when we are clear about the kind of society we are 
trying to build can we design our educational service to 
serve our goals. ... We have said that we want to create 
a socialist society which is based on three principles: 
equality and respect for human dignity; sharing of the 
resources which are produced by our efforts; work by 
everyone and exploitation by none. 
(Nyerere, 1967: 5-6) 
Accordingly, Tanzanian education is required to develop in each 
citizen: 
... an Ujamaa or socialist outlook, particularly the 
principles of equality and brotherhood entail a sense of 
individual and collective responsibility in all areas of 
activity and a willingness to co-operate and share on 
equal terms. 
(Ministry of National Education, 1980: 3) 
These noble intentions are not exclusive to Algeria and Tanzania, but 
are national interpretations of a universal faith in the power of 
education in creating peaceful and just millenia worldwide. The idea 
was expressed forty years ago with the creation of Unesco (The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation). 
4 With 
regard to non-industrial and newly independent nations, Unesco's 
regional conferences (Addis Ababa, Karachi, and Santiago de Chile) were 
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organised in the early 1960s, to recommend that Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) be achieved within two decades (1960-1980). 5 
However, the vision of 'education as a human right' was soon superseded 
by the more utilitarian approach of the 'economic returns' of 
educational provision. 
6 This development followed criticisms of UPE as 
costly, and led to the elaboration of a new millenium through cost- 
benefit analysis of educational provision. A policy shift from 
primary to secondary and higher education was recommended so that an 
educated manpower is supplied to growing and modernising economies. 
But, it was not long before a 'World Educational Crisis'8 was diag- 
nosed, and the formal sector of education bitterly accused of training 
non-relevant manpower. 
9 The main target of policy revision seemed again 
to be the so-called Third World countries. Formal educational systems 
there were denounced as having: 
resulted, on the one hand, in an increase in the number 
of educated unemployed, alienation of rural youths, 
migration to urban centres and overseas in search of 
jobs and, on the other, lack of properly qualified 
people to fill jobs in some critical areas of 
development... . (Prospects, IV/1,1976: 137) 
As an alternative, the motto of 'non-formal or informal' education was 
launched, claiming that it was more 'relevant' to the non-industrial 
and agrarian nature of most Third World societies. 
10 
With a world-wide food shortage looming ever more 
ominously, and with the economic growth of many 
developing countries being hobbled by lack of sufficient 
effort to modernize their agricultural and rural 
sectors, it is clear that farmer training, extension 
services, and the training of rural leaders (innovators 
and entrepreneurs of several sorts) must be a major 
objective of nonformal education in the years 
immediately ahead. Fortunately, it has already been 
shown - in Kenya, to cite but one example - that well - 
conceived short training courses for practising farmers 
and their wives (even if they cannot read) can have a 
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quick and handsome yield, provided they are followed up 
with effective advisory services and are complemented by 
the other necessary ingredients of a well-integrated 
agricultural development campaign. 
(Coombs, 1970: 143) 
Coombs' proposition to generalise the Kenyan experiment in non-formal 
rural education to a whole host of countries, just because their 
socio-economic structures are predominantly agrarian, is a telling 
example of the inductive procedure followed in international social 
planning. 
5.2. Methodological Shortcomings of World Educational Planning. 
The methodological procedure followed by international and national 
experts in educational planning has its roots in the positivist and 
hypothetico-inductive tradition in Western epistemology. 
11 Holmes has 
described such method in the following terms: 
The essential features of this method are (1) the 
collection of data using objective observation, (2) the 
careful classification of data, (3) the search for 
explanation by ascribing to each event an antecedent 
cause or causes, (4) the formulation of tentative 
hypotheses, (5) the collection of further confirming 
evidence and finally (6) the statement of universal laws 
whose validity can be provided. 
(Holmes, 1981: 39) 
As a result, there is a propensity to try and establish correlational 
links between different variables, such as educational provision and 
economic growth. Again, Holmes has warned that: 
There is no logical justification for asserting from a 
general proposition (in the form of a relationship 
statement) which has been confirmed by this kind of 
comparative research that an increment of change in one 
variable in any of the countries tested (and by 
extension to any other country) will result in an 
increment of change in the other variable unless, and 
this is the crux of the matter, that these general 
propositions have universal validity (ie. hold good 
regardless of circumstances), and that social events are 
determined by factors such as those operationalised by 
many social scientists. To use such testing to justify 
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policy decision a planner must be a positivist and a determinist. 
(Ibid: 67-8) 
Indeed, the next step in the saga of international educational planning 
has been that: 
In practice planners have advised governments to adopt 
panaceas as universal solutions to macro-problems. They 
have tried to find the residual 'causes' of failure, 
underachievement, slow economic growth, political 
instability, and get rid of them. At the same time they 
have tried to promote the causes of success. Had they 
succeeded, a worldwide educational millenium might 
indeed have arrived. It is not yet on the horizon. 
ibid: 69) 
It is unlikely that the millenium will ever be achieved precisely 
because it is a millenium, ie. an absolute promise which takes little 
account of specific social relations subject to the unpredictable tides 
of social change. 
Besides the shortcomings of a methodological order, an analogy can be 
made between colonial educational policies, and those advised by 
international experts or even undertaken by national leaders. Most 
worrying in the view of the present author is the idea of 'basic, 
non-formal, community' education for 'local and rural needs'. Indeed, 
the above mentioned Coombsian plea is significantly reminiscent of 
1920s British 'adaptationist' educational policies in Africa, and the 
French 'colon'(settler) conviction that the 'colonised' should only 
acquire 'basic vocational training'. 
12 The British philosophy of 
'adaptation' was devised for the colonial authorities by the American 
funded Phelps-Stokes commissions between 1921 and 1924.13 Significantly 
enough, the commissions included an American 'expert' on 'Negro' 
education in the American South, Thomas Jesse Jones. A strong advocate 
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of the idea of 'education relevant to the needs of the African 
natives', he had this to say: 
The temporal salvation of the colored race for some time 
to come is to be on out of the ground. The Negro race 
will succeed or fail as it shall devote itself with 
energy to agriculture and mechanical arts, or avoid 
these pursuits, and its teachers must be inspired with 
the spirit of hard work and acquainted with the ways that lead to material success. Teaching and farming go well 
together in the present condition of things. The 
teacher-farmer is the man of all times, he is 
essentially an educator throughout the year. 
(in Harik & Schilling, 1984: 57) 
The idea of rural and vocational 'salvation' is not only tantamount to 
Coombs' plea for non-formal education, but it is the more disturbing 
that it has also been advocated by African national leaders. For 
instance, Nyerere's Education for Self-Reliance (1967), is in its own 
way an 'adaptationist' philosophy, as will be examined later in this 
Chapter. Suffice it to note at present that Nyerere's vision of a 
peasant Tanzania, whose majority need only to have a basic literacy 
to yield more agricultural produce, and apply basic principles of 
hygiene and home-economics is uncomfortably reminiscent of colonial 
'adaptationist' education. 
The reminiscence is interesting to retain in as far as it is not 
entirely fortuitous. It can be explained in the light of Hyden's 
argument of the 'need' for the ruling elite to 'capture' an autonomous 
and scattered peasantry; 
14 
a task which he claimed, was left to 
national ruling classes to achieve in lieu of the former colonial 
authorities. In the light of this argument, educational provision 
answers theoretical claims that the educational system is an 
'ideological state apparatus' (Althusser, 1971)15 endowed with the 
function of 'social and cultural reproduction' (Bourdieu, 1973), 
16 
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Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that national educational 
reforms often inadvertently revive colonial educational programmes. 17 
On the other hand, such a scenario would be incomplete without the 
international experts who play a vital role as couriers of technical 
assistance often tied to vested interests. Indeed, the establishment of 
international organisations has systematised 'cultural borrowing' at a 
global level. The ensuing policies have represented macro-solutions 
which have often conveyed ethnocentric biases. It did not only take 
radical scholarship to denounce such practices as 'cultural 
imperialism'. 18 Holmes noted for instance that: 
Such technical advisers are neo-colonialists. 
Unwittingly they are cultural imperialists imposing, 
with the best will in the world, models of educational 
provision which may be ill-adapted and indeed not 
capable of adaptation by the nations whose governments 
have asked for help and advice. The difference between 
present day technical experts (whether under contract to 
an international agency or on a bilateral programme) and 
the missionaries and former colonial officials is that 
the modern adviser rarely stays long enough in any 
country to be held personally responsible for either 
success or failure. 
(Holmes, 1981: 33) 
Holmes' remark helps draw our attention to the methodological aspect 
of problem-solving. Besides global structural links, interpreted in the 
light of colonial, neo-colonial and dependency relations, there runs a 
methodological link. Common ground of the colonial official, the 
international adviser, as well as the national expert and political 
leader is to be found in their systematic use of inductivist and 
positivist methods of investigation and policy planning. Accordingly, 
it is contended here that the issue at stake in educational reform, (or 
in applying education as social reform) is not ill-adapted 'cultural 
borrowing', or the need to conform to so-called 'local needs', but the 
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necessity to carefully examine the trends of local social dynamics. 
This is what Holmes has called "the specification of initial 
conditions", 
19 
that is the identification of societal data, relevant to 
the [social] problem under investigation. This is done with a view to 
anticipating the outcomes of policy formulation or of hypothetical 
solutions (Holmes, ibid: 76). It is important to emphasize in 
problem-solving techniques the difference between 'specific initial 
conditions' associated with the Holmesian 'problem' in the sense of 
'asynchronous social change', and pseudo-sociological diagnoses 
pertaining to the 'nature' of 'local needs'. While the latter are taken 
as a priori axioms from which to confirm an already established policy, 
the former call for the prediction of likely outcomes of policy (or 
hypothetical solution), as they draw attention to the predominant 
'national character' . 
20 This latter should not however be understood as 
a corpus of static and intrinsic characteristics, but as the result of 
social interaction, both intra- and inter-nationally. It is out of such 
interaction, that a predominant set of values and cultural 
distinctiveness is established, and not out of some absolute condition. 
Our earlier models of interaction between ruling 'Citizens' and 
pressure groups of 'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law' have shown the 
fluctuations as well as the continuity of 'national character'. 
In the context of the present investigation, the provision of adult 
literacy for women will be considered hypothetically as a measure to 
alleviate women's domesticity. Two types of adult literacy philosophies 
will be examined as solutions to women's marginalisation from the 
'Republic of Citizens'. These are Unesco's functional literacy through 
the Unesco/UNDP 1967 'Experimental World Literacy Programme' (EWLP), 
21 
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and Paulo Freire's 'conscientization' method in adult literacy, 
22 
which 
will be taken as examples of macro solutions. Finally it will be argued 
that the specific socio-cultural conditions in Algeria and Tanzania 
suggest that such solutions are handled with care and circumspection, 
for the question will remain as to whether basic literacy is enough to 
'conscientise' women, or increase their participation in the public 
processes of either country. 
5.2.1. The Unesco/UNDP 'Functional Literacy' Programme. 
The project was the first of its kind to be implemented after years of 
international rhetoric on the 'scourge of literacy' and the necessity 
to fight it. 
23 When launched in 1967, the Experimental World Literacy 
Programme was presented as a 'revolutionary' method in the acquisition 
of literacy. The idea: 
... was to test and demonstrate the economic and social 
returns of literacy and, more generally, to study the 
mutual relations and influences which exist and may be 
established or strengthened between literacy training - 
particularly among the working population - and 
development. 
(Unesco, 1976: 10-11) 
Previous Unesco recommendations on adult literacy as 'basic' or 
'fundamental education'24 were issued as early as 1947. The prevailing 
proposition then was to provide a 'vocational' education to local 
communities. In 1958, the International Conference on Education, 
recommended that in 'under-developed areas, adult education 
[would] 
take the form of literacy and basic education campaigns'. 
25 In 1960, 
the World Conference on Adult Education gathered in Montreal and 
pledged to 'eradicate' illiteracy within a few years by organising an 
international campaign. 
26 In the meantime, the United Nations 
Organisation (UNO) issued resolutions on the 'eradication' of 
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illiteracy. 27 However, all these recommendations and resolutions 
remained without effect, until the convening of the Tehran World 
Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy, 28 
which adopted the principle of 'functional literacy'. The conference 
argued that: 
Rather than an end in itself, [functional] literacy 
should be regarded as a way of preparing man for a 
social civic and economic role that goes far beyond the 
limits of rudimentary literacy training consisting 
merely in the teaching of reading and writing. The very 
process of learning to read and write should be made an 
opportunity for acquiring information that can 
immediately be used to improve living standards; reading 
and writing should lead not only to elementary general 
knowledge but to training for work, increased 
productivity, a greater participation in civil life and 
a better understanding of the surrounding world, and 
should ultimately open the way to basic human culture. 
(Unesco, ibid: 10) 
It is significant that the economistic approach was dominant despite 
its camouflage behind ill-defined notions of civil participation, 
such as the millenium of 'basic human culture'. The holism of such a 
notion denotes a lack of concern for the more concrete outcomes of the 
policy of 'functional literacy'. The formulation of the latter is a 
good example of inductively-formulated policies. 
As a consequence, the subsequent adoption and implementation of EWLP in 
the countries concerned, 
29 
yielded results largely determined by the 
specific societal conditions of each recipient country. And, on 
Unesco's own admission, the project had by and large been a failure 
since it provided "technical solutions ... to non-technical problems" 
(ibid: 122-123). 
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In another criticism of the EWLP, it was pointed out that: 
The concept of functioi 
technical a solution 
partially technical. 
effective, functional 
political, cultural and 
well as purely economic 
iality, although valid, was too 
to a problem which was only It also showed that to be 
literacy should deal with 
social aspects of development as 
ones. 
(Prospects, VI/1,1976: 65) 
Note that this critique of the economistic bias of EWLP neither 
questions the principle itself, nor does it pose the crucial question 
of the specific conditions of each social context where the project was 
applied. The concept is retained as valid, and it is suggested that it 
could be improved with the addition of ad hoc auxiliary assumptions', 
as Popper shrewdly remarked of the positivist and inductivist approach 
to theory formulation. 30 As a result, the failing theory is not 
refuted, but reformed. For instance, pseudo-relativist lessons have 
been drawn for EWLP as appears in the following passage: 
For example, does the simple fact 
endow the European city dweller w 
reduce his or her superstition, or 
human value? 
It is very significant that the literate 
of being literate 
ith community spirit, 
increase his or her 
(Unesco, 1976: 119) 
'European city dweller' was 
implicitly taken as a model to achieve regardless of the variety of 
social and national contexts EWLP was addressing. The implicit 
admission that this model has informed the initial formulation of EWLP, 
reveals the ethnocentric bias of the project. 
However, the lessons drawn from the evaluation of EWLP were ultimately 
used in the salvation of the principle of functional literacy. Little 
attention was given to the outcomes of the policy in the conditions of 
each national and local context. Such methods of policy formulation, 
adoption and implementation cannot claim to be scientific. The 
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confidence with which functional literacy had been presented as an 
enhancement of agricultural and industrial productivity in societies as 
different as Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Iran, Madagascar, Mali, 
Sudan, Syria, Algeria, and Tanzania, could yield hardly more results 
than rain-praying rituals. Furthermore, the project had sometimes been 
adopted by local authorities for dubious reasons, as admitted by 
Unesco: 
Certain countries wanted national literacy campaigns and 
seem to have bought the EWLP product in part because 
they were not aware of all its implications, and in part 
because they saw no prospect of obtaining international 
aid in any other way. 
(ibid: 125) 
Thus, expediency motivated policy choices, rather than problem-solving 
social planning. It is worth remembering that EWLP was presented as a 
package to any client willing to buy it. It was not tailored to the 
demands of a specific problem analysis. Thence the dramatically 
different results it yielded in each national context. To illustrate 
this point, a comparison of the implementation of EWLP in Algeria and 
Tanzania will be made later in this Chapter. 
5.2.2. Freire's 'Literacy for Liberation'. 
The 'technocratism' of EWLP in the field of adult literacy places it 
inevitably within the scope of modernisation theory with its positive 
millenium of the 'achieving, performing, secular and universalistic' 
society. However, no radical critique has been made of cultural 
programmes such as EWLP. The conventional contribution of dependency 
theorists to the critique of 'modernisation' took an exclusive interest 
in the analysis of international market relations. 
31 Nevertheless, an 
'alternative' to programmes such as EWLP has been proposed by 
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proponents of the more radical approach of 'non-formal participatory' 
education. 
Apart from the euphoria of the 'deschoolers' such as Ivan Illich, 32 
viable methods had been experienced in Cuba during its 1961 mass 
literacy campaign. 
33 Although most students of Cuba ascribed the 
resounding success of the campaign to the revolutionary nature of 
social change there, 
34 
the present author argues that the Cubans' 
assessment of local and national circumstances for the campaign was as 
determinant as the revolutionary uprising of 1959. Indeed, it is worth 
remembering that Cuban revolutionaries did not formulate a communistic 
societal programme at the outset. Instead, their premise was a national 
and popular uprising, and it was within this framework that the 
literacy campaign was launched. 
35 
The more orthodox revolutionary regimes opted for more piecemeal adult 
literacy campaigns, 
36 
and gave priority to the formal school system in 
order to train the new scientifically-oriented 'communist man'. The 
Cubans gave precedence to adult literacy, closing all formal 
educational institutions for nine months in the course of 1961; not 
only to mobilise all literates in the operation, but in order to break 
down barriers between the educated urban elite and the rural 'masses', 
and create the conditions for the emergence of the 'revolutionary 
socialist man'. This is to say that a radical alternative to the 
technocratically-based functional literacy as devised by Unesco should 
not be seen as a unique formula undertaken by all revolutionary 
regimes, in all revolutionary circumstances. 
249 
The success of the Cuban campaign, and more recently of the Nicaraguan 
one37 led to the belief that this kind of revolutionary mass 
campaigning is more prone to succeed, in view of its corollary of 
'political awareness' or consciencia it uses. One of the most renowned 
champions and initiators of such method has been the Brazilian educator 
Paulo Freire. 38 Conscientizacao translated into 'conscien- 
tisation', was launched by Freire in the early 1960s in literacy 
experiments in the North East of Brazil, among illiterate slum 
dwellers, victims of a process of sub-proletarisation. The squalid 
living conditions they experienced, led Freire to argue that they were 
alienated from their very condition of 'humans'. Hence his 'humanist' 
stance in his approach of adult literacy. 
39 
His idea was to try and create a method whereby the illiterate person 
recovers his/her 'humanity' by knowing how to place himself/herself 
vis ä vis the physical as well as social environment. Freire assumes that 
the 'illiterates' are immersed in a 'culture of silence', 
40 
whereby 
they are estranged both from the physical and social world. Accordingly 
the primary task of a literacy action would be to lead the illiterate 
person into discovering his/her role as active 'subject' vis a vis the 
natural world, as 'creator of culture', 
41 
and thenceforth develop 
his/her critical reflection upon the social environment itself. In 
short, Freire proposed a method of anthropological self-discovery 
for 
the illiterate to achieve a critical appraisal of the environment, and 
a subsequent capacity to change it and make an 'impression' upon 
it. 
'Conscientisation' involves the use of literacy methods which induce 
the creative participation of the learner in that the 
latter is drawn 
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into reconstructing words and expressions, and not in repeating them 
ready made after memorisation, as is the case in more conventional 
literacy packages. Freire argues that this method of 'generative words 
and themes' 
42 helps inculcate a sense of control over the outside 
world. "To speak a true word is to transform the world"43 has been the 
motto of this method which purports to transfer the learner from the 
state of mythological, magic thinking into the world of rational 
perception and critical thinking. 
44 To achieve this it is imperative 
that the learner enjoys a relationship of dialogue with the 'educator'. 
Hence Freire's notion of 'dialogics', 
45 
and his thorough reappraisal 
of the pedagogical relationship between learner and tutor. He suggests 
that educator and learner are engaged in a kind of positive 
'dialectical' exchange whereby they learn from each other. He carefully 
distinguishes such process from the Socratic and Platonic 'dialogical' 
tradition which took knowledge to be a recollection, 
46 
and not an 
empirical pragmatic appraisal of man's reality. 
The social and political ramifications of Freire's methodology are 
quite obvious. The aim is to achieve a democratic millenium wherein the 
educational process liberates people from alienation to the dominant 
social and political order. It is pertinent to remember that Freire's 
conception of adult literacy is linked principally with situations of 
exploitation (in the economic sense) and oppression (in the social and 
political sense); hence his emphasis on 'humanisation', and 
'critical 
awareness'. The underlying assumption is that a social revolution 
is 
necessary so as to establish a 'liberating' education 
(from alienation) 
in lieu of the previous 'domesticating' education, which socialised 
47 
people into the acceptance of the status quo. 
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Freire himself warned that the 'oppressors' cannot organise 'education 
for liberation': 
But if the implementation of a liberating education 
requires political power and the oppressed have none, 
how then is it possible to carry out the pedagogy of the 
oppressed prior to the revolution? This is a question of 
the greatest importance. ... One aspect of the reply is to be found in the distinction between systematic 
education, which can only be changed by political power, 
and educational projects which should be carried out 
with the oppressed in the process of organising them. 
(Freire, 1972: 31) 
Freire poses here a very significant dilemma which unfortunately he 
avoids answering. When he realises that non-revolutionary circum- 
stances might jeopardise ' conscientisation' , he proposes somewhat 
evasively the adoption of 'educational projects' to lead the 
'oppressed' to liberation. Exactly how, remains unanswered. Instead, 
stages of liberating education are described. At this point it is worth 
quoting Freire's vision at length. For him: 
The pedagogy of the oppressed, as a humanist and 
libertarian pedagogy, has two distinct stages. In the 
first, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and 
through the praxis commit themselves to its 
transformation. In the second stage, in which the 
reality of oppression has already been transformed, this 
pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a 
pedagogy of all men in the process of permanent 
liberation. 
(ibid) 
This last passage is reminiscent of Unesco' s millenium of the 
attainment of a 'basic human culture' discussed earlier. Indeed, the 
Freirian alternative becomes also a panacea in view of its inductivism 
and holism. From a Brazilian experiment, it was all too quickly 
hailed 
as a systematic alternative to more orthodox methods of adult 
literacy, 
especially in the Third World where the mechanisms of oppression are 
assumed to be the same everywhere. 
48 
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There is no doubt that Freire's method can be effective in specific 
revolutionary situations such as Cuba or Nicaragua. The present author 
would go as far as to point out that these two experiences took place 
in contexts where cultural and linguistic unity was secured, where 
expertise was mostly national (Cuba) or regional (from Cuba to 
Nicaragua) and where popular mobilisation was systematically 
channelled. One cannot claim that such conditions are obtained in many 
parts of the Third World. Neither do we find the same pre-revolutionary 
conditions of oppression such as they were prevalent in Cuba or 
Nicaragua. Accordingly, no matter how noble the liberating objectives 
of the radical alternative in adult literacy, their effectiveness 
remains tributary of specific societal conditions. Above all conditions 
of oppression need to be more explicitly defined. 
The present investigation suggests for instance that a liberating 
education is desirable for women in Algeria and Tanzania, to reduce 
their domesticity and help their integration as equal citizens. 
However, the conditions of oppression and domestication of women have 
their own dynamics in each case, and this should determine policy 
choices in terms of adult literacy. On the other hand, we have to take 
into account the wider societal and educational changes and their 
bearing on women's integration as 'producing Citizens', as opposed to 
their traditional status of 'reproducing' social actors. 
5.3. Adult Literacy in Algeria: An Overview. 
The history of adult literacy campaigning in independent Algeria is an 
eloquent challenge to the inductively devised alternatives of 
functional literacy and liberating mass literacy alike. - As will be 
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demonstrated in the following discussion, neither revolutionary mass 
campaigning of early independence, nor EWLP functional literacy could 
make a breakthrough in the Algerian context. For the Algerian 'City of 
Women' this meant a disturbing marginalisation from the mainstream 
institutionalisation of a 'Republic of citizens' which chose to invest 
in its younger generations through formal schooling. Specific cultural 
dynamics placing Francophone 'Citizens' in opposition to Arabophone 
peers on the one hand, and spiritualist fundamentalist 'Cousins' on the 
other, may account for the confusion which precluded the clear 
formulation and implementation of adult literacy in Algeria. 
Literacy campaigning, presumably a corollary of all twentieth century 
revolutions has been conspicuously absent in the Algerian 
'Revolution '. 49 However, since Independence, it has been copiously 
reiterated in the official rhetoric. Reference to illiteracy (and the 
necessity of making greater provision for literacy) has, in the last 
twenty years, evolved from revolutionary fervour to economistic and 
functionalist considerations, ending in total oblivion in the 1980s. 
5.3.1. The 1963 National Literacy Campaign. 
In 1962, the Programme de Tripoli, Algeria's first comprehensive 
societal programme emphasized: 
the extension of the methods of mass education 
mobilisation of all mass organisations to 
fight 
illiteracy and teach all citizens to read and write in 
the shortest period of time. 
The Charte d'Alger, another product of revolutionary 
stipulated that: 
fervour, 
The fight against ignorance concerns the whole country. 
It calls for the participation of large popular masses. 
The Party is the animator of this action which must 
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become a paramount national duty. 
These two documents were the putative radical rhetoric of the Algerian 
'Citizens' before the Boumediene 're-adjustment' of 1965, and obviously 
render the emotional tide of the primitive euphoria of early 
independence. In this very atmosphere was launched the only mass 
literacy campaign of Algeria, in the summer of 1963, only to end in 
50 total failure six months later. 
The National Literacy Campaign, La campagne nationale d'alphabetisation 
was prepared by a National Literacy Commission in February 1963 and 
launched in July of the same year. The literature of the campaign gave 
prominence to the theme of "Revolution" and suggested for example that 
"revolutionary vocabulary should be introduced" as well as slogans such 
as: 
"long live liberated Algeria"; 
"Algeria has thrown out colonialism"; 
"there will be no socialist revolution without the 
active participation of woman". 
(CNA, 1966: 2-3) 
The last slogan in particular denotes the radicalism of the members of 
the national commission. This contrasts sharply with the subsequent 
rhetoric which emphasized the reproductive and domestic image of women 
as wives and mothers, as seen through Boumediene's speeches and the 
Family Code. 
However the campaign was doomed to failure as the political climate was 
riddled with internal political and ideological rifts between socialist 
radicals and liberal nationalist members of the polity. 
51 As a result, 
clashes sparked off within the National Commission for Literacy and 
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some of its members resigned (CNA, 1966: 3). It was admitted that the 
campaign was never considered a national priority (CNA, ibid: 3). In fact 
the results proved to be rather poor as it was "not possible to give 
precise statistical information" (ibid: 4). There were 5,000 literacy 
teachers out of the planned 100,000, änd it was guessed that "maybe" 
(ibid: 4) 10 to 20,000 people enrolled out of the five million 
illiterates whom the campaign initially sought to reach. "Classes were 
open for a few days only" and volunteers went back to their initial 
occupations (ibid). Too much enthusiasm and too little preparation 
seemed to constitute the main factors of failure. However it is more 
likely that ideological clashes took place as "many adults [did] not 
admit that yougsters explain political problems to them" (ibid). 
Indeed, the radical slogans of the campaign and their emphasis on 
values typical of a secular and revolutionary 'Republic of Citizens' 
were likely to clash with the by and large illiterate 'Republic of 
Cousins' they were addressing. The generational clash was more likely 
to be an ideational one, ie. a clash between two antithetical sets of 
higher valuations. The early sixties was a period of intense activity 
by radical secularist 'Citizens' in the government, party and trade 
unions in their last bid to retain power. However, as seen earlier in 
Chapter 3, they were to lose the battle to the moderate technocratic 
'Citizens' who were less keen on antagonising the existing 'Republic of 
Cousins'. Consequently, adult illiteracy was given little priority, and 
was to be only timidly tackled through selective functional 
literacy 
operations. 
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The failure of the Campagne was due ironically to an overzealous 
revolutionary euphoria on the part of its organisers. These had been 
impressed by the results of the Cuban experience, whose revolutionary 
character was interpreted as the main cause of its success. 
52 
A propen- 
sity to establish a rapprochement between anti-colonial revolutionary 
experiences and Third World social revolutions such as Cuba's was 
inevitable in the early 1960s. The ensuing 'cultural borrowing' from 
one context to the other was more than tempting. In the case of 
Algeria, the radicalism of the anti-colonial struggle was often 
mistaken for a total revolutionary upheaval, and its paraphernalia of 
social and economic rituals naturally awaited. Of these a literacy 
campaign had to be part. But as a revolutionary panacea it could only 
fail in the highly ambiguous societal programme of modernity and 
authenticity promoted by the polity, and the peculiar interaction 
between 'Citizens' and 'Cousins' in the process of social change. 
5.3.2. The EWLP 'Algeria 11': When Technocratism Fails Functionalism. 
When three quarters of a country's population are 
illiterate, a national literacy campaign is hard to 
achieve: priorities should be defined and an 
experimental approach proves necessary. The organisation 
of literacy cannot rely solely on the voluntary work of 
young people and militants; as any coherent and 
continuous action, literacy needs permanent cadres 
specially trained for the task, as well as it requires 
an administrative structure which will associate the 
mobilizing force of revolutionary zeal with the efficacy 
of technical competence. 
(CNA, 1966: 7) 
This appeared in an internal document of the Centre National 
d'Alphabetisation (CNA), created in 1964 following the spectacular 
failure of the 1963 mass literacy campaign. 
53 The new technocratic 
approach is not fortuitous, but merely the product of the 1965 
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political shift following the Boumediene coup. As seen in Chapter 3, 
this latter was characterised by the discourse of technical and 
administrative efficiency held by a team of pragmatic technocrats. In 
educational matters, precedence was to be given to manpower planning 
through schooling and to the training of younger generations. 
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Accordingly, the approach of 'functional literacy' professed by 
Unesco's EWLP appealed to the new authorities who adopted the project 
in 1967. 
The project was to affect farmers and industrial workers of the 
state-run farming domains and industrial enterprises. The selected 
areas were: the agricultural region of Staoueli near the capital 
Algiers, the oil and gas plant of Arzew in north western Algeria , and 
the steel complex and agricultural zone of Annaba in north-eastern 
Algeria. The project consisted of two phases: from 1967 to 1971 was the 
implementation of the EWLP package; and between 1972 and 1974, a mass 
literacy component was added as Algeria was embarking on its four-year 
plan of 1970-1973. 
Initially the project was to affect 1200 agricultural workers and 1500 
industrial workers in the first phase (Unesco, 1976: 18). But enrolment 
increased during the second phase as the Algerian authorities launched 
their programme to open functional literacy classes to 100.000 workers 
of different professional categories. 
55 On the other hand, an ambitious 
programme providing for a national literacy campaign base on the 
EWLP 
methods was also incorporated. Its target was to affect one million 
people for the duration of the four-year plan. 
56 
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The Unesco assessment of EWLP in Algeria, 'Algeria 11', remained vague 
in its evaluation, so that it is impossible to discover how many 
candidates had actually completed the whole literacy cycle. 
57 Although 
it did report a "30 percent drop out rate in the first cycle, and a 21 
percent rate in the second cycle" (ibid: 19), it did not mention the 
total population enrolled in each cycle, neither classified it by sex. 
The absence of women in 'Algeria 11' did not seem to be worthy of the 
evaluators' attention. The assessment estimated that "only one in every 
two entering the programme finished the second cycle, which implies 
about fifth grade reading ability in writing and calculation" (ibid). 
According to Algerian estimates, the operation affected 54,000 workers 
(40,000 in agriculture and 14,000 in industry) out of an initial target 
of 100,000.58 
In the light of the inconclusive results of EWLP and the dubious 
figures given by local authorities in Algeria (CNA, 1970), 'Algeria 11' 
can be considered a major failure. Prima facie , relative success would 
have been expected, given the convergence of positions between Unesco 
experts and Algerian technocrats. However, it has been acknowledged 
that 'indifference and even hostility had met functional literacy and 
indeed the whole idea of adult literacy'. 
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Paradoxically, it can be argued that the very technocratism of the 
'Citizens' in power in Algeria was more likely to hamper any programme 
of non-formal education, albeit functional, rather than 
foster it. For 
the ruling 'Citizens' and their developmental strategy of 
the 
polytechnical individual, society and knowledge; only 
formal education 
was worth the investment. 
60 
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The failures of the 1963 Campagne and the 1967-72 EWLP functional 
literacy programme in Algeria raise a number of questions. That neither 
alternative yielded positive results is revealing of the expediency of 
both operations, and their adoption as ready-made panaceas by the 
'Citizens' in power. But above all, they disclose a lack of 
consideration for the specific societal conditions of the Algerian 
national scene. If one takes into account the ambiguities of the 
overall societal programme as it is contained in the discourse of 
'specific socialism', and the interaction between 'Citizens' and 
'Cousins', one might find the answer to the above failures. Such an 
approach promises also to help predict outcomes of future hypothetical 
solutions. 
Incidentally, neither the National Campaign for Literacy nor EWLP 
provided data related to women, so as to measure the impact of 
literacy on their integration in the modern 'Republic of Citizens'. 
Consequently, the tentative solutions envisaged herein call for the 
analysis of selected societal data. In the following discussion, 
particular attention will be given to the national educational strategy 
of the 'Citizens' in power since Independence, to its reception by 
different social protagonists, and finally to its repercussions on 
women's integration in the public processes of the new 'Republic of 
Citizens'. The crucial question of whether educational provision has 
permitted women's access to the public realm is posed, and answered. 
From there, a further question is raised as to whether non-formal adult 
literacy could be at all viable in the specific circumstances of 
Algeria, and could it help liberate women from their domesticity? 
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5.3.3. Education Expands but Illiteracy Persists. 
In one of its most recent publications, 
61 
the Ministry of National 
Education reiterated the main principles which have informed Algeria's 
educational strategy since independence in 1962. These were: 
"Algerianisation, democratisation and a technical and scientific 
orientation". 
62 The top priorities were spelt out as "the development 
of technical education, the adaptation of training to the employment 
market, and the reinforcement of the technical and scientific 
orientation [of the educational system]". 
63 This orientation was not 
novel but had been a traditional concern of nationalist leaders since 
the mid 1950s. 
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As a consequence of this position, the 'Citizens' in power since 
Independence invested heavily in the formal educational system as part 
of their overall technocratic stance towards 'development'. Faith in 
the returns of the formal organisation of education have never 
faltered for the last three decades, despite serious ideological rifts 
in the educational and cultural arena, as will be examined later. 
Accordingly, the formal educational sector grew to absorb regularly 
between 20 to 25 percent of the total government expenditure. 
65 The 
results were to prove spectacular. 
Between 1962 and 1980-1981, primary school enrolment increased by 300 
per cent, from three quarters of a million to over three million 
pupils; secondary school enrolment increased by almost 20-fold from 
50,000 to over one million; and higher education enrolment showed a 
dramatic 50-fold increase from approximately 2000 students in 1962 to 
over 100,000 in the academic year 1982-83 (Rapport sur le Mouvement 
261 
Educatif: 1984). Female enrolment has been increasing substantially. 
The proportion of female pupils and students in 1978-79, was 
respectively, 41 per cent in the primary cycle, 37 per cent in the 
secondary, and 23 per cent in higher education , 
66 
However, universal primary education, which was targetted for 1980, is 
far from being reached despite the dramatic investments consented to 
education. Hence the equally spectacular figures concerning wastage and 
illiteracy. In 1981 the Bulletin d'Information Economique de l'APS, 
(Algeria's national press agency) released alarming figures on the 6 
to 13 year olds who were unschooled. 
67 In 1974-75, the rate was over 31 
per cent, and by 1979-80 it was still over 27 per cent. Between 1977 
and 1982 three million youngsters were expected on the job market 
without specific qualifications, given that technical institutes which 
traditionally delivered job qualifications, could only cater for a few 
thousands within the 15-18 age group (AAN, 1981: 711). In 1980, it was 
calculated that the rate of success in the passage from primary to 
secondary was only 55 per cent (AAN: ibid. 
Such high rates of failure as well as a total neglect of adult 
education and adult literacy, led to a most interesting configuration 
of illiteracy in Algeria. It remains bewildering that despite huge 
efforts in formal education, the adult illiteracy rate remains high, 
and the absolute number of people is actually growing. In 1982, the 
number of illiterates (ie. those unable to read or write in either 
classical Arabic or French) 
68 
was estimated as 6.3 million people out 
of a total population of 20 million, with a rate of 47 per cent 
for the 
Unesco reference population of those aged ten and over. Of this group, 
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39 per cent were men and 61 per cent were women (Statistiques, 1/IV, 
1983: 69). 
It is interesting to see how this compares with earlier figures since 
r Independence as the rate of illiteracy was cut by 
eh 
alf in a period of 
twenty years (Table 5.1), mainly through the progress of formal 
education. 
TABLE 5.1 
Illiteracy Trends in Algeria 1962-1982 
Number of Rate of 
Year Population Illiterates Illiteracy 
- - - 
(millions) 
- --- - ------- 
(millions) 
--- ----------- 
(per cent) 
--------------- -- - --- - 
1962 
- - - - 
9.0 
- 
5.600 85.0 
1966 12.0 5.885 75.0 
1977 18.0 6.214 57.7 
1982 20.0 6.342 47.2 
Source: Centre National d'Alphabetisation, 1984: 1. 
According to the latest estimates (Statistiques: ibid), the rate of 
schooling for the age group 6-14 years developed from 50 per cent in 
1966, to 70 per cent in 1977 and nearly 78 per cent in 1982. But, 
regional disparities have caused uneven rates of schooling, as in some 
areas of the country the rate is as low as 53 per cent, while the 
drop 
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out rate remains rather high at the end of the primary level (a 
six-year cycle), with less than 53 per cent of children who have 
enrolled reaching first year lower secondary (CNA, 1982: 3). Hence the 
recent creation of the Ecole Fondamentale69 which expands the period of 
minimum compulsory schooling to nine years, and caters for the 6 to 14 
year olds of both sexes. The Ecole is hoped to reduce the drop out rate 
and the relapse into illiteracy which threatens most primary school 
leavers given the absence of non-formal literacy facilities. 
However, the new system of the Ecole Fondamentale is a long term 
project of no immediate consequence for the nearly one million 
illiterate children aged between 6 and 14 out of school at present 
(Statistiques: ibid), of which girls make up the majority. Indeed, the 
number of female pupils (aged 5 to 15) decreases substantially in the 
primary cycle as they grow older (Figure 5.1). 
The configuration of illiteracy in Algeria is marked by substantial 
gaps between urban and rural areas, between age groups, and of course 
between the sexes. The overall tendencies are a significantly 
higher 
rate of illiteracy in the rural areas (nearly 
30 percentage points 
higher), a steady increase among older age groups 
(under 18 per cent 
for the 6-14 years; nearly 91 per cent for those aged 60 and over), 
and finally a notably higher rate of illiteracy among women 
(Table 
5.2). 
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Figure 5.1 Rate of Female Schooling in the Elementa 
Algeria 1975-76 and 1978-79) 
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TABLE 5.2 
Illiteracy Rates by Age and Sex in Algeria 1982 
Age Males Females Total 
(per cent) (per cent) (per cent) 
6-14 9.01 27.24 17.95 
15-17 10.34 30.82 20.45 
18-19 13.41 40.62 26.69 
20-24 20.99 49.87 34.39 
25-29 28.95 66.22 47.72 
30-59 63.89 89.02 77.05 
60 and over 86.14 97.43 90.76 
Source: Statistiques, No. 1/IV, 1983. 
A detailed national survey issued in 1977 by the Ministry for 
Planning70 disclosed some very significant figures for the 31 
wilayate (counties) of the country. The rates calculated concerned the 
population aged 9 and over, male and female, in the rural and urban 
sectors (Table 5.3). 
The table discloses constant high rates of illiteracy approximating 90 
per cent in the rural sector, with the majority of those affected being 
women. Besides, while the absolute number of illiterate men tends to 
decrease, that of the female population has increased (Table 5.4). 
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TABLE 5.3 
Illiteracy Rates in Urban and Rural Areas 
(population aged 9 and over, 1977) 
----------------------------------------------- 
Areas Male Female Total 
(per cent) (per cent) (per cent) 
Urban 37.1 66.2 44.3 
Rural 57.7 85.2 71.1 
Total 44.8 70.9 58.1 
Source: Ministere du Plan, Statistiques sur 
l'Analphabetisme dans les Wilayate: Evolution 
1966-1977. 
TABLE 5.4 
Changes in the Illiterate Population: 1966-1977. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Number of Illiterates Difference 
(millions) (millions) 
1966 1977 
Male 2.479 2.353 - 0.127 
Female 3.406 3.862 + 0.456 
Total 5.885 6.215 + 0.330 
Source: Ministere du Plan, op. cit. 
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The persistence of adult illiteracy in Algeria can bewilder many an 
observer if an explanation is sought within the confines of the 
educational arena. Presumably, the aggressive educational strategy, and 
the means put at its disposal, ought to have cut the rates of 
illiteracy to a minimum. But the facade of unity and coherence 
displayed by the formal educational system stands in fact in the midst 
of a unique cultural turmoil, which can be summarised in one word: 
Arabisation. Indeed, the attempt to generalise the use of standard 
Arabic (the national and official language) since Independence, clearly 
had to involve the educational sector. The urgency of the policy of 
Arabisation was a matter of national consensus. However, in the wake of 
its implementation, significant conflicts arose which can indirectly 
explain the notable lack of interest for the idea of adult literacy, 
already nurtured by the predominant technocratic stance of the ruling 
'Citizens'. 
5.3.4. The Issue of 'Arabisation': Educational Repercussions 
The pledge to expand and revive the use of standard Arabic in 
independent Algeria can be seen as an emotional response to the French 
colonial policy of 'cultural assimilation'. 
71 The policy of the 
colonial authorities to dismantle the pre-colonial educational 
network, which dispensed all teachings in Arabic, assumed genocidal 
proportions. 
72 
As in most Muslim areas, Algeria had a formal educational system in the 
shape of co-educational day-schools or medressah, and boarding schools 
for boys or zaouiah . The first dispensed a 
kind of elementary 
instruction, while the latter prepared its recruits for further 
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education in the university-like institutions of the jami'att . 
73 
Although these latter were not available in Algeria, candidates were 
often sent to neighbouring Tunisia or Morocco, as well as Egypt and the 
Middle East where universities thrived. 74 
The subsequent systematic dismantlement of the Algerian network by the 
colonial authorities led to an unprecedented rise of illiteracy among 
the Muslim population. 
75 It also seriously hampered the use of 
classical and standard Arabic as the French gradually extended the 
metropolitan educational system to the colony. 
76 It was not before the 
1930s that an attempt was made to revive the Islamic educational 
legacy, and by the same token instil the urgency for the recovery of 
the Arabic language. This was organised by the religious movement of 
the Ulamaa led by Sheikh Ibn Badis. 77 
Since that time, the issue of 'Arabisation' never failed to appear in 
the nationalist rhetoric. 
78 However, serious divergences were to mark 
the process of Arabisation between the Francophone and Arabophone 
nationalists in power (ie. between the 'Citizens' themselves). The 
hesitations of the Francophones, who opted for a gradual and selective 
Arabisation of the educational system, were challenged by the 
Arabophones who wanted a more forceful implementation of the policy at 
all levels of the educational system. They were particularly resentful 
of the Francophones' distinction between 'popular Arabic' and 
'classical Arabic', which implied that the classical form could not 
convey a modern culture and created divisions between a literate elite 
and illiterate masses. 
79 
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From 1963 to the early 1970s, the debate was restricted to the polity 
and the intelligentsia; between the secularist 'Citizens', most of them 
Francophones or bilingual, and the more fundamentalist Citizens almost 
all a product of the Ulamaa movement. While the most passionate 
polemics were exchanged between prominent spokesmen of these two 
trends in the press and in the decision-making process (Adam in AAN: 
1962,1963,1964,1965,1966,1967), the more discreet trend of 
religiously-inclined 'Cousins' were active in expanding the few 
religious educational institutions established by the Ulamaa tradition. 
A ministry of Habous ( or religious affairs) was created in 1963 and a 
decree on the 'organisation of religious instruction'80 gave full 
autonomy to religious education dispensed by special institutions 
exclusively in standard Arabic. The organic link between Islam and 
classical Arabic, and its modern derivative standard Arabic81 trans- 
pired clearly in such teaching. It marked the whole process of Arabis- 
ation, and was behind an ever-mounting pressure for the provision of 
'religious and ethical' instruction along Islamic principles in the 
public school sector. 
As early as 1963, Adam had rightly pointed out: 
The traditionalist and religious milieus have, since 
Independence, dramatically increased their pressure and 
even their audience. One party political regimes are as 
prone as the others to the fluctuations of public 
opinion. 
(Adam in AAN, 1963: 547) 
Indeed, the aura of unanimity which has characterised Algeria's 
educational system as one and indivisible structure, has been riddled 
throughout the years with debates and conflicts between Arabophone and 
Francophone 'Citizens', with the 'Cousins' working discreetly within 
270 
the institutions of religious instruction. By 1970, the Ministry of 
Habous was to become the Ministry of 1'Enseignement Originel et des 
Affaires Reli gi eus es (Religious Affairs) and launch an unprecedented 
expansion of religious instruction, by cleverly combining it with the 
provision of secular subjects. The aim was to "revive the Islamic 
heritage as well as the flame of scientific research, thus linking 
efficiency with our ethics" (Turin in AAN, 1973: 98). 
The ministry is composed of arabophones, men with no direct link with Western culture, but this does not 
exclude bilingualism or even multilingualism. 
(Turin, ibid) 
The Ministry concentrated its activities on the provision of informal 
82 instruction in mosques, as well as formal secondary education which 
numbered by 1974 over 200,000 students. Recruits were urged to "back 
the battle of Arabisation, the aim being to return to the sources which 
were the basis of our nation and the foundation of our national 
personality, as well as the fight against habits and practices contrary 
to our traditions, and to the letter and spirit of Islam" (Turin, 
ibid). Most significant of all was that the secondary education 
institutions affiliated to the Ministry taught a curriculum as varied 
as that of the public school sector. 
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But, most important to this dissertation is the interplay between the 
different tendencies of Arabophone and Francophone ' Citizens' and the 
religiously inclined 'Cousins'. Indeed the debates between the three 
were to be translated into serious clashes between university students 
throughout the 1970's (AAN, 1970,1971,1972,1973,1974,1975). By 
that time the gradual Arabisation in the public educational sector was 
being generalised fairly quickly to all literary and social science 
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disciplines. Meanwhile, Arabophone students grew seriously impatient 
with the lip service paid to their integration in the job market. 
84 
In the meantime, the secular 'Citizens' in the polity exploited the 
clashes to clamp down both on the traditionalist ' Cousins' as well as 
Marxist students by dissolving their associations. 
85 However the most 
serious clashes occurred between 1979 and 1980 when the discontent of 
Arabophone students was also accompanied by demonstrations of 
religious fundamentalist groups in many cities of the country (AAN, 
1979: 668- 669). The events led the 'Citizens' of the polity to take 
measures such as: 
the unification of the educational system to avoid future rifts 
between Arabophones and Francophones. This was announced by the 
Education Minister (AAN, 1979: 666); 
the Algerianisation and Arabisation of higher education, and 
their extension to the sciences and technological disciplines, 
announced by the Minister for Higher Education (AAN, ibid); 
finally, as a conciliatory gesture to the 'Cousins', whose 
system of Enseignement Originel was to be taken over by the 
public sector, religious education was to be "present at all 
stages of schooling and training, and be a compulsory discipline 
in all exams and tests" (AAN, ibid: 667). 
Once more, the moderate 'Citizens' of the polity managed to erect the 
spectrum of national unity, by discarding the secular 'Citizens' 
represented this time by Francophone writers and political figures of 
the cultural scene who, by the early eighties, had lost a number of 
decision-making positions. 
86 On the other hand, despite a heavy clamp 
down on the fundamentalist movement, whose leaders were arrested in 
1982,87 the moderate 'Citizens' found it harder to maintain a firm 
grip on them in view of the overwhelming popular support they 
attracted. 
88 These events were not totally dissociated from those of 
272 
the process which led to the adoption of the Family Code in June 1984, 
when the moderate 'Citizens' had to comply to the pressures of the 
'Cousins' in the National Assembly. A similar pattern of interplay 
was followed between the moderate 'Citizens' in power, discarding the 
secular 'Citizens' of the intelligentsia and professional strata, but 
yielding to compromises with the fundamentalist 'Cousins', in the 
cultural battle of Arabisation and religious instruction. 
The bearing that such events have on the issue of education in Algeria, 
and particularly women's education, may seem remote. But figures on 
educational enrolment, wastage, and especially illiteracy cannot be 
explained only in the linear fashion of structural difficulties 
encountered by educational institutions. The events described above 
have in fact had a tremendous impact on the persistence of illiteracy 
in Algeria, in view of the complexity of the cultural and educational 
'question'. Again behind the unitarian facade of the modernising 
moderate 'Citizens' there lied deep divergences between various 
protagonists, which were too divisive to allow the adoption of a 
coherent literacy strategy. 
5.3.5. Illiteracy Marginalises the 'City of Women'. 
Any student of Algeria indulging in matters pertaining to adult 
illiteracy is bound to encounter both surprise and indifference. 
Surprise because the subject does not seem to have caught the 
imagination of the authorities, and indifference because the subject is 
often dismissed as having no priority for the 'development' strategy. 
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This was what the present author encountered in a number of interviews 
with national officials. 
89 The surprise and indifference are even 
greater when the student attempts to specifically research illiteracy 
among women. The notable absence of data concerning women's 
participation in EWLP or the National Campaign for 100,000 people, has 
been referred to earlier. So have the specific conditions of the 
ideological and cultural disputes on language policy, as well as the 
dominant technocratic stance of the polity, which can provide a 
plausible explanation for this lack of concern for adult literacy. 
However, the official rhetoric abounds in revolutionary statements 
about the 'scourge' of illiteracy, and the necessity to 'eradicate' it, 
to reinforce the creation of a new society. The Charte Nationale 
states: 
It is obvious 
its objectives 
making it are 
alienated mentý 
often contrary 
that a Revolution cai 
when a majority of 
illiterate and when 
alities and modes of 
to the stated goals. 
z only be limited in 
the people who are 
it is backed by 
thought and action 
(ibid: 63) 
And it goes on: 
The fundamental basis of cultural transformation is the 
struggle against illiteracy and the expansion of public 
instruction. The struggle against illiteracy, residue of 
colonisation, should be reinforced in the coming years 
so that all citizens concerned, without distinction of 
sex, are affected. (ibid: 68) 
However compelling these statements, they express but a token interest 
in adult literacy as they were made at a period of triumph 
for the 
technocratic trend of the 'Citizens' in power. For no known programme 
or campaign is known to have been organised to alleviate the 
disturbing 
rates of illiteracy among adults. Meanwhile, national 
figures and a 
number of social research projects were showing a 
bewildering 
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marginalisation of women from mainstream public processes. Literally, 
an isolated and domestic 'City of Women' stood in the midst of an 
otherwise modern 'Republic of Citizens'. Accordingly, the following 
discussion will examine how women's participation in the public arena 
in Algeria is very much tributary of their educational attainment. 
5.3.6. Economic Marginalisation 
In terms of the marginalisation of women from the 'development' process 
the rate of illiteracy has devastating economic effects. Indeed, female 
figures comprised a mere 2.3 per cent of the national workforce 
according to the 1977 national census, Recensement General de la 
Population et de 1'Habitat (RGPH); 
90 
an insignificant increase from the 
1.8 per cent reported by the 1966 RGPH. In the meantime, the female 
population increased approximately from 6 to 9 million in the period 
1966-1977, which meant that "1,633,722 women of working age (15 years 
and over) joined those who, in 1966, represented a potential workforce" 
(Talahite-Hakiki, 1980: 293-294). The figures are the more intriguing 
in that Algeria has long been seen as one of the most modern states of 
the Arab world and yet, these figures place it well behind most Arab 
countries with regard to women's integration in the modern and 
officially reported economic sector (Paquot, 1982: 94-5; 142-5). 
Official statistics fail to report on female household production of an 
artisan or agricultural kind, and refer to this sector as aides 
familiaux (family aids) since it does not answer the technocratic 
criteria of labour evaluation. Abdelkrim (1980: 325-343) has for 
instance demonstrated the reluctance of Algerian statisticians to 
consider the economic impact of aides familiaux , by including them 
in 
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the category of the 'inactive population'. This attitude, she ascribes 
to the permeating model of the 'inactive women' hidden in the seclusion 
of the domestic realm. Thus, Algerian statisticians not only hold a 
'Citizen-like' technocratic bias by counting as labour only that which 
serves the formal sector of the economy, but they betray as well a 
'Cousin-type' lower valuation when they prefer to look upon women as 
inactive rather than active in the informal sectors of agriculture and 
artisanship. It is thus that 3.6 million women, of whom 2.3 million 
resided in the rural areas, were considered by the 1977 RGPH as part of 
the 'inactive population', as femmes au foyer (women at home) 
(Talahite-Hakiki, 1980: 294). 
The majority of active women recorded by the 1977 census had 
proportionately a higher education than men. 50 per cent of working 
women had a "formation specialisee" (specialised training) which, 
according to the 1977 RGPH definition, is a formal training in "a 
school, centre, institute with a view to acquiring a profession" 
(Talahite-Hakiki, 1980: 294). In a recent survey of the Office 
National des Statistiques , the correlation 
between literacy as 
indicated by possession of a formal qualification, and women's access 
to work has been confirmed. 
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Released in 1985, the survey attempted to find out more about "women's 
opinion" on taking up employment. It was based on interviews with 
women aged between 16 and 50 years, and covered 13,000 
households 
nationwide. The most interesting finding of the survey is that 
"a woman 
who works or seeks work is by definition an educated woman". 
92 The 
other pertinent finding is how far women's opinion is 
determined by 
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their social status. While celibacy and education encourage them to 
envisage or indeed take up employment, marriage seems to dissuade even 
some of the most educated from joining the job market (Table 5.5). 
TABLE 5.5 
Women's Attitude to Work After Marriage 
(single women aged 16-50) 
--------- ---- 
Educational level Envisaging work after marriage 
(per cent) 
Illiterate 3.5 
Literate 7.5 
Primary level 14.5 
Lower secondary 42.2 
Higher secondary 61.1 
Higher education 80.4 
Overall 28.0 
(Don't know 15.6 per cent) 
Source: Alg Brie-Actualit e, no. 1118,19-25 Mars, 1987. 
The status of 'married woman' is often seen and lived as a way to 
reintegrate the domesticity of home life, ie. the traditional security 
of the 'Republic of Cousins'. This new self-imposed seclusion is in 
fact a result of diffuse familial pressures, for women's access to 
work is seen as superfluous in a culture accustomed to women's 
confinement to the domestic realm. This is how nearly 62 per cent of 
277 
housewives who had previously worked, doubted whether they would work 
again because of familial opposition (45 per cent), or because of 
devotion to homelife (47 per cent). Of women who had never worked, 
barely 5 per cent would like to work, and 95 per cent discounted the 
possibility -in view of familial opposition (over 41 per cent) and 
devotion to domestic duties (54 per cent). Most of these women were 
illiterate or semi-literate. 
The picture is quite the opposite as far as younger educated women are 
concerned. When asked whether they would work after completing their 
studies, over 80 per cent were affirmative (nearly 78 per cent of 
those aged 16 to 19, and nearly 94 per cent of those between 20 to 
24). Again, these figures denote more uncertainty among secondary 
school girls, and a higher determination among university students. The 
overall climate however, remains that of a timid assault of women in 
the public realm in Algeria, 
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and this is to a great extent dictated 
by the educational level of women. Women's access to work is on the 
whole not fully accepted. Already, at a rhetorical level, the Charte 
Nationale, hesitated to encourage the productive role of women in the 
modern economy: 
However, the integration of the Algerian woman in the 
circuits of production should take into account the 
constraints inherent to the roles of mother and spouse 
in the construction and consolidation of the familial 
home, which forms the basic cell of the Nation. 
... Woman's access to work must 
be accompanied with ... 
the necessary adaptations to women's activities so that 
it is a factor of familial and social cohesion. 
(Charte Nationale, 1976: 144-5) 
This means that to be integrated in the 'development' process of 
the 
'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria, women would not only 
have to be 
literate, but go through formal schooling. It is also. implied that 
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once they are educated they are invited to join selected jobs so that 
the underlying 'Republic of Cousins' is not radically upset by women's 
new role of producers. This latter is not likely to be promoted in view 
of the concerted action of at least three factors: the lower valuations 
of the 'Citizens'; the opposition, both overt and latent, of the 
'Cousins' within the public at large; and, the confinement of women to 
domesticity, partly in view of the widespread illiteracy among them. 
However, there is evidence that women are willing to make a breakthough 
in the public arena, especially as political participants. In this 
field, illiteracy is to be again a serious obstacle. 
5.3.7. Political Marginalisation. 
The widespread illiteracy among adult women, combined with the 
exclusive recognition of formal education by the Algerian 'Republic of 
Citizens', have not only led to a derisory presence of women in the 
labour force, but to an even weaker political participation. 
In a one-party unitarian system such as the Algerian political regime, 
political participation is to be measured in terms of commitment 
(to 
official policies) and not in terms of opponents and supporters. 
Although opposition may be voiced, it is admitted only in as far as it 
is contained within the limits of the existing structures. In terms of 
political participation, the bulk of women have by and 
large been 
excluded from the various processes, and only the most educated 
have 
been able to join the ranks of the main political protagonists. 
Otherwise, illiteracy has kept women as part of the 'Republic of 
Cousins' which thrives on their domesticity and role of reproducers. 
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But, in view of wider changes in the normative and institutional 
patterns brought about by the societal project of the 'Citizens', 
increasing numbers of women were exposed to 'modern rituals' which 
gave them access to the public realm, such as voting. 
94 This access to 
the larger world outside the domesticity of home, gave women the 
opportunity to raise their expectations in terms of public 
participation. The ensuing re-appraisal of the values held by the 
'Republic of Cousins' vis ä vis women's place and role was inevitable. 
However, as very little data were available on this particular issue, 
the present author had to rely on a single reference in order to 
illustrate her suppositions, that of Helene Vandevelde-Dailliere. 
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For instance, Vandevelde-Dailliere has demonstrated how women reject 
'Cousin-like' customs (such as seclusion and excessive male and 
patriarchal authority) as stifling, but hold to Islamic precepts as 
sacred (Vandevelde-Dailliere, 1980: 223). That the distinction has 
been made by mostly illiterate women is extremely significant, as it 
contrasts with the views of male 'Cousins' who legitimise customs with 
the evocation of Islamic precepts. The National Assembly debates on the 
Family Code were for instance riddled with such amalgams of customary 
and religious legitimation of 'Cousin' claims on women's inferiority. 
However, most central to the present thesis are Vandevelde-Dailliere's 
findings on women's weak political participation. Although not 
explicitely interested in the issue of illiteracy, 
Vandevelde-Dailliere's investigations disclosed illiteracy as one of 
the major reasons for women's political marginalisation (ibid: 
336-344). Almost invariably, those who were politically participant or 
280 
active were educated women, mostly the product of the formal 
educational system and usually professionals or higher degree holders 
(ibid: 289-333). 
In her treatment of women's attitudes towards politics, Vandevelde- 
Dailliere resorted to a scale of political apathy and political 
participation which ranged as follows: 
(i) absence of participation; 
(ii) formal participation; 
(iii) desire to participate; 
(iv) conscious participation. 
The first three categories corresponded to secluded women, both in 
rural and urban areas (including slum dwellers), all sharing one common 
feature: they were illiterate. The last category embraced professional 
and student women (ibid: 337). Reactions to the degree of participation 
ranged from estrangement to revolt (ibid: 339-342): 
weak revolt and strong estrangement (characterised by apathy, 
passivity and absence of participation) experienced by 60 to 70 
per cent of rural, and 50 per cent of urban women; most did not 
vote and did not understand the significance of voting; 
weak revolt and weak estrangement (characterised by 
submissiveness) experienced by 30 per cent of urban and 10 to 20 
per cent of rural women; but exposure to media enhanced the 
"ritualistic visit to polling stations"; 
strong revolt and strong estrangement, displayed by secluded 
women with a sense of revolt, bred by powerlessness and a strong 
desire to take part in the public world, experienced by 20 
percent of urban and rural women; 
strong revolt and weak estrangement involving a greater degree 
of civic participation, political awareness and competence to 
organise political commitment, were displayed exclusively by 
urban, professional or student women (70 per cent wished to be 
politically active and not only vote). 
The first three categories involved almost invariably illiterate women, 
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with rare cases of primary education for the third. The fourth was the 
only group with a high level of education (higher secondary, university 
level). 
Vandevelde-Dailliere's findings help corroborate the hypothesis that 
illiteracy marginalises women politically to a great extent. This is 
also witnessed in the representation of women in political instances at 
a national level. The main elections held in the country since the 1967 
Re forme Communale disclose a derisory representation of women. Three 
main instances which call for women's participation are the city 
councils Assemb16es Populaires Communales (APC), the county Assemblees 
Populaires de Wilaya (APW), and the parliamentary Assemblee Populaire 
Nationale (APN). In all three, the percentage of women's 
representation has remained minimal between 1967 and 1979: 
---------------------------------------------- 
YEAR APC APW APN 
1967 1-- 
1969 - 3.9 - 
1971 0.5 -- 
1974 -4- 
1975 1.4 -- 
1979 -33 
The slightly higher rates in the APW and APN are due to the 
fact that 
"only professional women are elected" (Vandevelde-Dailliere, 
ibid: 299) 
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and this entails not only literacy but higher formal education. 
The combination of widespread illiteracy among women and the valuation 
of higher formal education and professionalism, have helped obtain in 
Algeria one of the most paradoxical 'Republic of Citizens', with nearly 
half of its population still constrained within the confines of a 
surviving 'Republic of Cousins'. Far from being supporters of the 
latter, adult illiterate women wish to break free, and believe that 
education should help them. Vandevelde-Dailliere's investigation has 
disclosed that the majority of women in her sample, and in particular 
those from rural areas, evoked "lack of education" as a major factor in 
their ignorance and domestication, along with "customs and prejudices, 
and men's opposition" to their participating in the 'public realm' 
(ibid: 191-196). 
In the light of these findings, a Freirian 'liberating' education can 
be evoked as a possible answer to Algeria's illiterate women. 
Prima facie all the ingredients for the success of 'conscientisation' 
pedagogy can be found in the context of adult illiterate women: the 
'culture of silence', the sense of 'being immersed' in the world and 
not 'subjects' in it, the culture of superstition and mythical beliefs, 
'oppression' by authoritarian males. However, the technocratism of the 
'Citizens' in power in Algeria has left them sceptical,. if not 
indifferent, to the whole philosophy of non-formal education. Indeed 
their societal programme provides for the necessity of literacy as a 
major characteristic of the Algerian modern man and woman; but only 
in 
as far as literacy is preferably scientific, technological and 
dispensed by the formal channels of education, ie. schools, institutes 
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and universities. The prevailing attitude towards illiteracy is that it 
will disappear with the universalisation of the formal educational 
system, and there is no sign of future shifts towards non-formal 
education as yet. 
But, is the provision and expansion of literacy among women sufficient 
guarantee for the enhancement of their public role, and the weakening 
of their domesticity? In some circumstances the opposite could well be 
witnessed, as will be examined in the case of Tanzania. 
5.4. Education for Self-Reliance in Tanzania. 
As in Algeria, the 'Citizens' in power in Tanzania, have been heavily 
investing in education since Independence in 1961. Public expenditure 
on the educational sector, both formal and informal, absorbed between 
15 and 17 percent of total government expenditure in each year between 
1966 and 1986.96 A similar faith was ascribed to the economic returns 
of education. In his presidential address to Parliament in 1965 (12 
May), Nyerere had this to say about educational strategy: 
The purpose of government expenditure on education in 
the coming years must be to equip Tanganyika with the 
skills and the knowledge which is needed if the 
development of the country is to be achieved. 
However, unlike the Algerians, the Tanzanians were to concentrate on 
investing in their adults. Thus Nyerere went on in the same venue: 
... first we must educate adults. 
Our children will not 
have an impact on our economic development for five, ten 
or even twenty years. 
This unorthodox strategy was nonetheless economistic, but was to 
evolve differently from the technocratic stance of Algeria's policy. 
It 
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was to shift dramatically towards the development of informal adult 
education together with the primary cycle, to the detriment of the 
secondary and tertiary stages of the formal educational system. The 
shift occurred in 1967 following Nyerere's issue of Education for 
Self- Reliance97 (ESR) in which he expounded the main principles of an 
education he wanted to be 'relevant' to the predominantly peasant 
society of Tanzania. Following in the footsteps of the wider societal 
programme of Ujamaa and The Arusha Declaration, both issued in 1967, 
the philosophy of Education for Self-Reliance was part of Nyerere's 
scheme to create a 'Republic of Citizens' where 'basic needs' would be 
met so as to avoid social inequality: 
98 
... Most often of all, our Government and people have 
stressed the equality of all citizens and our 
determination that economic, political and social 
policies shall be deliberately designed to make a 
reality of that equality in all spheres of life. 
(ESR, 1967: 5-6) 
In the educational sphere, Nyerere argued that social equality could 
only be achieved through 'basic education'. This entailed the provision 
of primary education as "education for life, and not a preparation for 
secondary school [whose] only justification is that it is needed by the 
few for service to the many" (ESR: 15). Stressing the peasant and 
agrarian nature of Tanzanian society, Nyerere proposed that the 
educational system should be reorganised in such a way that it caters 
for the training of the many as future farmers. Hence his conception of 
'terminal primary education' and self-reliant schools which would 
function as productive units, securing their own upkeep. Accordingly, 
the main features of self-reliant education in Tanzania were: 
to relate the curricula to immediate social tasks; 
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to organise the schools into productive communities; 
to raise the entry age to seven years and over so as to obtain an employable school-leaver at the end of a cycle of seven years. 
Nyerere's proposals , on education were a mixture -. of- revolutionary 
and Pv puI iSt rhetoric . ýT =-_ The most 'salient features of the 
socialist (-revolutionary) educational tradition which appear in 
Nyerere's discourse are: the unity between theory and practice; the 
amalgamation of manual and intellectual work; and finally, the 
combination of education with productive work (Carnoy & Wertheim, 1977: 
573-587). It is significant that in ESR Nyerere should point out that 
"Tanzanian education must counteract the temptation to intellectual 
arrogance" (ibid: 7). This is reminiscent of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) and its pugnacious attack on intellectualism. 
However, the similarities between the'Tanzanian and Chinese educational 
reforms should be handled cautiously. Hawkins (1982)99 has usefully 
summed up the Chinese experiment in education as the "Red and Expert 
Debate". This latter was posed within the framework of the Marxist- 
Leninist construct of the ideal Communist student, who should be both 
"politically aware [Red] as well as highly skilled [Expert]" (Hawkins, 
1982: 412). Against this, the Tanzanian Ideal Typical Student [learner] 
is set up within the eclectic framework of Ujamaa 'specific 
socialism', whereby high expertise matters little, and political 
activism is far from being 'Red', but is 'cooperative'. The con- 
ciliatory tone of ESR is indeed far from the class struggle injunctions 
of Chinese militantism; it calls instead for: 
the development in each citizen of three things: an 
enquiring mind, an ability to learn from what others do, 
and reject or adapt it to his own needs; and a basic 
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confidence in his own position as a free and equal member of the society, who values others and is valued by them for what he does and not for what he obtains. 
(ESR: 8) 
Nyerere goes as far as to exort Tanzanians to become free thinkers; an 
original call within the socialist tradition: 
... the free citizens of Tanzania will have to judge 
social issues for themselves; there neither is nor will be a political "holy book" which purports to give all the answers to all the social, political and economic 
problems which will face our country in the future. 
... But the educational system of Tanzania would not be 
serving the interests of a democratic socialist society if it tried to stop people from thinking about the 
teachings, policies or the beliefs of leaders... . Only free people conscious of their worth and their equality 
can build a free society. 
(ibid: 8-9) 
This recalls Freire's humanist pedagogy of liberation, rather than the 
more conventional socialist tradition of the subordination of education 
to political action (Lilge, 1977: 556-572), and the primacy of scien- 
tific and technological expertise. Ironically, Algeria's technocratic 
penchant is more in agreement with this latter tradition. 
In order to obtain his 'basically-literate and 'basically-skilled free 
thinking farmer'. Nyerere dismissed academia and expertise as 
irrelevant to the majority of Tanzanians: 
We should not dete 
taught in primary 
engineer, teacher, 
know. Most of our 
things. 
And, 
rmine the type of things children are 
schools by the things a doctor, 
economist, or administrator need to 
pupils will never be any of these 
(ESR: 16) 
It will probably be suggested that if the children are 
working as well as learning they will therefore be able 
to learn less academically and that this will affect 
standards ... in the professions and so on throughout our 
nation in time to come. ... But even if this suggestion 
were based on provable fact, it could not be allowed to 
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over-ride the need for change in the direction of 
educational integration with our national life. 
(ESR: 24) 
Nyerere is providing here a good example of a politically and ideo- 
logically formulated policy, which takes little account of the 
specifications of the problem it purports to solve. On his own admis- 
sion, provable predictions, as he put it, should be of no consequence, 
as opposed to the rightousness of a visionary societal plan. This would 
prove fatal for Nyerere's wholistic dream of a 'content and basically 
literate nation of farmers' he had for Tanzania. For Tanzanians nation- 
wide would be pressing for further expert-based education, as will be 
examined later in this Chapter. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the 
so-called 'majority' of Tanzanians could have genuinely accepted that 
the acquisition of the 3Rs was enough together with the teachings of 
"history, workings of Government, and skills necessary to earn a 
living" (ESR: 24). 
Nyerere's scheme of Education for Self-Reliance is indeed unique as a 
socialist model, for it has sacrificed modernity, science and tech- 
nology at the alter of basic needs, knowledge and skills. The reper- 
cussions on the formal and nonformal sectors of education were to be 
far-reaching. 
5.4.1. The Pressure for More Formal Education. 
In his vision of the ideal equal society in Tanzania, Nyerere hastened 
to visualise a uniform society of happy farmers, literate but not 
expert, led by 'intellectually non-arrogant selected 
few' whose 
education is justified by "service to the many" as "there can 
be no 
other justification for taxing the many to give education to only a 
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few" (ESR: 15). However, Nyerere's utopia became a recipe for social 
differenciation rather than equality. Not only did the selection from 
primary to secondary witness a dramatic drop, falling from 36 per cent 
in 1962 to less then 6 per cent in 1980 (Dreuth et al., 1983: 103), but 
ironically it was found to: 
restrict access to secondary and higher education (and 
therefore knowledge) to a very few, who tend 
increasingly to be children of the bureaucracy and petty 
bourgeoisie. 
(Mbilinyi, 1979: 112) 
Restrictive access to public secondary education indirectly encouraged 
the mushrooming of fee-paying private secondary schools, most of which 
were denominational; and thus not only contradicted the socialist 
principle of free public education, but that of secular education 
sought by the 'Citizens' in power. When Nyerere was reported to deplore 
the expansion of private secondary schools, "which he argued were exp- 
loiting smallholder peasants": 
The political elite were dismayed and privately said 
they would oppose putting a lid on expansion and 
operation of private schools. 
(Omari et al., 1983: 19) 
A clamp down on private schools was made impossible; not only in view 
of the importance of the sector which accounts for over 40 per cent of 
national enrolment; 28,000 pupils against 40,300 in public schools 
(Ministry of National Education, 1980: 31), but also by the discreet 
resistance put up by the religious missions which administer most of 
these schools. It was estimated that "in 1961, about 70 per cent of the 
school children were being educated in church-sponsored schools" 
(Westerlund, 1980: 118). 
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The nationalisation of the educational system by the 1969 Education 
Act, did not precipitate "the end of eighty years of mission 
participation in public education" as expected by some observers 
(Mbunda, 1979: 88). It is probable that church leaders took advantage 
of the severe restrictions imposed on secondary enrolment, to start 
private secondary schools as a sector where they could continue to 
operate. Westerlund pointed out the reluctance of church leaders to 
abide by the new secular public educational system (Westerlund, 1980: 
121), and it is not surprising that they found a haven in private 
secondary schooling. 
But Westerlund helps disclose another subtlety of the educational 
debate in Tanzania, behind the idyllic uniformity of education for 
self-reliance, and that is the conflict between Christian and Muslim 
leaders vis ä vis the secular content of state education. While Church 
leaders accused the Muslims of dominating the party apparatus and of 
promoting secular and state education, Muslim organisations also 
denounced the secularism of state education as a euphemism for 
Christian domination (Westerlund, ibid: 93-119). This is an interesting 
example of the interplay between the secular 'Citizens' in power, and 
the leaders of the Muslim and Christian 'Brothers-in-law' concerning 
education. However, while the Christian 'Brothers-in-law' benefited 
from their massive participation in pre-independence educational 
provision by converting to private secondary schooling, their Muslim 
counterparts were not allowed to operate by the more moderate Muslims 
holding power within the Chama Cha Mapinduzi. 
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The above conflict did not prove of notable consequence for the 
adoption and implementation of 'Education for Self-Reliance' except in 
the sense that Christian private schools might undermine both the 
principles of secularism and equality promulgated by the rhetoric of 
the 'Citizens', mainly represented by Nyerere. It has been observed 
that: 
Many of the private schools have inherent religious and 
class biases because admission is by religious denominations or by ability to pay, influence... In 
fact, the existence of private schools is defeating 
government measures for equalisation such as regional 
and sex quotas in selection because several of the 
private schools are for boys only, and parents still 
prefer to pay for boys rather than girls in coeducation 
schools. 
(Omari et al., 1983: 19) 
In the long run, it is likely that such developments would lead to a 
structural inequality of class and sex and to a clear distinction 
between 'mass non-formal basic education' and 'elitist, formal and 
expert education'. Instead of 'the two legs'100 of Tanzanian education, 
the former would become 'the wooden leg' of Tanzania's socio-economic 
development as it dangerously limits its access to scientific and 
technological knowledge in favour of basic skills. 
Indeed, the expansion of 'basic education', whether in the form of 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) or non-formal literacy (mass or 
functional) is bound to heighten people's expectations towards further 
education, which ESR denies to an overwhelming majority. There is a 
disquieting disproportion between primary and adult education provision 
on the one hand and secondary and higher education on the other (Table 
5.6). 
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TABLE 5.6 
Pupil, Student and Adult Education Population 1981-83 
--------------------------- 
1981 
--- 
1982 1983 
Primary 
------------- 
3,530,622 
------------- 
3,512,799 
------------ 
3,582,923 
Secondary 
- public 38,365 38,983 39,737 
- private 29,513 30,162 31,482 
Technical College 1,360 1,409 1,164 
University of Dar es Salaam 
- undergraduate 2,852 2,980 3,531 
- postgraduate 528 460 446 
Adult Education 
- Functional Literacy 3,526,565 1,051,957 2,771,162 
- Post Literacy 1,388,069 1,403,524 1,637,073 
Source: Country report submitted to the 39th session of the 
International Conference on Education, Geneva, 16-25 
October 1984. 
However, Nyerere's vision of 'education for basic needs' was to be 
implemented as from the Second Five Year Plan (1969-1973), and was 
combined with a systematic campaign of adult literacy (from 1970) and 
of course the most dramatic social transformation of all: 
villagisation. The combination of the three gave Nyerere's vision of 
Tanzanian society a wholistic, comprehensive character. But of 
interest to the present thesis is the extent to which 'Education for 
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Self-Reliance' has helped expand literacy, especially among women. The 
pertinent question is whether it has succeeded in changing attitudes 
towards formal education, and whether it helped women be integrated in 
the new 'just and equal Republic of self-sufficient farmers'. 
5.4.2. The Expansion of Adult Literacy. 
'Education for Self-reliance' had a resounding impact on adult 
education on the whole, and in particular on adult literacy campaigns 
in the 1970s. Prior to this period, adult literacy campaigning was 
tackled haphazardly. Most students of Tanzania's community and adult 
education (Hall, 1975; Kassam, 1978, Malya, 1979; Ishumi, 1981) pointed 
out the lack of consistency and coordination in the drive to organise 
adult education and literacy prior to the Arusha Declaration, and 
Education for Self-reliance. They also emphasized the importance of a 
coherent societal vision, especially that of Nyerere, in encouraging a 
systematic organisation of adult education. 
The philosophy of 'basic needs' and self-reliance answered most 
accurately the non-formal nature of adult literacy and education. Hence 
the subsequent success of Tanzania's campaigns, which reduced 
illiteracy from 70 per cent to 21 per cent within a decade (1971-1981) 
(ILO, 1982: 107). Being consecrated by the presidential seal on many 
occasions, adult education, including literacy campaigning became a 
formidable institution in the country's educational structure. As from 
1970, which was declared 'Adult Education Year', Tanzania proceeded 
slowly but surely to overcome illiteracy among adults (over 15 years 
old) through a variety of campaigns, and the progressive 
institutionalisation of post-literacy courses for adults. 
293 
The originality of Tanzania's experience in this field is that it has 
been able to combine functional literacy with mass literacy campaign- 
ing, yielding most encouraging results. Indeed none of the revolu- 
tionary methods of systematic and immediate political mobilisation of 
the population through literacy was adopted. However the rationale of 
Freirian 'conscientization' is shared by Tanzania and only there could 
it be said to have a 'revolutionary' component as the "purpose [of 
education] is the liberation of Man from the restraints and limitations 
of ignorance and dependency" (Nyerere, 1976), and "the first objective 
of adult literacy [is to help people] shake [themselves] out of resig- 
nation" (Nyerere, 1969-1970). 
But a careful reading of Nyerere's rhetoric reveals a functionalist 
attitude rather than a revolutionary stance: 
The first job of adult education is to give us the 
ability to reject bad houses, bad jembes [hoes], and 
preventable diseases: it must make us recognise that we 
have the ability to attain better houses, better tools, 
and better health. 
(Nyerere, 1969-1970) 
Nyerere was here addressing the nation on New Year's Eve to announce 
1970 as 'Adult Education Year'. His emphasis on the functional objec- 
tives of adult education and literacy was strongly influenced by the 
Unesco/UNDP Experimental World Literacy Programme which Tanzania 
benefited from in the period 1968-69. The five-year pilot project was 
initiated in Mwanza (around Lake Victoria) a most important economic 
zone for the authorities in the sense that it produced cash and foreign 
exchange crops. It was designed (Malya, 1979: 143-144): 
to teach illiterate men and women [peasants] basic reading and 
writing, and to solve simple problems of arithmetic utilizing as 
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basic vocabularies the words used in agricultural and industrial 
practices; 
to help them to apply the new knowledge and skills to solve their basic economic, social and cultural problems; 
to prepare them for a more efficient participation in the development of their village, region and country; 
to integrate the adult literacy and adult education programmes 
with the general agricultural and industrial development of the 
country; 
to provide the necessary and adequate reading materials, impart 
the knowledge of community and personal hygiene, nutrition, 
child-care and home economics, which will help to improve family 
and community life, provide opportunity for a continuing 
education and avoid relapse into illiteracy. 
The population to be affected by the project (2 million people) 
numbered in 1970,60 per cent of male illiterates and 90 percent of 
female illiterates (EWLP, 1976). The initial Plan of Operation hoped 
to reduce illiteracy rates to 25 per cent among the 15-45 years old, 
that is provide them with standard 4 primary level. Between 1971-1973, 
200,000 people became literate but held Standard 2 level (EWLP, 1976). 
On the other hand, the functional aspect of the project was vaguely 
attained as there was (Malya, ibid: 145-146): 
indication that the training of approximately two years 
was not enough for the majority of the participants to 
become functionally literate; 
indication that the training cycle was affected by high 
drop-out rates and drop-in rates...; 
indication that although the majority of participants in 
most programmes were women, it was they who dropped out 
more often than men; 
indication that individual deficiency in the knowledge 
of the Swahili language acts as a stumbling block in the 
learning process. 
However, no attempt was made to carry out an investigation into the 
cultural and socio-economic factors that could have been partly 
responsible for the weak response of the participants. Although only 
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marginally successful, the objectives and methods of the project were 
to be adopted subsequently as the basis of future adult literacy and 
adult education in Tanzania. Coupled with Nyerere's philosophy of 
'learning by doing' and 'lifelong education', functional literacy was 
to become the backbone of adult education in Tanzania. 
In the period 1971-1975, a series of measures were taken to launch a 
national mass literacy campaign. The process was piecemeal and started 
with another experimental project, the Six-District Literacy Campaign 
in 1971, following a speech by Nyerere on New Year's Eve (Kassam, 1978: 
32). It proved "difficult to obtain reliable statistics on the number 
of illiterates who, after registration, continued to attend literacy 
classes on a regular basis and the number of people who actually became 
literate" (Kassam, ibid: 35). However enrolment figures showed high 
percentages of participation, and the whole experience served as a base 
for the nationwide literacy campaign decided towards the end of 1971 
(Kassam, ibid: 37). 
5.4.3. The National Literacy Campaign 1972-1975. 
Literacy campaigning in Tanzania was a piecemeal process. It was 
initially planned to last 4 years (1972-1975) but was extended until 
1981 when the last literacy test at national level was undertaken. The 
initial plan of TANU to eradicate illiteracy by 1975 was not only 
delayed, but had to resort to different phases and campaigns to achieve 
progressive literacy rates. 
The most intensive period of the National Campaign was between 
1972 and 
1975, when phenomenal results were achieved. A formidable institution- 
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alisation of adult education provision took place at national and 
regional levels, integrating adult education into the educational 
system by creating special bodies within the Ministry of Education. 
101 
The campaign also involved political instances as a great deal of 
mobilisation work was needed to attract people. Although the 
authorities did not close the schools in order to mobilise students and 
teachers, campaigning was nevertheless intense. Party cells, 'Adult 
Education Committees' at regional, district and ward level, primary 
schools and a variety of offices were assigned to conduct adult 
literacy classes. Twelve functional literacy primers were produced, all 
on agriculture except for one on the political ideology of TANU and 
home economics (mainly designed for women). About 25 million primers 
were distributed free as well as 12,500 spectacles (a notable borrowing 
from the 1961 Cuban experience). Some 98,000 teachers were involved in 
the campaign, of whom 84,000 were voluntary primary school leavers and 
14,000 experienced teachers (Kassam, 1978: 62-64). 
The campaign was targeted on an illiterate population of 5.9 million 
from a total population of 13 million. Enrolment developed dramatically 
from 745,000 in 1971, to 2.5 million in 1973, and 5.2 million in 1975. 
Thus 88 per cent of the total number of illiterates enroled (Kassam, 
ibid: 65). The figures are indeed spectacular but they do not indicate 
rates of attendance or dropping out. 
Nevertheless, the 1975 National Literacy Examination was very 
encouraging as 3.8 million persons (77 per cent of enrollees) took the 
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test, and 2 million of them were estimated literate, that is able to 
read and write simple sentences and messages. 
At the end of 1975, therefore, the total number of illiterate persons aged 10 years and over was estimated to be about 3.9 million which constitutes about 39 per 
cent of the total population of Tanzania. To put it in 
another way, the illiteracy rate in Tanzania was reduced from 67 per cent in 1967 to 39 per cent at the end of 1975. 
(Kassam, 1978: 68) 
The slogans accompanying the campaign marked three phases and were 
predominantly functional. They were: 
1972 - 'Politics is Agriculture'; 
1973 - 'Man is Health'; 
1975 - 'Food is Life'. 
Subsequent campaigns were reported to have involved 5.82 million people 
in 1977, reducing the national illiteracy rate from 27 per cent in 1977 
to 21 per cent in 1981 (ILO, 1982: 108) (Table 5.7). The mass campaig- 
ning effort was backed by a whole network of post-literacy 
institutions in the shape of 'Folk Development Colleges', rural librar- 
ies for the distribution of functional literacy primers, radio prog- 
rammes and the production of rural newspapers. For those who had 
advanced beyond the post literacy level, the Institute of Adult 
Education organised correspondence courses to further their education 
up to university level under the 'mature age entry scheme' (ILO, ibid: 
109). 
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TABLE 5.7 
Literacy Test Results in 1975,1977 and 1981 
millions 
------------------------ 
196.7 1975 1977 1981 
--- Population age 10 
---- 
M 
------- 
3.95 
-------- 
4,80 
---------- 
5.15 
---- 
6.1 
years and over F 4.21 5.10 5.49 6.3 
T 8.16 9.90 10.64 12.4 
Estimated illiterates M 2.12 2.56 1.67 1.32 
age 10 years and over F 3.33 3.30 2.42 2.07 
T 5.45 5.86 4.09 3.39 
Participants achieving M 0.95 0.45 0.49 
levels III and IV F 0.96 0.35 0.42 
T 1.91 0.81 0.91 
Remaining illiterates M 1.61 1.22 0.83 
F 2.34 2.07 1.65 
T 3.95 3.28 2.48 
Estimated illiteracy M 54 34 24 14 
rates (per cent) F 80 46 38 26 
T 67 40 31 20 
Source : Ministry of National Education (1981) 
5.4.4. The Campaign and Women. 
One of the most salient features throughout the campaign was the 
overwhelming appeal it seemed to have had amongst women: 
... 
[the] reason may well be propagation of the political 
philosophy which aimed to create social and sex 
equality. It would seem that women who have always been 
neglected in this respect, have rallied behind this 
philosophy. Thus for example, of the 5.82 million adults 
enrolled in literacy classes during 1970-1977 3.3 
million were women and 2.54 million men, a pattern found 
to be typical for most years and regions. 
(ILO, 1982 : 108) 
Owing to the predominantly rural economy of Tanzania, women have 
traditionally been a most active labour force, both in the actual 
production process and in the domestic realm, which can 
hardly be 
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distinguished from the first in a subsistence economy. Hence the high 
rate of women's participation in productive labour; 74 per cent 
according to ILO estimates (ILO, 1982: 142-143). 
However, with the introduction of the wage economy as the formal 
sector, women's activity on the farms has been relegated to the 
so-called informal sector, thus reducing their participation to a 
mere 12 per cent in 1978 "according to the narrow definition of the 
labour force [as] those who are looking for and are available for work 
(mostly wage-paid jobs)" (ILO, ibid: 143). It is ironic that wage 
labour, as a prominent feature of the modern 'Republic of Citizens', 
should debase women's work, and threaten to relegate them to 
domesticity. A number of observers have warned against the loss of 
economic autonomy of women (especially peasants) with the expansion of 
the money sector (Mbilinyi, 1972: 61), as well as that of villagisation 
which tends to address male household heads rather than female heads 
(Caplan, 1981: 98-108; Brain, 1976: 265-282). 
Furthermore, wage labour is often linked with the attainment of a 
minimum educational standard; often provided by the formal educational 
system which delivers the qualifications so scornfully condemned by 
Nyerere in Education for Self-reliance. Formal qualifications 
nevertheless remain the dominant rule for social promotion, and access 
to white collar and executive jobs as attested by the formidable 
expansion of private secondary schooling. As in Algeria, women more 
than men need formal qualifications in order to be employable in the 
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formal economic sector (Table 5.8). 102 Hence their low participation in 
this, 12 per cent as opposed to 66 per cent for men (Shields, 1980: 
38). 103 
TABLE 5.8 
Educational Distribution of Female Wage and Non-wage 
Earners in Tanzania 
Level of Education Percentage of Wage Percentage of Non- 
Earners wage Earners 
None 21.3 65.7 
Standards 1-4 13.1 16.0 
Standards 5-8 38.5 16.6 
Forms 1-4 23.6 1.8 
Forms 5-6 1.9 0.0 
University 1.6 0.0 
(Number of cases 314 513) 
Source: NUMEIST, 1971 
Accordingly, the acquisition of a literacy level through the non-formal 
sector, so widely acclaimed to be popular with women, will not 
necessarily help them shift from a domestic-reproductive status 
to a 
public-productive one. It has been argued that the policy of 
informal 
education and functional literacy and their enforcement among women, 
were but structural adjustments to the international market: 
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At this moment in history, capital is able to extract 
more surplus from the peasants without raising the level 
of productive forces, by increasing the number of producers who produce for the market and depend on the 
market for basic consumption and producer goods, and at the same time increasing the proportion sold of what is 
produced, and through labour intensification. This is 
why women are so crucial, since-they have been the most 
obviously overlooked potential labour force among 
peasants. 
(Mbiliny, 1977: 500-1) 
Indeed, with 90 per cent of Tanzanian women involved in agricultural 
production, Mbilinyi's dependency analysis would have been accurate if 
at least a majority of women were involved in the formal agricultural 
sector, but this is not the case, since the majority of peasant women 
are active in the economy of subsistence. 
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The question remains whether their formidable participation in the 
literacy campaigns will further their 'capture' by the modernising 
'Republic of Citizens' in power. What is certain, is that the 
'Citizens' would like to see women improve their attitudes towards so- 
called basic needs such as health, hygiene, family planning and 'home 
economics', 
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which have been considered specifically female concerns. 
It has been argued that "women are [the] major home-makers, and as 
mothers and housewives require retention of literacy for the benefit of 
the nation" (Malya, 1978: 2-3). This statement illustrates the attitude 
of the Tanzanian 'Citizens' towards women's education and its ultimate 
domestic functionality. Women's domesticity is required to become more 
effective and more modern through the instillation of basic educational 
principles. This type of attitude, coupled with the non-recognition of 
women's work in the informal sector may well jeopardise their future 
participation in literacy campaigns, and can hardly help those who have 
become literate to retain their skills. 
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5.5. Specific Initial Conditions: The Lessons from Algeria and Tanzania 
The comparison of the Tanzanian and Algerian contexts helps identify 
more saliently the phenomenon of women's seclusion as specific to 
Algerian traditional society. Their ensuing identification with the 
domestic private realm has prevented them from playing a cons- 
tructive part in the production process. Their participation in the 
political arena and the educational one, especially among adult age 
groups, has remained very limited. 
In Tanzania on the other hand, the involvement of women in informal 
agricultural production could be said to have encouraged their 
spectacular enrolment in adult literacy campaigns. But should their 
economic autonomy be discarded, the raison d'etre of their partici- 
pation would wane. Their possible confinement to the home and to 
domestic concerns such as suggested by Malya, would weaken their drive 
to become literate. The Tanzanian experience in terms of female 
involvement in literacy teaches two important lessons: 
the necessity for women to take part in public processes in 
order to be drawn to literacy; 
public participation of women is not necessarily a result of 
modernisation, but could well exist in so-called traditional 
society, and paradoxically be jeopardised by modern processes 
such as concentrated urban groupings, or wage labour. 
Conversely, the Algerian experience discloses: 
the conspicuous absence of women as adult learners in view of 
their domestication; 
the necessity for further modernisation as the sole guarantor of 
a public participation of women faced with a powerful tradition 
of female seclusion and domesticity. 
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The Algerian and Tanzanian experiences in adult literacy are valuable 
in revealing the linearity of the modernity/traditionality dichotomy, 
especially with regard to women's status. In Holmesian terms, the 
specific conditions of each context have not always revealed a 
progressive continuum from tradition to modernity. Women's 
participation in literacy campaigns in Tanzania has shown that they 
have been encouraged in this by their 'traditional' status as producers 
in the informal agricultural sector. In Algeria, on the other hand, an 
aggressive modernisation through industrialisation and urbanisation has 
only marginally affected women's 'traditional' domestic status 
primarily as 'reproducers'; and did not not live up to its promise of 
the egalitarian 'Republic of Citizens'. In fact the 'Citizens' in power 
have often declared that it was up to women to merit their emancipation 
as the latter was dependent on their moral behaviour (Boumediene, 
Charte Nationale). This usually meant the non-emulation of Western 
women, and the preservation of reproduction and family roles as 
paramount (ie. of domesticity). 
With regard to women's education, both the 'Citizens' in Algeria and 
Tanzania have clearly favoured, if not imposed, indiscriminate 
schooling for both sexes. In both countries, girls involvement in the 
primary cycle has reached parity with that of boys. However, the weak 
female quotas in the secondary and higher stages remain notable as 
cultural resistance to women's further education after puberty 
(Algeria), or economic necessity (Tanzania), 
106 lead to the withdrawal 
of girls from the secondary level. 
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But however keen on women's education or women's work, the Algerian and 
Tanzanian 'Citizens' have hardly supported their educational policies 
with provisions intended to alleviate the domestic chores which, by and 
large accrue to women. In classical socialist regimes, two provisions 
are immediately enforced: 
legal equality for women (Rowb-otham, 1980), which cannot be said 
to have been the case either in Algeria or Tanzania. On the 
contrary, the family laws of both countries have been rather 
retrograde and are helping to institutionalise sex inequality; 
family planning to weaken woman's role as reproducer, and the 
provision of community-run kindergartens to liberate women as labour force (ie. as producers), which again have failed to 
appear as priorities in either country (Paquot, 1982: 93-97; 
127-128). 
The sole provisions of adult literacy is unlikely to help women join 
the modern and egalitarian 'Republics of Citizens' in Algeria or 
Tanzania, as long as the 'Citizens' in power remain normativally 
ambivalent about the 'Ideal Woman Citizen' in their Republic. While the 
bulk of Algerian adult women are likely to remain marginalised by 
their overwhelming illiteracy; Tanzanian women are threatened with 
marginalisation by a growing formal sector from which they are excluded 
in view of their low educational qualifications (in the form of basic 
literacy). 
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NOTES: CHAPTER 5 
1. The institutionalisation of sex inequality through family 
legislation in Algeria and Tanzania sharply contrasts with the more 
progressive legislation of conventional socialist regimes such as the 
Soviet Union, China or Cuba. This is not to say that the latter do not 
experience a lag between a progressive rhetoric and slow changing 
institutions and values. Cf. Sheila Rowbathem, Women, Resistance and 
Revolution, Penguin Books, 1980. Rowbathem reports discrepancies 
between revolutionary rhetoric, namely that of sex equality and sexual 
liberation, and slow changing traditional practices in a number of 
socialist regimes. However, Algeria's and Tanzania's family 
legislations contain at the outset a 'normative institutionalisation' 
of the status of minority for women. While Algeria and Tanzania have 
not enacted radical legislation freeing women from domesticity, radical 
socialist regimes have forthrightly condemned domesticity in favour of 
women's disposition of their own bodies, and a strong work ethic. Cf. 
Barbara Wolfe Jancar, Women Under Communism, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978. 
2. While 'obscurantism' and illiteracy are seen as directly resulting 
from colonialism in Algeria, (Charte Nationale, 1976: 63,68), Nyerere 
condemned the colonial educational system as inadequate in Education 
for Self-Reliance (1967). 
3. In both cases, the public sector is coeducational. However 
in 
Tanzania private secondary education provides separate education 
for 
boys and girls. See section 4 of this Chapter. 
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4. Unesco came legally into being in November 4,1946. For further 
details consult J. P. Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, Princeton 
University Press, 1975, for a good overview of the international 
conditions of Unesco's birth. See also J. C. Aggarwal, Unesco's 
Contribution Towards World Education, Arya Book Depot, New Delhi, 1971, 
and P. I. Hajnal, Guide to Unesco, Oceania Publications, 1983. 
5. See Unesco: Conference of African States on the Development of 
Education in Africa: Final Report, ED/181, Paris, 1961; Report on the 
Needs of Asia in Primary Education, 11C/PRG3, Paris, 1960; Report of 
the Meeting of Ministers of Education of Asian Member States 
Participating in the Karachi Plan, ED/192, Port Publishing Company, 
Bangkok, 1962; Conference on Education and Economic and Social 
Development in Latin America: Provisional Report, UN Economic and 
Social Council, Unesco/ED/CEDES/37, Paris, 1962. 
6. A real economistic fever took over the educational scene worldwide. 
The presumably alarming rates of wastage and drop out from the primary 
cycle (see Unesco's regional conferences above) led to the emergence of 
a new breed of international experts: the economists of education. 
They were to launch the more utalitarian view of the economic returns 
of educational provision. It is beyond the scope of the present study 
to mention all the related literature. However a representative sample 
is best rendered by The Policy Conference on Economic Growth and 
Investment in Education, OECD, Paris, 1962; Parnes H. S., (ed. ), 
Planning Education for Economic and Social Development, OECD 
Mediterranean Regional Project, Paris, 1963; Harbison F. and Myers 
C. A., (eds. ), Manpower and Education: Country Studies in Economic 
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Development, McGraw Hill, New York, 1965; Anderson C. A. & Bowman M. J., 
(eds. ), Education and Economic Development, Aldin Publishing Co., 
Chicago, 1965; Vaizey J., The Economics of Education, Faber and Faber, 
London, 1962. 
7. The expediency of such argument is best illustrated by statements 
such as "It is unquestionably true that the cost of primary education 
must be kept down, otherwise it will consume most of the resources 
which are more urgently needed for secondary and higher education". Cf. 
Frederick H. Harbison, "The Strategy of Human Resource Development in 
Modernizing Economies", in Policy Conference on Economic Growth and 
Investment in Education, op. cit., p. 25. For a good compilation of 
representatives of this school of thought, see Don Adams, (ed. ), 
Education in National Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1971. This 'liberal' trend was criticised by radical social scientists 
who argued that human capital theory had had little effect on either 
occupational structure or income distribution, both in the capitalist 
centres and peripheries. See J. Karabel and A. H. Halsey, (eds. ), Power 
and Ideology in Education, Oxford University Press, New York, 1977; in 
particular part three, pp. 307-365. But an earlier critique of the 
economistic trend was issued by Holmes, who warned (1981: 14) that: 
... economists of education who 
have flirted with 
comparative education have done nothing worse than raise 
wastage and stagnation rates in education throughout the 
world by convincing governments that there were sound 
economic reasons for doing what they had already decided 
to do on the grounds of expediency, political necessity 
or ideology. 
Holmes reminds us that the 1956 Year Book of Education had 'initiated 
the comparative study of the economics of education' but that little 
308 
progress had been made since, in view of the expediency and 
ideologically ridden nature of policy planning. 
8. Cf. Philip H. Coombs, The World Educational Crisis, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1970. Coombs argued, amongst other things, 
against the overproduction of educated unemployed yielded for instance 
by the ambitions of the 1960s human capital theory. A decade earlier 
Coombs was promoting this very approach as chairman of the Policy 
Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education, op. cit., p. 
87. By the late 1960s, he was urging the adoption of nonformal 
education, unfortunately along the same inductivist premises. 
9. The very proponents of manpower theory admitted defeat in the early 
1970s, and questioned whether increased expenditures on education were 
an effective means of achieving either economic growth or social 
equality. See OECD, Education, Inequality and Life Chances, Paris, 
1975. This was preceded by Unesco's Learning to Be, edited by Edgar 
Faure, Paris, 1972; and the ILO's Employment, Incomes and Equality, 
Geneva, 1972. All heralded that a more prosperous era could be attained 
through 'basic education for local needs'. According to these, the 
Shumacher panacea of Small is 
automatically deemed effective for 'developing' societies. 
10. Cf. for instance Castle E. B., Education for Self-Help: New 
Strategies for Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, London, 
1972; and Wood A. W., Informal Education and Development 
in Africa, 
Mouton, The Hague & Paris, 1974. 
Beautiful, Abacus, London, 1974, was 
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11. Holmes argues that the inductivist-positivist method has its origin 
in nineteeth century social and political science and was promoted by 
such men as J. S. Mill, Auguste Comte, Saint Simon, and Karl Marx, who 
all induced general laws about human society from a knowledge of 
European bourgeois early capitalist society (Holmes, 1981, chapter 2). 
Holmes's methodological argument illuminates the present author's 
contention that contemporary social theory is perpetuating the 
ethnocentrism of nineteenth century European social, and 
political-economic theory. See Chapter 1 of this thesis. Holmes will be 
quoted at length in the following, especially from his Comparative 
Education: Some Considerations of Method, George Allen & Unwin, London, 
1981. This is a compilation of his methodological views since they were 
first expounded in his Problems in Education: A Comparative Approach, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965, where he introduced his 
problem(-solving) approach. Over the years, Holmes had repeatedly 
warned against the expediency of educational solutions (to social 
problems) based on inductive generalisations. 
12. See E. M. Harik & D. G. Schilling, The Politics of Education in 
Colonial Algeria and Kenya, Papers in International Studies, Africa 
Series No. 43, Ohio University, Centre for International Studies, 
Africa Program, Athens, Ohio, 1984. The settlers in colonial Algeria 
and Kenya strongly opposed the expansion of European education to the 
colonised peoples, and would only agree to the provision of basic 
vocational training. There was a difference however between the 
policies followed in Paris and London. The former advocated 
'assimilation' so as to 'civilise the Arab', while the latter 
recommended 'adaptation', in order to 'communicate with the native' 
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through 'the raising up of capable, trustworthy, public spirited 
leaders of the people, belonging to their own race'. This came in 
Educational Policy in British Tropical Africa, (1925), cited by A. R. 
Thompson, "Ideas underlying British Colonial Education Policy in 
Tanganyika", in I. N. Resnick, Tanzania: Revolution by Education, 
Longmans of Tanzania Ltd. 1968, pp. 17-18. 
13. The Phelps-Stokes commissions inspired British educational colonial 
policies of adaptation from 1925 till 1960, and this came out in a 
whole series of memoranda and reports. These reflected the colonial 
administration's concern for the provision of basic education for 
eventual 'self-government'. Four memoranda expounded the philosophy of 
'adaptation': the 1925 Educational Policy in British Tropical Africa, 
the 1935 Memorandum on the Education of African Communities, the 1943 
Mass Education in African Society, and the 1948 memorandum on Education 
for Citizenship in Africa. See Thompson in Resnick, op. cit., pp. 
17-28. 
14. See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
15. Cf. Althusser L., "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in 
Cosin B. R. (ed. ), Education, Structure and Society, Penguin Books, 
1972, (reprinted 1977), pp. 242-280. Althusser developed the concept in 
his Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New Left Books, 1971. The 
bulk of his argument rests on Marx's discussion of the 'reproduction of 
the means of production' and on the dominance and reproduction of 
bourgeois capitalist values. Marx's 'superstructure' (state and 
ideology) becomes Althusser's 'ideological apparatuses' as they serve 
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in the 'social and cultural reproduction' of bourgeois values. However 
the concept of reproduction has been more thoroughly developed by P. 
Bourdieu (see note 16 below). 
16. Cf. Bourdieu P., 'Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction', 
in Karabel J. & Halsey A. H., Power and Ideology in Education, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1977, pp. 487-511. 
17. The example of Education for Self-Reliance is a striking case in 
point if one compares it with the colonial principle of education for 
'self-government', elaborated in the 1943 and. 1948 memoranda. See 
Thompson in Resnick, op. cit., pp. 21-2, and note 13 above. 
18. Cf. Camoy, M., Education as Cultural Imperialism, David McKay, 
1974; M. Carnoy et al., Can Educational Policy Equalise Income 
Distribution in Latin America?, Saxon House, 1979. The overall argument 
is that the 'productivity' thesis of educational provision is more of 
an ideological and political decision [to maintain the bourgeoisie in 
power]. The expansion of schooling is found to be associated with 
greater inequality in the distribution of economic benefits to 
individuals. 
19. In problem-solving, Holmes was inspired by the 
hypothetico-deductive method put forward by Karl Popper as an 
alternative to the holistic and causative tradition in Western social 
science. Cf. K. R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London 1957, and his Conjectures and Refutations, The 
Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969. 
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Quoting Popper from The Poverty of Historicism, Holmes (1981: 50) noted 
for instance that : 
For Popper 'to give a causal explanation of a certain 
specific event means deducing a statement describing 
this event from two kinds of premises; from some 
universal laws, and from some' singular or specific 
statements which we may call specific initial 
conditions'. In practical terms failure to take into 
account these initial conditions (or the societal 
context) leads to unconditioned prophecies about the future of education as opposed to conditional scientific 
predictions. 
Popper's proposition that theories should be falsifiable is an 
interesting contrast with the kind of educational panacea reviewed 
earlier. These respond to Popper's criticism of the conventional scien- 
tific posture which seeks to test a theory in order to confirm it, not 
refute it. In Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit. p. 37, he remarked: 
Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be 
false, are still upheld by their admirers, for example 
by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by 
re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it 
escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, 
but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the 
price of destroying or at least lowering its scientific 
status. 
No better statement can summarise the methodological process followed 
by international organisations and accepted by national governments in 
educational (and 'developmentalist') theorising over the last three 
decades. Indeed, ad hoc assumptions have been made on UPE, then human 
capital, then non-formal education, in order to prove or confirm that 
development is attainable through education, (under all circumstances). 
20. The notion of 'national character' was developed by a number of 
Western comparative educationists earlier this century. The temptation 
to borrow from 'successful' educational systems among European nations 
and between Europe and the USA, led some educationists to warn that 
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such 'cultural borrowing' was highly suspicious. For each national 
entity presented cultural specificities which marked its own traditions 
in educational organisation. People like Michael Sadler (England) spoke 
of 'living spirit', I. L. Kandel (USA) and N. Hans (England) thought 
'national self-consciousness' necessarily marked each national system 
of education (Holmes, 1981: 24-5). Vernon Mallinson (England) linked 
'national character' with 'deeply held sentiments' and 'the totality of 
disposition to thought, feeling and behaviour', Cf. Mallinson V., An 
Introduction to Comparative Education, Heinemann, London, 1957, p. 14. 
However, the stereotypical connotations of 'national character' led 
Holmes to propose that 'ideal typical models' of the cultural 
traditions which inform social protagonists be drawn. The advantage of 
this method lies in its concern for the variety of traditions that are 
likely to inform mental states, and not for a presumably fixed 
mentality. The latter might lead to the establishment of stereotypes, 
such as those elaborated by the colonial literature on the so-called 
'natives', or even national figures from former colonies, such as 
Leopold Sedar Senghor with his notion of 'Negritude'. 
21. The Experimental World Literacy Programme (EWLP) was launched by 
Unesco and supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
in 1967. The programme was based on the idea of 'functional literacy' 
as opposed to mass literacy and the teaching of the 3Rs. Candidates 
were to be made literate in relation to their jobs so as to become more 
'productive'. Eleven countries benefited from the programme, including 
Algeria and Tanzania. Cf. Unesco, The EWLP: A Critical Assessment, 
The 
Unesco/UNDP Press, 1976. 
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22. Paulo Freire became an international authority on 'revolutionary' 
methods in adult literacy after his experience in North Eastern Brazil 
prior to the 1964 coup. Freire devised the method of 'conscientization' 
which purports to develop the candidate's critical view of his/her 
environment, and particularly of the conditions of economic and social 
exploitation. Hence his vision of 'education for liberation' as opposed 
to conventional literacy methods which he claims 'domesticate' the 
learner into accepting the social status-quo. The bulk of Freire's 
argument can be found in his Cultural Action for Freedom, Penguin 
Books, 1974; and Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin Books, 1978; 
Education: The Practice of Freedom, Writers and Readers Publishing 
Cooperative, London, 1978. For a practical experiment of his methods in 
Africa, see his Pedagogy in Process, The Letters to Guinea-Bissau, 
Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, London, 1978. For a 
general study of Freire, see Mashayekh F., "Paulo Freire: the man, his 
ideas and their implications", in Literacy Discussion, Spring 1974. 
23. Cf. P. I. Hajnal, Guide to Unesco, Oceania Publications, 1983, p. 
112. The founding conference of Unesco held in London in 1945, 
mentioned the 'detrimental social and economic effects of the scourge 
of illiteracy'. 
24. Cf. Unesco, Fundamental Education, Macmillan, New York, 1947. 
25. Consult recommendation no. 47 in International Conference on 
Education, Recommendations 1934-1977, Unesco, Paris, 1979. The 
recommendation was made to the Ministries of Education concerning 
Facilities for Education in Rural Areas. 
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26. Cf. P. I. Hajnal, op. cit., p. 113 
27. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1677 (XVI) of 18 
December 1961, and the 1963 Resolution, on the World Campaign for the 
Eradication of Mass Literacy (11 December). See Hajnal, op. cit., p. 
113. 
28. See J. C. Aggarwal & S. P. Agrawal, Role of Unesco in Education, 
Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982. 
29. The countries which benefited from the programme were Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Iran, Madagascar, Mali, Sudan, Syria, 
Tanzania, and Algeria. For details on the results of the project, see 
Unesco, The EWLP: a critical assessment, The Unesco/UNDP Press, 1976. 
30. See note 19 above. 
31. See Chapter 1. 
32. Cf. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, Harrow Books, New York, 1971. 
33. Following the 1959 revolution, the new leadership launched a mass 
literacy campaign over a period of nine months in 1961. Unprecedented 
popular mobilisation was organised as all formal educational 
institutions were closed, and literate adults as well as children sent 
to the countryside where they became 'brigadistas' to their fellow 
learners. Students of Cuba's campaign were impressed by the atmosphere 
of social solidarity which prevailed throughout. But most astounding of 
316 
all were the results attained. The national illiteracy rate was reduced 
from 20 percent in January 1961 to 4 percent in December the same year. 
See J. Kozol, "A New Look at the Literacy Campaign in Cuba" in Harvard 
Educational Review, Vol. 48, no. 3, August 1978. 
34. Cf. Kozol, op. cit.; M. Camoy & J. Wertheim, Cuba: Economic Change 
and Educational Reform 1955-1974, World Bank Staff Working Paper 
No. 317; and R. Jolly, "Contrasts in Cuban and African Educational 
Strategies" in J. Lowe, N. Grant, & T. D. Williams (eds. ), Education and 
Nation Building in the Third World, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh 
& London, 1971. 
35. Kozol for instance speaks of 'exhilaration' as the driving force of 
the campaign and points out that this latter "was launched before Cuba 
attempted any consistent ideological consolidation", op. cit., p. 345; 
while Carnoy and Wertheim contrast it with East European socialist 
revolutions, noting its 'enthusiasm' and lack of ideological dogma. 
36. In 1897, only 28 per cent of the population of the 'Russian 
Empire' was literate; in 1939, twenty years after the Soviet 
Revolution, 87 per cent were literate. Literacy rates among women 
increased from 17 per cent to 82 per cent for the same time span. 
Cf. Wasyl Shimoniak, Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and 
Politics, Rand McNally and Company, USA, 1970. As for revolutionary 
China, anti-elitist education did not necessarily lead to swift mass 
literacy campaigning but rather to a more comprehensive socialisation 
of all the population into communistic behaviour. Cf. J. N. Hawkins 
"Educational Reform and Development in the popular Republic of China", 
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in Altbach P. G. et al, (eds. ), Comparative Education, Macmillan 
Publishing Co., New York, 1982. 
37. The Nicaraguan mass literacy campaign, Crusada Nacional de 
Alfabetizacion (Great National Literacy Crusade) was organised in 1980. 
Illiteracy rates were reduced from 50 per cent to 23 per cent in 5 
months, and to 15 per cent in 9 months. See R. F. Arnove, "The 
Nicaraguan National Literacy Crusade of 1980" in Altbach et al., 1982, 
op. cit., pp. 433-450. 
38. See note 22 above. 
39. Freire's basic philosophical position in adult literacy is 
existentialist. He gives particular attention to what he calls the 
process of 'dehumanisation' of man through the dialectical mechanism of 
'oppression'. 'Dehumanisation' affects both 'oppressor' and 
'oppressed', and 'humanisation' is possible only when the 'oppressed' 
are engaged in a social and pedagogical process by virtue of which they 
become aware of their critical and active role as 'subjects' and not 
'objects' of their living conditions. To be complete this process 
should also liberate the 'oppressors' and all temptation for the 
'oppressed' to become oppressors themselves. This biblical vision is 
best rendered in Freire's own terms which are worth quoting at length 
(Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 20-21): 
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Concern for humanization leads at once to the 
recognition of dehumanization, not only as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality. And as man perceives the extent of dehumanization he 
asks himself if humanisation is a viable possibility. 
... But while both humanization and dehumanization are 
real alternatives, only the first is man's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation. ... Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but also (though in a different way) those who have stolen it, is 
a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human. ... Because it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the 
oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In 
order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed 
must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is 
a way to create it), become in turn oppressors of the 
oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of 
both. This, then, is the great humanistic and historical 
task of the oppressed: to liberate themselves and their 
oppressors as well. 
According to Freire, this redeeming vision could be attained through a 
'liberating pedagogy' (ibid: 30): 
No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant 
from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and 
by presenting for their emulation models from among the 
oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in 
the struggle for their redemption. 
The emphasis is added so as to mark Freire's strong biblical bias, 
which is unlikely to serve as an effective analytical basis for 
concrete social problems. Indeed the evasiveness of his categories of 
'oppressors' and 'oppressed' ultimately recovering together their lost 
humanity in the hazy ecstasy of a liberating pedagogy, seems to rely 
more on a messianic vision, rather than the organisation of concrete, 
albeit imperfect solutions. Indeed, Freire himself has been hailed as a 
'messiah' in the field of adult literacy. See Denis Goulet in the 
introduction to Freire's Education: The Practice of Freedom, and 
Richard Shaull's Foreword to Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 
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40. See Freire's Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 16, and part two. 
41. See Education: the Practice of Freedom, p. 5, and 
for Freedom, Chapter 1. 
Cultural Action 
42. A detailed description of the method of 'generative word' can be 
found in Education: the Practice of Freedom, pp. 63-84. 
43. Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 60. 
44. The stages of 'conscientization' are: 
intransitive awareness: men struggle for life not as 
subjects but objects under the influence of magical 
forces; 
naive transitive awareness: there is an initial 
perception of problems; 
critical transitive awareness: there occurs freedom from 
alienation, rational perception of the world, dialogue 
with fellow men. 
Cf. Education: the Practice of Freedom, pp. 17-20. 
45. See Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Chapter 3. 
46. See Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 37. 
47. See Freire's discussion of the 'banking concept' of education 
whereby learners are taken as recipients of the dominant values of the 
oppressors. In this case education is used to 'domesticate' the 
learners into adapting to the status quo, (Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
Chapter 2). 
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48. Freire's conception of 'oppression' and the 'oppressed' has been 
inspired by the revolutionary writings of Franz Fanon, in particular 
The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin Books, 1968, and Albert Memmi, 
Colonizer and the Colonized, Orion Press, 1965, on the oppression of 
the colonised. These latter had made socio-psychological studies of the 
transformation of the colonised under severe conditions of deprivation 
and exploitation. The observed context was colonial North African 
society, and in particular Algeria, where French policies of 
pauperisation and assimilation dramatically dismantled the local social 
organisation. Indeed, the dispossession of the local Algerian 
population was so total, and the dismantlement of its educational and 
cultural networks so ruthless, that observers such as Franz Fanon and 
Albert Memmi perceived a vast 'dialectics' between oppressor and 
oppressed. However, the present author insists that mechanisms of 
defence and resistance exist among the 'oppressed', and that the latter 
should be more rigorously delineated as active social actors, and not 
as victims of some wicked immoral social order. See later in this 
Chapter, the discussion of the local population's response to France's 
attempts of cultural assimilation. 
49. Since the Declaration du 12-1 Novembre 1954, which marked the 
launching of the war of liberation, the official rhetoric dicloses a 
preoccupation with the creation of a modem scientifically and 
technologically minded model of man for Algeria's future citizen. Basic 
literacy was only paid lip service. The 1976 Charte Nationale sums up 
the technocratic nature of the Algerian 'Socialist Revolution'. 
Indeed, one of its chief pillars would reside in the achievement of a 
'Cultural Revolution', assigned with the task of "constantly raising 
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the level of schooling and 
1976: 64). The preoccupation 
expansion of modem science 
the poor legacy of the French 
manpower: in 1953 for 8.5 mi 
were 99 doctors, 5 surgeons, 
technical competence" (Charte Nationale, 
of Algeria's ruling elites with the 
and technology can partly be explained by 
mission civilisatrice in terms of skilled 
Ilion Algerians (native population), there 
17 dentists, 44 pharmacists, 161 lawyers, 
193 notaries, 185 secondary and higher education teachers, 27 engineers 
(mainly in textiles), 5 architects, and 8 senior administrators. Cf. 
Harik & Schilling, The Politics of Education in Colonial Algeria and 
Kenya, op. cit. Subsequently at Independence, there was a genuine 
yearning for technical skills, as well as an urgent need to fill the 
technical posts deserted by European experts. 
50. Very little information was available on the Campagne. References 
found in the archives of the Centre National d 'AI phabeti sati on , were 
not always classified, and the present author had to carry out the 
painstaking task of systematically consulting all internal documents. 
These latter were sometimes undated, and not always referenced. For the 
Campagne the only available information was found in La Lutte contre 
1'analphabetisme en Algerie de 1962 a 1966, undated mimeographed 
internal document. 
51. See Chapter 3 on the polity's internecine struggles. 
52. See notes 33,34,35, this Chapter. 
53. The Centre National d'Alphabetisation (CNA) was created in August 
1964 and was assigned with the "task to eradicate illiteracy 
in the 
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shortest period of time, in a scientific manner, and to provide culture 
for evey citizen so that [he or she] participates in the economic and 
social development of the country". Cf. CNA, Textes Officiels 
concernant la creation et les attributions du CNA, art. 2, Decree of 
31.8.1964, no. 64-352, Alger, 1964. However, the CNA was not 
operational before 1966 (Decree no. 66-352), just before the launching 
of EWLP in 1967. 
54. See the data below on Algeria's formal educational system. 
55. Cf. Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, Ministere des 
Enseignements Primaire et Secondaire, population ä alphabetiser pendant 
le Plan Quadriennal, 1970-1973, Centre National d'Alphabetisation, 
Alger, Juin 1971, mimeo. 
56. Cf. Centre National d'Alphabetisation, Plan Quadriennal 
(1970-1973), Alphabetisation d'un million de personnes. Alger, 
Septembre 1970, mimeo. 
57. The complete literacy cycle should correspond to fourth year 
primary level in the acquisition of the 3Rs. Candidates should be able 
to write and read messages, read a newspaper, and solve simple 
arithmetic problems, in order to be considered as functionally 
literate. 
58. Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), Commission de l'Information, 
Avant-projet de rapport sur la politique d'alphabetisation, 1983, 
mimeo, p. 4. 
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59. Cf. CNA, :u sur l'alphabetisation fonctionnelle Bans les 
secteurs agricoles et industriels en Algerie, Juillet, 1970, mimeo, p- 
120. 
60. See this Chapter below. 
61. Cf. Republique Algerienne D6mocratique et Populaire, Ministere de 
1'Education Nationale, Rapport sur le Mouvement Educatif, 39eme 
Conference de l'Education, Geneve, Octobre 1984, mimeo. 
62. Ibid., p. 2. 
63. Ibid., p. 5. 
64. Concern for the technological and scientific orientation of 
education has been consistent in all the main blueprints of the 
'Revolution'. Cf. la Platforme de la Soummame, (1956); le Programme de 
Tripoli (1962); La Charte d'Alger (1964); in Ministere de l'Information 
et de la Culture, Textes Fondamentaux du Front de Liberation Nationale 
(1954-1962), Dossiers Documentaires 24, Alger, Janvier 1976. 
65. Cf. Unesco, Statistical Yearbook, from 1966 to 1986. The early 
1970s are marked by a notable increase in government expenditure on the 
formal educational system as the Reform of Higher Education, 
La Reforme de 1'Enseignement Superieur was launched (1971-72) in order 
to expand the basis of higher education. This resulted in the abolition 
of yearly selection and the establishment of a flexible system of 
graduation on a semester basis. 
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66. The proportion of female pupils and students increased to reach 43 
per cent of total enrolment in the primary cycle, 41 per cent in the 
secondary, and 33 per cent of total university enrolment in 1983-84. 
Cf. Rapport sur le Mouvement Educatif, op. cit. 
67. Agence Press Service, (APS), Bulletin Economique de l'APS, no. 71, 
Alger, 1981. 
68. Classical Arabic, or as is more commonly called today 'standard 
Arabic' (a modernised version of the more Qur'anic based classical 
form) has been the national and official language of Algeria since 
Independence. However, French has been retained for use in 
decision-making processes as well as an educational medium. 
Consequently in setting up standards of literacy one has to take into 
account whether these are in French or Arabic. This linguistic 
complexity has implicitly hampered the launching of systematic 
programmes of adult literacy, in addition to the technocratic stance of 
the polity. 
69. The Ecole Fondamentale was launched in the early 1980s both to 
establish a full educational cycle of nine years, and inculcate a 
polytechnical training. With its establishment, a radical rupture with 
the previous academic French legacy was made. 
70. Ministere du Plan, Statistiques sur l'analphabetisme Bans les 
wilayates: evolution 1966-1977, undated mimeo. 
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71. The policy of 'cultural assimilation' of the local Muslim 
population of Algeria was a subject of controversy. While the 
metropolitan authorities wished to extend the Ecole Laique (the 1882 
Bill of Jules Ferry on free, secular and compulsory primary education 
for children of both sexes) to the colony (1883 educational law), the 
settlers lobby fought the initiative. They argued that no more than a 
basic education should be given to the 'natives' so that they become 
efficient labourers. Further education would give them the same 
opportunities open to the European population. This was categorically 
refuted by the settlers. Hence the Decree of 1892 and the Programmes of 
1890 and 1898 limiting the schooling of boys and emphasizing 
agricultural skills. Nevertheless, the metropolitan administration 
never gave up on the policy of assimilation, and had to meet effective 
resistance on the part of the local population who had hitherto used 
the network of medressah. People deliberately kept their children away 
from the colonial schools, lest they were proselytised. Cf. F. Colonna, 
instituteurs algeriens 1883-1939, presses de la fondation nationale des 
sciences politiques, Paris & Alger, 1975, pp. 15-48; and Y. Turin, 
Affrontements Culturels dans 1'Algerie Coloniale, Maspero, Paris, 1971. 
72. Cf. C. R. Ageron, les Algeriens Musulmans et la France (1871-1919), 
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1968, Vol. 1; and J. Melia, Le, 
triste sort des indigenes musulmans d'Algerie, Mercure de France, 
Paris, 1935; as well as Y. Turin, op. cit. 
73. The jami 'ah comes etymologically from the word jama 'a which means 
gather. The Islamic universities were created 
between the eighth and 
twelfth centuries AD. These institutions were both religious and 
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secular as knowledge, or 'iim in Islamic epistemology, designates both 
secular science and religious knowledge or 'iim al din . Hence the 
comprehensive curricula ranging from theology, to philosophy and 
mathematics as well as astrology. 
74. The most popular centres were those of 
Zaituna in Thais, al Qayrawan in Morocco, 
Damascus and Baghdad. 
al Azhar in Cairo, al 
and the universities of 
75. In 1948 the rate of illiteracy among the Muslim population (aged 
15+) was 93.8 per cent and in 1954,92.3 per cent; compared to 
respectively 8.2 per cent and 7.0 per cent for the European settlers. 
In 1966,81.2 per cent of the total Algerian population were 
illiterate. Cf. Unesco, Literacy 1969-1971, Paris, 1972, and Literacy 
1967-1969, Paris, 1970. In contrast, historical evidence showed that 
Algeria's population was relatively more literate than France's when it 
was colonised in 1830. See Etienne B., and Leca J., "La Politique 
Cuturelle de 1'Algerie" in Annuaire de 1'Afrique du Nord, 1973, CNRS, 
Aix en Provence. 
76. The rates of schooling for the Muslim population were astonishingly 
low, but increased gradually form 2 per cent in 1889, to 8.9 per cent 
in 1930 and 15 per cent in 1954. See Merad A. "Regards sur 
l'Enseignement des Musulmans en Algerie 1880-1960" in Confluent, 
juin-juillet, 1963. 
77. The Ulamaa movement of the 1930s evolved around the slogans "the 
people of Algeria is Muslim and to Arabity it belongs" launched 
by its 
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leader Sheikh 'Abd al Hamid Ibn Badis. This latter was a by-product of 
the Arab Islamic Renaissance movement or nahdha which had shaken the 
Arab world since the end of the 19th century. Cf. Abdel Malek A. et 
al., Renaissance du Monde Arabe, Duculot-SNID, Alger, 1972. In Algeria, 
the Ulamaa movement was crucial in reviving the scripturalist tradition 
through the re-creation and expansion of the medressah network. Its 
main concern was to reassert orthodox Islamic teachings, and expand the 
use of standard Arabic. The movement was anxious to denounce the 
colonial assimilationist policies, as well as fight the proliferation 
of 'religious brotherhoods' or mourabi tin. These latter were treated as 
saints and were largely the product of the non-scripturalist tradition 
which thrived as illiteracy pervaded. Despite relentless harassment by 
the colonial authorities, the Ulamaa movement managed to create 
hundreds of schools and train thousands of youngsters. Out of these was 
to emerge the future Arabophone political elite of Algeria. Cf. Merad 
A. Le Reformisme Musulman en Algerie de 1925 a 1940, Mouton & Co., The 
Hague & Paris, 1967; 'Amar Talbi, Ibn Badis: hawatuhu wa atharuhu, 
(Vol. 4), Dar al yagadhah al 'arabiyya, al-Djazair, 1968, wizarat al 
shu'un al diniyya, athar al imam 'Abd al Hamid Ibn Badis, (Vol. 4), 
al-Djazair, 1984. 
78. Most of this rhetoric was ironically produced in French, by 
Francophone members of the political elite who had been entrusted with 
writing the blueprints of the new nation. However, the champion of 
'Arabisation was Boumediene who tried to strike a balance between his 
Francophone technocrats and his Arabophone party members with relative 
success. But future clashes proved inevitable. 
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79. The dispute was epitomised in the late seventies by the exchange 
between two prominent members of the intelligentsia, Mostefa Lacheraf 
(then Minister of Education), and Abdallah Cheriet, professor of 
philosophy at the University of Algiers. The first denounced the policy 
of Arabisation as being expedient; while the second thought that 
despite its drawbacks, it was a necessary step towards the full 
recovery of the Arabic language, and the expansion of its use. Both 
were secularist 'Citizens', but Lacheraf was Francophone and Cheriet 
Arabophone, and their exchange of views through the national press 
showed the 'tactical' divergence of opinion due to their initial 
training, despite their common allegiance to the progressive 
nationalist ideal. Cf. Lacheraf M., "Le probleme de l'arabisation" in 
El Moudjahid, 9,10,11 Aout 1977; and Cheriet A., "Ara' fi Siassat 
al-Ta'lim wa al-Ta'rib" in al-Sha'b, 15-30 Aug. 1977, translated and 
compiled in French as Opinions sur la Politique de l'Enseignement et de 
l'Arabisation, SNED, Alger, 1983. 
80. Cf. Decree on the Organisation de 1'Enseignement Religieux en 
Algerie, 1964, in Annuaire de l'Afrig ue du Nord, 1963, p. 545. 
81. See note 68 above. 
82. In addition to the adjacent medressah, mosques provided adults with 
informal literacy classes. But no written information is available on 
this activity. 
83. The religious lycees were part and parcel of the state educational 
sector, and cannot be seen as denominational institutions. 
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84. Most administrations and national enterprises were run through the 
medium of French, despite a forceful Arabisation of the educational 
process at the primary and secondary levels. 
85. Cf. AAN, 1970 on the dissolution of the fundamentalist movements 
al gi yam (Values) and djounoud Allah , (Allah's Warriors); and AAN, 1971 
on the dismantlement of the Union Nationale des Etudiants Algeriens 
(UNEA), reputed for being predominantly left-wing. 
86. The move was especially witnessed in the academic world where posts 
of administrative and prestigious responsibility were distributed to 
Arabophones throughout the mid-seventies. 
87. Cf. AAN, 1982. 
88. At the funeral of one of the fundamentalist leaders, Sheikh Abd al 
Latif (a disciple of Sheikh Ibn Badis) on 12 April 1984, hundreds of 
mourners gathered. The massive attendance at the funeral was taken as 
a warning by the government who wished to avoid any open clashes. As a 
consequence, a number of fundamentalists were released a month later on 
12 May 1984. Cf. AAN, 1982, pp. 519-520. 
89. The interviews were held during the month of January . 1985 in 
Algiers with the Director General of the Centre National 
d'Alphabetisation, the Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly and the 
Secretary General of the Union Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes 
(UNFA), as well as a number of officials from the party Front de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN). 
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90. Cf. Ministare de la Planification, Recensement General de la 
Population et de l'Habitat, 1977; Hizb Jabhat al-Tahrir al Watani 
(FLN), al-lajnah al wataniah li-tahdhir milaf siassat tandhim al-usrah, 
al-Tatawar al-Tarikhi lil Usrah al Djaza'iria hata al-Marhala al 
Rahinah, undated mimeo. This document is a comprehensive survey on the 
social trends of the family structure in Algeria. It was prepared by a 
special commission of the FLN party prior to the enactment of the 
Family Code. 
91. Cf. Fatiha Akeb, "L'Emploi au Feminin" in Alge rie-Actualite, no. 
1118, Semaine du 19 au 25 Mars 1987, pp. 20-21. 
92. Ibid., p. 20. 
93. According to the survey of the Office National des Statistiques, 
(1985), only 326,000 women were active in April 1985, (ie. 8.4 per cent 
of the total active population). Some 17,000 women were seeking work, 
and four million women aged 16-64 were homebound and had no wage-based 
activity. Of women who worked, over 36 per cent were 
involved in 
teaching, 20 per cent were employed in the public sector 
(mainly 
services), 10 per cent were unqualified workers 
(mainly cleaners), and 
19,000 were 'high cadres'. The latter accounted 
for 14.5 per cent of 
the total of 'high cadres' in the country. 
94. Voting had immediately been decreed as a universal right at 
independence. 
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95. Cf. Vandevelde-Dailliere, H., Femmes Algeriennes: a travers la 
condition feminine Bans le Constantinois depuis l'independence, Office 
des Publications Universitaires, Alger, 1980. The research covered the 
Constantine region in Eastern Algeria, and was based on questionnaires 
distributed to a sample of approximately 1300 women and men, in urban 
and rural areas. The survey attempted to investigate "the degree of 
woman's participation in the Algerian national society" (ibid: 28). 
Vandevelde-Dailliere rightly points out that "the problem is not posed 
in terms of political demand on the part of women's movements,... but 
is expressed in an aura of silence and effacement [of women] which 
threatens to be a sign of social stagnation" (ibid: 29). This ties in 
with the present author's argument of a segregated 'City of Women' in 
the midst of a 'Republic of Citizens' sandwiched between its lower 
valuations and the pressures of an underlying 'Republic of Cousins'. 
96. Cf. Unesco, Statistical Yearbook, Paris, issues between 1966 and 
1986; United Republic of Tanzania (URT), Annual Report of the the 
Ministry of National Education: 1967, Government Printer, Dar Es 
Salaam, 1972; URT, Recent Educational Developments in the United 
Republic of Tanzania: 1981-1983, Ministry of Education, Dar Es Salaam, 
June 1984. 
97. Cf. Nyerere, J. K., Education for Self-Reliance, Government Printer, 
Dar Es Salaam, 1967. Subsequent quotes in the text will be taken from 
this issue. 
98. See earlier in this Chapter for Nyerere's vision of an equal 
society in Tanzania. 
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99. Cf. Hawkins, J. N., "Educational Reform and Development in the 
People's Republic of China", in Altbach et al. (eds. ), op. cit. 
100. The expression has been used to designate China's educational 
strategy of formal and non-formal teachings. "Chinese education must 
walk on two legs" was the motto. "The leg of formal, hierarchical and 
selective education" as well as "the leg of nonformal, flexible and 
open education". See Hawkins in op. cit., p. 422. Both were open to a 
very wide social basis, in contrast with Tanzania's drastic selection 
at the secondary and tertiary levels. 
101. From 1969 onwards, the organisation of adult literacy campaigning 
in Tanzania was taken systematically in charge by the Ministry of 
Education. The centralised control of the ensuing national literacy 
tests (1975,1977,1981), did not hamper an effective regional 
implementation through, District, Regional and Ward Adult Education 
Coordinators. On the other hand, special training of adult literacy 
'educators' was insured regularly through courses for 'Permanent 
Regional Trainers' Teams' on functional literacy (1972,1974,1978) and 
international conferences were organised in Dar Es Salaam (1974,1976). 
But what gave adult literacy campaigning in Tanzania a genuine impetus 
was the launching of 'Zonal Rural Newspapers' exclusively for adult 
learners. Between 1979 and 1981, five such newspapers were launched 
nationwide. See, Swedish International Development Authority, Adult 
Education in Tanzania, a review by Johnsson A. I., Nystrom K., & Sunden 
R., Education Division, Documents no. 9, March 1983. 
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102. The table is based on the results of the 1971 Tanzanian National 
Urban Mobility Employment and Income Survey (NUMEIST). It was 
reproduced in Shields N., Women in the Urban Labor Markets of Africa: 
The Case of Tanzania, World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 380, April 
1980, p. 50. 
103. Shields has observed that: "The analysis of differentials in labor 
earnings indicates that, while African urban women may not suffer 
appreciably from sex discrimination, either in terms of wage level or 
as a result of occupational segregation, the urban women's low economic 
status in the labor force is primarily a result of cumulative 
discrimination over time in both the provision of and the demand for 
educational services" (Preamble to her study, op. cit. ). Emphasis 
added. 
104. Concern for the integration of African women in the market economy 
dawned on international and national experts in the early and mid 
seventies. Thence followed a number of international conferences within 
the renowned United Nations Women's Decade (1975-1985). Cf. United 
Nations, The World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women, 
Mexico City 1975; Report of the World Conference of the United Nations 
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Copenhagen 14-30 
July 1980; and Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement 
of Women, A World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of 
the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, 
Nairobi 15-26 July 1985. In the African context, an explicit interest 
in women's vocational training, especially in rural areas was expressed 
in the Report of the Regional Conference on Educational Vocational 
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Training and Work 0 ties for Girls and Women in African 
Countries, organised jointly by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA) and the German Foundation for Developing Countries, 
Rabat, Morocco, 20-29 May 1971. Recognition of women's 'strategic 
contribution to the economy' led to recommendations on the provision of 
vocational training based on 'appropriate technology' in order to 
improve agricultural output. In this context Mbilinyi's analysis is 
accurate, but not when it comes to the specific conditions of 
implementation of such policies. In Tanzania, for instance, the 
reproductive role of women is so deeply ingrained (see note 105 below) 
that it cannot be so automatically offset by a new role of 'producers' 
in the formal economy, be it in exploitative relations of production. 
Cf. Swantz M. L. , Women in Develop ment: A Creative Role Denied, the Case 
of Tanzania, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1985. 
105. In a field study on the implementation of functional literacy in 
the Mara region (Lake Victoria), Viscusi M. described the high 
participation of women as "a curious social phenomenon", and reported 
that "Project staff were considering if the opening of classes on home 
economics for women ... would change the male/female ratio 
in the 
agricultural programmes". See her study for Unesco, Literacy for 
Working: Functional Literacy in Tanzania, Educational Studies and 
documents, no. 5,1971. 
106. Cf. Mbilinyi M., The Education of Girls in Tanzania, Institute of 
Education, University College, Dar Es Salaam, 1969. Mbilinyi points out 
that parents and especially fathers are reluctant to pay 
for their 
daughters' education, especially at secondary level. 
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CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM ME 'CITY OF WOMEN' 
This thesis has attempted to make a contribution to two major debates: 
women's position under socialism, and the role of literacy in 
alleviating their marginalisation from mainstream public processes. 
The comparative analysis of the position of women in Algeria and 
Tanzania, two national contexts where the political elites have 
professed a 'specific' brand of socialism, has indicated that: 
a. Unorthodox socialist discourses are not to be dismissed as 
epiphenomenal, but obtain a rationale of their own which carries the 
mark of a variety of cultural legacies as a substratum. These, however, 
convey world views which are at variance with the basic principle of 
equality of the sexes inbuilt in socialism, and cause normative 
inconsistencies within the rhetoric itself. 
b. Normative inconsistencies bring about a reappraisal of the 
evolutionary connotations of social change theory, hitherto anxious to 
depict a contradiction between a positive progressive rhetoric, and a 
lagging implementation of its principles. The emphasis on normative 
ambiguities helps to highlight the contingency of social change. 
The main theoretical line of argument pursued in this thesis has been 
to demonstrate the limitations circumscribing development theories of 
modernisation and dependency, which stemmed from the Weberian and 
Marxian traditions in their approach to non-western, non-capitalist 
societies. The most significant drawback of both schools of thought 
has been identified as their dismissal of the dynamic role of local 
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social forces in their contact with the western capitalist onslaught 
through colonialism and imperialism. The critique which advocates of 
dependency theory have made of modernisation theory certainly 
illuminated the inductivism of the idea of 'diffusion of modernity' 
from developed areas to underdeveloped 'areas. But they established in 
its stead an equally inductivist thesis by systematically subscribing 
'delinking' as a way toward development. 
In fact, the whole philosophy of 'development' itself can be a 
misleading framework within which to probe social change worldwide, for 
it is unmistakably an evolutionary paradigm. By maintaining the notion 
of 'development', dependency theorists could only metamorphose it into 
a negative process; hence their new dichotomy of 'developed centres' 
versus 'underdeveloped peripheries'. But they could hardly deny that 
their criteria of development had remained the 'secular' and 'rational' 
society so shrewdly described by Weber as the by-product of capitalist 
and socialist organisation of society alike. 
Moreover, it was significant that their presumed forefather, namely 
Marx, had been an enthusiast of colonialism as a ruthless but necessary 
device to transfer the capitalistic revolution worldwide, and from 
there achieve the communistic millenium. Marx did not hesitate to 
consider the new colonies of the French and British empires as 
non-historical. Indeed, his enthusiasm for colonialism as a way of 
implanting western society in the colonies was shown to be a precedent 
for the notion of 'diffusion' in modernisation theory, and not that of 
'delinking'. In making these points, the thesis intended to highlight 
the predominance of the evolutionary paradigm in Western epistemology, 
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which encapsulated non-western social formations in a pre-historical 
episode; thus annihilating all other cultural experiences as obsolete. 
The vagaries and vicissitudes of the construction of socialist societal 
programmes in Algeria and Tanzania, and women's social position in 
particular, have provided a valuable opportunity for the reappraisal of 
social methodology and theory. These were only hinted at in the present 
investigation, as expounded above, but further speculations are needed 
which could result in the elaboration of fresh heuristic tools for the 
understanding of social change worldwide. Already, the Algerian and 
Tanzanian experiences have suggested that social change is variegated 
enough to be treated with the least deterministic approaches possible. 
In this thesis, Holmes's problem (-solving) approach helped to 
highlight the normative inconsistencies of the discourse of 'specific 
socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania. Indeed, the internal analysis of 
the rationale of 'specific socialism' disclosed conflicting world 
views. The simultaneous retention of universalist claims of socialist 
principles of equality, and the more restrictive views of local 
ideologies legitimised ambivalent attitudes towards the equality of the 
sexes in Algeria and Tanzania. 
This internal examination of the discourse was made in the light of 
'ideal typical models' of the norms which informed 'specific 
socialism'. The use of ideal typical normative models was proposed 
by 
Holmes (based on Weber's 'rational constructs') as heuristic 
devices 
and not as representations of reality. 
models fundamentally differed from the 
It was argued that these 
rigid categorisation of 
338 
traditional versus modem society, which purports to render the 
reality of social change worldwide. 
The models disclosed that socialism was not a natural heir of local 
philosophies, claimed to be the authentic inspiration of Algeria's and 
Tanzania's official ideological discourses. On the contrary, neither 
Islam in the case of Algeria, nor traditional African communitarianism 
in Tanzania were imbued with non-hierarchical views, either of society 
or of the sexes. These unequivocally held men as superior to women, and 
emphasized the reproductory cycle of society, and the reproductive 
function of woman; whereas socialism was primarily progressivist in its 
portrayal of society and individual. 
Two legitimations of the proposed societal programmes in Algeria and 
Tanzania were thus invoked, and constituted the normative 
inconsistencies of 'specific socialism'. The reluctance to admit that 
socialism was the product of 'cultural borrowing' by Algerian and 
Tanzanian ideologues had blurred these inconsistencies; an aspect 
which ideal normative types helped illuminate. This normative 
ambivalence had eluded most observers of Algeria and Tanzania; 
especially early radical enthusiasts who later interpreted failures to 
implement socialist developmental policies as a retreat from socialism 
in both countries. 
These inbuilt normative inconsistencies of 'specific socialism' 
provided penetrating clues to the present enquiry, particularly with 
regard to women's social position. These loomed large among impediments 
to the realisation of the equality of the sexes, and paved the way for 
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the legitimisation of 
minor social subjects. 
family laws which consecrated women's status as 
The construction of ideal types was also used to elucidate the 
interaction between the modernising leaderships of Algeria and 
Tanzania, and civil society at large. The conventional dispute over the 
use of the concepts of 'class' and 'elite' was deliberately avoided in 
favour of less 'rigorous' models. Indeed, defending the use of 'class' 
instead of 'elite', and vice versa, seemed to stem from a priori 
choices, more informed by ideological biases than logically derived 
motivations. This was illustrated by a discussion of the amendments 
appended to the Marxian concept of 'bourgeoisie' by Marxist students of 
non-European, non-Western social formations. They coined the notions 
of 'state bourgeoisie' and 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' for Algeria and 
Tanzania respectively, who they proceeded to incriminate for the 
distorted implementation of socialist policies. Significantly, the 
present thesis demonstrated that these reformed versions of the 
bourgeoisie were at odds both with Marx's own concept, which was 
clearly associated with the private property of the means of 
production, and his appraisal of the bourgeoisie's laudable mission as 
a progressive class. 
The models used in this enquiry are ad hoc, and have been devised so as 
to identify the active role of those social agents involved in inducing 
normative and institutional innovations (ie. the 'Republic of 
Citizens') and those who resisted them (ie. Algeria's 'Republic of 
Cousins', and Tanzania's 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'). These models 
presented a number of advantages. First, they helped to depart from 
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the controversial dichotomies of traditionality/modernity, and 
satellite/metropolis, so dubiously linked with capitalist expansion and 
colonial history worldwide. Other historical contributions in Algeria 
and Tanzania were thus taken into account, together with the more 
contemporary colonial and neo-colonial components, in establishing a 
more open and more universalist 'Republic of Citizens'. Second, they 
helped to construe the process of change not as the result of the 
unilateral will of the 'Republic of Citizens' (generally prone to 
change), but as conditioned by the response of previous formations with 
their norms and values and social organisation in the shape of the 
'Republic of Cousins' and the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' (generally 
prone to resist in order to survive). 
In the light of these models, it was demonstrated that the persistence 
of normative and institutional residues pertaining to the two 
'conservative Republics', were antithetical to the realisation of the 
societal programmes of Algeria's and Tanzania's emerging 'Republic of 
Citizens'. This was illustrated by the difficulties of 
industrialisation in Algeria, and villagisation in Tanzania. Normative 
and institutional residues were identified in the form of the 
resistance offered by the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', in order 
to preserve social and cultural autonomy in the case of the first, and 
economic autonomy in the case of the latter. 
The resistance was more diffuse among the Algerian 'Cousins' as they 
largely accepted the technocratic programme of the 'Citizens' in power, 
but did not internalise the corresponding work ethic. In contrast, in 
Tanzania the resistance was offered by the peasants at large in order 
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to eschew the exigencies of a wider market economy which would reduce 
their own autonomy. Here both men and women were equally involved, 
since more than half of Tanzania's rural workforce are peasant women. 
But while resistance to change was found to be diffuse in the public 
realm of nation-building, it grew into explicit opposition when the 
private realm of the family became subject to official reforms. Family 
legislation in each country impinged directly on the prevailing view of 
women, held both by the polity and civil society. Where more orthodox 
analyses have argued that social resistance to women in modernisation 
processes concerned their access to the public arena, this thesis has 
demonstrated that a more pugnacious resistance has been expressed 
against their legal equality in the very domestic realm of the family. 
The paradox is significant and opens new scopes in women's studies. A 
promising field of research would be to investigate further the 
repercussions of legal inequality on the public participation of women, 
not only in Algeria and Tanzania, but in similar contexts. 
In order to retain the interaction between the different social forces 
at play, it was not sufficient to limit the analysis to the legislation 
per se. A study of actual debates on the issue was also appropriate and 
as far as Algeria was concerned, nowhere else could the ideal models 
have been better illustrated than through the revelations, of the 
'Cousins-delegates' at the National Assembly in expressing their 
normative vision of ideal womanhood, and beyond it of society. Indeed, 
the 'Cousin-delegates' offered an irascible resistance to the modest 
legal reforms of the Government in family legislation. The challenge 
was quite novel as it threatened the facade of unitarianism displayed 
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by the modernising 'Citizens' in power. Ironically, this was not to be 
in favour of women. 
The debates demonstrated the overwhelming strength of 'Cousin-like' 
valuations apropos women's place, role and status in society. Women 
were unequivocally regarded as minor social subjects, whose 
reproductive function and dependence on male kin had to be maintained 
in order to insure social harmony. Above all, the debates revealed the 
normative ambivalence of the official discourse of 'specific socialism' 
which legitimised the adoption of the Shari'a in the name of 
specificity. The principles of the latter were indeed antithetical to 
the constitutional rights of woman, but they could not be denounced as 
unconstitutional since the rhetoric of specificity secured their 
legitimation. 
In Tanzania, the legal status of women was also made inferior through 
the 1971 Law of Marriage Act. The literature on the Tanzanian case 
demonstrated that the implementation of the Act was riddled with 
flaws. Despite its conciliatory clauses, which attempted to combine 
different family codes (Christian, Muslim and Customary), it was 
opposed by each community comprising the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'. 
By and large, people did not resort to the official channels to 
settle their family disputes, but rather continued their own practices. 
Here the resistance of the 'Brothers-in-law' was more diffuse and 
discreet than that of the 'Cousins'. 
The most striking feature of the legal status of women in Algeria and 
Tanzania concerned the regressive measures taken in the field of family 
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legislation compared with the more daring and aggressive policies in 
the economic and social spheres. In both countries, the minimal 
adjustments to existing religious and customary practices, highly 
detrimental to women's individual autonomy, was a significant 
withdrawal from the constitutional right of equal citizenry. 
The official endorsement of a legal status of minority for women, 
betrayed the ambivalent position of the 'Citizens' in power vis a vis 
a total equality of the sexes. Indeed the Algerian and Tanzanian 
leaderships were treading on sensitive ground when they had to grapple 
with the private realm of the family. It remains bewildering that 
neither they nor: the 'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law' shunned women's 
access to the 'public realm' of institutional change, but that all 
scorned a de jure legal autonomy for women. As indicated, this author 
could only identify this latter paradox and further research is needed 
in order to illuminate the dynamics of the private and public realms, 
especially as highlighted by women's social position in the process of 
social change. 
Total equality of the sexes in the public and private realms was 
perceived by all social protagonists, as presenting dire consequences 
for the harmony of the social order. However, the corresponding 
arguments expressed an almost obsessive indictment against women as 
potentially subversive social elements by the 'Cousins' in Algeria, and 
as necessary domestic labourers by the 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania. 
As for the moderate 'Citizens', they were anxious to put forward the 
argument of the complementarity of the sexes, but nonetheless endorsed 
women's inferiority by denying them full legal majority. 
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Alongside such legal conservatism however, the 'Citizens' in power in 
Algeria and Tanzania enforced aggressive educational policies so as to 
integrate women in the modem 'Republic of Citizens'. In both 
countries, female access to the formal educational system gradually 
became a universal reality, albeit with only modest participation in 
the secondary and higher levels. Nevertheless, while in Algeria, the 
formidable expansion of formal education automatically excluded 
millions of illiterate adult women, in Tanzania, non-formal education 
in the form of adult literacy campaigns involved more women than men. 
This drew attention to the specific societal conditions which had 
permitted such developemnts. The persistence of high illiteracy rates 
among adult women in Algeria was supported by a powerful tradition of 
seclusion and domesticity; whereas the active role of Tanzanian women 
in the agricultural sector encouraged their formidable participation in 
the country's adult literacy campaigns throughout the 1970s. 
However, it was contended that an 'educational solution' to the 
marginalisation of women should be treated with circumspection in both 
cases. A comparison of functional literacy as advocated by Unesco's 
1967 Experimental World Literacy Programme, and the more revolutionary 
method of Freire's 'conscientization', further corroborated the 
paramount importance of specific social conditions in determining the 
success or failure of policy. Either was found to be highly tributary 
of specific initial conditions, and neither could be taken as an 
alternative (panacea) to the other. 
1 
While the neglect of adult literacy and non-formal education in Algeria 
threatened to marginalise women even more in what is gradually becoming 
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a 'polytechnical society', in Tanzania, the emphasis on basic 
non-formal education and functional literacy did not appear to make of 
women 'better farmers', especially as an increasing number of them have 
been relinquishing their economic autonomy as producers, through the 
modernisation programmes of Ujamaa and' villagisation. This particular 
unsuspected development constituted a significant refutation both of 
the presumed universal benefits of modernisation, and the drawbacks 
of traditionality. Here was a case of traditional practices which 
insured at least one universal right, that of women's economic 
autonomy. 
In conclusion, it has been argued that in Algeria, adult literacy 
programmes would help to alleviate the severe alienation of women 
resulting from their debilitating domestic seclusion. In Tanzania on 
the other hand, the expansion of formal education among women would 
provide them with the necessary qualifications to further the 
appreciable asset of basic education that they had gained in the 
course of their massive participation in the country's adult literacy 
campaigns. 
By shedding some light on the persistence of women's marginalisation in 
Algeria and Tanzania, this thesis is a departure from more orthodox 
analyses of women under socialism. The bulk of women's studies had by 
and large followed an evolutionary line of argument, whereby the 
persistence of sex inequalities in socialist countries was construed as 
a gap between the principles of socialist theory and their problematic 
implementation. ' Western feminist scholarship of the 1960s and 1970's 
had however, questioned the holistic approach of Marxian theory towards 
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the 'liberation of women' (which it deemed secondary to the wider 
dynamics of class struggle). Feminist writers nonetheless maintained 
that 'women's liberation' and socialism, were intrinsically linked, the 
latter bringing forth the former. 2 
In contrast, the findings of the present thesis have suggested that the 
study of women under socialism depends on the peculiarities of national 
social contexts. Indeed, the position of women under socialism cannot 
be investigated outside specific national contexts without reducing the 
subject to an abstract litany on the ultimate and absolute synthesis of 
socialism and women's liberation. Such an approach assumes that the 
millenium of women's liberation is at hand provided an 'authentic' 
socialist revolution is accomplished. The unorthodox socialist 
experiences of Algeria and Tanzania have hopefully refuted such 
holistic claims, hinting that no millenia are to be expected for the 
segregated 'City of Women' . Instead, the ambiguous position of the 
latter reflects wider social conflicts, involving a variety of social 
actors whose ambivalent attitudes towards change and innovation cannot 
be resolved drastically without leaving yet more unsuspeted 
ambivalences. The 'City of Women' requires that pragmatic solutions are 
adopted which will firmly establish women as serious protagonists in 
the process of social change. 
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NOTES: CONCLUSION 
1. Cf. Rowbotham, S., Women, Resistance and Revolution, Penguin Books, 
1972, for a comprehensive panorama on, women's position in various 
socialist systems; Scott, H., Women under Socialism: Experiences from 
Eastern Europe, Alison and Busby, London, 1976; Lenin, V. I., On the 
Emancipation of Women, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977; Lenin was 
against the idea of a separate women's organisation, and suggested that 
women should join communist parties and trade unions as men's equals. 
He followed in the footsteps of Marx and Engels in incorporating 
women's liberation in the wider proletarian class struggle. Cf. Engels, 
F., Origin of the Family, State and Property, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, 1981. Engels advocated the complete equality of men and women 
before the law, and the provision of wage employment outside the home 
as pre-requisites of women's liberation. Scott (1976: 42) has pointed 
out that the "fundamentalist interpretations of [Marx's and Engels'] 
writings encouraged the belief that women would be 'returned' to a 
position of equality by the destruction of the private property system 
as part of a kind of natural history process". Not only this belief has 
fallen into disrepute as women did not attain equality or liberation in 
systems which abolished private property, but it is utterly untenable 
in pre-capitalist societies where private property was unknown, and yet 
women were downtrodden. 
2. A number of western feminists have pointed out the specificity of 
women's liberation and the shortcomings of Marxian theory on 
the 
question. Cf. Friedan, B., The Feminine Mystique, Penguin 
Books, 1968; 
Mitchell, J., Woman's Estate, Penguin Books, 1971; Millett, K., Sexual 
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Politics, Hart-Davis, London, 1971. But others have suggested that 
women's liberation is intrinsically attached to Marxist theory. See, 
Vogel, L., Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary 
Theory, Pluto Press, London, 1983. 
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